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      In the British Colonial Service, to be a successful administrator, certain expectations 
must be met. These involved clarity of dispatches, keeping the CO fully informed of 
development in the dependency and cultivating a healthy working relationship between 
the governor and his subordinate staff and between the governor and the CO. The 
absence of the latter was a failing on a -would be successful administrator. At the time of 
Sir Percy’s outstanding performance in the Sudan, Transvaal and Northern Nigeria, he 
was acclaimed as Canada’s outstanding proconsul in the British colonial administration. 
His performance in the latter places informed the CO’s decision to appoint him governor 
of the EAP, but the latter tour of duty belied his competence, having been confronted 
with challenges that were by more far difficult to resolve. Sir Percy, like his predecessors, 
failed to prop up the protectorate’s administrative and economic disabilities occasioned 
by what the CO described as a succession of weak administrators and staff members and 
the entry of European settlers.  
    These were contributing factors to the inherent difficult administration and 
development of the protectorate, especially the introduction of an effective policy of 
administration and economic development. Such difficulty, created by the demography of 
the colony, could define the success or failure of any administrator. The CO felt that the 
lethargic administration of Sadler could not solve the challenges confronting the 
protectorate and sought Sir Percy to govern the affairs of the protectorate so that he could 
fix the protectorates administrative and economic predicaments. Having successfully 
built a railroad in the Sudan, Transvaal and Northern Nigeria, it was possible to suggest 
that a successful engineer might not necessarily be a successful administrator, having 
failed to fix the challenges confronting the protectorate, despite his lengthy proposed 
reform and a relatively free hand given to him by the CO.  
     Sir Percy’s proposed reforms failed in a similar manner like his predecessor, his 
performance in these areas, especially, land question, produced difficulty rather than 
mitigating the difficult position of prospective immigrants farmers either from the South 
Africa or England or elsewhere. In view of its many attendant disabilities, Sir Percy, like 
his predecessor, also failed to solve the problems of the protectorate and that the 
administration of the protectorate remained weak as it had been without any change. This 
was as a result of the internal dynamics of the protectorate, which suggested that even the 
most presumed best performing administrator could be handicapped by the prevailing 
circumstances of the protectorate to performed as much expected of him. Despite his 
outstanding proposals for effective policy of government administration and 
development, he failed to ensure that the CO approved his proposals. His failure to follow 
up with the CO in respect of his proposed policy for the protectorate occasioned his 
failure and suggested his rush to failure as he had failed to follow up with his proposed 
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                                                              Chapter 1 
                                               Introduction to the Dissertation 
  Introduction  
       Sir Percy Girouard, 1867-1930, was considered the best Canadian administrator in 
the British colonial service. Having carried out remarkable development projects aimed at 
modernizing the territories assigned under his administration; especially in South Africa, 
the Sudan, and Northern Nigeria. Sir Percy’s tour of duty in the East Africa Protectorate 
(hereafter EAP), in 1909-1912, caused altercations with his home government.1 His 
altercation with his home government over the Maasai move among others, led to his 
untimely resignation. The quarrel with his home government ended his official career. In 
spite of all the development projects he had carried out (railroad building and agricultural 
development), his career ended in a regrettable incident relating to the Maasai move in 
East Africa.  
     In determining as to whether or not Sir Percy was an outstanding administrator, the 
study examines his governorship of the EAP (renamed, Kenya). The examination will 
include the development projects that Sir Percy implemented or sought to implement and 
circumstances that caused his untimely resignation. Admittedly, he carried out 
remarkable development projects aimed at modernizing the protectorate, but his relations 
with the Colonial Office (hereafter, CO), and the local people he governed left a lot to be 
desired.  
    This study contends that his tragic failure in the field of colonial administration proper 
suggests that Sir Percy was not an outstanding administrator because he failed to adhere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East Africa 
Protectorate, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), viii-ix. The British East Africa Protectorate became Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate in 1920. 
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to regulations governing his official duties. This could be seen from his attitude toward 
the deportation of Galbraith Cole and the Maasai move, all between 1910 and 1912, 
among other things.2 
  Statement of the Problem 
      Current and past scholarship suggests a mixed evaluation of the career of Canada’s 
proconsul and colonial administrator, Sir Percy. Scholars suggest that he was the most 
outstanding administrator Canada produced in the British colonial service. While on the 
other hand, other scholars contend that Sir Percy was a hardworking officer, but that does 
not necessarily mean he was an outstanding administrator. However, this study examines 
by colonial standards what should be considered to be the best style of administration, 
reflecting from the circumstances that ended the career of Sir Percy. Scholars who 
suggest that Sir Percy was the best administrator Canada ever produced in the colonial 
service point to his track record of initiating development project aimed at modernizing 
African colonies.      
     However, this study contends that such an assessment fell short of considering 
measures expected of an outstanding or a successful colonial official. Devising and 
implementation of development programs alone should not be used as a measure in 
determining the success or failure of administration or an administrator. Admittedly, Sir 
Percy was hard working, but that was only part of the expectations of an outstanding 
administrator, but there are other qualities worthy of consideration in critically addressing 
that issue. Part of the qualities expected in outstanding performance and could also be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lotte Hughes, Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 68. Cole was an 
influential European settler in the protectorate. He was a son of the British Earl of Enniskilin. He arrived in the 
protectorate in 1903 as a settler. He was also a brother in law to Lord Delamere, an influential leader of the European 
settlers in the protectorate. 
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credited to an outstanding administrator involvement in good working relations with his 
subordinate staffers and with the CO. 
    An administrator judged to be the best proconsul should be in a position to carry out 
instructions accurately. He should act within the established rules and regulations 
governing the colonial service. An outstanding officer should not engage in double-
dealing or any act that was capable of embarrassing the metropolitan government. An 
outstanding officer should subordinate himself to his superior officers and to the rules of 
the colonial service. The superior officer should respect and deal with his subordinate 
staff according to the rules and regulations of the colonial service. 
 Conceptual Frame Work  
    Sir Percy, having had to discontented with the service, he was also concerned with the 
position of the economy. He wanted to introduce export economy for eventual solvency 
of the protectorate economic difficulty. This export production was to integrate Kenya’s 
economy into the global market in order to earn the needed finance from exports, for both 
the agricultural sector and the government. These measures were supposed to make the 
colony self-reliant and to do away with its dependence on grants-in-aid from the British 
Treasury. Both the argument of Pye and Apter will be viewed with relation to the Maasai 
move and its implication on the social and political cohesion of the Maasai society. The 
issue of resistance will be reflected on the part of the Maasai through their resistance to 
the move in which they resorted to challenge the authority of the colonial administration 
through court proceedings.  
      As I have pointed out, the modernization schemes that were associated with Sir Percy 
were the construction of the railways, reinvigoration of the colonial service, and the 
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introduction of economic initiatives aimed at the development of agriculture, the 
relocation of the Maasai and the consolidation of European settlement. These initiatives 
were partly intended to make the colony effective and efficient in terms of the 
establishment of an efficient colonial system of administration and self-supporting 
through the development of the economy that would generate the needed revenue to 
support the administration of the colony.       
     The establishment of European settlement was considered indispensable to the 
agricultural production for export. Therefore, the development initiatives carried out by 
Sir Percy will be evaluated and relevant examples drawn from them to justify the concept 
of modernization. Again, it was these initiatives that this study conceptualizes as a 
modernization policy, thus being reflected as a conceptual framework of this study.  
     Railway building will serve as one example. Construction of railways would ease the 
movement of people and goods from one place to another, especially the movement of 
goods to the major coastal center, from where it would be shipped to abroad. 
Modernization also involves policies to generate sufficiency in agriculture to support a 
thriving civilization.  
   The subscription to a loan from London, innovation in agricultural production, and the 
extension of railways, which Sir Percy initiated, was aimed at transforming Kenya to an 
industrial nation. To achieve it, Sir Percy initiated the ideas and the projects that would 
modernize Kenya.      
 Significance of the Study  
       The study is significant because it is a contribution to the debate on the best practice 
of a colonial service. The career of Sir Percy as a British proconsul and colonial official 
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will be examined with particular attention to the period when was in charge of the EAP. 
The circumstance that resulted in his untimely resignation will be spotlighted as a non-
conventional norm and practice in the colonial service. His failure to measure up to the 
expectations of London will be gauged based upon conventional wisdom as the best 
administrative practice of the colonial service. For example, Sir Percy erred in failing to 
comply with the directives from London to deport Mr. Cole.3 He failed to inform London 
on the relocation of the Maasai from Laikipia to Ngong. Sir Percy’s partiality toward the 
European community and disregard towards the rights of both the African and the Indian 
communities, among others, combined to discredit him before the CO.  
     Double-dealings in the colonial service or reluctance in the implementation of 
directives, the failure to make timely communications and a lack of clarity of dispatch, 
among other things, are not normally considered as the best practices within the colonial 
service. However, Sir Percy fell short in this regard, and had to resign. His untimely 
resignation following his double-dealings could in no way be considered to be in the best 
interest of the colonial service. Thus, Sir Percy should not be considered the one of the 
best administrators, but he may be considered a hardworking officer. Sir Percy failed to 
measure up to the expectations of London, and that led to his untimely resignation. This 
study will lay to rest the argument as to whether or not Sir Percy could have been 
considered an outstanding and successful colonial administrator, drawing from his action 
in the field of administration vis-a-vis the expectations of the colonial service. 
Scope of the Study  
     The study will cover the stewardship of Sir Percy in the EAP, from 1909-1912. The 
study will examine and highlight areas where Sir Percy initiated development projects 




aimed at modernizing EAP, and the areas in which he erred. All aspects that resulted 
from his service and resignation will be examined and analyzed before being committed 
to written form. To this end, issues relating to the reinvigorating of the EAP 
administrative system, staff redeployment or retirement, and his relations with the settler 
community vis-a-vis the African and the Asian are examined. His relations with London, 
especially his official correspondence on issues relating to Cole’s deportation and the 
Maasai move, and his subsequent altercations with his home government over these 
issues that led to his resignation, formed the scope of this research. Issues that combined 
to portray a picture of Sir Percy’s stewardship in the EAP are examined with a view to 
capturing a clear and correct picture of his administration. Such issues must form the 
scope of this study because they provided justification that could be used to measure what 
would be the best administration or administrator based on the colonial service subsisting 
rules, regulations, and expectations.  
 Methodology 
     The sources formed the methodology section of the work. The sources consulted in 
the course of this research include primary archival documents of CO correspondence 
between London and EAP in the CO533 series.4 These documents are housed in the West 
Virginia University and the Syracuse University libraries. They offer substantial 
documentary evidence to support the position of this study. Other sources are the private 
memoires and dairies of colonial officials and travelers, as well as official gazettes and 
other reports of the colonial government. Published articles in reputable journals that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 CO 533 document was Colonial Office’s correspondence between the East Africa Protectorate and the Colonial 
Office in London. This correspondence involved the Commissioners or Governors of the protectorate and the Secretary 
of State of the Colonies in London. 
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relevant to the area of study, as well as books, were consulted to complement, and check 
the accuracy of both the primary and the secondary data at hand.  
     After thoroughly examining the data, I evaluated his tour of duty and activities by a 
standard of expectations will be used to synthesize the various positions of the argument, 
and to come up with the true situation of what should have been expected of a colonial 
official of Sir Percy’s position vis-a-vis expectations of colonial services. This will 
include his performances that fell short of such expectations, and his final resignation. 
Again, the evaluation and analysis would help lay the information in sequential order, 
and strengthen the argument through linking each factor that contributed or suggested 
otherwise to the current debate on the performance of Sir Percy as governor of the EAP. 
All the consulted literature was examined, analyzed, before committing it into written 
form. The critical examination and scrutiny helped establish the originality, authenticity 
and authority of the work.        
     A considerable amount of literature relating to the study exists and is reviewed in the 
following paragraphs. Sir Percy’s tenure in Kenya has received mixed reactions from 
scholarly publication following the abrupt end of his career. Some scholars argued that he 
was the best administrator, but least known, while others argued that he might have been 
hardworking, but not necessarily the best administrator. The following is a review of the 
position of the current scholarship on the argument as to whether or not Sir Percy was the 
best administrator. In terms of Sir Percy’s promotion of modernization, the EAP 
department of agriculture annual reports were used to help me to understand Sir Percy’s 
agricultural policy. This gave an insight into the circumstances that informed Sir Percy’s 
decision to engage in agricultural development. It also helped me to understand the 
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achievement made by Sir Percy and their impact. These reports, which include those 
from 1908-1909 through 1912-1913, have relevance to my research because it helped me 
draw relevant examples of the agricultural policy of Sir Percy, for example in the amount 
and kind of exports, and to see how these impacted on the EAP in a positive or negative 
way. Most of the sources relevant to Sir Percy’s tour of duty document various aspects of 
his administration. There are proponents of political and economic schools of thought 
who document their perspectives in support of their position that Sir Percy was an 
outstanding colonial servant. While on the other hand some of the proponents of these 
schools argue that Sir Percy erred, and thus should not be considered Canada’s 
outstanding colonial servant. In carrying out the review of Sir Percy’s tour of duty, 
literature critical of Sir Percy’s is reviewed first and then followed by the literature that 
praises Sir Percy’s tour of duty. 
      In assessing literature critical of Sir Percy’s governorship, there is an article by 
Robert M. Maxon.5 Maxon argues that Sir Percy should not be considered an outstanding 
administrator in Kenya, even though he performed development and modernization 
projects in most of the places he had worked, Kenya included. He argued that a good 
colonial administration, should have certain qualities; good working relations with 
London, especially the ability to implement directives from London, clarity of dispatches, 
among other things. Maxon argues that Sir Percy fell short of these criteria, which, 
according to Maxon, should be considered as criteria for a good administrator. This 
article is relevant to this research because it will guide me in understanding the criteria 
used or considered acceptable within the colonial norms, rules and regulations. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robert M. Maxon, “Judgment on a Colonial Governor: Sir Percy Girouard in Kenya”, Transafrican Journal of   
    History, 18, (1989), 90-1.  
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Maxon’s article has not done much to document the agricultural production and railway 
extension projects carried out under Sir Percy. 
      Another study on Sir Percy’s stewardship is included in Maxon’s Struggle for Kenya 
and also presents a less than positive assessment of Sir Percy’s governorship.6 He shows 
how Sir Percy failed to follow instructions from his superiors and failed to keep them 
informed of his dealings with the Maasai move. Maxon also shows officials at the CO 
were very critical of Sir Percy’s handling of his duties at the time he left office, and as a 
result they refused to consider him for another appointment in the colonial service. 
However Maxon touches only on the end of Sir Percy’s career in his book. The book 
gives little attention to the main period of Sir Percy’s governorship. Maxon’s book will 
be relevant to me in understanding the circumstance that led to the untimely resignation 
of Sir Percy from the colonial service, which is an important aspect that this research will 
look into in studying the governorship of Sir Percy. 
      Another book by Maxon is John Ainsworth and the making of Kenya.7 Maxon 
discusses some of the impressive agricultural and administrative policies introduced by 
Ainsworth, which Sir Percy accepted, and recommended to London for approval. These 
policies, according to Maxon, were the brains behind Sir Percy’s reform in the 
agricultural sector. However, Maxon’s work focuses on Ainsworth’s impressive 
contribution to the colonial service in Kenya, and has not gone far in discussing the full 
tour of duty of Sir Percy in Kenya. The book was useful to me in understanding whether 
these impressive economic developments of Sir Percy originated from him or his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid; Robert M. Maxon, Struggle for Kenya: Loss and Reassertion of Imperial initiatives, 1912-1923. (Cranbury:       
    Associated University Press, 1993), 1-10, & 50-60.  
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subordinate staffers initiated them. This aspect is significant to my research because it 
will help me highlight the origin behind these policies. 
     There is another critical account of Sir Percy in Kenya that is of interest. It is George 
Bennett’s Kenya: A Political History, which details how the politics of European settlers, 
Africans and the Asians played out during Sir Percy’s governorship.8 Sir Percy was seen 
to have championed the cause of the settlers to the disadvantage of the rest of the 
communities in all aspects of their lives. This preferential treatment of the settlers could 
be seen in the area of land allocation, amendment of the land ordinance in support of 
settler land claims, and advocacy for European political rights and privileges. The work is 
relevant to my research because it highlights the divisions amongst the communities and 
the role of Sir Percy in accelerating the divide. This is significant to my research because 
it helped me in understanding whether Sir Percy administered the subjects of the crown 
with equity and justice or not. Sir Percy’s preferential treatment to the settlers will be 
drawn as an example to support the position of some aspect of my arguments, which 
suggests that Sir Percy was not an outstanding administrator. However, Bennett only 
touches on the end period of Sir Percy’s governorship, and he did not go far in discussing 
the controversial issues that led to the resignation of Sir Percy from the colonial service.  
      There is also the work of Norman Leys, a significant source on Sir Percy’s relations 
with the Maasai. Norman Leys discusses some aspects of Sir Percy tour of duty in EAP.9 
Leys was very critical of Sir Percy’s dealings with the Maasai and the Maasai move of 
1911-12. Leys criticized Sir Percy’s handling of the Maasai, as he, Sir Percy attempted to 
move the Maasai from Laikipia to Ngong in violation of the agreement that the Maasai 
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and the government had entered into. The Maasai and the government had agreed that the 
Maasai would not be relocated from Laikipia as long as they existed. Sir Percy attempted 
to move the Maasai in violation of the agreement, but the move collapsed along the way. 
Leys offered the Maasai the guidance they needed in instituting a court proceeding 
against the colonial government. Leys’s book helped me to understand how Sir Percy 
played the politics of the Maasai move and how it collapsed. This aspect of the Maasai 
move contributed to my research by understanding how Sir Percy failed to comply with 
the agreement between the Maasai and the government and what really informed his 
action, which is an aspect that this research intends to cover. However, Leys’s book did 
not go far to either document the development initiated by Sir Percy, nor did he bring his 
criticism of Sir Percy to a logical conclusion, that is to the time when Sir Percy left the 
colonial service. 
       Another significant and relevant issue is that discussed by Lotte Hughes, who gives a 
detailed account of Sir Percy’s dealing with the Maasai and their 1911-12 moves.10 
Hughes argues that the Maasai move initiated by Sir Percy was a colonial misadventure. 
She pointed to the double standard of Sir Percy by not only refusing to inform the CO of 
his attempt to move the Maasai, but also of his coercing the Maasai to accept that they 
wanted to relocate to a different place.11 Hughes argues that Sir Percy’s action was a 
violation of a treaty that the CO had accepted with the Maasai. The work is relevant to 
my research because it provides information useful to analyze one of the main factors that 
led to Sir Percy’s resignation, an aspect that I will come to study in my research. 
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However Hughes has not gone far in discussing the other policies of Sir Percy, especially 
his plans for the agricultural development and the extension of the railway system.  
In a critical assessment of Sir Percy’s development policy, John Mwaruvie, in his Ewart 
Grogan and Scot Grogan and Politics of Railway Development in Kenya: The Case Of 
Uasin Gishu Railway: 1901-1930, discusses the political economy of railway extensions 
in Kenya. 12 Mwaruvie discusses the extension of the railway to Uasin Gishu between 
1910-30. The work discusses the need for the rail line and the politics that beclouded it 
and it ended in exorbitantly and not the best for the railway. He argues that this was 
because of the lack of competence in the contractor assigned to the project (John Norton 
Griffiths). Mwaruvie discusses how a sub-standard work on the construction was carried 
out because of the interest of the few individuals in London. He highlights that, when the 
railway was completed, the Africans hut tax and poll tax was used to service the railway 
loan, while the settlers were busy bargaining for cheap cost of transiting their good. 
Another similar critical study of Sir Percy’s development record is contained in an article 
by John Mwaruvie, which discusses Sir Percy’s governorship in EAP and his 
involvement in railway construction.13  
      Mwaruvie’s “Kenya’s Forgotten Engineer and Colonial Proconsul: Sir Percy 
Girouard Departmental Railway Construction in Africa, 1896-1912” discusses that Sir 
Percy was able to initiate economic development that made it possible for Kenya to 
balance its budget and do away with the grants-in-aid from London. These impressive 
economic initiatives relieved Kenya of its dependence on grants-in-aid from the British 
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Treasury. Sir Percy, he contends, put the colony on the path to economic development 
and self-sufficiency. This article gave me an insight into the achievement of Sir Percy, 
especially in the area of modernization through the initiation and development of 
railways and on economic development generally. This is important because it gave an 
insight into the initiation of modernization projects by Sir Percy and how well he was 
able to carry them out. This aspect is relevant to my research because it provides 
complementary information on the development projects undertaken by Sir Percy in 
Kenya. Nevertheless, Mwaruvie has not gone far in discussing the administrative aspect 
of Sir Percy’s governorship that was instrumental in ending his colonial career.  
      Another critical alternative account is the work of Sir Cosmo Parkinson14 whose book 
provides an understanding of the official working policy in the British colonial service. 
Parkinson shows how the CO worked through a chain of command and procedures in the 
day-to-day administration and in correspondences with the colonies. This book is relevant 
because it helped me reflect on the administrative policies of Sir Percy vis-a-vis the 
established rules and regulations governing the conduct of the colonial service. This work 
is important because it has bearing on my research because it helped me seek to address 
the policies of Sir Percy as per as they concerned his subordinate official staffers, as well 
as his administration his administration of the protectorate and his relations with the CO.  
      Another study that is critical of Girouard, especially on the Maasai move and other 
aspects of Sir Percy’s governorship, is M. P. K. Sorrenson’s Origins of European 
settlement in Kenya, which provides a classic account of the origins of European 
settlement in Kenya and land issues in Kenya.15 Sorrenson argues that it was the lethargic 
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administration of Sir James Hayes Sadler that made London look for a strong 
administrator to manage the affairs of Kenya. London redeployed Sir Percy from 
Northern Nigeria because, in their own judgment, they believed that he could handle the 
problems in Kenya. Sorrenson argues that Sir Percy was seen to be a good administrator 
in view of his remarkable achievements in the colonial service in South Africa, Sudan, 
and northern Nigeria. Sorrenson’s book gave me an insight into the nature of Sir Percy’s 
administration in EAP, including land issues, the Maasai move, and his relations with 
London, his subordinate staff, European settlers, Africans, and the Asians. The book 
helped me to see how Sir Percy’s development policy was carried out vis-a-vis his 
relations with London. This is an important aspect that partly relates to the conduct of Sir 
Percy’s administration, and which has bearing on this research. While Sorrenson laid 
emphasis on both the administration and development policy of Sir Percy in Kenya, he 
has not done much to unearth the details leading to altercations between Sir Percy and 
London, which resulted in the untimely resignation of Sir Percy from the colonial service. 
     In assessing Sir Percy’s positive administrative records on the other hand, an early-
published account is G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912.16 Mungeam 
examines the achievement of Sir Percy in the extension of administration to the remote 
parts of the protectorate and the establishing of authority where, hitherto, it was 
nonexistent. He also shows how the governor introduced development projects for the 
colony to be self-supporting. This account suggests that Sir Percy be considered an 
outstanding administrator. The work is relevant because it showed me schools of thought 
that argued in favor of Sir Percy as an outstanding administrator of Canada, which will 
provide insight of what Mungeam considered to be good, especially in the extension of 
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administration, and his relations with his subordinate staff. However, Mungeam has not 
done much to examine the working relationship between London and the EAP during the 
tour of duty of Sir Percy. Mungeam does not also provide sufficient details of the 
controversy between Sir Percy and the Maasai that led to his resignation.   
     There was an alternative positive point of view to Mungeam’s interpretations by A. H. 
M. Kirk-Greene.17 Kirk-Greene argues that Sir Percy was Canada’s most distinguished 
yet least-known British colonial governor. Kirk-Greene, quoting from Leo Amery’s 
comment18 on the Canadian colonial servants, pointed to Sir Percy as one of the best 
colonial officials, especially in managing railways. This article enabled me to understand 
the method or yardstick used by Kirk-Greene to arrive at a conclusion that Sir Percy was 
the best administrator. This aspect had a significant bearing on this research because it 
helped me in understanding how Kirk-Greene arrived at the conclusion that Sir Percy was 
an outstanding administrator. However Kirk-Greene has not gone far in discussing the 
controversies that surrounded the tour of duty of Sir Percy. Kirk-Greene laid much 
emphasis on the development policy rather than looking into the issue of the proper 
administration of Kenya under Sir Percy. 
     A similar contemporary view of Sir Percy as an outstanding colonial administrator 
was expressed in 1908 during the Royal African Society dinner held in London at the 
Criterion Restaurant, Piccadilly, on Friday evening, May 15th, when Sir Percy, the 
governor of Northern Nigeria, was entertained to dinner by the society. The article 
praises British colonial officials, in its own judgment believed they were outstanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





examples of British colonial administrators.19 Those mentioned in the article included Sir 
Percy, the then governor of Northern Nigeria. The article highlights the administrative 
achievement of the British in Northern Nigeria during the administrations of Lord Lugard 
and Sir Percy, among others. However, the article falls short of highlighting the major 
administrative landmarks of Sir Percy, other than the briefest mention of his active 
railway management. The article is relevant because it helped me see how well Sir 
Percy’s tour of duty in northern Nigeria was successful, and the leadership qualities he 
demonstrated before being transferred to Kenya.  
      The society commended Sir Percy for bringing impressive development to the West 
African region, where he had served as a colonial governor. While at the dinner, 
monumental for the British presence in Northern Nigeria. Sir Percy along with Gordon 
Guggisburg was mentioned as the best brains Canada had ever produced in the colonial 
services. His achievement was, according to speakers at the dinners, monumental for the 
British presence in Northern Nigeria. This article helped me understand the reason or the 
yardstick used by the Royal African Society to judge Sir Percy as Canada’s best 
administrator in the British colonial service prior to his assumption of the governorship of 
the EAP. The article is relevant to my research because it tells about the personality of Sir 
Percy and his administration. This aspect formed part of my background study on Sir 
Percy’s policies. The recommendation of the dinner was measured by the performance in 
Kenya to see if Sir Percy had stood the test of time or not. If he had not, then 
circumstance surrounding his failure might be seen to be peculiar to Kenya alone.  
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  Organization of Chapters 
        The dissertation is composed of thirteen chapters. The initial chapters provide an 
introduction for the study. The first of these will form the introduction to the dissertation 
and a rationale for the research on this topic. Chapter two examines a brief biography of 
Sir Percy and his prior achievements in the Sudan, Transvaal and the Northern Nigeria. 
Chapter three examines a background history of the EAP, prior to Sir Percy’s assumption 
of government of the protectorate. Chapter four treats the policy of government 
administration and Sir Percy’s proposed policy reform as to the defined policy of 
government administration of the protectorate. This deals with his review of 
administrative condition of the colony and his recommendations for reforms, especially 
on official circulars, taxation, executive, legislative, judicial, departments and officials, 
structure of administration and staff, as well as provincial administration.  
      Chapter five examines Sir Percy’s policy on the European settlers and Indian 
residents, his proposed application of settler involvement in county, local government 
and other government bodies, establishment of a separate settlement on the highland and 
their access to land. The effective application or failure to apply these proposed policies 
suggests his competence or otherwise in the field of policy of administration on the two 
races. Chapter six examines Sir Percy’s policy of African administration, recommending 
a separate administration in separate African settlements or reserves for the Africans. The 
policy was informed by his belief that Africans should not be governed by a European 
method of administration. He reflected on his experience in administration in Northern 
Nigeria where Lugard introduce an effective method of administration of Africans that 
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came to be known as indirect rule. Sir Percy’s administration of this policy and his failing 
as to its application has implication as to his outstanding performance or his failure. 
     Chapter seven examines Sir Percy’s coastland policy on the administration of land. 
This chapter provides his approach to the resolution of the coastland competing title 
claims between the Sharia and the Mijikenda land tenure systems. His desire to apply a 
British land ordinance so that land could be granted to European estate developers was 
complicated by the legal abolition of the status of slavery and the dispersal of the slaves 
that became a serious challenge to his administration in defining limits of each estate 
owned by Arab slave master.  
    Chapter eight examines Sir Percy’s economic development policy for the eventual 
solvency of the colony’s economic predicament. He introduced a policy of reduced 
railway rates on coastward bound agricultural products so that farmers could be induced 
to produce more for export. He applied the policy on European settlers only to the 
exclusion of other races. But the settlers could not produce enough in view of their 
insignificant numerical strength to produce more, and his policy could not have afforded 
the colony the desired economic relief he sought to introduce. His view on the policy and 
his process of implementation defines his policy capability or failing as far as economic 
development of the colony was concerned.  
     Chapter Nine examines the development of railway to boost communication and 
shipment of goods for the eventual solvency of the colony’s economy. Even though, the 
origin of some of the railways was for communication rather than economy, but they had 
at the same time provided relief in the shipment of goods. The construction of railways 
was not an easy undertaking that Sir Percy grappled with. His knowledge of railway and 
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how best he applied this knowledge to achieve what he wanted or failed to achieved and 
portrayed his failing form the content of this chapter. Chapter ten discusses the 
administration of land policy for settlement and farming by European settlers. His policy 
of land administration was a curious undertaking as the proposed amendment of the land 
ordinance had been on hold and Elgin’s land regulations were not been fully applied by 
Sir Percy. Sir Percy also introduced his regulations that, in addition to Elgin’s regulations 
complicated land administration. His land grants vis a vis land regulation left a lot to be 
desired and portrayed unhealthy land administration which could not be judged to be an 
effective land administration policy. This policy suggested the limit or otherwise of Sir 
Percy’s land administration to European settlers, as well as difficulties it occasioned to 
prospective immigrants into the colony.  
    Chapter eleven examines the Maasai removal and the question of compensations to 
European farmers. The failed attempted removal of the Maasai and displacement of some 
European settlers from their farms with a view to allocate Laikipia land to them. The 
failure to allocate Laikipia as a result of the failed Maasai move created two bodies of 
displaced persons. The compensation paid to European settlers for their suffering 
following the failed move, and the failure to afford compensation to the Maasai who were 
in the same situation suggests a clear shortcoming in Sir Percy’s sense of justice in his 
administration of policy. The question of justice can also be seen in other aspect that 
bordered directly or indirectly on land question and compensation, and a commitment to 
fairness in his dispensation of government functions. The later aspects were reflected in 
Sir Percy’s removal of the Maasai without recourse to the CO.  
20	  
	  
   Chapter twelve discusses the Galbraith Cole case, colonial judicial proceedings and the 
application of the law, and Sir Percy’s refusal to comply with directives to deport Cole. 
These issues and the circumstances or policy application that brought them to light 
suggests a policy that portrayed a serious shortcoming on the part of the administration. 
However, some of the issues in this chapter could also be subject to debate, as to whether 
or not such policy could be considered outstanding in view of the deportation of Cole. 
Chapter thirteen is a brief summary and conclusion of the work. The conclusion is a brief 
summary of each chapter and findings made on the issue being discussed in each chapter.  
                                                   
 
















                                                                Chapter 2 
                                    Sir Percy Girouard’s Prior Achievements  
   Introduction 
         Sir Percy Girouard was French Canadian whose career prior to the assumption of 
office in the EAP had taken him from Canada to Great Britain and then to varied regions 
of Africa. His achievements in Africa included distinguished service as a railway 
engineer, an administrator of railways, and a colonial governor. Sir Percy’s success as a 
railway builder impressed his superiors and was a key factor in his winning distinction 
and honors. This experience also led to his appointment to important railway 
administrative positions in Egypt and South Africa. While his work in South Africa 
ended in some disagreement over railway policy, Sir Percy met his wife while there. He 
also had drawn favorable attention from the CO, and this led to his appointment to head 
the colonial administration of Northern Nigeria. Sir Percy’s governorship of Northern 
Nigeria was characterized by success in railway building and in general administration. 
He implemented policies with regard to land, taxation, education, and general economic 
development that advanced Northern Nigeria’s economic, social and political status. By 
1909 this, together with his earlier work in North and South Africa, had won Sir Percy 
the admiration of many within the CO as a strong and effective administrator. Viewed 
from that perspective, it is not surprising that Sir Percy would be chosen to head the 
administration of the EAP. 
   Finally, a note on usage seems appropriate.  Throughout the dissertation, Sir Percy is 
used in preference to Girouard.  This has been done for consistency of usage, but it also 
22	  
	  
reflects the fact that the governor favored being addressed in that way rather than by his 
surname.  
 Early Life 
      Sir Percy Girouard or Sir Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, K. C. M. G., D.S.O., R.E 
(1867-1932), was a French Canadian, Roman Catholic, whose ancestors had settled in 
Quebec in the early eighteenth century. He was born to the family of Desire Girouard, an 
eminent Montreal attorney, justice of the Canada’s Supreme Court, Member Federal 
Parliament, and Canada’s Deputy Governor General.20  
      Sir Percy’s mother, whom he lost in 1879, when he was 12 years old, was a daughter 
of an Irish doctor, Three months later, in September 1879, Sir Percy and his elder sister 
moved to a boarding school. Sir Percy attended College St. Joseph at Trois Rivieres, on 
the banks of the St Lawrence River in Quebec.21  Sir Percy attended a seminary college 
headed by “a radical conservative bishop,” whose teaching philosophy and message of 
faith depended on the preservation of the French heritage, language and culture that had 
been imported from France during the time of Louis XIV. 
    On completion of his college, Sir Percy enlisted in the Royal Military College at 
Kingston where he pursued engineering as his course of study. Upon his graduation at the 
age of 19, with a diploma in engineering, he joined the Canadian Pacific Railway, as a 
surveyor, and worked from 1886 to 1888.22 In the Pacific railways, Sir Percy was 
preoccupied with the task of surveying, mapping and “fixing the final stages of the 
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Pacific of railway west of Winnipeg.”23 Sir Percy was interested in the latter as Williams 
wrote, “Girouard loved nothing better than the sight of virgin land to be laid bare, 
levelled trammelled and tracked.”24 It was at this point of his career that his actual 
interest and practice of railway construction began.  
      In 1888, Sir Percy decided to move to Britain to enlist in the British Royal Army. On 
the heels of his departure to Britain, his father, having objected to Sir Percy’s enlistment 
into the military, refused to pay for Sir Percy’s trip and uniform fee of one hundred 
pounds. Sir Percy’s auntie gave him the money, and the journey began, leaving Canada 
behind.25 Upon his entry, he advanced a coastal defense theory rooted in the railway. He 
proposed that a railroad could be constructed to the coast, machine guns mounted on 
railway steamers, so as to move past to confront the enemy.26 The officials of the British 
Royal Army College welcomed his idea but it was not put into practice. It showed how 
creative he was in proposing defense by railway, which earned him respect and he 
became an enviable military engineer.27  
    After a successful completion of his military training, he made his way to the Royal 
Arsenal at Woolwich. In 1888, Sir Percy received a commission in the British Army 
Royal Engineers, and by 1890, he attained the rank of Second Lieutenant in the Royal 
Army engineering corp.28 His engineering knowledge, especially on railway construction, 
became very important in his career and in his future appointments in the colonial 
service. This was clearly demonstrated when he was called upon by the Sirdar of the 
Egyptian army to help construct a railway for a military campaign. 
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   The Sudan 
       In the Sudan, there were developments that necessitated a military campaign against 
the Mahdist forces of the Khalifah of the Sudan, which had murdered the Governor of the 
Sudan, Sir Charles Gordon.29 The death of the latter would not go unpunished as the 
Sirdar of both the Egyptian and the Sudan’s armed forces, General Horatio Herbert 
Kitchener, was preparing to confront the Mahdists.30 Kitchener was hampered by the lack 
of a railway from Khartoum to Dongola so that he could move his troops.31  
      On the question of construction of the railway, Sir Percy was introduced to Kitchener 
in July 1895, and he invited Sir Percy to join his army and help construct the railway to 
confront the Mahdists, by advancing from Egypt south to the Sudan. But there was 
hesitation on the part of Sir Percy who, according Williams, wrote in his unfinished 
memoir of his life that he felt the end has come.32 The War Office did not approve his 
deployment to the Sudan on the spot. The War Office’s objection might have been 
informed by Sir Percy’s hesitation to accept Kitchener’s invitation. But when Sir Percy 
heard that Kitchener was preparing to advance to Dongola to confront the Mahdists, he 
cabled Kitchener, asking him if he could join him in the expedition.33 
     Sir Percy arrived in Sudan and discovered a 33 miles unfinished railway toward the 
south, from Khartoum to Wadi Halfah, abandoned due to lack of funds by Egypt’s 
Khedive Ismail.34 Sir Percy took over the abandoned railroad and construction began in 
earnest. Despite the difficult terrain characterized by rock and sand, dust storms, heat 
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files and lack of equipment, Sir Percy constructed this desert railroad from Wadi Halfah; 
to the Berber; north of Khartoum.35 Sir Percy worked a minimum of a mile a day for 250 
miles. Having completed the railway, he joined Kitchener’s expeditionary forces in the 
Dongola campaign against the Mahdists in 1895. He won a prestigious medal for his 
outstanding performance in the expedition.  
      The medal was the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). The Dongola expedition 
against the Mahdists made Sir Percy famous and popular and was significant in his future 
assignment in the Transvaal. Following the successful completion of the Dongola 
campaign and the Nile expedition in 1897. Sir Percy was called upon to work for the 
Sudan railways, and by 1898, he was appointed president of the Egyptian railway board 
at the age of 31.36 His railway skill became an asset in his progression to the top echelon 
of the colonial service. The latter was the last position he held until his redeployment to 
the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, on the heels of the Anglo-Boer war, so that he 
could construct another railway, from the Transvaal to Bloemfontein, to confront the 
Boer rebellion against the British authorities.37 
 The Transvaal       
       There was the need for a railway to confront the Boer rebellion, but the deployment 
of Sir Percy from the Sudan to the Transvaal might have been informed by his knowledge 
of railway engineering within the CO. The deployment of Sir Percy to the Transvaal was 
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requested by the Transvaal, Sir Percy having had a prior acquaintance with the Governor 
of the Transvaal and Orange River colony, Lord Milner.38 At the time of the construction 
of the Khartoum to Wadi Halfah railway, Milner worked under the British Consul 
General at Cairo, Lord Cromer.39 
        Sir Percy arrived the Transvaal in 1899 and assumed dual responsibilities of the 
construction of the railway and control of the South African Field Force. This was at the 
time of incessant bombing and guerilla sabotage by the Boers.40 In view of the increasing 
hostility of the Boers and the urgent need of the railroad, Sir Percy laid eighty miles of 
track in forty-eight hours. 41  The British War Office queried his estimate for the 
construction of the railway, but he ignored the query and went over to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, and resolved the issue.42 Sir Percy completed 
the construction of the railroad, and the Boers were confronted and defeated. The railway 
that Sir Percy constructed used electricity to illuminate the road, making travel in the 
night possible. It was a great engineering work never seen anywhere in Africa. With the 
end of the Boer war in 1902, Sir Percy was knighted and appointed railway commissioner 
of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies.43 Thereafter, in the lull that followed the 
Boer war, Sir Percy met his future wife in Pretoria. 
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      It was in the house of the Attorney General and Lieutenant Governor of the 
Transvaal, Sir Richard Solomon, and his wife, Elizabeth, that Sir Percy, at the age of 
thirty-six years, met their twenty one years old daughter, Gwendolen, who became his 
wife.44 Gwendolen, Williams wrote, was, “slim, dark-haired and shy; she was their much-
loved only child.”45 Gwen’s father, Solomon and his wife, Elizabeth, “were children of 
non-conformists missionaries, having grown up among the Griqua.” 46  They were 
compassionate, religious and kind. In fact, Williams described Solomon as “known for 
his principles and liberal sympathies for the black and dispossessed.”47  
     Despite the humble orientation that Gwen had from her parents, Sir Percy caused her 
to comment on some of his conception about life. Gwen, while listening to a discussion 
between Sir Percy and members of his railway board relating to costs of running the 
railway, and “having trouble trying to persuade hard bitten members of his railway board 
in Johannesburg-owners of gold companies and hostile Afrikaners to agree to the costs of 
running the railways.”48 The railway freight was an important aspect of the Transvaal 
economy as the cost of freight was seen to have been the main cause of the rising cost of 
living in the Transvaal. But in spite of the interwoven nature of the economy being tied to 
the railway receipts, Sir Percy did not care to state what was in his mind. However, Gwen 
disagreed, and the following day, she wrote to Sir Percy, “I am only a child in some 
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ways, and you are a very clever man, but… you told me last night that no-one in this 
world cares whether you live or die, or whether you do well or badly. Never think that 
again because there is one person who cares more than a little and who would give a 
great deal to be able to help a little….”49  
     The wedding of Sir Percy and Gwen was held on 10 September 1903 in the cathedral 
at Pretoria massed with tropical palms and arum lilies. Thereafter, they proceeded to 
London for their honeymoon. On their visit to Canada, Gwen told his father in Montreal. 
“We meet some interesting people but they talk of nothing in the world but this Fiscal 
Question, till one gets quite tired of it.”50 
       After successful completion of the railway, Sir Percy was charged with the 
administration of the Transvaal railway as its Commissioner. But he could not stay long 
to administer the railway as disagreement between him and Milner ensued. The basis of 
their disagreement stemmed from the fact that Sir Percy introduced low railway rates on 
goods and passengers on the Transvaal railway. But Milner was concerned that he had 
subscribed to a £35 million loan for the construction of the railways for the two colonies, 
and as the Transvaal could not balance its fiscal expenditure from its receipts, it would 
incur a deficit, annually.51  
       Therefore Milner wanted to raise the cost of freight rates so that he could repay the 
loan. He told Sir Percy to raise railway rates on goods so that Transvaal would have more 
receipts to be able to balance its annual expenditure and to contribute its share in loan 
repayment. Milner argued that doing so would help the colonies offset the debt and invest 
profit accruing elsewhere to reduce dependence railway receipts. Sir Percy disagreed, 
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believing that low rates were the means to secure more shipments and more receipts. The 
latter position became the source of disagreement between Sir Percy and Milner, 
president of the inter-colonial council, called, for its intervention.  
      The council had the responsibility of administering the two colonies, with Milner as 
its president, and its decision was final. The moment Sir Percy and Gwen returned to 
South Africa in December, he was immediately summoned to the Cape to discuss railway 
finances. The council deliberated on Sir Percy’s disagreement with Milner on the railway 
rates, and in the ensuing discussion of the council, there were altercations between the 
council members and Sir Percy, on the administration of the Transvaal railway. The 
council wanted to harmonize the disjointed and chaotic railways for effective 
administration as well as to revisit costs of freight. But Sir Percy refused to give away, 
insisting on low rates on freight, frustrating efforts of the council. Milner could not hold 
back his frustration. He told Sir Percy, “With every recognition of your great service and 
your eminent ability in your army line, I do not think [finance and general business] are 
your strong points.”52  
     The council insisted on Sir Percy’s resignation, but Milner placed him on a 
compulsory leave with pay for six months. At the end of six-months, his official full time 
of tour of duty ended, and he moved out of the Transvaal.53 Sir Percy was redeployed 
back to London at the end of 1904 as he resigned from railway commissionership and 
returned to regimental duties in England, much decorated with a K.C.M.G and there were 
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three mentions in dispatches from the South African war, in addition to his Sudan war 
D.S.O.54 
      In the Transvaal, Sir Percy succeeded in accomplishing his mission as he constructed 
the needed railway that could be used to transport the army to confront the Boer 
rebellion. The railway was constructed to the satisfaction of the colony and became 
instrumental in defeating the Boers. The railway could be used for both civilian and 
military purposes.55 In spite of his disagreement with Milner, his tour of duty was 
considered successful, mission accomplished.  
     Upon retirement from South Africa, in December 1904, Sir Percy sailed for England 
grimly determined to lobby for something more than the ‘regimental grind’ as a staff 
officer he had been offered at Chatham. Already, Gwen was pregnant with their first 
child. Sir Percy had been promoted to brevet Lieutenant Colonel before leaving Africa. 
There was also speculation that Sir Percy might perhaps stand for election to the 
Parliament.56 His resignation did not go unnoticed. During a Parliamentary debate, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, was asked whether he could make a 
statement as to the change in railway policy proposed by Milner which led the resignation 
of Sir Percy. Lyttelton replied that Milner had informed him that in consequence of the 
debate and resolution of the International Council, Sir Percy had tendered his resignation 
of the office of railway commissioner.57 
  England 
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        Sir Percy was posted to HQ Eastern Command at Chatham, Kent, where he served 
as staff officer to the Chief Engineer. Shortly thereafter, Gwen’s parents also moved to 
London. Solomon was appointed High Commissioner for South Africa in London. He 
settled in a house at Studland Bay in Dorset; Sir Percy stayed in London during the week, 
commuting home to see them at weekends.58 He was subsequently appointed Hon. 
Lieutenant Colonel of the 18th Regiment of Canadian Infantry, the Franc-Tireurs de 
Saguenay, and granted the freedom of the Ironmongers’ Guild of London.59 
     In 1906 Sir Percy was transferred to HQ Western Command at Chester (he himself 
lived at Hartford) where he acted as Assistant Quarter-Master General. In 1906, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, The Earl of Elgin, on the recommendation of the 
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, selected Sir 
Percy for appointment as High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria.60 It was possible that 
Elgin had taken into consideration the railway skill Sir Percy had demonstrated in 
appointing him to head the colony, so that he could speed the rail construction in 
Northern Nigeria, so desperately needed to speed up communication and combat 
rebellion.61 The railway was the single most important factor in Elgin’s decision to 
appoint Sir Percy to the job. In appointing Sir Percy, Elgin instructed Sir Reginald 
Laurence Antrobus62 to write to Sir Percy, “In deciding to offer you this employment, 
Lord Elgin has been influenced by the consideration that your experience of railway 
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construction would assist him in coming to a conclusion with regard to a project for light 
railway from Baro on the Niger which has been put forward by Sir F. Lugard.”63 
Northern Nigeria  
       The appointment of Sir Percy as High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, following 
Lugard’s resignation, underlined the need for the construction of the railway. The railway 
was needed in view of Lugard’s experience in crushing the Satiru rebellion. Lugard, 
before his resignation, sought and obtained the consent of the CO for the railway from 
Northern Nigeria to Southern Nigeria. Lugard’s campaign against the Satiru revolt was 
hampered by lack of a railway to move troops quickly to crush the rebellion. Lugard 
constructed a railway from Zungeru to Zaria and to Sokoto, transported his troops, and 
crushed the rebellion.64     
    Lugard’s difficulty in moving troops to crush the revolt informed the CO’s decision to 
consider a Baro to Kano railway, which they believed, with the recent Satiru revolt, was 
indispensible.65 Thus what really informed the appointment of Sir Percy was the need for 
railway for Northern Nigeria. Lugard had laid down an effective administration and, now 
the question of railway was the single most important aspect that is being envisioned for 
the north. It was widely believed that Sir Percy was the right person for the job. Sir Percy 
initiated the rail line that connected the important commercial center of Kano to the 
seaport so that shipping in and out of commodities as well as movement of peoples could 
be relatively eased. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






      Hitherto, Lugard had built a railway from Zaria to Zungeru for administrative 
convenience, and Zaria to Sokoto to move troops to crush Satiru revolt. But now, the 
main reasons for the railway were, in addition to defense, the questions of 
communication and transportation.66 On initiating the railway, Sir Percy changed the 
direction of the railroad. Instead of from Northern Nigeria to Southern Nigeria, he 
directed it to Lagos in the west. Sir Percy directed that the railway should run from Baro 
to Kano, instead of Kano to the Southern Nigeria.67 He supported his change to Baro, 
stating that the river Niger would provide easy navigation of ships to upload the train 
goods from both directions, Kano or Lagos, and that Baro was the most suitable meeting 
point of both Kano and Lagos railways, citing professional consideration as the main 
factor for the Baro rather than the former.68 The post of High Commissioner was 
upgraded to that of Governor, following the commissioning of Sir Percy, in 1908.  Sir 
Percy served in Northern Nigeria as governor and perfected some of the policies 
introduced by Lugard, especially African land, taxation, and education. In all the latter 
three, Sir Percy departed from Lugard’s, perspectives as to their application. Sir Percy 
considered that Africans should have control over their landed property rather than the 
crown. Africans should govern the local treasury as a native treasury, allowing Africans 
to have control over their landed property, finance and revenue.69 On Lugard’s return to 
Northern Nigeria, Sir Percy left for his vacation to London in April 1909.  
     In Northern Nigeria, Sir Percy’s tour of duty could be clearly seen in the construction 
of the Baro to Kano railway, implementation of the indirect rule method of 
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administration, which allowed land control under African chiefs with limited interference 
by the colonial officials. Sir Percy’s remarkable successes in Northern Nigeria were not 
only on the construction of the railway; he succeeded in ensuring that Africans were 
allowed to govern their own affairs. These were significant successes in the execution of 
policies of administration bequeathed to him by his predecessor. Following Lugard’s 
return from the Hong Kong, Sir Percy was appointed governor of the EAP. While Sir 
Percy was still on his vacation in April 1909, Lord Crewe, concerned with the economic 
stagnation of the EAP, intimated to Sir Percy whether he could be transferred to the EAP, 
despite the fact that Churchill wanted Sir Percy to remain governor of Northern Nigeria.  
     Colonial, cavalier and cautious, Sir Percy replied to Crewe that he would defer the 
question of his transfer from the west to the east to public interest.70 The transfer to the 
EAP might had been in the very best interest of Sir Percy, as he was reported to have told 
his father his comfort in the exercise of his power and authority in Northern Nigeria, 
when he was on vacation in Canada. Sir Percy told his father, in Northern Nigeria, other 
than the hold of the Secretary of State, he was a little independent king.71 His statement 
suggested Sir Percy’s own colonial ambition, and his desire for self-esteem, power and 
relevance.  
      By August 1909, Sir Percy was bound to Mombasa, EAP, in a German boat. 
Disgusted, Sir Percy wrote that the British don’t have it own line. Sir Percy’s statement 
as to the lack of British line to the EAP further suggested the British Government’s lack 
of interest in the EAP or insignificance of the EAP to the British Government. Upon his 
assumption of government in mid September 1909, he found the condition of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Williams, Running the Show, 365. 
71 Ibid., 366.	  
35	  
	  
administration of the protectorate in a sorry state and recommended major reform of 
government policy of administration and development. 
 Conclusion 
       Sir Percy’s arrival in the EAP was the result of a successful tour of duty elsewhere in 
Africa. He distinguished himself as a railway builder in the Sudan and South Africa. 
These successes earned him positions of leadership in railway administration in Egypt 
and the Sudan as well as in the Transvaal and Orange River colonies. His resignation 
over a disagreement to railway rates with Milner did not hold back Sir Percy’s rise in the 
service of the British Empire. After a brief stay in Britain, he received a major promotion 
as he was chosen by the CO to take over the governorship of Northern Nigeria.  
      In that post, Sir Percy succeeded in constructing the Baro to Kano railway as well as 
governing the colony effectively. He implemented policies in the interest of the African 
population, especially in the area of land, taxation, and education. With this success in 
Northern Nigeria, the CO appointed him governor of the EAP with a view that he could 
fix that protectorate’s economic and administrative problems.     
     However, the EAP was quite different from Northern Nigeria. The absence of a well-
grounded policy of administration, the EAP’s different social composition on the ground, 
and the poor policies of his predecessors complicated Sir Percy’s governorship. The CO’s 
expectation that Sir Percy would provide strong and effective leadership for the EAP in 
working out policies for effective administration and the promotion of economic 
development was thus complicated by the earlier history of the EAP. 
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                                                           Chapter 3 
                                         The British East Africa Protectorate  
  Introduction 
       The British East Africa Protectorate, conceived in uncertain circumstances and born 
into a chaotic situation, outstripped initial problems that led its emergence as a 
protectorate. The declaration of a protectorate in 1895 and the assumption of 
administration by a diplomat was a clear departure from the established norm of British 
imperial administration, especially in Africa. On assumption of government, the 
protectorate was saddled with the problem of a lack of a policy of colonial administration 
and lack of income.  
      The protectorate continued, in the short run, to be administered by the Foreign Office, 
in its pioneer years. In the midst of these problems, the protectorate, unwittingly, had a 
succession of incompetent governors whose tour of duties was punctuated by altercations 
with the FO and CO, leading to the resignation of governors. The administrative staff 
members were not any better, having been taken over from the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (hereafter, IBEA) or Uganda administration, which was in a healthier 
economic and political condition than the EAP. These staff members were untrained in 
colonial administration and most of them lacked a university education.  
     There was also a neglect of the protectorate by the imperial authorities, as it was never 
considered of any significance to the overall British interest in East Africa and the Indian 
Ocean. The protectorate was also poor relative to the Uganda, as it could not fund costs 
of administration and development, thereby, deferring responsibility to the British 
Treasury, which annually supported the protectorate with a grant-in-aid to fund 
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administration and development. The inhabitants of the protectorate were multi ethnic 
communities, living in scattered areas, who, on the introduction of the colonial rule, had 
little knowledge of agricultural production for export and economic development, other 
than their usual annual production for subsistence.  
      The entry of European planters, their demands for agricultural land for cultivation, as 
well as Indian demands for equal rights and treatments with the Europeans, caused 
competing demands between the two, altered the course of events that made weak local 
authorities unable to administer the protectorate effectively. The politics between the two 
and settler interest in fertile agricultural land interfered with African reserves, causing 
rebuke from the British authorities, and provoking resignations. 
         Condition of the EAP on Sir Percy’s Assumption of Government  
      The EAP came into existence in unusual circumstances in 1895, when the British 
Consul General to the Zanzibar government, Sir A. H. Hardinge, on the instruction of the 
British government, declared a protectorate over an area, between Mombasa and Uganda, 
as the East Africa Protectorate72 (hereafter, EAP) On the declaration of a protectorate, 
Hardinge retained the infrastructure of the IBEA and its staff members as pioneer 
administrators of the protectorate.73 Since then, not much had been done to accelerate 
political and economic developments of the protectorate.  
     As at the time of Sir Percy’s assumption of government of the protectorate in 1909, 
there was near absence of a defined policy of government administration and economic 
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development.74 The latter were occasioned by developments on the ground, in the 
protectorate that accentuated difficulty in its administration. The difficulty in the 
administration of the protectorate was not uncommon to Sir Percy’s predecessors and 
would be a potent factor in Sir Percy’s difficulty to place the administration of the 
protectorate on a policy that could mitigate its troubled policy of administration and 
accelerate its economic development. 
      Moreover, the protectorate administration was characterized by a succession of 
incompetent governors who could not define the protectorate’s government policy of 
administration and economic development. The latter produced a condition where the 
protectorate’s policies of administration and development were almost absent. 75 
Therefore, the confused state of the protectorate’s administration was attributed to a 
succession of weak governors. Such incompetency of Sir Percy’s predecessors had not 
been in doubt as the CO was fully aware of the protectorate’s predicaments. The CO 
pointed out that on Sir Percy’s assumption of government, he was startled with the 
contrast between the EAP and Northern Nigeria.76 The CO staff realized that, in Northern 
Nigeria, Sir Percy had a clean slate as Lugard had worked out a defined policy of 
government administration. On the other hand, in the EAP, there was a succession of 
weak governors.77  
      Some of the earlier governors had difficult times in handling the affairs of the 
protectorate or in dealing with the imperial authorities. For example, the protectorate’s 
second Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, had difficulty in dealing with the FO, on the 
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protectorate’s land question, and resigned, prematurely.78 Stewart succeeded him, but he 
died soon after taking office. Stewart’s successor, Sir James Hayes Sadler, was said to be 
incompetent to handle the affairs of the protectorate.79 Sadler had not been able to 
administer the protectorate effectively and the continued economic stagnation of the 
protectorate had been a source of concern to the CO.80 The CO transferred him to the 
Windward Islands, and appointed Sir Percy whom they believed was competent governor 
who could solve the protectorate’s problems.81  
     Sir Percy could not perform the miracle expected of him, as he was embroiled in 
altercations with the CO over the deportation of Cole and his subsequent failed attempted 
removal of the Maasai from the Laikipia reserve to the southern Maasai reserve without 
the knowledge of the CO. This ended his career, prematurely.82 The succession of short-
lived and incompetent governors left a legacy of unresolved problems and anyone 
appointed governor of the protectorate, would be expected to do more, to prove his worth 
by solving the protectorate’s predicaments. 
      Many of the staff members of the protectorate were also incompetent. The staff 
members were untrained colonial administrators; they were former IBEA staff members, 
inherited by the protectorate or staff of the Uganda administration.83 When the British 
government took over of the administration of the protectorate, the IBEA, having 
relinquished its charter to the British government, closed its door to further business in 
the protectorate.84 Among these staff members; few had university degrees and, as Sir 
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Percy maintained, they lacked social connections and social graces. These unqualified 
staff members became pioneer administrators of the protectorate and had been seen as 
part of the difficulty of the protectorate. The staff members were not trained in public 
administration, as they were company officials that the protectorate inherited rather than 
trained colonial administrators. Therefore, the unsuitable staffing of the protectorate also 
became a difficulty in the administration of the protectorate.85  
      In view of a succession of weak governors and poor staff members that the 
protectorate inherited from a commercial company, there was a near absence of a defined 
policy of government administration and economic development from which Sir Percy 
could take up the task of administration and development.86 The administrative condition 
of the protectorate was in a sorry state and execution of government function was left to 
the personal originality of each individual official. This position of the protectorate had 
contributed to the difficulty of successive administrations in coming up with a defined 
policy of administration and development. The latter had not been without its influence in 
the complex nature of the administration that challenged Sir Percy’s predecessors, and 
could also have challenged any governor the CO could appoint to the protectorate.  
      Another problem was the position of the EAP relative to Uganda. To Britain, the EAP 
was not an important protectorate; economically it was poor, it lacked the significance of 
Uganda for Britain. Uganda was taken over in 1894 by Britain, earlier than the EAP, 
taken over in 1895.87 In the EAP, the African people were culturally diverse and lived in 
scattered areas; most had little connection to the world economy prior to colonial rule. 
The latter condition was further compounded by multi racial character of the protectorate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 210-11. 
86 Ibid., 210.	  
87 Mackinnon, Imperial British Eat Africa Company, 186-7; Hobley, From Chattered Company to Colony, 39 
41	  
	  
and the problems created by Eliot’s decision to encourage European farmers to settle had 
consequence on the protectorate’s land question.88  
      Upon the entry of European farmers, land became an important resource as the 
European settlers took to agricultural production. Therefore, the question of how to make 
land available and accessible to European farmers and also protect the interest of the 
colonial state became further difficulties in the administration of the protectorate. As at 
the time of European entry, the protectorate lacked a clearly defined land policy.89 Lord 
Elgin’s land regulations being enforced had not been without its shortcoming; therefore, 
the question of a clearly defined land policy had to be addressed to ease difficulty in 
dispensing Crown lands, as well as secure income for the protectorate from increased 
land value for the future welfare of the protectorate.90  
     The amendment of the land ordinance that could have included the Elgin regulation 
would have resolved the question. But disagreement between Sir Percy’s predecessor and 
the CO, and between the CO and the Sir Percy, failed to provide the desired land 
ordinance for dispensing Crown lands.91 The absence of the land ordinance and the 
refusal to enforce certain sections of the regulations had produced speculation and 
dummying in land dealing. The lack of a defined policy of dispensing Crown lands 
afforded wealthy and influential settlers in concert with local authorities to take 
advantage of the situation, by having easy access to land, but at prices exorbitant to poor 
and prospective immigrants. The latter had more or less discouraged the flow of 
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immigration into the protectorate, causing some of the settlers to move back to South 
Africa and never return to the EAP.  
       Land dispensation was one of the problems that an administrator of the protectorate 
had to deal with, and it had been a cause of disagreement and altercations between the FO 
and Eliot, causing Eliot’s resignation. The difficulty associated with land dealings alone 
was enough trouble to occupy and misguide any administrator of the protectorate. The 
CO expected that, while land would be made accessible to the settlers, it made it clear 
that the question of protection of African land rights in the reserves, against 
encroachment by syndicates and interest groups, would be complied with.92 The CO’s 
expectation that land in African reserves must be safeguarded for the Africans was 
another difficult responsibility that the local authorities had to enforce in a protectorate 
that settlers cast their eyes on any fertile lands; crown or African rights notwithstanding.  
       The local authorities and the CO could not prevent the desire for fertile land, and 
encroachment on land in African reserves by influential settlers. For example, the Maasai 
nominal grazing reserve was to have been granted to three South African brothers, by 
Eliot, and that became the cause of his disagreement with the CO, and his eventual 
resignation.93 But in the FO, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, 
went around Eliot, and granted the same nominal Maasai grazing reserve to a London 
based South African Syndicate, over Eliot’s head.94  
   There was also Lord Delamere’s reclaims over his Laikipia compensation on the eve of 
Sir Percy’s arrival, and on his assumption of government, he granted Delamere’s request, 
thereby, falling into the protectorate’s troubles by removing the Maasai from Laikipia to 
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the extended southern Maasai reserve.95 There was also the Indian quest for land in the 
highlands; settlement was reserved for the European settlers only. Indians quest for 
equality with the European settlers, especially in grants of land in the highlands, was 
rejected by all the governors and the CO.96 The Indians, believing that they had better 
rights in the protectorate than the settlers, took their campaign to London.97  The Indians 
demanded that they should be granted land in the white highlands, further immigration of 
the Indians into the protectorate should be allowed, similar Indian trial by jury as was the 
case with the Europeans, equal opportunities with the Europeans in government, land 
grant in the strategic place in Nairobi should be extended not only to the European but 
also them, and equal treatment between Indian and European in the railway steamer.  The 
Indians further contended that because of their economic contribution to the protectorate 
and their cultural influence in the protectorate, the EAP should be made a vassal state of 
the Indian Viceroy. The Indian campaign caused indignation in both the protectorate and 
the CO, causing the Indian Office and the All Indian Muslim League to request for 
investigation. Despite the investigation of such grievances with Indian representatives 
present, the Indians were not accorded the equality they believed they deserved.  
     In fact, it was only on the question of land grant in the highlands that the Indians were 
given a definite answer. The Indians were told that the CO had reserved the highlands for 
the settlers only, and also, the CO, other than the highlands, had no objection to grant 
being made to subject of the Crown elsewhere, in the protectorate.98 This ended the 
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Indian search for equality that did not happen, and the inequality and mistreatment of the 
Indians continued.  
     As a result of the settler question, the protectorate was saddled with both the land 
question and racial politics that made it difficult for any administrator to secure 
cooperation and support in carrying through these responsibilities. The local authorities 
could not fulfill their responsibilities to the satisfaction of the multi-racial groups, thereby 
creating disquiet for policy formulation and administration which became a difficulty in 
further complicating the administration of the protectorate. Some of these settlers had 
aristocratic connections; these big men came to dominate politics in the protectorate; the 
presence of wealthy, influential, and aristocratic settlers in the protectorate, capable of 
directly obtaining a decision from London, over the head of the governor, was no less a 
problem to the governor’s exercise of authority over the protectorate’s affairs.99     
      Settler demands for easy access to land and political representation in the 
protectorate, had caused some of them to make their way over the head of the governor. 
Competing demands of both the Europeans and Indians for opportunities in government 
and land, and equality in treatment between the two, could make the evolution of a 
defined policy of administration for the protectorate difficult. Settler demands was 
another difficulty in the administration of the protectorate, and some of the governors 
were not unaware of the influence of the settlers and the extent they could go to obtain 
satisfaction over the head of the governor.100 Therefore, it was possible that some 
governors would have treaded carefully in dealing with the settler demands, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




unmindful of the consequence that could arise against the governor, should he object to 
the wishes of the settlers.  
     While on the other hand, most of the settlers were poor and thus wanted land for free 
and labor at low cost. This problem of sourcing labor for settler cultivation had taken its 
toll on both the government and the settlers on how best they could source labor for 
agricultural development. It had not been without its impact on the performance of 
European cultivation. Therefore, the entry of the European settlers could not be relegated 
in the factors making for the difficulty in the protectorate’s administration, as their entry 
had accentuated the difficult position of the administration of the protectorate.101 
       A common source of labor in the protectorate was slaves, and with the abolition of a 
legal status of slavery, Arab plantation estates at the coast that had depended on slave 
labor reverted to waste land.102 Competing title claims between the Arab Sharia land 
holding and the Mijikenda land tenure further complicated the question of demarcation of 
these abandoned Arab estates for grants to prospective European planters.103 The Arabs 
had no knowledge of the boundaries of their estates and the former slaves who knew 
these boundaries had been dispersed by the abolition of the slavery.104 Therefore, the 
competing title claims, abolition of slavery and the dispersal of the former slaves 
produced a difficult position for any governor to rehabilitate the deteriorating coast 
economy. The slaves knew these boundaries but as slavery had been abolished and the 
slaves dispersed, it became a problem for government to delineate these estates for the 
development of the coast’s economy.  
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    With the abolition of slavery, the Arab economy deteriorated and their lifestyle ruined. 
Compensation paid to them by the British government failed to alleviate their sufferings. 
Therefore, the rebooting of the coast economy became another question that had to be 
addressed. The coast’s poor economic condition that demanded action was further 
compounded by the protectorate’s poor economic condition that depended on grants-in-
aid from the British Treasury.105 The protectorate’s negative economic situation, as it had 
not been in a healthy financial position to balance its budget, was a huge challenge. Since 
the British declaration of a protectorate over the EAP in 1895, the protectorate depended 
on grants-in-aid from the British Treasury to fund administration and development.106 
This had been a serious problem to the protectorate as it was not in a position to generate 
revenue to fund administration and development. 
 Conclusion 
       The condition of administration of the protectorate on the eve of Sir Percy’s arrival 
was not in any satisfactory condition to afford effective administration. The government 
policy of administration was almost absent so that any administrator would have to 
navigate the administration based on his own individual idiosyncrasy. The succession of 
ill equipped governors had accentuated the difficulty of administration as there was not a 
well-defined policy put in place by the previous governors, having little time in office 
due to the controversial nature of the protectorate, that most often engaged governors and 
the CO, in altercations, or the governor and the settlers or local colonial officials, causing 
a governor’s resignation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




      The staffing of the protectorate had not helped ease the difficult position of the 
protectorate. The staff members were taken over from the IBEA, when the IBEA 
liquidated its administrative charter over Uganda in 1895, and prompted the declaration 
of a protectorate over an area between Mombasa and Uganda, which came to be known 
as the EAP. Some of these staff members were not trained for colonial administration nor 
do they have university education, indeed a matter that compounded the difficult 
administration of the protectorate. In addition, there was the multiracial question and the 
hasty in rush of European planters into the protectorate. These races of the protectorate 
had to be protected and their rights safeguarded, but the European planters entry brought 
forth the question of their access to land which had been not been settled by 1909.  
      Grants of land to settlers were complicated, especially on the coast, where the 
abolition of slavery also ended Arab plantation estates. The latter produced a shortage of 
labor for the Arabs and the European planters and as there was no solution in sight, 
planters were left to their own individual devices. The labor problem compounded the 
productive output of the protectorate, if compared with the days when slaves produced. 
Having opened up the protectorate to planters, there was also the question of 
safeguarding the rights of other races, especially the Africans and the Indians, which had 
not been effectively carried through. The Indians, despite their early presence in the 
protectorate and their contribution in the development, trade and commerce in the 
protectorate, were not afforded equal rights with the European settlers.  
     The Indian frantic search for equality had not been a less important factor in engaging 
the attention of the local authorities’ energies in finding a way to avoid Indian demands, 
which continued, unresolved and remained one of the colony’s problems. As to the 
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question of land, the right to exclusive possession and use of land by Africans within 
their own reserve had not been safeguarded. Reserves were encroach upon, especially 
land relating to the Maasai nominal grazing reserve prior to Sir Percy’s assumption of 
government. What had been accepted as a final solution of the Maasai reserve was 
reopened shortly after Sir Percy’s arrival. His handling of he issue was in many ways the 
defining aspect of his administration. As in several other key challenges faced by Sir 
Percy, it proved to be one that he failed to adequately deal with. One of the most pressing 
and demanding challenges that confronted him, on his assumption of government, was 
the absence of a clearly defined policy of administration of the protectorate. In this, he 

















                                                                  Chapter 4 
                                                 Policy of Administration 
   Introduction                              
     Sir Percy assumed the governorship of the EAP on 16 September 1909, and had, in 
pursuit of his desired policy, appraised the existing policy of the government, and 
proposed reforms in a manner he believed would be consistent with the administration of 
Crown colonies. Sir Percy deplored the lack of any defined policy of administration and 
development compared with Northern Nigeria, and the Transvaal. Sir Percy became very 
critical of government policy of administration, especially taxation, the records of 
administration, the large size of administration staff, the government departments, and the 
almost complete absence of a general policy of administration.  
      Sir Percy proposed that a well-defined policy of administration would engage the 
staff with specific responsibilities. Sir Percy added that government departments would 
be reorganized in a manner consistent with the needs of the administration; the required 
departments for the administration of policy would be retained while those with duplicate 
functions or redundant would be merged or phased out. Therefore right from the onset, 
Sir Percy criticized the existing policy, and proposed reforms in the government policy of 
administration.  
     Sir Percy proposed the reorganization of government departments, African policy, 
European and Indian policy, land policy, agriculture, trade and commerce, the police and 
the military affairs. The appraisal and reform that Sir Percy considered for the 
protectorate were common in crown colonies, especially in the Northern Nigeria where 
he had been governor. In the EAP, by contrast, he found that there was an absence of 
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government policy of administration. The absence of policy was not only evident in 
government circulars, political memoranda, staff and government departments’ 
organization for effective administration and taxation, but it was common in all areas of 
government function.  
     
 Appraisal of Policy of Administration  
         Upon his assumption of the governorship, Sir Percy planned a tour of the country so 
that he could acquaint himself with the protectorate so as to be able to report on land and 
agricultural subjects.107 But after his perusal of official documents on the workings of the 
protectorate’s successive governments, he deferred his tour, and reported on the general 
policy of the administration of the protectorate.108 Sir Percy observed and reported the 
deplorable condition of administration of the protectorate to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, The Earl of Crewe.109 
   In both his confidential dispatch of 13 November 1909 and his Interim Report, Sir 
Percy told Crewe that the protectorate lacked “any defined policy of administration.”110 
Sir Percy also told Crewe that his Interim Report was out of his own general knowledge 
of the protectorate, which he learnt after “as close a study of the records,” consultations 
and enquiry from executives, and a series of meetings with the provincial commissioners, 
whom he had assembled for such purpose.111   
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     Also, Sir Percy, in his review of the condition of administration, held discussions with 
other individuals he “deemed advisable and necessary,” especially Lord Delamere, leader 
of the European settler community, and the unofficial members of the Legislative 
Council.112 Sir Percy added that he also gathered information on the affairs of the 
protectorate from the meeting of the Legislative Council and that of heads of departments 
during the consideration of the 1910-1911 proposed annual estimates.113  
      Therefore, Sir Percy had, after perusal of all documents that could be laid before him, 
and through which he obtained knowledge of the protectorate, in addition to his meetings 
with the officials of the protectorate and consultations with individuals he deemed 
desirable, told Crewe, “I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that there was an utter 
absence of any defined policy, where I could take up the work of my predecessor and 
ensure continuity of effort and direction.” 114  Sir Percy added that there was no 
compilation of records of administration, service regulations, and it was “hardly 
necessary to state those steps are being taken to remedy the situation.”115   
     Sir Percy also told Crewe that the situation was unlike Northern Nigeria, where a 
“clearly well-defined and printed policy of government” existed.116 In Northern Nigeria, 
Sir Percy told Crewe, such policy was covered in “series of admirable political 
memoranda and a thoroughly worked out and published series of government standing 
Orders.”117 However, Sir Percy was quick to point out that the Nigerian situation may not 
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be applicable to the EAP in its entirety. In the case of the latter, Sir Percy admitted that 
there were great differences between his Nigerian policy experience and his attempt to 
grasp the EAP’s policy of the past, through a perusal of the secretariat’s files and annual 
departmental reports.118  
     In view of the latter state of the administration, Sir Percy deplored the near absence of 
any policy. Sir Percy further pointed out that the only available laws of the protectorate 
were “set forth in seven printed books and each law may be spread over the whole series, 
to which there was no general index.”119  The latter situation of the laws suggested to Sir 
Percy that “No attempt whatsoever appears to have been made to consolidate the statutes, 
and combined with the above legal labyrinth there are Indian laws to the number of 
twenty-seven, upon such subjects as Lunacy, Penal offences, whipping, succession, Posts, 
Divorce, evidence, contract, Criminal & Civil Procedure, Railway, &c.”120 Out of the 
seven volumes, Sir Percy collated the laws of the protectorate, and deleted those laws that 
had been repealed, which successive governors had not done.121 Sir Percy, in concluding 
his recommendations, requested for a speedy approval of his proposals and threatened to 
resign should the CO delay approval or deny latitude in the application of the approved 
recommendations.122 
      In the CO, Sir Percy’s observations on these matters were the cause of much interest 
and comment. Before F. G. A. Butler could embark on Sir Percy’s comment on the 
absence of policy, he cautioned that in the EAP, Sir Percy went to a government that was 
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totally different from that which he administered in the Northern Nigeria Protectorate.123 
However, Butler agreed that there was the need to strengthen the administration of the 
colony, suggesting that Sir Percy was “evidently somewhat startled and shocked by the 
contrast, a contrast, which in reality is quite intelligible.”124 Butler added that his 
“Predecessor in Northern Nigeria, Sir F. Lugard, had a clean slate on which to write. He 
had the molding of the administration and of the government policy from the very start, 
and he used his opportunity with excellent effect.”125  
     In contrast, Butler stated, “in East Africa, on the other hand, we have had a succession 
of Governors who, if not actually unsatisfactory, have been ineffective.”126 Other than 
unsatisfactory administrators being posted to the colony, Butler stated that “For various 
reasons, there has been, in addition, the grave complication of the perhaps over-hasty 
rush of white settlers, buoyed up by extravagant hopes and correspondingly discontented 
when progress was slow.”127 Butler stated, “it is only fair to Sir Percy to say that he 
recognizes these reasons for the difference.”128 But at the same time, Butler stated, “it is 
only fair to him also to point out that his record shows that he is not merely a new 
broom.”129   
      Butler pointed out that in Northern Nigeria Sir Percy “followed most loyally and 
minutely in the footsteps of his predecessor. He was a strong admirer of and supporter of 
Sir F. Lugard’s policies in every respect, as I know from personal experience in the West 
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African Department.”130 Butler added that Sir Percy was following Lugard in Northern 
Nigeria, kept Lugard informed of his progress along the lines laid down by Lugard.131  
Therefore, Butler suggested that as drastic as Sir Percy’s proposals in respect of the EAP 
might be, they should not be dismissed on the ground that he was “keen to strike out a 
new line for himself and is suffering from the usual inclination of a new Governor to 
reverse the acts and policy of his predecessor.”132  
     Despite his commendation of the proposals, Butler expressed his doubts as to the 
originality of the report, stating that they should be cautious in their responses.133 Butler 
viewed that it would not be possible for Sir Percy to produce such reports within two 
months of his assumption of government, in view of the fact that he would have to attend 
to the affairs of the government while at the same time writing a report.134 This was 
another reason for careful study and a delayed response by the CO.  
      In a reply to Sir Percy’s Interim Report in a telegram of 7 January 1910, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, The Earl of Crewe, agreed to Sir Percy’s proposed 
strengthening of the administrative staff with a view to enhancing government policy of 
administration. Therefore, Crewe asked Sir Percy to transmit details as to the proposed 
strengthening of the administration of the colony.135 Thus Sir Percy, in a telegram of 19 
February 1910, requested action on his proposed staff reform.136 Butler commented that 
there was the need for Sir Percy to provide detailed information by dispatch on how he 
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wanted to carry through his reform.137 H. J. Read agreed and stated that Sir Percy should 
be asked to transmit full details of the process of his reform.138  G. V. Fiddes pointed out 
that there must be a detailed presentation on the question before action could be taken. 
Fiddes warned that the proposed reforms should not be made in piece meal by 
telegram.139 Crewe told Sir Percy that nothing could be done until he transmitted a full 
report by dispatch. 140  In a reply to Crewe’s request for more details, Sir Percy 
transmitted, two months later, his secret dispatch covering his Main Report Upon the East 
Africa Protectorate of 26 May 1910, recommending far-reaching reforms. In this, he 
recommended the retirement of certain officials from service and the abolition of certain 
departments so that efficiency and strengthening of the machinery of government could 
be possible.141  But nothing was done on this aspect as the CO refused to rely on his 
recommendations in effecting these reforms. 
      As to the question of provincial administration, Sir Percy recommended, in his Main 
Report, for the merger of the three coast provinces of Jubaland, Tanaland, and Seyyedie, 
under one provincial administration headquartered at Seyyedie. 142  Sir Percy 
recommended further that Lieutenant Governor Jackson, if not transferred to Uganda as 
governor, be appointed Provincial Commissioner of the newly reconstituted coast 
province. But if he was transferred, C. W. Hobley should be appointed as provincial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Minute by Butler to Read, 23 February 1910, on Sir Percy to Crewe, telegram, 19 February 1910, CO 533/71; 
Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 212. 
138 Minute by Read to Fiddes, 24 February 1910, on Sir Percy to Crewe, telegram, 19 February 1910, CO 533/71; 
Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 212. 
139 Minute by Fiddes to Crewe, 24 February 1910, on Sir Percy to Crewe, telegram, 19 February 1910, CO 533/71; 
Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 212. 
140 Crewe to Sir Percy, telegram, 2 March 1910, CO 533/71; Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 212. 
141 Sir Percy to Crewe, secret, 26 May 1910, CO 533/74; Sir Percy to Crewe, Main Report Upon the East Africa 
Protectorate, confidential, 26 May 1910, CO 533/74. 
142 Ibid; Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 216. 
56	  
	  
commissioner.143 However, the request for the merger of the provinces was refused, as 
the existence of each province was considered significant in controlling the ethnic 
formations within its boundaries.144  
    This suggested that Sir Percy had not appraised the rationale for the existence of the 
three provinces before transmitting his request for their merger. In this case, Sir Percy 
could not secure the approval of Crewe for the merger of provinces as their separate 
existence out weighted the advantages of merger.145 Therefore, the CO expressed its 
hesitations that the proposed merger of the coast provinces could not be put into 
operation immediately and it was deferred. The question was never revisited up to the 
time when Sir Percy resigned and left the colony.146  
     Other than the question of provincial administration, Sir Percy appraised the method 
of tax collection in the colony, which he noted not only varied with individual 
idiosyncrasy but he also noted that it was chaotic and would have to be reformed. Sir 
Percy pointed out that the protectorate lacked a uniform method of tax collection and 
recommended that there was the need of a unified method of tax collection to be adopted. 
Sir Percy decried the near absence of records of government activities, especially 
government standing orders, which he suggested must be put in place in order to organize 
efficient and effective administration. There was a lack of government records and where 
they existed they were vague, especially at provincial and district headquarters. Where 
such records existed, they were disorganized and lacked a clearly defined description of 
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function. The absence of policy, Sir Percy stated, had created a body of staff without any 
defined role other than backstabbing amongst themselves.  
       Therefore, Sir Percy proposed in his Interim Report, the introduction of John 
Ainsworth’s method of tax collection in the Nyanza Province, as the most effective 
means of tax collection throughout the colony.147 Ainsworth, who became the Provincial 
Commissioner of Nyanza Province in 1907, had successfully evolved an effective method 
of tax collection. Ainsworth directed the district officers to collect taxes and to be 
assisted by chiefs and headmen, and they should use registers where a list of eligible 
payees was recorded, and records of defaulters made. It was this method that Sir Percy 
considered the most effective means of tax administration and, therefore, sought to 
introduce it throughout the colony. In this regard, Sir Percy made a significant effort in 
the introduction of the said method but he was not be able to introduce the method 
throughout the colony up to the time he left the protectorate. He was able to make certain 
progress in the administration of taxation, but he had not successfully introduced the 
method of tax collection throughout the colony. Therefore, the question of carrying 
through an effective means of taxation had to be deferred to his successor, Sir Henry 
Conway Belfield.  
 
Amalgamation Between the East Africa Protectorate and the Uganda Protectorate 
Considered 
    The question of Uganda’s administration and its potential amalgamation with the EAP 
occupied the attention of Sir Percy at the time he was compiling his Interim Report. The 
question of amalgamation came forth as a result of Crewe’s direction to Sir Percy, some 




two weeks after the latter assumed office, to report on the administration of Uganda.148 
On receipt of Crewe’s telegram, Sir Percy made interim recommendations on the 
question of amalgamation in his confidential dispatch of 13 November 1909, stating that 
he favored that Uganda be amalgamated to the EAP.149  
     He gave his reasons and provided recommendations to carry it into effect. Sir Percy 
added that he was persuaded of the necessity of strengthening the East African 
administration and inclined toward amalgamation of the two protectorates.150 Sir Percy 
reiterated that the Uganda Protectorate should be amalgamated with the EAP in his 
Interim Report of the same date.151 Sir Percy added that the amalgamation of Uganda 
would afford it the opportunity to develop in the same way the EAP developed. Sir Percy 
argued that if Uganda were amalgamated the administration of the protectorate would be 
strengthened.152 Sir Percy argued that the amalgamation of Uganda and the EAP would 
be in the very best interest of Uganda and that it would not accentuate its difficulties but 
lessen them.153 
    Sir Percy wrote a report on the administration of Uganda following a brief visit to that 
protectorate. He completed the report and included it with his Interim Report on the East 
Africa Protectorate of 13 November 1909. A significant part of the Uganda report was Sir 
Percy’s recommendation that Uganda should be amalgamated with the EAP. He did this 
despite the fact that his report on Uganda clearly indicated that Uganda was in a healthier 
administrative and economic condition than the EAP. Sir Percy considered that the 
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merger, or at least a fusion of government departments of the two protectorates, was 
imperative.154 
     Sir Percy’s recommendation on amalgamation engaged him and the CO in a long 
drawn argument on the desirability, or otherwise, of the amalgamation of the two 
protectorates. The argument clearly demonstrated knowledge of colonial administration 
and policy, the developed and underdeveloped conditions of both protectorates, and how, 
according to Sir Percy, the underdeveloped condition of Uganda could be mitigated by its 
amalgamation to the EAP so that it could experience all the developments similar to that 
of the EAP.155 
    Sir Percy, in his Uganda Report, told Crewe that he considered that amalgamation 
would bring benefits of economic development and the strengthening of the 
administration of the amalgamated colonies. Sir Percy told Crewe, in both his Interim 
Report and Uganda Report that Uganda would benefit from the proposed amalgamation. 
It was, he asserted, uneconomical to allow Uganda to look for services and development 
that the EAP could afford her.156 In his report upon the condition of administration in the 
Uganda Protectorate, Sir Percy reported to Crewe that, “of the two protectorates Uganda 
appears to be in a healthier administrative condition, though certain departments would 
be the better for new blood, and the provincial administration is languid for the same 
reason.”157 Sir Percy also pointed out that other than the land question, Uganda as an 
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African state presented fewer complications.158 The land position that Sir Percy was 
referring to was the Buganda Agreement of 1900; an agreement that provided “that waste 
and uncultivated land, and land occupied without prior gift, was to be vested in His 
Majesty’s Government.”159  
     Sir Percy also reported to Crewe that the former governor, H. H. Bell, had however 
pointed out that Uganda was not unsuitable country for planter life, and that the question 
of settler entry into the country should be expected to come forward at any time.160 Sir 
Percy stated that when the latter issue came up, there would be “much criticism of the 
government land policy, which would require the soundest possible judicial and legal 
assistance to avoid pitfalls we have practically dug for ourselves.”161  As to the condition 
found in the EAP, Sir Percy observed and reported in his Uganda report, that “it would 
have been impossible to conceive that the East Africa Protectorate would have been on an 
even sounder basis today, had it not witnessed the somewhat hurried introduction of 
white settlement.”162 
     Sir Percy criticized previous administrators of the EAP, especially Sir H. H. Johnston 
and Sir A. Hardinge, for the protectorate’s administrative problems, stating that the latter 
two failed to provide adequate infrastructure that could have supported the entry and 
settlement of Europeans in the protectorate, despite the fact that they were aware of the 
planned European immigration in to the protectorate. Sir Percy added that the absence of 
any arrangement for settler entry into EAP, a colony organized purely for African 
populations, had complicated the administration of the protectorate and forced Africans 








into conditions suitable for white settlers.163 Sir Percy suggested that in spite of the cost 
that might be involved in the setting up those departments and the Uganda land question, 
that they should be hurriedly established.164 With regard to the land question, Sir Percy 
also reported that it was fortunate that as far as the Uganda chiefs were concerned, the 
land question would not present any difficulties in the event of white settler entry.165 
      As to the prevailing administrative difficulties occasioned to the EAP, Sir Percy 
stated that such problems, which authorities in the Uganda Protectorate might think that 
Uganda was spared the trouble of the EAP, would have happened in any colony 
organized for purely African administration.166 He suggested that should Uganda witness 
planter immigration, the difficult situation that occasioned to the EAP, on the entry of 
European planters would also manifest itself in the Uganda Protectorate, if not more.167 
Sir Percy, therefore, pointed out that the settler entry into the EAP had been 
accomplished and that their presence should be seen in a broader view. This was in 
reference to Uganda, which he believed was suitable for the habitation of European 
planters and that the CO should have a broader view of the white entry into Uganda. Sir 
Percy also pointed out that the settlers were their own kith and kin who would have 
wished applications for their entry into Uganda, would have been well received.168  
    Sir Percy added that it would be unfair to allow Uganda to reap all the benefit that EAP 
could afford her, and, in return, the EAP would be compensated only from receipts of the 
Uganda railway. Therefore, Sir Percy recommended, “If by amalgamation the Colonial 
Department can be strengthened in East African administration and policy without 









impeding Uganda’s progress and development, fusion of some kind should take place.”169 
Sir Percy pointed out that the general benefits that would accrue to both protectorates 
would be the strengthening of the machinery of government and development of the 
Uganda Protectorate and its economy. 
     In the CO, before they could embark on reviewing Sir Percy’s recommendations, 
officials sought and obtained comments on Sir Percy’s Uganda Report, from a senior 
government official in Uganda, Stanley Tomkins. Tomkins examined Sir Percy’s Uganda 
Report, and expressed his views to Crewe, in an “undated Memorandum Containing 
Rough Notes for a Despatch to the Secretary of State upon the question of Amalgamation 
between the Uganda Protectorate and the East Africa Protectorate.”170  
      Tomkins, in his comments, opposed Sir Percy’s recommendations on the 
administration and the proposed amalgamation of the Uganda Protectorate to the EAP. 
Tomkins, drawing from Sir Percy’s Uganda Report, wondered why Sir Percy considered 
Uganda’s amalgamation with the EAP, when Uganda was more advanced and prosperous 
than the EAP, would still be to the benefit of Uganda.171  Tomkins opined that it was the 
latter that would be amalgamated to the former, in view of its less developed condition.172 
He therefore stated that the prosperous colony of Uganda should be separate from the 
EAP.173  On the question of the legality or otherwise of amalgamation that was raised by 
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Sir Percy, in his Uganda Report, Tomkins “questioned whether it was legally possible” 
which he felt it was not.174  
    Tomkins observed that the Commissioner of Uganda, A. Boyle, concurred in the 
proposals as to amalgamation, but Tomkins also observed that Boyle had subsequently 
modified his views. Tomkins stated that he was not convinced of the facts that the EAP 
had something beneficial to offer for the development of the Uganda. Tomkins also 
disagreed with Sir Percy’s view that if Uganda were amalgamated, its difficulties would 
be mitigated, and instead, told Crewe that the difficulties of Uganda would be 
accentuated, if the proposed amalgamation would be considered.175  
     In this regard, Tomkins pointed out the difficulty in inter-communication between the 
headquarters in Nairobi and Uganda, which could cause delays in making a decision on 
any issue relating to Uganda. Tomkins stated that the distance and communication 
between Nairobi and Uganda would delay a decision on any issue of Uganda that would 
have to be transmitted to London via Nairobi where, before a decision could be reached, 
it would take no less than three weeks of back and forth and thereafter, the decision 
would be referred to London for approval.176          
     Tomkins stated further that whatever advantages Sir Percy considered would accrue to 
Uganda as a result of its amalgamation to the EAP, it “would not have been otherwise 
than detrimental to the best interests of the Uganda.”177  In this regard, Tomkins believed 
that in spite of Sir Percy’s report, which clearly showed that Uganda was more advanced 
and more prosperous than the EAP, Sir Percy should not recommend the amalgamation 
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of Uganda and instead, he should have recommended the amalgamation of the EAP to 
Uganda. Therefore, Tomkins disagreed with the proposed amalgamation as Sir Percy 
failed to convince him of the expediency of the amalgamation.  
    The officials of the CO were equipped with Tomkins’s view on the administration of 
Uganda and the proposed amalgamation when Crewe sought their comments on Sir 
Percy’s Uganda Report. Butler, in his minute on Sir Percy’s Uganda Report, stated, 
“since Sir Percy was authorized to go to Uganda and report on the question of 
amalgamation, circumstances have changed considerably, it has been found necessary to 
designate Captain Cordeaux as Governor of Uganda for a period of two years, which will 
expire, so far as can be seen at present, about the middle of 1912.”178 Butler added, 
“There can, therefore, be no question of immediate amalgamation even of the partial kind 
advocated by Sir Percy Girouard.”179   
     However, the question of amalgamation was left open when Butler pointed out that 
“Fortunately Sir Percy has the foresight to make recommendations which are applicable 
to EAP whether amalgamation is decided or not.”180 Butler added, “we can therefore 
consider them on their own merits undeterred by the fact that amalgamation is for the 
present out of the question.”181  
    Read, who commented on the question of white penetration into the Uganda 
Protectorate, if amalgamation of Uganda to the EAP was decided, complemented Butler’s 
minute. Read, in his minute, opposed the proposed amalgamation of Uganda with the 
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EAP, stating: “Personally I think it would be unwise, at any rate for the present, to 
amalgamate Uganda with the EAP. In addition to the objections of Mr. Tomkins, it seems 
to me that the EAP with its numerous problems is likely to require all the attention of Sir 
P. Girouard for some time to come. Further, Sir P. G: is evidently paving the way for 
giving a larger share in admin. to the white settler of the E. A. P. and I do not think that a 
purely native country like Uganda would be likely to benefit by the arrangement.”182 He 
went on: “There is, however, an amalgamation which seems to be desirable in itself & 
which would throw but little additional work on Sir P. G: -- the amalgamation of 
Zanzibar with the EAP.”183  Read added, “Sir P.G. would probably like to have his 
command in this direction & with this additional responsibility; he might be less keen 
about the Uganda amalgamation.” 184  Read clearly believed that Sir Percy’s 
recommendation for the amalgamation of Uganda to the EAP was not based on account 
of conditions found in Uganda, rather it was based on his own desire to have a large area 
under his command. 
     Fiddes also commented on the question of white penetration into Uganda should the 
CO agree to amalgamate the two colonies. He complemented Butler when he minuted: 
“one thing seems to me to stand out clearly: viz that on no ground of public advantage is 
amalgamation desirable at present.”185 Fiddes, moreover, pointed out the enormous task 
involved in running the two colonies when he stated: “the governor will have enough and 
more than enough to absorb all his energies in dealing with all the problems of the eaP 
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[sic].”186  Fiddes also stated that Sir Percy “practically recognizes that Uganda is in a 
better position administratively than the eaP [sic].”187 Fiddes cautioned that Sir Percy 
suggested that this would not be the case if a white element came into Uganda; but if this 
happened it would afford an additional reason against amalgamation, as it would make "it 
more than ever necessary that the head of the govt. should be on the afot [sic].”188 As to 
the land agreement between the Baganda chiefs and His Majesty, Sir Percy observed and 
reported that if the proposed amalgamation would be implemented, it would relegate the 
relevance of the land agreement to the back seat.189 In the two latter cases, Fiddes 
disagreed with Sir Percy’s observation on the benefits that could accrue to the Uganda as 
a result of its amalgamation with the EAP and stated, “The Baganda have recently given 
several striking proofs of their capacity for development and – apart from our agreements 
with them that cannot be disregarded–we owe it to them to give them a chance of 
development such in this we have to keep them aloof from the disturbing white influence 
of the eaP [sic].”190  Fiddes also minuted that Sir Percy should be told in a telegram that 
“the S of S has thought it advisable to recommend the apt of a new Gov. for Uganda for a 
short term of office during wh. [sic] time the question of amalgamation will receive 
further constion [sic].”191 Fiddes refused to agree with Sir Percy’s recommendations that 
the amalgamation would be to the benefit of the Baganda, stating that the Baganda were 
capable of developing by themselves, having proven that earlier. Fiddes thus concluded 
that the Baganda should be left free of white entry. Fiddes also suggested that 
amalgamation might produce difficulty in the administration of Uganda similar to that of 









the EAP.192 To avoid a repeat of the situation, Fiddes suggested that a new Uganda 
governor should appointed for a term of office within which the issue would be 
considered fully. Therefore, Fiddes’s recommended to Crewe a telegram to Sir Percy, 
intimating to him the decision to appoint a new governor.  
      Parliamentary undersecretary of State J. B. Seely accepted the advice of the civil 
servants and called attention to another issue. Seely minuted that, “on the whole I should 
be disposed to telegraph as Mr. Butler proposes. Sir P. Girouard’s talk of resignation 
unless he gets a free hand is the result of the unaccustomed altitude on a highly energetic 
temperament.”193 Butler proposed that Sir Percy’s threat of resignation if he was not 
given a free hand or his work delayed should be disregarded so that it would not distract 
them from the merit of his report. Seely stated that when Sir Percy “gets used to living 
9000 feet above sea level the energy will remain and the tendency to hurry will vanish. In 
the meantime, we may well support and encourage him as far as possible. It is a good 
thing to have in our service a man so full of energy and enthusiasm for his work.”194 
Seely believed that Sir Percy was yet to get accustomed to the influence of the 
environment which would make his head lighter and less determined in view of the 
altitude of the new environment where he found himself. But the tendency to hurry would 
still remain, the change in the altitude notwithstanding. Crewe noted that, “for some 
reason our relations with Sir P. Girouard are delicate and I concur in Col. Seely’s view of 
the situation.” 195  Despite Butler and Seely’s comments that Sir Percy’s threat of 
resignation should be ignored, the officials at the CO treaded cautiously in dealing with 
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Sir Percy’s recommendations. Sir Percy threatened to resign if approvals of his 
recommendations were delayed or latitude in their application denied. This had been the 
cause of the CO’s caution, and Crewe also described their relationship with Sir Percy was 
delicate. This threat of resignation suggested the cavalier nature of Sir Percy, and 
difficulty in dealing with him, keeping in mind his earlier run in with Milner, perhaps a 
portrait of the man is coming together that is not so commendable as some suggest.  
      Therefore, Crewe replied to Sir Percy, in a telegram of 7 January 1910, stating, “as to 
amalgamation, circumstances which I will explain to you separately have made it 
necessary to designate a new governor of Uganda for a period of not more than two 
years.”196 Crewe stated further: “Full amalgamation therefore is not practicable at the 
present, but I am much impressed by your arguments in favor of amalgamation of some 
kind, and I shall not cease to consider the question more closely during the period of 
office of the new Governor.”197 However, Crewe added that, “in the meantime, your 
report on Uganda will be extremely valuable to me particularly in the matters of the land 
question, communications, and military policy.”198  
    This ended the question of amalgamation in the short run, but Crewe was willing to 
review the question on amalgamation at an appropriate time with a view to appraise the 
position fully. Despite the intimation transmitted to Sir Percy on the position of the CO 
on the question of amalgamation, the CO continued to deliberate on the question, which 
did not produce an outcome other than the suggestion made by Read, that Zanzibar could 
be amalgamated to the EAP rather than Uganda. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





       However, the main factor that could inform any decision on Sir Percy’s proposed 
amalgamation of the two colonies was the expediency of the scheme, which the CO was 
open to consider. Nevertheless, Sir Percy was faced with the most daunting task of 
convincing the CO of the expediency of amalgamation that informed his 
recommendations, which the CO would also consider at length before they could decide 
whether or not amalgamation would produce the desired strengthening of the machinery 
of government. In the interim, it was clear from Crewe’s reply that Sir Percy could not 
from the very beginning convince the CO of the need to amalgamate Uganda to the EAP. 
The latter situation had informed the CO decision in the interim, pending full appraisal of 
the position before a final decision on whether or not amalgamation would be considered.  
      All that the CO wanted was to be convinced that the proposed amalgamation would 
produce development of the protectorates and strengthen the machinery of government as 
Sir Percy had recommended to Crewe. The CO, having considered Sir Percy’s proposed 
amalgamation, came to a clear conclusion that Sir Percy’s arguments on the desirability 
of the amalgamation were not convincing. The CO opined that Uganda was more 
advanced and more prosperous than the EAP and therefore, Uganda would remain as a 
separate protectorate from the EAP.199 
     This suggested that Sir Percy refused to advise based on the existing conditions, and, 
instead, reported out of his own personal interest; that of placing Uganda under his 
command.200 His Uganda report was based on facts in most instances, but in other 
instances, his report was marred with misapprehension on certain issues especially on the 
staff of the Uganda Protectorate. Sir Percy might have wanted to have a large area under 
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his command, which would extend his power as well as his control over a large expanse 
of land. It could be recalled that Read, in a minute on Sir Percy’s Interim Report and the 
Uganda Report, stated that Sir Percy might be interested in having a large expanse of area 
under his command, which might have informed his amalgamation scheme, rather than 
the need of amalgamation based on public advantage as Uganda was in a better state of 
administration and development than the EAP.  
     The fact that Sir Percy stated that the provincial staff of Uganda was weak clearly 
demonstrated that his recommendations were unfair, as he was only in Uganda for two 
weeks, which might not be enough to assess all the provincial staff of Uganda. It could be 
recalled that he made a similar statement on the staff of the EAP, in his Main Report 
Upon the EAP of 26 May 1910. 201 From all indication, personal interest might have 
informed his report on Uganda, as his recommendation contradicted what he reported as 
to the status of Uganda’s administration and state of development. This was an indication 
that Sir Percy’s proposed amalgamation was informed by personal political prestige 
rather than real knowledge and expertise on administration. It also suggested that Sir 
Percy was willing to sacrifice Uganda administration and development to enhance his 
political authority. 202  The CO objected and pointed out his bias, rather than 
administration expediency, and refused to budge on the idea of amalgamation.  
    The question of whether he could convince the CO of the desirability of amalgamation 
clearly demonstrated that Sir Percy had not fully appraised the conditions of 
administration of the two protectorates to warrant his recommendation for the 
amalgamation. Sir Percy did not avail himself of knowledge of the two administrations 
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sufficiently to convince the CO of the expediency of amalgamation. Despite the CO’s 
interest on the question of amalgamation of the two colonies, they declined to approve of 
the policy, as there were no merits for such amalgamation based on Tomkins’s 
memorandum.  
    From Sir Percy’s report and the reaction of the CO staff, another interesting view 
which Sir Percy raised was the question of white penetration into Uganda, and it was not 
illogical from his own view that the placing of Uganda under the EAP would afford him 
the opportunity of opening up Uganda to the white settlers, a view that Fiddes rejected 
outright. Fiddes viewed that the whites would penetrate into Uganda if amalgamation was 
decided and it would afford additional reason against the amalgamation so that Uganda 
would not be thrown in a similar problem that the EAP has had.203  
     Therefore, Sir Percy’s recommendations were informed by his desire to have a large 
expanse of area under his command rather than advantages that would accrue to the 
colonies and the CO. This situation left a lot to be desired on the personality of Sir Percy, 
as he was more interested in the promotion of his own personal political interest by 
having a large area under his command rather than advancing the course of the two 
colonies based on public interest. This case of amalgamation, and its resolution by the 
CO, suggests that Sir Percy was not be an administrator devoted to the promotion of 
ideals based on the best interest of advancing the course of the colonies and the interest of 
British government of effecting economy in colonial administration.  
 Appraisals of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches 
     The executive, legislative, and judicial arms of the colony were appraised in Sir 
Percy’s Interim Report. He recommended that they should be reorganized. As to the 




executive council, Sir Percy reported to Crewe, in his Interim Report, that lack of a strong 
colonial secretary had been the cause of the secretariat disabilities in many respects.  Sir 
Percy added the absence of the latter had caused the governor to be preoccupied with 
minor affairs that would have been attended to by a strong colonial secretary. The effect 
of this preoccupation, Sir Percy stated, caused the governor to devote less time to the 
question of the evolution of both political and administrative questions.204  In short, lack 
of a strong colonial secretary and the weakness of the executive council in numerical 
strength as well as in debate caused Sir Percy to recommend the reorganization of the 
council.  
   As to the legislative Council, Sir Percy reported in his Interim Report that from his 
experience of one meeting with the Legislative Council, it appeared to be “an invertebrate 
body, and requires strengthening both officially and unofficially.”205 Owing to the 
number of departments in the protectorate, many had no direct representation in council, 
which Sir Percy viewed as a very grave disadvantage in debate.206 Sir Percy also pointed 
out “the government element not infrequently divides on subject of importance, and there 
has been wanting a strong lead. It is not politic to my mind that this lead should in 
council come from the President himself. In a community such as I gauge this one to be, 
this line of action might create a situation in which the governor could not allow himself 
to be placed.”207  
    Therefore, Sir Percy recommended that the policy must come from the governor and 
his executive council, and what was desired was a strong exponent of these views in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






legislative council, a colonial secretary.208  Sir Percy recommended that what he expected 
in council were elements who share the views of the governor and who could advocate 
such views in the council debates, especially the colonial secretary. Sir Percy added that 
the only possible solution to such weakness was to appoint a competent colonial secretary 
who could take the work seriously. Also with regard to the legislature, Sir Percy 
recommended for more European unofficials as members of the Legislative Council, so 
that they could be heard.209   
    With regard to the judicial and legal affairs, on the other hand, Sir Percy was very 
critical as to the competence of the judiciary when he told Crewe, in his Interim Report, 
that  “the Bench as a body is I fear somewhat discredited.”210 Sir Percy observed that 
there was the need “for strengthened and even leavening the Judiciary.”211  However, Sir 
Percy told Crewe that he gained experience of the principal judge, Judge Barth’s, 
competence when he was compiling his Interim Report.212 Sir Percy added that Judge 
Barth impressed him as an able conscientious justice who would be of assistance.213 
     The law department, in Sir Percy’s view, was none too strong for the many difficult 
tasks before the colony. The senior officer was a charming person, but had no extensive 
colonial experience; his junior was said to be incompetent.214 Neither judiciary nor law 
department appeared “to have done any serious work in the very necessary codification 
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of the laws or in the removal of the anomalous situation created by the application of 
Indian enactments unsuited to the white or indigenous inhabitants.”215   
      In the CO, Butler commented that Sir Percy stated that the reorganization he proposed 
would involve no increase in the estimates but will be met by his savings from the 
proposed annual estimates.216 Therefore, Butler continued, “on this understanding, I think 
that the appointment of a Chief Justice, a Colonial Secretary, and an Attorney General is 
in itself desirable.”217 Butler added, “we should have to consider the question further in 
the light of the difficulty of dealing with the present holders of appointments which have 
virtually taken the place of these, viz: - The Principal Judge, the Lieutenant Governor, 
and the crown advocate.”218  
      Therefore, Butler summarized Sir Percy’s requests for reform as to the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches that Sir Percy recommended for the appointment of 
Chief Justice, a Colonial Secretary, and an Attorney General. Butler added, “Sir Percy 
sketched his idea on the distribution of work between the various departments, and 
proposed his idea of the composition of the executive and legislative councils.”219 Butler 
added that Sir Percy had clearly made “out a preliminary case on all these points, but of 
course detailed consideration must follow.”220 Butler recommended that if there were a 
colonial secretary there should be no Lieutenant Governor and “the Colonial Secretary 
would naturally replace the treasury on both councils.”221 Butler also stated that there was 
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no need for both the attorney general and the crown advocate to be in the councils, the 
attorney general could replace the crown advocate.222   
     As to the agriculture and lands departments, Butler recommended that the merger of 
the two departments “would make unnecessary the presence of the Director of 
Agriculture on the Legislative Council.”223 Butler went on to describe the important 
alterations suggested in the legislative council. The alterations suggested for new 
appointments or rearrangement of departments were the removal of A. C. Hollis, 
Secretary for Native Affairs (henceforth a part of colonial secretary’s department), the 
making of the commissioner of public works an ex-officio instead of an official member 
and the addition of two unofficial members. The net result would be to have eight ex-
officio in the Legislative Council, one of whom is the governor, face to face with seven 
unofficials in the Legislative Council. The present council had six ex-officio members, 
three official, and five unofficial members. The margin against a vote adverse to the 
government, Butler observed, “is thus considerably narrowed.”224  
    Butler added, “This is an inevitable accompaniment of giving the people of the 
Protectorate more voice in their own affairs, but I should be inclined not to let the number 
of unofficial members exceed 6 at present.” 225  Butler added that Sir Percy’s 
recommendation of having the Attorney General and the Solicitor General in the 
Legislative Council appeared to be “a little odd as there was no other department that was 
doubly represented.”226 Butler stated, however, the need to discuss legislation in the 
council might require the presence of both the Attorney General and the Solicitor 








General.227  Therefore, Butler, in continuation of his comment on the proposed reforms of 
these branches of the government, recommended that the immediate “necessary thing is 
to intimate to Sir Percy the sympathy and interest with which the Secretary of State has 
received this report and the value he attaches to it, and to show him that he is secure of 
full support within reasonable limits.”228  
     Butler stated further that it should be made clear to Sir Percy that he must expect “a 
certain amount of criticism, and that it is not possible to swallow all the proposals which 
he puts forward without examination.”229 Butler added “a telegram conveying all this 
would be a lengthy and expensive affair, but I think it is justified by the 
circumstances.” 230  In spite of Butler’s indisposition to reply by telegram, he 
recommended that the telegram was the most appropriate as it had been found urgently 
necessary to inform Sir Percy that there would be a new governor for the Uganda 
Protectorate for a certain period of time.231 But such intimation, Butler suggested, should 
go along with the general sympathetic attitude of Crewe in other aspects of his report.232  
    Without sympathetic expression of Crewe on his report, Butler added, “I am afraid that 
Sir Percy might think, very naturally, that he had not been well treated by the 
appointment of a governor immediately on the heels of instructions to him to report on 
the question of amalgamation.”233 Therefore, Butler recommended to Crewe to send a 
telegram to Sir Percy as a reply. Read expressed concurrence with Butler’s 
recommendations. He minuted: “Mr. Butler has dealt so fully & ably with this interesting 
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desp: that it is scarcely necessary for me to add anything.”234  However, Read observed 
that they may differ in opinion as to Sir Percy’s proposed reforms especially in “the 
weeding out of inefficient officials.”235  Read added, some of these officials did an 
excellent job in the early pioneer days of the protectorate and “we naturally hesitate to cut 
them adrift without some sort of provision.”236   
      Read added that the older staff remember the colony during its early years and had 
interest in the protectorate and the big game and there were no trouble with questions 
which white settlement had raised and they might not be enthusiastic about modern 
development. 237  Fiddes complemented Read’s comments, when he minuted on Sir 
Percy’s proposed reform in the Legislative Council. Fiddes recalled Sir Percy’s 
consideration that unofficials members would be equal in number to the officials 
(members of the government). Fiddes minuted, “it seems to me that if he wanted to 
produce trouble this is exactly the way to do it.” Fiddes pointed out that the governor’s 
casting vote will be required and if the governor’s representative or the commandant 
were away, the government will be in a minority position.238  In this situation, Sir Percy 
wanted to have a lead over the council by having more voting unofficials in the council 
so that he could have overriding votes for his agenda to pass through. In an equal vote or 
if the legislators are in majority, Sir Percy might not get his way out. Despite this 
potential difficulty, this was one of many issues that indicated Sir Percy’s desire to curry 
favor with the European settlers. 
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      Nevertheless, he could not implement the proposal, as the CO could not approve 
some of the recommendations in view of their being detrimental to the colony. Thus his 
policy failed.  Crewe, in a reply to Sir Percy, in a telegram of 7 January 1910, wrote that 
it was necessary to consider them in connection with the men, the office of the principal 
judge, lieutenant-governor, and crown advocate, and asked Sir Percy to submit detailed 
recommendations on the said subject.239   
      Sir Percy, in a reply to Crewe’s request for more information on the proposed 
reorganization, addressed a telegram of 19 February 1910, requesting the consideration of 
his proposed reforms he transmitted in his Interim Report.240  In the CO, Butler minuted 
that Sir Percy should transmit a detailed explanation of how he wanted the reforms 
carried out in a dispatch.241 Read also emphasized the need for detailed information in a 
dispatch.242  Fiddes, in his comment on Sir Percy’s request for action on his proposed 
reorganization of the executive, stated that Sir Percy’s piecemeal requests for a policy 
formulation by means of a telegram could lead to complications in the future and 
cautioned against similar requests.243  Crewe thus replied to Sir Percy, in a telegram of 2 
March 1910, and directed Sir Percy to transmit full detail of his request by dispatch.244     
    In a reply to Crewe’s telegram, Sir Percy transmitted another report, which he titled 
Main Report. There he reiterated his request for the abolition of the post of Lieutenant 
Governor and, in its place, a new post of a colonial secretary should be created.245  In a 
covering secret dispatch, Sir Percy recommended that Jackson should be transferred to “a 
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purely native country.”246  This was a veiled reference that Jackson should be transferred 
to Uganda. Sir Percy stated that he admired and respected Jackson and that he 
commanded respect within the community and had qualities for the administration of a 
purely African state, but he lacked requisite qualities for a developing mixed community 
like the EAP.247  Sir Percy added that Jackson did not control the legislative council as 
speaker or leader, nor could he control the secretariat, which got out of control.248 Sir 
Percy recommended the Treasurer, Bowring, as the colonial secretary for his ability, 
popularity, success, tact, and urbanity in handling council.249 
     In reply to Sir Percy’s requests for the reorganization of the executive, legislative and 
the judiciary, a decision was not made until early 1911. With regard to Sir Percy’s 
request for the abolition of the post of lieutenant governor and the creation of a post of a 
colonial secretary in its place, the CO approved the abolition of the post of the lieutenant 
governor, and the post of a colonial secretary was created. Bowring, the Treasurer of the 
colony, was appointed colonial secretary. Jackson, who was the lieutenant governor, was 
promoted and transferred to the vacant post of governor of the Uganda Protectorate. In 
fact, Jackson elevation’s was made possible by Read who insisted that Jackson’s past 
service should be recognized and it was in consideration of Read’s appeal that Jackson 
was elevated.250 As to the legal department, the CO refused to make any reorganization of 
staff of this department.251   
      These reorganizations were necessary, as Sir Percy had indicated that other than the 
absence of a clearly defined policy of government administration, the colony’s machinery 
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of government must be strengthened to carry through his proposed reforms. Lack of 
policy was responsible for many of the disabilities of the colony, especially government 
standing orders, which Sir Percy stated had caused the presence of a body of staff without 
a defined role.252  Therefore, Sir Percy believed that his proposed reforms would provide 
the desired policy reform that would strengthen the executive to carry through his 
reforms.   
    But of Sir Percy’s proposed reforms at the executive level, other than the two changes 
mentioned; lieutenant governor and colonial secretary, nothing had been altered. The CO 
was reluctant to affect a sweeping reform that could have a dire consequence on the 
administration, believing that Sir Percy must not have appraised the condition of the 
administration sufficiently to inform his proposed reform. Therefore, his reforms at the 
executive level failed as he failed to convince the CO of the necessity of the sweeping 
reforms. This suggested that Sir Percy failed to examine the condition of administration 
fully before he could recommend for the changes, a situation that an effective 
administrator would always desist from effecting inconsequential reforms. 
 Sir Percy’s Views on the Provincial Political Staff 
      Another part of Sir Percy’s assessment of the EAP’s administration was his 
evaluation of individual staff members in his Main Report. In that document, he assessed 
the staff members and passed very uncomplimentary statements on them. He claimed that 
his comments were guided not just by his own observations, but also reflected the 
opinion of some of the provincial commissioners. Sir Percy told Crewe, in the Main 
Report, that in the opinion of the commissioners, some of the senior staff was “hopelessly 
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incompetent.”253 There were some of the staff whose grade had been reduced, and there 
were also two other staff that was known to have been “habitual drunkards.”254 Sir Percy 
also reported on other separate cases of two staff; one had already been transferred to 
Nyasaland for circumstances that Sir Percy refused to disclose and the conduct of the 
other staff member was under investigation for circumstances that he “could not believe 
possible in a British colony or protectorate.”255 Sir Percy lamented the very deplorable 
conduct of the staff but declined to condemn them, reiterating that he was impressed 
favorably by the provincial commissioners. 256   
     In spite of lack of defined policy of administration, which made it difficult for Sir 
Percy to highly praise the staff, Sir Percy, in his Main Report of 26 May 1910, told 
Crewe that the commissioners had been long without any defined policy of 
administration, and had become “hopelessly self-satisfied or supine.”257  Sir Percy stated 
that the former was not a matter of moment with capable men; “but of such we only have 
Ainsworth, and he is probably leaving the Protectorate service.”258 Sir Percy added that 
Hobley was “mistrusted and unpopular; he has undoubted ability which tends towards 
assuming all possible functions he can lay his hands on: he has been at one and the same 
time Acting Lieutenant-Governor, Provincial Commissioner, President Municipal 
Committee, and President, Education Board.”259  
     Sir Percy was further “struck in perusing reports and correspondences, where he learnt 
of the prevailing spirit of factious rivalry and disloyalty which was common among some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









members of the political staff.260  With such attitudes Sir Percy found it difficult to let go. 
He advised Crewe that winnowing was imperative, and should be “ruthlessly carried 
out.”261 At the same time, Sir Percy suggested that the most important consideration was 
that “continuous policy must be established, and harmony and co-operation 
engendered.”262  
    At this point, Sir Percy, upon the counsel of the executive, became increasingly critical 
on some of the senior officials of the administration when he recommended for their 
retirement from service.263  Sir Percy also told Crewe that his criticism of the political 
staff was informed by the views he sought and obtained from the Lieutenant Governor 
and provincial commissioners in council, as to the general weaknesses or incompetence 
in the administration.264 The commissioners offered frank advice without allowing their 
“personal feelings to actuate them in tendering their advice.”265 Distance however was 
great, and it was not for some time that, “I thoroughly realized the efficiency in working 
of both the administrative and judicial machines and the suitability of the executive 
policy.”266  
     Just as in the Interim Report, Sir Percy also criticized what he viewed as a lack of 
general policy that was characterized by little action to collate laws or set out proper 
administrative regulations. But it was his staff criticism that was most striking. That the 
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staff situation was not pleasing to the governor may be seen when he told Crewe “the 
situation will demand much close attention and pruning knife.”267 
     Two senior members of the provincial staff who came under Sir Percy’s critical 
assessment were H. L. Hinde and C. R. W. Lane. Sir Percy described Hinde as “lazy and 
unreliable” and stated that Lane was “self-satisfied, pigheaded and highly unpopular.”268 
Sir Percy also told Crewe that Lane “came to me unsolicited to deny that ‘he was drunk 
in a public bar and making use of disloyal utterances as to Government and myself.’ I had 
heard from the best of sources that he was talking a great deal too much, nothing else; 
and Mr. [sic] Jackson was asked by me, as a friend of his, to caution him.”269  Despite Sir 
Percy’s admonition to Jackson on Lane, Sir Percy “was mortified and astonished to hear 
Mr. Lane repeat this accusation of drunkenness, and told him it was quite unnecessary to 
have explained. Had I heard of any such conduct I would have at once required him to 
clear his character.”270  In addition to this inappropriate behavior, Sir Percy put forward 
another factor in his negative views of officers such as Lane. This was that most 
provincial commissioners lacked the social qualifications necessary for the entertaining 
of a white community. Only the now retired S. S. Bagge had the desirable “social 
qualifications fitting him for a Provincial Commissionership.”271 
      Sir Percy also reported that Mr. Reddie was a newly appointed staff at 58 years of 
age, and Sir Percy was of the opinion that Reddie was “desirous of pension.”272 There 
was also Mr. McClellan whose appointment was the last to have been made in the 
protectorate. Sir Percy told Crewe that other than McClellan, none of these officers had 
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the “social qualifications necessary for the handling or entertaining of a white 
community.”273  This was very unfortunate and Sir Percy stated, it had been a “potent 
factor in accentuating the situation.”274  
   Sir Percy also took a negative view of many senior district commissioners. Among 
these was a Mr. Foaker who had been passed over for promotion and no provincial 
commissioner would have him in his province. The governor considered him an obstacle 
to administration. Sir Percy added that he was “indeed a bitter and disappointed man, 
with a quite impossible wife who stirs up dissension wherever she goes,” and “He should 
undoubtedly be pensioned at once.”275  There was Mr. Gilkison who had been pensioned 
but he was still in the service of the protectorate, and a “reason for his continued retention 
in the service I cannot fathom-the results were deplorable.”276  
       Sir Percy also pointed out two senior assistant district commissioners, Farrant and 
Mayes, as similarly unsuitable officers. The two were “ useless as officials,”277 and such 
a state of affairs, Sir Percy maintained, “demands more than ordinary remedies.”278 Thus 
he called for the immediate retirement of men like Farrant and Mayes. Provincial and 
district commissioners, in his view, must be men of ability, social position, and good 
education.279  
    Despite Sir Percy’s strong demands for the retiring and firing of staff, the CO 
recognized that there would be problems in carrying out Sir Percy’s recommendations. In 
his response to Sir Percy’s Interim Report, for example, Read had minuted that there 










would be difficulty in carrying through Sir Percy’s staffing recommendations. He pointed 
out that some of the staff had done an excellent job in the early days of the colony and 
London would naturally hesitate to cut them adrift without some sort of provision.280  He 
added that in giving a retiring allowance the Treasury does not offer any assistance, 
having taken an uncompromising attitude in the matter. In the EAP, Read stated that 
practically all the IBEA employees were taken over by the protectorate, with the result 
that the protectorate was saddled with various officials who were unable to keep pace 
with the development of Uganda and the EAP.281  
     Crewe followed up Read’s December minute in a telegram of 7 January 1910. As to 
the question of retirements, the Secretary of State advised Sir Percy to work out 
separately the circumstances of each staff member in respect of his retirement, or possible 
transfers of present heads of departments, and submit such proposals to the CO for 
further consideration.282  Crewe added that in forwarding the said proposal, Sir Percy 
should take into consideration the adjustments of claims of officers now at the heads of 
separate departments by some means other than dispensing with their services, unless 
“absolute inefficiency can be maintained against them.”283  
    But such a request from Crewe was not clearly honored as Sir Percy followed up these 
requests in his Main Report with harsh criticism of staff. The CO refused to approve of 
him effecting any changes, as it had not been found necessary to make alteration in the 
provincial staff.284  The CO believed that the position of staff should be left alone, 
conceding to Sir Percy’s proposal would jeopardize the administration and place the staff 
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in difficulty. There was no provision for pensions being made in that year by the colony. 
Again, sourcing for replacement or promoting junior staff to take up senior positions 
would further entail financial costs to a colony depending on annual grants-in-aid from 
the British Treasury. Therefore, not much alteration was done in respect of the staff. In 
this case, it could be argued that Sir Percy had not appraised the competence of the staff 
to even warrant his recommendations. It could be learnt from the Uganda Report, where 
he stated that the staff members in Uganda were weak, having spent only a fortnight in 
Uganda at the headquarters of the administration.285 There were objections on the latter 
view by Tomkins who stated that Sir Percy was in Uganda for only weeks which was not 
enough to appraise the position, if at all he met all the staff of the protectorate. Therefore, 
his appraisal of the staff in the EAP might have been done under misapprehension in a 
similar manner to that of the Uganda Protectorate. In this case, Sir Percy had not carried 
through an objective assessment of the situation to warrant the approval of his 
recommendations. The fact that the CO refused to approve his recommendations for 
firing and retirement meant that he had failed to effect the sound administration he had 
proposed to carry through for the development of the EAP. 
Reorganization of Government Departments and Staff Redeployment 
      In the reorganization of government departments and senior staff redeployment, Sir 
Percy proposed the merger of certain departments which he believed were either 
redundant or duplicating functions of other departments or they should not have been 
there in the first place. In this reorganization, Sir Percy wished to trim the size of 
government departments and the weeding out ineffective staff members with a view to 
ensure that the machinery of government was strengthened to carry through his proposed 
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reforms. In carrying through his reforms, Sir Percy recommended to the CO, in his Main 
Report, that the eight provinces of the colony should be reduced to four provinces. A 
chief commissioner who would be reporting to the central government would head each 
of the four provinces.286 At a district level, Sir Percy recommended that there would be 
senior district commissioners to administer the fifteen districts.”287    
      For the proposed chief commissioners, Sir Percy recommended that one should be 
located in Nyanza and proposed Ainsworth should be appointed to the position. In a 
situation where Ainsworth retired, Sir Percy proposed that Lane should be appointed to 
the position.  In the white highlands, Boyle would be transferred from Uganda to take 
charge. For the Northern Province, McClellan was recommended for the job while the 
fourth office was to be at the coast with Jackson proposed for the job, or Hobley in case 
Jackson was transferred to Uganda.288 If the latter arrangement failed to take off, Hobley 
would be transferred to Uganda to replace Boyle. Hinde and Reddie were to be retired, as 
there were no senior positions for them to fill. Sir Percy made it clear in his report that he 
wanted to see some of the changes. It was his concern to placate and promote good 
feelings with the European settler community. He wanted Hobley out of the protectorate, 
for example, as he would not work well with the white community of the highlands.289 If 
amalgamation was approved, Sir Percy would transfer him “to a purely native province in 
Uganda.”290 Sir Percy’s desire to transfer Boyle to the EAP had a similar motivation.  
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The governor felt that Boyle would “get on well with both the white and native 
community.”291  
      In the CO’s response to Sir Percy, Crewe asked him to submit detailed proposals. 
This suggests that by mid-1910, the CO was wary of Sir Percy’s condemnation of 
officials and calls for wide ranging reorganization. The officials had good reason to be. 
Sir Percy failed to submit further recommendations on retirements, transfers, and 
adjustment of claims on all the staff members regarding whom he had made 
recommendations.292  
     Therefore, his failure to follow up on the issue of staff reorganization ended his 
proposed reorganization. Other than Jackson, who was transferred to Uganda as 
governor, and the treasurer, Bowring, who was appointed to the newly created post of a 
colonial secretary, nothing had been affected. For the heads of departments he 
recommended for retirement, it was agreed that they should retire on the expiration of 
their terms of office. Other than the latter two, nothing had been achieved in his proposed 
restructuring of staff. These recommendations were informed by his knowledge of 
Northern Nigeria. He hoped to see that a similar administration was established in the 
EAP. But the different conditions of the EAP and Northern Nigeria, and a lack of 
evidence to support some issues he raised, complicated his proposed reforms.    
       Therefore, Sir Percy’s assessment of the situation was not carried through in a 
manner that would afford improvement on the conditions found as it was haphazardly 
done. He had not invested sufficient time and learned of the condition in the colony to 
enable him put forward those recommendations. An administrator considered to be sound 
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would carry through all his assignments in a manner that would afford progress and 
development, but Sir Percy’s recommendations on these subjects would have created 
shortages of staff and difficulty, which suggests that Sir Percy either lacked knowledge of 
the outcome of his action or he ignored the outcome. These were not the qualities that 
could be associated with an outstanding administrator, as they would have caused 
embarrassments to the CO.    
       In this regard, Sir Percy’s administration came under critical scrutiny by historians of 
East Africa, especially Mungeam, who argues that Sir Percy had been a force to be 
reckoned with in the administration of Kenya as he had given the administration a sense 
of direction by putting official circulars in place, hitherto almost absent.293  While this 
success may be acknowledged, it is still clear that Sir Percy’s achievements in the area of 
the administration of policy and staff matters were far from satisfactory. He failed to 
implement most of the recommendations discussed in this chapter, and this revealed a 
failing of his governorship. Sir Percy also failed to convince his superiors in the CO of 
the rightness of his policy recommendations, which without London’s backing and 
approval, he thus had limited success. 
     Contrary to Mungeam’s assessment, going by Sir Percy performance in policy, which 
he stated was absent, Sir Percy could had been considered to provide a sense of direction 
to the colony’s policy as far as the official circulars of the colony were concerned. On the 
contrary, and administration was characterized by individual idiosyncrasies of each of the 
senior officials of the protectorate. 
 Conclusion  
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       The administration of policy recommendations became a very critical aspect of Sir 
Percy’s administration but not much had been achieved, other than a political 
memorandum guiding officials in the discharge of their functions, improved record 
keeping, and taxation had improved to a certain degree. But the relative improvement had 
not been as successful as he had proposed in his policy recommendations. This is very 
clear from his failed attempt to introduce his proposal for applying Ainsworth’s method 
of tax collection throughout the colony.  
      On the question of merger of the three coast provinces of Jubaland, Seyyedie, and 
Tanaland, the CO refused to approve of the merger. As to amalgamation between the East 
Africa and the Uganda protectorates, the CO, having studied Sir Percy’s Uganda Report 
and the Interim Report, opined that Sir Percy was under misapprehension for 
recommending Uganda to be amalgamated to the EAP. Uganda was more advanced and 
prosperous than the EAP. Therefore, Uganda continued as a separate protectorate, and the 
question of amalgamation was dropped.  
       As to the executive, legislative and judicial arms of administration of the colony, Sir 
Percy’s recommendations for reform had not been approved. Other than the appointment 
of Bowring as a colonial secretary, the transfer of Jackson to Uganda, and the increase of 
members on the legislative council, nothing had been approved. On the provincial 
political staff, the CO took no measure of reform. However, Sir Percy was advised to 
treat the staff with respect so that there will be harmony engendered in the colony.  
     With respect to his recommendation on termination of appointments of some officials, 
Sir Percy was advised to wait until the expiration of their terms of office so that they 
would be relieved of their functions and their offices could be merged as he had 
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recommended. In this case, Sir Percy secured the termination of the position of the 
commissioner of lands, public works, and conservator of forests upon the expiration of 
their terms of offices. On the merger of their departments and elevation of their juniors to 
take control of the departments, Sir Percy was told to provide details on how to carry 
through the reforms, considering adjustment in pay and payment of pension to retiring 
officials. However, Sir Percy never transmitted such detail to the CO, and the proposed 
reform remained in abeyance. Therefore, his proposed policy of establishing government 
standing orders, record keeping and taxation had improved but had not been as proposed 
for introduction in the colony. The question of reforms in the executive, legislative and 
judiciary as well as provincial political staff and government departments had not been 
achieved to a degree that could be considered a successful introduction of policy.  
   By the time he left the colony, not much satisfaction had been achieved in the evolution 
and development of government policy of administration as he had proposed in both his 
Interim and the Main reports. This failing was spectacular in the areas he had proposed to 
reform, and as he could not do so, the administration of policy had not been successful 
and Sir Percy had not succeeded in his task of administration worthy of being an 
outstanding colonial administrator. 
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                                                            Chapter 5 
        Sir Percy as Arbiter between the EAP’s Racial Groups: European Settlers and    
        Indian Residents 
 Introduction 
      The CO and Sir Percy recognized the EAP as a multiracial colony. By 1909 the 
territory was inhabited by a majority of African ethnic groups as well as three others 
recognized at the time as belonging to distinct racial groups: Arabs, Europeans and 
Indians (also referred to as Asians). A challenging aspect of Sir Percy’s administration 
was the often-competing claims of the European settlers and the Indian residents of the 
EAP for political influence. Even more than his predecessors, Sir Percy’s policy of 
administration was slanted to favor the European settlers in what would later be termed 
the Indian question in Kenya’s history. He helped to provoke deepening tensions between 
those two racial groups that emerged within a decade to become a major issue 
confronting the British government. His failure to balance the competing claims of the 
Indians and the Europeans, as in the case of his failure to reform the protectorate’s 
administration, thus left huge problems unresolved at the end of his governorship. 
 Indians and European Settlers Political Demands  
     The Indians were also conscious of their political aspirations since the beginning of 
their immigration into the colony. The Asians demonstrated this in the formation of an 
association in order to coordinate among Indians and as a means of protest against what 
they could conceive as unjust.294 Therefore, the Indians formed their first political 
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association, the Mombasa Indian Association, in 1900, which was led by L. M. Savle.295 
In 1906, the Indians formed a similar association in Nairobi that became a leading 
organization for Indian politics in the colony. The Indians also formed other associations, 
especially after World War 1, in Kisumu, Naivasha, Eldoret, Fort Hall, and in other urban 
centers of the colony.296 
    The Indians political voice was first heard from the colony in 1906 notably by the 
formation of Mombasa Indian Association, which protested against European settler 
exclusive possession of the highlands for settlement. The Indians sent a deputation to the 
CO, demanding fair treatment against what they described as unequal treatments between 
them and the settlers.297 By 1907, the Indians had formed a broad based association, the 
British East Africa Indian Association, which addressed Churchill during his visit to the 
colony on the question of the highlands. But Churchill told the Indian deputation that the 
highlands would be reserved for the settlers. After Churchill’s tour, however, he 
recommended that the colony be made more suitable for the Indians.298  
     The time coincided with the Liberal government of Herbert Asquith who sought to 
implement Churchill’s recommendations that the EAP was more suitable for Indian 
colonization. In March 1909, Crewe appointed a parliamentary committee to investigate 
Indian migration and recommend the most useful area where it could be encouraged.299  
The committee chaired by Lord Sanderson was also asked to recommend on the 
desirability of Indian colonization of the protectorate. Sanderson’s recommendations 
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were not considered, and by 1909 Sir Percy was appointed governor of the colony.300  He 
demonstrated an anti-Indian bias in his administration, especially when he demanded the 
removal of A. M. Jeevanjee from the legislative council.301 But it was not long before 
Jeevanjee aired his grievances against the administration while on a vacation in London. 
The Indian grievances came up when Jeevanjee was granted an interview to the press on 
Indian disabilities in the colony. What could be seen as an outburst from Jeevanjee to the 
Daily Chronicle, which was, later on, publicized in the media and newspapers throughout 
Britain, caused indignation in the colony and caused the settlers to unite as a political 
force with a view to counter Jeevanjee’s position.  
    Jeevanjee alleged preferential treatment of the settlers by the colonial state against the 
Indians in the interview with The Daily Chronicle. Jeevanjee told the Chronicle that there 
were no equal rights or equal opportunities between the settlers and the Indians. He added 
that there were restrictions on Indian acquiring land in the highlands, favoritism to the 
settlers in the award of contracts, unfair use of the immigration laws, prohibition against 
Indians using the European market in Nairobi, discriminatory treatment on the railway, 
and refusal to allow Indians trial by jury.302 The Indians were discontented with the 
preferential treatment being accorded to the settlers, and the general disabilities under 
which they lived.303  
     As the news filtered into the protectorate, there was indignation amongst the settlers as 
his interview brought about a renewed feeling of unity amongst the settlers.304 Even 
though such disabilities were not the making of Sir Percy, he compounded them, in view 
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of his open anti- Indian stand as demonstrated in his opposition to Jeevanjee’s 
appointment on the legislative council soon after his arrival in the protectorate.305  
Therefore, the settlers asked Sir Percy to travel to London to represent their grievances, 
as well. Sir Percy sought and obtained permission, in August 1910, to travel to London to 
represent the settler’s view.306 
     Before Sir Percy traveled to London, the settlers who had entered the colony and 
settled there since 1903 had formed a well-established ideological political organization 
as well as set their eyes on the agriculturally fertile Nyanza basin.307 In a counter to the 
Indians press interview, the European settlers organized a dinner in November, in 
Nairobi, to mark his departure.308 During the dinner, in November, Delamere, in his 
address, told the crowd that recognized itself with the name of convention of 
associations, on the very first day of its meeting that since the assumption of government 
of Sir Percy, division between the settler and the local authorities had disappeared.309 
Captain Ewart S. Grogan was elected Chairman of the convention, and in his address, he 
replied to a toast, when he described himself as “the baddest and the boldest of the bold 
bad gang.”310 The association brought the settlers together so that they could ventilate 
their grievances to the government. The settlers became a united force in countering what 
they said was a fabricated interview that Jeevanjee granted to the press. These allegations 
and counter allegations were part of the struggle of the Indians for equality and the 
European search for supremacy in which Sir Percy sided with the cause of the Europeans 
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and ignored the Indian cause. This was also part of the problem that had accentuated 
racial division and portrayed Sir Percy’s bias towards the settlers that had made it 
difficult for him to evolve a fair and just policy for the administration of the races. While 
Sir Percy was at the CO representing settler opinion on Jeevanjee’s interview to the press, 
the India Office was also responding to Jeevanjee’s interview by demanding an 
explanation from the CO. Sir Percy and Read represented the settlers view in a meeting 
with the India Office representatives and two members of the Council of India. It was 
noted that all the grievances boiled down to two points; the land question in the highlands 
with the Indians not allowed to have a grant, and also a grant of land in some parts of the 
townships. Sir Percy and Read were able to convince the meeting that there was nothing 
to worry about.311  
   Sir Percy told the meeting that it was Lord Elgin who decided that the highlands should 
be reserved for the whites and in that regard; he should not be accused of bias, and, more 
importantly, the highlands were not suitable for Indian agriculturalists. As for grants in 
the townships, Sir Percy stated that in view of the sanitary condition of the Indians, he 
decided to limit grants to Indians in certain parts of the townships.312  
    But that was not the end of it, as Sir Percy fought back against Jeevanjee’s renewal of 
his tenure in the council.  Sir Percy became very critical of him, and told Crewe, in a 
confidential dispatch of 19 October 1910, that Jeevanjee’s statements were “fabrications 
and falsehoods,” which have “caused much indignation here.”313  Sir Percy criticized 
Jeevanjee, who he claimed could neither read nor write, and was refused permission to 
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have his secretary in the Legislative Council.314 He added that Jeevanjee had plenty of 
opportunities to ventilate his grievances in the council, but except on small matters had 
not done so. Sir Percy recommended to Harcourt, on the expiration of Jeevanjee’s term of 
office in September 1911 that it should not be renewed.315 Harcourt agreed to Sir Percy’s 
request that Jeevanjee’s appointment would not be renewed immediately. Harcourt 
opposed a complete termination of Jeevanjee’s appointment but was disposed to delay the 
renewal of Jeevanjee’s appointment.316   
     The Indians, nevertheless, continued to suffer, as they had no equal rights and 
opportunities with the settlers. Despite these disabilities associated with the Indians and 
their resolution, Sir Percy refused to do so, and instead turned against Jeevanjee by 
suspending his tenure on the council and renewing the tenure of the unofficial settler 
members regularly.317  Sir Percy’s bias in this case was clearly a manifestation of his 
favoritism towards his kith and kin which was further demonstrated when he supported 
and advocated for the European course, especially during the formation of their umbrella 
organization; the convention of associations.  
      The convention of associations convened in February 1911, for its first convention of 
association in the colony, where it passed a motion for the protectorate’s representation 
and Eliot was nominated as their representative at the fourth imperial conference. The 
meeting had a grandiose idea of the protectorate’s representation. In view of the 
conference, the settlers were talking of responsible government being “almost within a 
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hand reach.” 318  In August, the convention of associations convened for a second 
conference, where it voted unanimously for elective representation to the legislative 
council. Thereafter, a delegation met Sir Percy, at different times, to press for elective 
representation, but Sir Percy told them that the CO would turn down their request.319  
    This was the first time for Sir Percy to turn down the request of the settlers, without 
making reference to the CO. His past dealings with the CO might have informed his 
renewed sense of duty, that it was not all for the settlers, and the settlers must be run-on 
in certain instances, in the best interest of fairness and justice especially, when Harcourt, 
in December 1910, refused to consent to his proposed land reform and also rejected the 
April 1909 land ordinance.320     
     Nevertheless, the settlers were increasingly becoming interested in participating in the 
government of the protectorate so that they could be part of any decision affecting their 
lives.321 Not only were the settlers conscious of the latter, even the Indians were aware of 
it and interested in being part of the government, so that they be would be part of any 
decision affecting their lives. This was clearly demonstrated by Jeevanjee’s interview to 
the press in London, in 1910, where he exposed the politics and the competitions between 
the Indians and the settlers, and how the former were relegated to the back door, in the 
politics and policy of government.322 The settlers were politically conscious and were 
working toward the formation of political associations and unions that would lead their 
struggle for self-government.323  
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      The settlers believed that colonization of the protectorate and, more especially the 
white highlands, was a possibility.324 The settler’s worldview as to colonization was that 
they would establish a purely white settlement and a government side by side with an 
African state, and each would govern their own affairs. The settlers were determined to 
make Kenya their permanent home, not as a place where they could make wealth and 
quit.325 Sir Percy supported the settler’s quest for self-government and worked to achieve 
that through piecemeal policy initiatives. But the settler desire for self-government was 
rebuffed.326  
     Despite this eventual outcome, the European settlers considered Sir Percy’s 
administration as the best, and most promising. The settlers considered Sir Percy 
advocate and defender of their interests. This view was held by Elspeth Huxley, who 
considered that Sir Percy had provided a gateway for the development of the settlers and 
the colony by allowing unhindered settler access to land for the development of the 
colony as the Africans were unwilling partners in production for development. Huxley 
concluded that Sir Percy was an outstanding administrator who left Kenya, much revered 
by settlers.327 However, Maxon disagrees with Huxley, pointing out that Sir Percy’s 
administration of the races was detrimental to other races especially the Indians, as he 
adopted an unfavorable disposition toward them and opposed all their political 
aspirations for fairness in the colony.328 
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      In view of his anti-Indian stand that was more like a continuation of a policy of his 
predecessors, Maxon suggested that his administration accentuated racial prejudice 
between the Europeans and the Indians, instead of providing the desired quiescence 
administrative environment for both races to achieve their political aspirations. With this 
performance, Maxon contends that Sir Percy performed below the expectations of the 
CO, and cannot be considered an outstanding administrator, considering his failure to 
fairly administer a multiracial colony.329    
 Legislative Council 
 Sir Percy, within the first week of his assumption of government, told Crewe, in a 
telegram of 23 September 1909, that Lord Delamere, leader of the European settlers 
should be appointed to the legislative council, as the settler representative.330  Earlier on, 
Delamere had been appointed to the legislative council, but he resigned his appointment 
in May 1909, about four months before Sir Percy’s assumption of government.331 In his 
telegram, Sir Percy also urged Crewe to postpone the appointment of the Indian 
representative to the legislative council, A. M. Jeevanjee, made on 25 August 1909, until 
he had been able to “fully appreciate the position.”332 
      Sir Percy pointed out that the appointment of Jeevanjee might lead to a “legitimate 
demand” on the part of Arabs and the Swahili community, “who are our oldest native 
subjects, and who outnumbered the Indians by two to one.”333 Sir Percy went further as to 
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Jeevanjee’s appointment, when he told Crewe that even the term “Indian was an 
embarrassment to thousands of Goanese who were not British subjects.”334  
     In the CO, Butler minuted that Sir Percy should be told by telegram that steps might 
be taken to appoint Delamere to the council.335 As for the postponement of Jeevanjee’s 
appointment, Butler minuted, “unfortunately it was announced in the gazette of the 21 
September 1909 that the King had been pleased to give direction for the appointment, so 
that postponement is impossible.”336 Butler minuted, “we had better tell the Governor by 
telegraph, the question of appointing a representative for the Asiatic was carefully 
considered, and the intention was public property for a year before the notification 
appeared in last Tuesday’s gazette.”337      
    Fiddes agreed and pointed out that Delamere had done a lot of work in Kenya.338 Sir 
Francis Hopwood, Permanent Undersecretary of State, agreed, and stated, a full 
explanation by a telegram should be transmitted.339 Crewe agreed, and asked them to go 
ahead and work on the appointment of Delamere. Crewe, in reference to Delamere’s 
appointment, stated they should go on as proposed. He added: “by the way, talked a great 
deal, with insufficient knowledge,” referring to Delamere.340 In the interim, Crewe 
replied to Sir Percy, in a telegram of 2 October 1909, that the appointment of Delamere 
will be favorably considered, but regretted that he could not postpone Jeevanjee’s 
appointment as it had been announced in the gazette of 21 September 1909.341  
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     Therefore, Crewe, in order to convince Sir Percy, directed him to a confidential 
dispatch, dated 14 July 1908, which detailed that the “question of appointing Jeevanjee as 
an Indians representative in the legislative council was carefully considered, and that the 
decision to appoint a representative for the Indians was made public for more than a 
year.”342  Therefore, Sir Percy was told that the appointment of Jeevanjee would not be 
postponed. In this regard, Sir Percy failed to persuade the CO to drop Jeevanjee from the 
legislative council.  
     On the other hand, Sir Percy succeeded in convincing the CO to approve Delamere’s 
appointment as settler’s representative on the legislative council. His Majesty the King 
approved Delamere’s appointment on the legislative council on 16 November 1909.343 
Thus, Sir Percy succeeded in convincing the CO to appoint Delamere to the legislative 
council, as a settler representative, which was a great stride in the implementation of his 
policy recommendations.  
      On the other hand, he was unsuccessful in his effort to convince the CO to postpone 
Jeevanjee’s appointment, in view of the fact that the appointment of Jeevanjee had 
already been made. It could not be withdrawn as His Majesty’s Government had already 
consented to his appointment.344 Sir Percy’s anti-Indian stand mainly informed his 
opposition to Jeevanjee’s appointment, as he had not supported his opposition to the 
appointment with any convincing evidence as to whether Jeevanjee’s was incompetent to 
represent the Indians residents of the protectorate, on the legislative council. Again, as to 
the number of the Indians, they certainly outnumbered the settlers and if the settlers could 
be allowed representation, why not the Indians. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Ibid. 
343 Crewe to Sir Percy, confidential, 16 November 1909, CO 533/62. 
344 Bennett, Kenya, 30.	  
103	  
	  
      Therefore, his anti-Indian stand informed his opposition to the appointment of the 
Indian representative rather than any policy consideration. This also suggested his open 
support for the settlers’ interest and against the Indian interest. In considering the 
question of policy of administration on the Indians, Sir Percy proposed that the Indians 
should not be represented on the legislative council, in view of their insignificant 
numerical strength relative to the Arabs and the Swahili.345 With such a tendency in the 
administration of government, Sir Percy failed to demonstrate fairness in his dealings 
with the Indians, which could not be considered a fair, sound administration of 
government.  
     Moreover, Sir Percy ignored that the numerical strength of the whites, who were 
represented on the council, were less than that of the Indians. But Sir Percy pressed 
further his anti-Indian stand when he told Crewe, in a confidential dispatch of 5 May 
1910, that Jeevanjee might be preparing to table before the Legislative Council demands 
for the appointment of Indian juries.  The Indians wish to be tried by jury as it was the 
case with the settlers.346  Despite the Indians persistent demands for participation in the 
administration of the colony, Sir Percy refused to give way, and instead continued to 
block each move the Indians could make for participation in the colony’s political life. 
Policy of Administration 
      In dealing with the European settlers and the Indians, Sir Percy adopted a different 
method of handling their respective affairs, conferring preferential treatments on the 
settlers over the Indians. In the administration of European settlers, Sir Percy proposed a 
separate area for their settlement, participation in county and local government, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




voice in the legislative council, and service as advisers in agricultural matters of the 
colony.347 Yet Sir Percy did not propose any policy for the administration of the Indians 
other than accentuating their difficulties.348 
     The Indians experienced disabilities even before the arrival of Sir Percy to the colony, 
and upon his assumption of the administration of the colony, he had not mitigated the 
difficulty of the Indians and instead, adopted an unfavorable stand against them. There 
were shortcomings in dealing with these races, which became instrumental in his failure 
to evolve an effective policy of administration over them. His proposed settler policy 
usually resulted in accentuating racial divisiveness and prejudices between the settlers 
and the Indians.349  In this regard, Sir Percy’s recommendations as to the general policy 
of settler administration were a sharp contrast to that of the Indians, which showed a clear 
partiality toward the settlers and a disregard towards the Indians. 
     Upon his assumption of government, Sir Percy noted that the protectorate lacked a 
well-defined policy of administration. The absence of policy not only impacted the 
settlers and the Indians but also on every aspect of government administration.350  
Therefore, Sir Percy proposed in his Main Report the establishment of an exclusive area 
for a settler habitation, which would be independent of any province within the 
protectorate.351 Sir Percy’s proposed policy of administration on the settler was to afford 
him participation in government so that he could be part of decisions affecting his life.352  
     In carrying through some of his favorable policies towards the settlers, some of these 
eventually produced difficulty for the settlers. Despite his favoritism toward the settlers, 
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other than a few influential individuals, policies designed to accelerate settler politics 
resulted in accentuating their difficulty.353 Part of the difficulty was the favorable stand 
that he had adopted towards the settlers, causing competing demands from the Indians. 
This development caused the CO to refuse approval of any policy it deemed would 
accentuate the racial divide between the settlers and the Indians.354 
     The introduction of suitable policies of administration for these races had been a 
difficulty as both settlers and Indians were competing for an active political participation 
in the colony’s administration, which contributed to the widening racial divide. The latter 
was reinforced by Sir Percy’s favorable disposition towards the settlers and his racial 
prejudices against the Indians, which complicated his administration of policy and 
ultimately produced unsuitable policies, resulting in an unsuccessful administration. The 
lack of success was not only on the Indians but it also affected these settlers as 
succeeding paragraphs clearly demonstrate his view and vision that occasioned his failure 
to administer the races with an even hand. 
 Settler Policy of Administration 
      The European settler was considered the most favored not only during Sir Percy’s 
tour of duty but right from the commencement of European settlement in the colony. As 
noted in the previous chapter, Sir Percy, in his consideration of a settler policy, told 
Crewe, in his Interim Report of 13 November 1909, that previous governments of the 
protectorate lacked a defined policy of administering the European settlers. Sir Percy 
added, the settler never knew how he was being governed and neither was there any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Ibid. 
354 Bennett, Kenya, 30-31. 
106	  
	  
policy that would promote his active political participation in the government of the 
colony.355         
     To remedy this, Sir Percy recommended to Crewe, in his Interim Report, that the 
government should produce “a more clearly defined area devoted to the settler separate 
settlement.”356  As for the outlined map of the existing white settlement, Sir Percy told 
Crewe that it had “the appearance of the patches on an old fashioned crazy-quilt,” which 
Sir Percy believed, lent themselves to amalgamation of the eastern province of Uganda to 
the EAP in 1902.357 Nevertheless, the area devoted to the European settlers was standing 
on its own, as the area was not part of any of the provinces of the protectorate.358 Sir 
Percy added that a clearly defined area for the settlers should take into consideration 
further expansion without affecting areas defined as African reserves. As to the area of 
settler habitation, Sir Percy suggested that the highlands could foster a conducive 
habitation for the settlement and that it should be devoted exclusively to settler habitation 
only.359  
      As to the question of government policy over the settlers, Sir Percy recommended to 
Crewe, in his Interim Report, that it was not only essential but it was in all interests to 
allow active participation of the settler in the government of the protectorate.360  Sir Percy 
added that to expect the settler to know how he was being governed by “a perusal of the 
existing book of law would be to demand a virtue young colonists do not seem to be 
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possessed of, lasting patience and deep research.”361  This was in reference to what was 
described in chapter four as Sir Percy believed in the colony’s lack of a clearly defined 
policy of administration other than the only available books of law from which an 
administrator could infer as to what was supposed to be the right course of action for the 
administration of the colony. Sir Percy pointed out that the absence of a clearly defined 
policy for a settler administration had made it difficult for the settler to know how he was 
governed.  
      Sir Percy recommended further, in his Main Report, that they should be held in 
confidence as to the policy, which would be approved. However, Sir Percy observed that 
the presence of the settlers at the moment was not of great financial assistance, but they 
will demand full recognition and it should be accorded to them. Sir Percy also told Crewe 
that the settlers should not be kept in the dark as to the financial position of the 
protectorate or the aims of the government. If the latter was to be the case, Sir Percy told 
Crewe that would “only be productive of grossly exaggerated figures as to their financial 
weight as a community and perverted statements of the policy of the government.”362 Sir 
Percy, however, told Crewe that all the European associations have vied with each other, 
in giving him every possible assistance. Sir Percy added that the missionaries of all 
denominations were too anxious to assist him in any government-defined policy.363   
    Sir Percy went on to tell Crewe that it had been his aim to “show no favour to 
individuals or communities, but to try and act in the best interest of all and in accordance 
with your instruction.”364 To the latter, Sir Percy did not prove good to his word when he 
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supported the settlers’ quest for political participation and denied the same to the Indians. 
The latter case was, in part, what led to his unsuccessful policy of administration of these 
races.365 
     Not surprisingly, he recommended in his Main Report of 26 May 1910 that the 
European settlers should be actively involved in the administration of the country.366 Sir 
Percy reiterated to Crewe that with the question of the type of administration policy to be 
established for the white community, they should be held in confidence by the 
government and due recognition should be given to them, where they needed it. The 
settlers, Sir Percy observed, “are quite reasonable in their attitude, and Lord Delamere 
himself, as a votary of leasehold, will I trust be of assistance.”367   
    Moreover, Sir Percy told Crewe, in the same report, “I do not consider the European 
community an unreasonable one, and, except for a few, they constitute a body of settlers 
of unusual education and social standing.”368  Therefore, Sir Percy recommended to 
Crewe that if his recommendations for settler policy could be approved, “it will be 
possible to give the inhabitants more duties in purely local government.”369  Sir Percy 
pointed out that with the introduction of the justice of the peace ordinance, an indication 
of a start in that direction was being made. There was the need to go further by the 
introduction of divisional councils or some other bodies. Sir Percy further suggested that 
if the urban population could be allowed more active participation in local government, it 
was highly desirable that the settlers should also be allowed to feel the difficulties 
associated with the administration of government, as well as the “weight of the Courts in 
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the revision of J. P. ordinances.” 370   Therefore, to achieve the latter, Sir Percy 
recommended that the settlers should be given more duties in their county or local 
government, legislative council, and be part of an agricultural advisory committees.371  
       In this circumstance, Sir Percy’s policy recommendations as for the Europeans 
suggested that the settlers would be participating in the administration of the protectorate, 
establish a separate settlement, and it is possible to suggest from his proposed policy 
recommendations that the settlers would be able to participate in the county and local 
government administration. With the latter, the settlers would have been in a position to 
push for self-government, a desire which most of the settlers viewed as within their reach.  
But Sir Percy’s proposals did not amount to anything, as he had not push further to 
actualize his proposed policy and neither did he push for the settler political ambition 
when he noted Harcourt’s reservation over his support for settler opportunities were 
beyond what the CO could approve. 
     As noted earlier, Sir Percy recommended to Crewe, in his Interim Report, that other 
than their participation in local government, the settlers should be given the opportunity, 
especially for those who intended to make a home in the protectorate, to have more voice 
on the legislative council.372 Sir Percy cautioned Crewe, “Like all other young colonies, 
concealment in any sense can do no good whatever, and on the other hand-as has been 
patent from the past here can do an infinity of harm.”373 On the question of the legislative 
council, Sir Percy told Crewe in his Main Report that he needed more representation 
from the settlers so that they could participate fully in the government of the country.374 
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His request for more participation of the settlers in the government, in his both his 
Interim and the Main report, was in support of his request for the appointment of 
Delamere to the legislative council, which had already been transmitted to Crewe, a week 
after his assumption of government.375 In addition to the latter, Sir Percy desired more 
unofficial representatives on the legislative council.  
     In the CO, his recommendations for the participation of settlers in government 
contained in his Interim Report were favorably accepted. Butler, in his minute, expressed 
his general agreement with Sir Percy’s recommendation, as to more active participation 
of white settlers in county or local government. More voice on the Legislative Council, 
and facilities for giving advice in agricultural matters were accepted. Therefore, Butler 
urged that Sir Percy’s recommendations be accepted as a general outline of policy, but a 
more detailed explanation on how he intended to carry out his recommendations on each 
subject was necessary.376  Butler minuted that Sir Percy’s recommendation was “on the 
right line, but of course it will be necessary to go slowly and consider carefully the 
detailed proposals made under this head.”377  Read, in his minute, stated that Sir Percy 
was planning to give a larger share in administration to the settlers of the EAP and “I do 
not think a purely native country like Uganda would be likely to benefit by this 
arrangement.”378 Read referred to Uganda in view of the proposed amalgamation, if 
carried out, would not produce any benefit as Uganda was purely an African country.  
     In Crewe’s reply to Sir Percy, in his telegram of 7 January 1910, the Secretary of State 
expressed his concurrence with the proposal. Crewe told Sir Percy, “it is desirable to 
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encourage a more active participation of the white settlers in county or local government 
and in agricultural matters.”379 The latter approval as contained in the telegram paved the 
way for the participation of the white settlers in the government of the EAP. By such 
approval, it was left to Sir Percy to give more details of how he should carry out the 
process through which they will be involved in the administration of the protectorate. But 
Sir Percy failed to follow up on the participation of the settlers in the county and local 
governments of the protectorate.  
     In this aspect of his policies, other than securing additional unofficial members that 
should not exceed six unofficial members in the Legislative Council, he had not done 
much to see to the realization of his proposed settler involvement in county and local 
governments. The latter recommendations were informed by Sir Percy’s consideration 
that the settlers should be allowed to govern themselves and be part of government 
decisions affecting their lives. This would empower the settlers politically and might led 
to the settler colonization of the protectorate.380 
 Conclusion  
       The most challenging aspect of the administration of these competing races was the 
question of balancing the quest for equality between the European settlers and the 
Indians. The more the Indian demands for equality, the further the settlers objected to 
their being on the same footing. The participation in the Legislative Council was the first 
instance where the CO sought to balance the equilibrium, when it directed for the 
appointment of Delamere and Jeevanjee on the Legislative Council as representatives of 
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their respective races. When Sir Percy assumed government, he requested for the removal 
of Jeevanjee and wondered why the Indian was represented while the settlers were not. 
      He therefore, sought the removal of Jeevanjee and the appointment of Delamere. The 
CO accepted his request for the appointment of Delamere but refused to approve of his 
request for the removal of Jeevanjee. In his consideration of a settler policy, he 
recommended for their participation in government but other than the appointment of 
Delamere and the increase of unofficials to six, nothing had been achieved in respect of 
their participation in county and local government, and in agricultural matters. As to their 
settlement, he had not succeeded in establishing a distinct European settlement as he had 
envisioned in his Main Report.  
      As to the Indians, he had not been able to come up with any defined policy other than 
his unfavorable disposition to their demands. The Indians, despite their struggle for a fair 
treatment by the administration, had achieved nothing. In fact, Jeevanjee was removed 
from office, even though the CO reinstated him, because of his criticisms of the 
administration’s unfair treatment of the Indians in comparison to the way the settlers 
were treated. In spite of the favorable treatment Sir Percy afforded the settlers, he had not 
been able to push for their demand for electoral representation.  
     His failings in this regard, resulted from the CO’s refusal to allow the settlers to have 
their way in everything. This clearly demonstrated their hesitations on how Sir Percy 
advocated for settler insatiable demands, which might provoke racial division and 
empower the settlers politically which would be to the detriment of the Indians. This 
could be seen from Sir Percy’s trip to the CO to represent the settler position on 
Jeevanjee’s press interview. Sir Percy also extended a similar attitude toward the 
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Africans whom he proposed to govern separately and indirectly. Sir Percy proposed 
African chiefs and elders should govern the affairs of their own people and that they 
should be placed under the trustees to safeguard their land.  
     Despite his recommendation of the latter, Sir Percy, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, sacrificed the interest of the African reserves to the Europeans, allowing the 
Europeans to have unhindered access to land. He also attempted to remove the Maasai 
from their Laikipia settlement to the southern reserves with a view to allot Laikipia land 
to the European settlers. Sir Percy could sacrifice the interest of any of the races of the 
colony to satisfy the European settler interest. Sir Percy further demonstrated this, in his 
attempt to establish African administration policy, especially when he compromised land 
regulations and African reserves. His favoritism for the settlers over the Indians was thus 
not an isolated issue. 
 












                                                                Chapter 6 
                                                      African Administration  
     Introduction   
        Sir Percy viewed that the colony lacked a well-defined policy of government 
administration and sought to reform the policy as to African administration. Sir Percy 
concluded that the Africans were administered in a manner that was inconsistent with the 
administration of the crown subjects of the empire. He therefore proposed to provide a 
well-defined policy for the administration of Africans in their reserves. Sir Percy accused 
the High Court of interference in the administration of Africans and sought to change it 
with a system of indirect rule, similar to that Lord Lugard introduced in Northern Nigeria. 
His proposed policy was welcomed by his provincial commissioners who sought for the 
same policy for the colony, even before Sir Percy’s arrival.  
      But the High Court refused to give way on its interference, citing an Order-in-
Council, 1902, as its basis of involvement in African administration and stating that the 
order must be repealed or amended before Sir Percy could introduce a new African policy 
of administration. The position of the two had been a source of discord, but there wasn’t 
much variation as to their position that could cause friction. Both sides insisted that they 
had rights to govern the Africans. However, through administrative reforms, Sir Percy 
was able to introduce his African policy of administration, which defined the role of 
chiefs and elders and the function of European officers assigned to deal with the 
administration of African reserves.  
     It also provided a common action in dispensing government functions by provincial 
commissioners and district officers as against the former position occasioned by 
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individual idiosyncrasy of government officials. This brought in Africans to govern their 
people under the direction of European officials, as was the case in Northern Nigeria. 
Despite his administrative reform, the application of the indirect rule method in the East 
Africa Protectorate was not as elaborate as Sir Percy proposed to introduce. Even then, he 
failed to effectively end the court’s control in certain areas, especially where Africans, 
European, and Indians interacted. The success was too little and too late to have been 
considered an outstanding performance in affecting defined policy of African 
administration. 
Basis of Sir Percy’s African Policy 
     Sir Percy’s African Policy was designed so as to provide a better means of 
administration for the Africans in their own reserves as well as to establish safeguards 
against infringement on their land within their reserves.381 Sir Percy proposed the 
administration of the Africans by their chiefs and elders as the most desirable means of 
governing the affairs of the Africans.382 In his proposed African policy, Sir Percy 
recommended the introduction of an indirect rule method of administration that was 
similar to what Lord Lugard introduced in Northern Nigeria Protectorate.383 The latter 
would allow the Africans to be administered by their chiefs where they existed, and 
where they do not, community elders would be allowed to govern the affairs of their 
people.384  
    The African chiefs would be supervised and guided by a British official designated as a 
Resident. Under this arrangement, the African chiefs would have a relative freedom of 
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action over their own affairs but subject to the guidance of the Resident, in matters of 
government policy and administration.385  
   While the British officials will be deployed to serve as Resident officers supervising, 
advising and guiding African rulers to conform with the policy laid down by His 
Majesty’s Government, they would, as well, avoid imposition of certain policies 
considered repugnant to African norms and values.386 Sir Percy’s decision to introduce 
the policy was informed by what appeared to have been a near absence of a defined 
policy of administration.  
     Under this method, Sir Percy proposed to allow African chiefs, and elders as well as 
headmen were they existed to administer, and where they never existed, community 
elders would be appointed to take control of their people.387 Sir Percy’s proposed Africa 
policy was a replica of Lord Lugard’s indirect rule method of governance that he 
successfully introduced in the Northern Nigeria Protectorate. Sir Percy, equipped with the 
Northern Nigeria’s experience of indirect rule, sought to introduce the same in the EAP. 
Prior to Sir Percy’s arrival into the colony, a similar African policy of administration had 
been proposed in a memorandum co-authored by two provincial commissioners, 
Ainsworth and Hobley, dated 2 October 1908.388 But the provincial commissioners 
proposed African policy of administration could not be introduced, as it would have 
conflicted with the role of the High Court of the protectorate, in the administration of 
African reserves. This conflicting position could not allow the application of African 
policy, unless the order was amended or repealed.      
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    Other than the role of the High Court, was the question of placing the Africans under 
trustees as guardians of the African people. The question of trustees had in 1907 been 
contemplated, but the British Government refused to give way to trustees to serve as 
guardians of the Africans. Sir Percy’s proposed introduction of the trustees in the 
administration of African reserves might have been outweighed by government’s 
apprehension of complications that might occasion His Majesty’s Government by the 
introduction of private persons in the administration of the subject of the empire. There 
was also the question of African land within the African reserves, which Sir Percy 
proposed to safeguard exclusively for the Africans and against capitalists’ encroachment 
into African reserves with a view to grab African land within the African reserves. The 
safeguard of African land became a challenge to Sir Percy, in view of increasing 
European demands for fertile land, which caused Sir Percy to compromise his proposed 
African land safeguards, thereby jeopardizing his entire proposed African administration 
policy. In considering his proposed administration policy and the challenge of the court’s 
interference, Sir Percy, opined that it would still be possible to establish effective method 
of administration as opposed to the court’s administration. 
 Divergence of Opinion on African Administration Policy  
     Sir Percy hoped to uphold his proposed African policy of administration, where 
African chiefs would be allowed to govern their people. The latter position was fully 
corroborated in a memorandum by his provincial commissioners who sought the 
introduction of the policy earlier on, before Sir Percy arrived into the colony but their 
proposal was defeated as the court was empowered to govern African areas.389 Sir Percy, 
in his drive to institute his proposed policy, reported to Crewe, in his Interim Report, that 
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there was a near absence of a policy of administration in the protectorate. Sir Percy also 
told Crewe that as to Africans, he proposed to introduce a method of administration, 
where African chiefs would be allowed to govern their people with a minimal supervision 
by British officials. Sir Percy’s position and that of his provincial commissioners was in 
sharp contrast with the position of the court and despite the divergence of opinion, Sir 
Percy was determined to uphold his position against that of the court. 
       Sir Percy, therefore, reported to Crewe, in his Interim Report of 13 November 1909, 
of the desirability of introducing his proposed method of African administration. Sir 
Percy pointed out that as long as tribal groups were to be retained, therefore, the 
government should consider improvement in the administration of Africans, by their 
chiefs under the supervision of the British officials.390 Under the latter, Sir Percy believed 
that the government would be successful, in gradually evolving and applying the most 
desirable African administration policy. In a situation that demanded appeals, it should 
take African law into consideration, rather than the British law, especially, in a case with 
greater political weights.391  
    With the latter, it was difficult to come to some understanding or to balance the 
appropriate method to administer justice between African law and custom and the method 
of the colony’s judiciary, considering the fact that it was not the function of the judiciary 
to administer Africa policy. Sir Percy shared the view with Ainsworth and Hobley.392 
This was one reason Sir Percy advocated that his policy of using African chiefs and 
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elders to administer their people using African law and customs, through customary 
courts, should be seriously considered.393   
     In addition, Sir Percy recommended for the introduction and application of British 
East African code, except in certain special circumstances where its application was 
considered inappropriate, and that civilian affairs should not be left to the “discretion of 
native courts.”394  With such a policy, Sir Percy believed that it would not only have the 
support of a larger section of people and influential bodies in Britain, but would also 
provide a strong safeguard against individuals or groups interested in jeopardizing the 
legitimate African interests and rights.395  Sir Percy recommended that the best method of 
governing Africans would be to allow their chiefs to govern their own affairs with a 
minimal supervision by British officials.396 Sir Percy pointed out that the position of the 
commissioners was in concurrence with African policy in British Crown African 
dominions, and the provincial commissioners, Sir Percy added, were experienced in 
colonial administration in both the EAP and Uganda and some these officials had fifteen 
years of service.397 
     Therefore, the commissioners’ memorandum on African policy of administration 
should carry weight, and he urged Crewe to take into consideration the position of the 
commissioners, in view of their long service experience in British African colonies.398 
Also, Sir Percy suggested that the memorandum had the same substance as those, which 
Sir F. Lugard adopted successfully in West Africa. The recommendations of the 
memorandum, Sir Percy pointed out “had the acceptance of every leading authority on 
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native rule in Africa,” and requested the CO to accept the memorandum for application in 
the EAP.399  
     Sir Percy believed that the involvement of the court was accentuated by their belief 
that if they administer British law, to all the Africans, it would make it easy for them to 
exercise full control.400 Sir Percy dismissed the latter view and stated that Africans would 
have greater benefit and justice, less oppression, if the protectorate allowed the chiefs to 
govern their people and to be charged with the enforcement of reasonable native law and 
custom over their people.401 Sir Percy further opined that by such methods as the 
judiciary advocated would substitute the power and law that the Africans cherished and 
were accustomed to with British or Indian law and at the same time employ the service of 
the native police.    
      In this regard, Sir Percy was advocating that the African policy should be moderated 
or synthesized with the British policy, so as to check the power of the chiefs. Also, the 
police who were charged with the enforcement of the law were “unacquainted with, and 
not expected to know native law and custom.”402 Sir Percy was confident that his 
proposed policy, which was in concurrence with the position of his commissioners 
presented to the court before his arrival, would produce the desired African policy of 
administration.  
      Sir Percy further stated that experience over the years suggested that the application 
of such policy especially in African countries, such as, West Africa and Uganda, was 
based upon the use of Africans and the application of African law and customs, as long as 
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they were desirable to the people.403 But Sir Percy was concerned that the native police 
charged with the enforcement of the law, would subject the application of purely a British 
law to abuse.  
     However, Sir Percy was concerned that the recruited African police, having “the 
thinnest European veneers with its attendant advantage,” was bound to be ambitious in 
application of the British law, or British made law, which he was as well bound to 
compromise. However, Sir Percy opined that there was the tendency of the African police 
to use the British law as means of extortion and oppression, which was far more 
oppressive that the rule of the African chief under the supervision of a British 
Resident.404 Sir Percy was attempting to establish a safeguard against the African police 
recruit exploiting the ordinary African, when he recommended full control of affairs of 
the Africans, by their chiefs, instead of the newly recruited African police who would be 
desirous of power and exploitation of the situation. 
    In spite of Sir Percy’s support of the African chiefs, he stated that the African police 
might not be perfect in the dispensation of this policy. However, Sir Percy pointed out 
that, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the African chiefs, they were part of the 
Africans and could administer their “rough and ready justice,” based on their own 
customs and traditions of their tribal formations that had been in existence over the 
years.405  
       In the memorandum of the provincial commissioners, co-authored by two provincial 
commissioners, Ainsworth and Hobley, “Memorandum on Native Policy,” dated 2 
October 1908, held that African chiefs and elders should administer African reserves, and 
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where the latter were absent; there were recognized patriarchal systems of authority 
among all the tribal formations.406 They recommended that in a situation where African 
chiefs never existed, a system of patriarchal administration, where community elder(s) 
would be responsible for the administration of his tribe within the tribal reserve, as earlier 
on, recognized by the protectorate, was also proposed in the said memo.407 
        The Memorandum of the provincial commissioners was transmitted to the Principal 
Judge of the protectorate for his comment. Justice R. W. Hamilton, in his comment on 
Ainsworth and Hobley’s proposed “Memorandum on Native Policy,” in a Memorandum, 
titled, “Proposed Introduction of a Simple Code for Natives of 1 December 1908,” 
objecting to Ainsworth and Hobley’s memorandum. Hamilton was not only adverse to 
the views expressed by the provincial commissioners, but also very critical of the 
provincial commissioners. Hamilton made the position of the court very clear on the 
question of the legality of its interference in the administration of African areas that:  
 His Majesty the King Order in Council 1902, constituted the High Court, and gave it full 
responsibility to supervise the administration of Justice in East Africa. For the last six 
years the High Court has been endeavoring to do its duty in that respect and it is not 
unnatural that its interference, where interference was before unknown, has led to some 
soreness of feeling; but unless your excellency is prepared to recommend the amendment 
of that order and the curtailment of the powers of the High Court the country must be 
permitted to develop on the lines laid down.408 
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      Sir Percy did not agree with Hamilton’s position. He strongly supported the position 
of the provincial commissioners in his Interim Report. He maintained that his provincial 
commissioners were men of a longstanding experience in colonial administration and that 
their views would be very valuable in the consideration of the policy.409  Sir Percy also 
reported to Crewe, that the role of the High Court in the administration of African areas 
had produced difficulties and divergence of opinion in the administration of African 
reserves. Even though, the divergence of opinion was to a lesser extent because whenever 
provincial commissioners decided on a case, they were found to be in accord with the 
court’s verdicts.     
     It was on a few incidences that the court had altered the decision of the provincial 
commissioners. Despite the latter instances, the provincial commissioners were unhappy 
with the court’s interference, and Sir Percy, having served in Northern Nigeria, where 
indirect rule was well established, proposed his African administration policy which was 
fully supported by the memorandum of his provincial commissioners. Sir Percy also 
reported to Crewe that in the administration of African people, his position was the most 
accepted and widely used, citing northern Nigeria and Uganda as examples, and urged 
Crewe to approve his proposal for the introduction of the said policy.410  To emphasize 
his stand Sir Percy enclosed Ainsworth and Hobley’s Memorandum on Native Policy” 
and Hamilton’s “Proposed Introduction of a simple Code for Native” as appendixes to his 
Interim Report.    
      In the CO, Sir Percy’s recommendations were welcomed. Butler, in a minute on Sir 
Percy’s proposed African administration, commented on the general interference of the 
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Court in areas where the whites, Indians and Africans interacted and to inside the African 
reserves.411 In view of such interference, Butler supported the proposed policy of 
administration of Africans by their chiefs and elders, stating that it was desirable for the 
Africans to be governed by their chiefs, and the use of native law and customs and native 
courts in African areas.412 The latter would be applied “side by side with the gradual 
introduction of British East Africa law, when evolved, except in certain criminal and civil 
matters, which cannot even, at the outset, be left to the discretion of native courts.”413    
      Butler recommended that Sir Percy’s recommendations should be accepted in their 
entirety but he was, at the same time, concerned that Hamilton would oppose the policy, 
once it was introduced in the country.414 Butler added, “we shall find a strong and 
determined opponent in Mr. Hamilton, the Principal Judge,” whose memorandum of 1 
December 1908, formed one of the appendices of Sir Percy’s covering confidential 
dispatch to his Interim Report.415  Butler added that the memorandum proposed and could 
be applied in the case for applying British or British-made law in minute detail all over 
the protectorate.”416 Butler added that his own sympathy, based on long experience, at 
any rate, from this end, of similar question in West Africa, were entirely with the 
provincial commissioners.417  
     Butler stated, “it seems absurd to me that, with our scattered officials set in enormous 
masses of native population, there could ever be any idea of applying our own system of 
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law in detail and individually to the Africans.  It is in fact impossible to apply a uniform 
British made laws through out the protectorate,” but he suggested that it could no doubt 
be possible to do so, in old established and highly organized districts. But in the further 
areas on the fringe of administration, and in the new areas hereafter to be occupied, 
Butler suggested that the only method of procedure is to lay sympathetic hands on the 
native machinery, which had existed. In order to transform African authority, both 
administrative and judicial, into “a tool suitable for the admitted purposes for which our 
administration in these protectorates exists.”418  
     Butler also pointed out that there was the need for a careful discrimination to decide, 
where this system shall be followed and where “the Principal Judge’s idea of absolute 
adherence to British or British made laws and procedure shall be adopted.”419 However, 
Butler expressed his confidence in Sir Percy, stating that, “it can be done, and I am sure 
that Sir Percy, with his experience of similar problems in Northern Nigeria, and with the 
aid of a political staff with whom he appeared to be in entire sympathy on this point, will 
be successful in handling the question.”420 However, Butler added, “Sir Percy made out a 
preliminary case on all these points, but of course detailed consideration must follow.”421 
Butler was suggesting that Sir Percy had identified and proposed the desired policy of 
African administration but further detail was necessary on how he intended to carry his 
proposed scheme out. Also, Butler agreed with Sir Percy’s recommendation that Africans 
be placed under the administration of their chiefs and headmen.422  
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   Crewe, in his reply to Sir Percy’s Interim Report, and reflecting on Butler’s comments, 
addressed a telegram of 7 January 1910, expressing his concurrence to the desirability of 
placing the Africans under the administration of their chiefs, stating that, “I agree that 
native chiefs should be used in the administration of native reserves or states.”423 Crewe 
also requested Sir Percy to furnish further details on the procedure to be adopted in 
carrying through his proposed policy.424 Therefore, Sir Percy’s recommendations as to 
African policy were accepted despite objection from Hamilton.  
     It was up to Sir Percy to carry out his proposed reform by providing details of how he 
intended to implement his approved African administration policy. Therefore, the African 
policy would form one of his policies for implementation and subsequent events would 
determine the course of its implementation. The success or failure of the policy would 
depend to a large extent on the ability of Sir Percy to lay out an acceptable detailed 
process, by which African policy of administration could be implemented in the colony.    
Trustees as Guardians in Administration  
       The question of involving trustees in the African administration had been 
contemplated in 1907, but Parliamentary Undersecretary State for the Colonies, Winston 
Churchill, rejected the idea outright. Sir Percy revisited the question of using the trustees 
as guardians of African reserves, when he sought to introduce a method of African 
administration.425 Sir Percy reported to Crewe in his Interim Report that there was almost 
a complete absence of a defined policy of government administration and that he 
proposed to place the Africans under the administration of their chiefs.426 Sir Percy was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Crewe to Sir Percy, telegram, 7 January 1910, CO 533/63. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Sir Percy to Crewe, Interim Report, confidential, 13 November 1909, CO 533/63.  
426 Ibid.  
127	  
	  
determined to safeguard African reserves, by making them independent of any 
interference from the government, individuals, and interest groups. In carrying out the 
latter, he considered the inclusion of appointing private individuals as trustees of the 
African people. Sir Percy told Crewe, in a secret dispatch of 6 May 1910, that he 
proposed to place the Africans under the administration of their chiefs and headmen, who 
would be supervised by private individuals as a board of trustees.427  
     Sir Percy told Crewe, in his secret dispatch, that the board would be independent and 
would be saddled with the responsibility of safeguarding the African reserves against 
interest groups who would want to seize lands within the reserves.428 The trustees would 
be composed of the chief justice of the protectorate as chair, a high court justice, a 
bishop, and the secretary for African affairs, Sir Percy stated.429  Sir Percy told Crewe 
that he would transmit a further intimation on the policy by dispatch.  
     The question of safeguarding the African reserves against land grabs by individuals 
and syndicates as well as the placing the Africans reserves under the supervision of a 
board of trustees formed an important policy consideration of Sir Percy. Sir Percy was 
determined to safeguard the reserves. Sir Percy considered, in the course of providing 
details of his African policy, appointing private individuals as trustees, in safeguarding 
African reserves. The inclusion of the trustees was a departure from his initial 
recommendations on the administration of the reserves. In Sir Percy’s African policy, for 
the introduction of a policy that was similar to that one introduced by Lugard, in Northern 
Nigeria. Therefore, the inclusion of trustees to safeguard the African reserves altered his 
initial proposed African policy of administration. In fact, it was the inclusion of the 
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trustees as guardians of the African people that provoked Crewe’s dissatisfaction, when 
Sir Percy, in his secret dispatch of 6 May 1910, told Crewe that, the Africans should be 
placed under the administration of their chiefs and headmen who would be supervised by 
private individuals as a board of trustees.430  
     The first Africans he considered for the policy were the Maasai who became a focal 
point of such policy, because they were occupying an agriculturally fertile land, much 
desired by the European settlers for agricultural cultivation. Therefore, Sir Percy 
proposed to remove them from their fertile Laikipia to the extended southern Maasai 
reserve so as to give way to European farmers.431 As for the trustees, Sir Percy told 
Crewe, in his Interim Report, that the board would be independent and would be saddled 
with the responsibility of safeguarding the African reserves against interest groups who 
would want to seize lands within the reserves.432  The inclusion of a board of trustees as 
part of the details of the policy became a source of concern to the CO, even though, Sir 
Percy told Crewe that he would transmit a further intimation on the policy, in his Main 
Report. 
     Prior to the transmission of further details, he had already initiated his first test case of 
placing the Africans on a separate settlement as reserve when, in his 6 May 1910 
telegram, he proposed the removal of the Maasai from Laikipia to the extended southern 
Maasai reserve. Sir Percy added that the Maasai would be placed under the 
administration of a board of trustees, in the first instance, but the CO refused Sir Percy’s 
proposed board of trustees as administrators of African reserves. In a reply to Sir Percy’s 
telegram of 6 May 1910, Crewe told Sir Percy, in his telegram of 12 May 1910, “I fear it 
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is not feasible to place the Masai Reserves in the hands of trustees for reason which will 
be explained to you by dispatch. I am therefore not able to depart from the policy of 
making trustees the guardian of the African people.”433 Crewe reiterated his view in a 
further confidential dispatch of 31 May 1911, when he told Sir Percy, “I was unable to 
accede to your suggestion that the Masai reserve should be placed in the hands of private 
trustees as stated by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on 22 July 1907.434  
     Crewe added that even if suitable persons could be found as trustees, the responsibility 
of administrating African people would in the long run, rest in the British Government.435 
Crewe also told Sir Percy, in his dispatch of 31 May 1910, of Churchill’s House of 
Commons debate of 22 July 1907, on the nature and extent of government commitment 
in safeguarding the African reserves.436 The question of safeguarding African reserves 
and the possible involvement of trustees in the administration of reserves, in the East 
Africa, had been brought forth, for consideration, but Churchill rejected it outright.437  
     Sir Percy revisited the question of using the trustees as guardians of the African 
reserves, when he sought the approval of Crewe to allow him to use trustees as custodians 
of African reserves.438 But Crewe refused to depart from the policy of Lord Elgin and 
Churchill, and held that he would not approve of Sir Percy to appoint private individuals 
as trustees of the African people, which he viewed as an unnecessary complication.439 
Crewe rejected the proposal, having had no doubts of the presumed complications that 
the involvements of the trustees could produce, in the administration of African reserves, 
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and thus, kicked against the proposed policy, once more. The British government would 
not consent to the trustees, as the question of government being the trustee of the African 
people became policy.  
     Therefore, Sir Percy’s proposed African policy was refused, as it was not in 
consonance with the policy of the British government. Crewe’s dispatch of 31 May 1910 
ended further correspondence, in the short run, on the desirability of Sir Percy’s proposed 
African policy recommendations. The development of the African institutions would 
have afforded the African chiefs and elders an opportunity to govern their people with 
minimal interference from the colonial authorities.440 In the case of the EAP, what 
probably seemed to have raised doubt of its viability was the inclusion of the proposed 
board of trustees, which gave the impression that His Majesty’s Government was 
abandoning its responsibility to private individuals.  
     Crewe argued in his confidential dispatch of 31 May 1910 that the British Government 
would not surrender its responsibilities to “a private board of trustees, even if suitable 
persons as trustees could be found, the responsibility of deciding whether the trust was 
being suitably administered, had in the last resort, to rest with the Government, and 
intermediaries would only be an unnecessary complication.”441  It was on the strength of 
the latter statement that Crewe dumped Sir Percy’s proposed African policy of 
administration, so as to avoid embarrassing His Majesty’s Government. The impression 
of the CO as to the involvement of trustees in the administration of Africans was that His 
Majesty’s Government was abandoning its crown subjects of the empire to private 
persons to administer them, on behalf of His Majesty.  
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      Sir Percy’s details of the process of administrating African policy was a departure 
from his initial African policy recommendations as contained in his Interim Report, and 
also as proposed by his commissioners in their memorandum of 2 October 1908. In the 
former, Sir Percy proposed to Crewe to administer the African in a manner that Lord 
Lugard administered the Northern Nigeria Protectorate, where African chiefs, under the 
supervision of British Resident exercise administrative and judicial responsibilities, 
without any role being assigned to a private person(s) to administer the Africans on 
behalf of his Majesty’s Government.  
       In the case of the EAP, the inclusion of a board trustees to administer subjects of the 
crown did not form part of his initial proposal, and it was based on the inclusion of the 
board of trustees that Crewe kicked against his revised African policy recommendations. 
In this regard, Sir Percy failed to come up with an African Policy that the CO believed 
could provide the desired result, after having initially approved of his policy. He failed to 
provide a convincing explanation as to the policy, which led to the rejection of his 
recommendation by the CO.  
     However, Sir Percy never gave up when, on 18 May 1910, he reiterated in his Main 
Report, that the Africans should be administered through their chiefs and elders. Crewe 
replied to him, agreeing to the proposal. Thereafter, Lewis Harcourt was appointed the 
new Secretary of State for the Colonies, On his assumption of office, he approved of Sir 
Percy’s request, in a confidential dispatch of 7 December 1910, Harcourt approved of Sir 
Percy to carry out a limited measure of African policy as proposed, in his memorandum 
for provincial and district commissioners of 18 May 1910.442 
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     With the latter, Sir Percy introduced to provincial commissioners and district officers 
some guidelines on the role of chiefs and elders and headmen in the administration of 
African reserves. The measure provided a basis of chiefs and elders to administer their 
people with the supervision of Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners. 
The memorandum provided some semblance of African policy, where Africans were 
allowed to govern their people.443 Sir Percy believed that the latter course was necessary 
and failing to carry out such reform could jeopardize the African tribal authority.444  
       But one of the challenges of this limited policy measure that became a source of 
concern to Sir Percy was how the government could control Africans in areas outside 
their own reserves. In areas where African, European and Indian interacted, it would be 
difficult to control the Africans, more especially, the youth, who saw the European way 
of life as model and held their own ways and institutions in contempt. More importantly, 
the court could contest his limited reform measure, as he had not requested the CO to 
repeal or amend the Order-in-Council, 1902, which empowered the court to administer 
Africa reserves.445  
     As to African youth, Sir Percy believed, as they looked up to the European ways of 
life, a situation that could denationalize them, as well as produce new attitudes and 
assumptions that were inimical to the authority of the chiefs, and could be an obstacle to 
the development of the African political institutions. Sir Percy added that western 
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civilization could lead to denationalization as the Africans preferred the independence of 
the town, as a wage earner, to the authority of the elders in a tribal society.446  
      In this regard, Sir Percy believed that the African would have preferred to earn his 
wages working on the European farm rather than holding to his own reserve and living 
under the order of his chief. Such a view did not turn out to have been the case, as the 
wage workers refused to go out to work on European farms, and it caused the local 
authorities to compel Africans before they could go out to work for wages on the 
European farms, in addition to the taxation that Sir Percy imposed on all African males so 
as to force them out to the European farms to work for wages, so as to be able to pay 
taxes imposed by the government, presumably to source labor for the whites’ farms.447 
    Sir Percy pointed out that the presence of Europeans in the protectorate would not 
undermine African policy, a concern, which could not be substantiated. If the British 
colonial officials could float an exclusive apartheid policy of administration within South 
Africa, indirect rule in Northern Nigeria, there would have been no reason for their 
failure to institute an indirect rule in the EAP. In the case of EAP, it would have even had 
a better chance of survival as both whites and the Africans lived in separate areas, a 
policy reminiscent of the apartheid South Africa, and which Sir Percy worked for its 
evolution, when he proposed that they should be established in certain areas that would 
be exclusive to them, as much as the highland was exclusive to the settlers.  
    This was a clear demonstration of land and administration policies that reflected his 
experience of South Africa’s apartheid policy of administration. The establishment of 
separate settlements which Sir Percy believed was a safety valve against inter-racial 
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discord does not suggest that it was meant to establish peace and acquiesce in the 
country, in view of the policies he implemented or he proposed to implement on each of 
the three races of the country.  
   Therefore, his policy of separate settlement for each of the races of the protectorate 
under the guise of establishing peaceful settlements amongst the racial groups in the 
country, suggested that he was determined to establish a South Africa’s model of 
apartheid policy of administration for the protectorate. Therefore, African policy in the 
EAP would have had a better chance of survival, if it had been introduced as a well 
elaborated system, similar to that of Northern Nigeria, the presence of the white-settlers 
notwithstanding. 
    In a desperate attempt to save his African policy, he revised his African policy and 
followed up with the CO, transmitting it in a form of a memorandum on African policy. 
A memorandum, dated 18 May 1910, stipulated certain uniform functions of political 
officers in the discharge of their functions, and the role of chiefs and elders, in the 
administration of their people.448 The memorandum was a step forward, in the application 
of African policy, but the memorandum did not transform into a policy of government. It 
was a mere administrative documents to guide provincial commissioners’ and district 
officers in the discharge of their functions. 
     The memorandum could not be debated in the Legislative Council because, even if it 
was done, it would not have amounted to a policy document as Sir Percy failed to request 
for the amendments of the Order-in-Council, 1902, which authorized and empowered the 
High Court of the protectorate to exercise control over African reserves. Therefore, for 
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any documents to form part of government policy on African administration, the Order-
in-Council would have to be repealed or amended so as to afford for the administration of 
Africans by their own chiefs and elders, as recommended in Sir Percy’s Interim Report 
and, in Ainsworth and Hobley’s memorandum. 
     But as Sir Percy had not pressed the CO to repeal or amend the Order-in-Council, his 
proposed African policy was rejected. Persistent to pursue his proposed African policy, 
Sir Percy revised his position that he transmitted in the form of a memorandum that was 
supported by the CO. The support afforded Sir Percy the opportunity to introduce certain 
reforms in the administration of Africans, which were considerably less than what he had 
proposed for the African administration. 
  Conclusion 
      The African policy advocated by Sir Percy was that of an indirect rule, which Lord 
Lugard implemented in Northern Nigeria. His proposed policy was accepted by the CO 
that Africans be administered by chiefs and elders. As for policy of administration, 
initially, the CO accepted his proposed administration of Africans by their chiefs but later 
on, it was turned down, in view of Sir Percy’s departure from the initial policy he 
proposed to the CO, having brought in the idea of a trustee to administer the Africans. 
      But the CO required detail of the process of carrying out the policy. In the detail, Sir 
Percy made a provision for a trustee to administer African reserves, a view which His 
Majesty’s Government believed that, it was the trustee of the African people not a private 
person. Churchill had in 1907 rejected the question of placing the Africans under a 
trustee, and as it became a policy, Crewe could not see his way in approving of Sir Percy 
to place Africans under the administration of private persons.  
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       It was in consideration of the complication that might arise by placing the African 
under a trustee, and more importantly, it had been ruled out by Churchill before the 
Commons that government was the trustee of Africans that his proposed policy failed. 
His memoranda of strengthening the African and working through their institution, in 
African areas, a reform he made in May 1910, did not turn out to be a policy of 
government. It was left to individual idiosyncrasy and personal originality of each 
provincial or district officer.  
       More importantly, the measure was inadequate to provide effective and efficient 
policy of African administration within the reserves, and further complicated by the 
presence of other races, with whom the Africans interacted outside the reserves. 
Therefore, in all the proposed policy recommendations on African administration, Sir 
Percy had not been successful in implementing any one of them, therefore, it was a failed 
attempted introduction of the indirect rule, similar to the Lugard Northern Nigeria’s 
policy of administration. A policy that Sir Percy revered, but which he failed to 
successfully provide detailed based on his initial proposal so as to convince Crewe, to 
move on, and instead, introduced new elements into the proposal that caused Crewe to 
reject the proposal outright. 
      The interaction of the Africans with other races, outside their reserves, could only 
complicate the application of African policy, whenever there was a dispute between 
African and any of the two races, as different laws governed them, and the question of 
which law would be applied in the event of dispute outside the reserve came forth. 
Therefore, in all the proposed policy recommendations on African administration, Sir 
Percy had not been successful in implementing any one of them. It was a failed attempted 
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introduction of indirect rule, similar to the Lugard’s Northern Nigeria’s policy of 
administration.  
      Another failure for Sir Percy’s policy of African administration was demonstrated by 
his inability to safeguard African land through the initiation of a land policy that would 
safeguard African reserves. As there was no policy, African reserves were left vulnerable 
to big syndicates and interest groups. Sir Percy had earlier on pointed out that they might 
grab African land if safeguards were not in place. But he never put safeguards in place as 
examples of syndicates and interest groups attempting to grab African land marked his 
governorship. In all Sir Percy’s proposed recommendations for African administration, he 
had not been successful in implementing any one of them. From his failed attempt to 
introduce indirect rule, to his backing of the provincial commissioners in their quarrel 
with the court, to his inability to protect African land. Sir Percy’s policy of African 
administration was one of promise, as reflected in his Interim Report, rather than actual 
performance in the form of implementation of his policy ideas. This reflects on his 
subsequent policy of economic development of the colony for the eventual solvency of 
the colony’s economic predicaments.   
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                                                                Chapter 7 
                                                 Economic Development Policy 
   Introduction  
        In the area of economic development policy, Sir Percy, as he did with the issues of 
land administration policy, faced difficult challenges due to lack of success of his 
predecessors in addressing a very critical issue. Here, as in those issues as well, Sir Percy 
rushed to undertake a study of the issue and the varied problems surrounding it and to 
submit detailed proposals to the CO. Just as in those issues, Sir Percy’s rush to tackle 
economic development policy led to a less than complete understanding and an outcome 
that was hardly successful. 
     Sir Percy’s economic development policy was premised on low railway rates for a 
coastward-bound shipment, with a view to induce farmers to produce more for exports. 
The policy was introduced with the view that European settlers could be induced to 
produce for export for economic solvency of the protectorate as well for the farmers to 
earn a little from the reduced railway rates. While Sir Percy was governor, the colony 
witnessed economic prosperity, as it could balance its budget by 1912. The colony 
succeeded in pulling itself out of its economic predicament, as it did away with the 
annual grant-in-aid from the British Treasury. The economic prosperity of the colony was 
presumed by A. H. M Kirk-Greene’s “Canada’s proconsul,” to have been achieved as a 
result of Sir Percy’s policy of induced agricultural production by means of a reduced 
railway rate on a coast-bound shipment.  
       Contrary to the latter presumption by Kirk-Greene, the economic prosperity that the 
colony witnessed between 1909 and 1912 was not a result of Sir Percy’s policy of 
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induced agricultural production, in view of low shipping rates on the Uganda Railway. 
While Sir Percy had played an important role in the economic development of the colony, 
his economic policies were not instrumental in accentuating the economic development 
of the colony. In fact, his economic policies of low railway rates on coastward bound 
shipments had not helped in accelerating the colony’s economic development to a 
considerable extent, when Sir Percy left the colony, in 1912.     
      Sir Percy’s reasoning for the reduction was to induce farmers to produce more for 
export, as the rates, which Sir Percy claimed was their difficulty in marketing, must be 
reduced. He pointed out that once more exports could be secured, the colony could 
collect duties from exports and imports, which could enable the colony to achieve 
economic solvency. Therefore, following the reduction of rates, it becomes necessary to 
examine the agricultural production of the country and the exports and revenue with a 
view to ascertaining if it was the production of the European farmers that brought home 
the revenue desired that effectively helped the colony do away with its dependence on 
grants-in-aid from the British Treasury.  
      Nevertheless, the economic policy he advocated had not produced the desired result 
by the end of his administration as it was African agricultural production that paved the 
way for the economic solvency of the country rather than European production. As to the 
adjunct railways, they had not proved to be very promising as he had proposed, and by 
the time he left the protectorate, much of the economic and infrastructure development 
the country needed had not been achieved. Development problems in economics and 
transportation continued to pester the colony. Therefore, this chapter seeks to assess what 
was the economic position on his assumption of government, what were the exports of 
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the colony, and the total government revenue receipts on export and on poll and hut taxes 
between 1908 and 1913.  
   The latter process of examining the economic development of the protectorate 
suggested that Sir Percy’s policy of economic development of the colony by European 
settler agricultural production failed to provide the desired economic relief for the colony 
and it was the policy he had not supported, African peasant production, especially in the 
Nyanza basin and revenues from exports of shipment originating from neighboring 
colonies as well as receipts from African poll and hut taxes that turned the economic tide 
of the protectorate by 1913.  
    The economic development of the protectorate took a center stage in Sir Percy’s 
governorship but it turned to disappointing him, suggesting that it was not his economic 
development policy that accelerated the colony’s economic prosperity and achievement 
of independence of the annual grants-in-aid from the British Treasury. 
  Sir Percy’s Economic Development Policy 
      Hitherto, the policy of the EAP emphasized the need to maintain law and order while 
commercial activities were left to private enterprise.449 But Sir Percy believed that it was 
necessary for the government to get involved in stimulating economic development in 
order to be self-sufficient.450 It should be noted that Sir Percy assumed government when 
the annual expenditure of the protectorate as at 1908-1909, stood at £703,102 while its 
annual receipts were £485,000.451 Despite the British Treasury’s annual grant-in-aid of 
£138,000; the colony could not balance its annual budget.452 Sir Percy quickly recognized 
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it was the high cost of railway shipping that discouraged production, as most farmers 
could not afford the railway shipping rates. As a result, railway wagons moved empty 
coastward as no shipment could be procured. Therefore, Sir Percy proposed the 
development of European agriculture for export and the reduction of coastward rates on 
the Uganda Railway so that the European farmers could make savings and be encouraged 
to produce.453 Sir Percy wasted little time in presenting these development ideas to the 
CO, which had the authority to make final decisions as to general policy within the 
dependent empire. However, Sir Percy presented his ideas and policies piecemeal rather 
than as part of a well-developed and comprehensive plan.  
     Sir Percy made the first intimation of his economic plans for the EAP in November of 
1909. He told the CO that the development of European agriculture was key to his ideas 
to promote the protectorate’s economic improvement, and one way to accomplish this 
was to reduce the rates on the coastward railway traffic for commodities such as maize, 
groundnuts, and beans. Sir Percy made this recommendation clear in a telegram of 12 
November 1909.454 Such a policy, he claimed, would not only encourage farmers to 
increase production, but also by increasing traffic, this would increase railway receipts.         
      The increased exports that would result would also increase the earnings of farmers. 
As things stood, Sir Percy told Crewe, the high freight rate charged by the Uganda 
Railway meant that most railway wagons went empty to the coast as farmers could not 
afford to fill them. With the colony’s poor state of revenue generation, Sir Percy told 
Crewe that the situation was unsustainable and suggested that no matter how efficient the 
administrative machine of the country would be, it could not satisfy the economic want of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the country, if it remained in its present condition.455 Sir Percy sought to be given a free 
hand in deciding the rates, and of encouraging the European settlers to engage in 
agricultural production for export.456 This constituted the governor’s main argument that 
lowering the coastward rates would stimulate production and allow a little profit for 
farmers. Thus Sir Percy requested that the CO approve an immediate reduction of railway 
rates.  
      In a separate confidential dispatch of 13 November 1909, accompanying his Interim 
Report, Sir Percy reiterated his proposal for a reduction of rates. He told Crewe that by 
this reduction he desired to accentuate the economic development of the colony. The 
reduction of the railway rates was to be the first step in that direction.457 In his Interim 
Report, Sir Percy deplored the absence of an economic development policy as the 
government had to depend on grants-in-aid from the British government for its annual 
fiscal expenditure. Sir Percy pointed out that this was contrary to the tradition in Northern 
Nigeria, the Transvaal and Orange River colony. According to his analysis, the revenue 
for the EAP was contributed by several different sectors. In 1909-1910, for example, 
Uganda and German East Africa contributed £200,000. The white population of the EAP 
contributed £100,000 and the African population £200,000 while the British taxpayers’ 
contribution that came in the form of a grant-in-aid stood at £138,000. This provided total 
revenue generated for the fiscal year 1909-10 at £638,000.458 
     At the CO Butler noted the prominence Sir Percy had given in the confidential 
dispatch to the reduction of rates as part of his economic policy. In his minute he stated: 
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“it is pleasing to be in a position to tell him that we have already laid this proposal before 
the Treasury, and have supported it in the strongest possible manner.”459 Butler added, “It 
is evidently a question which we must fight to the bitter end in the unfortunate event of 
the Treasury not agreeing outright.”460 Butler earlier noted: “there is already a special rate 
of 1/2d. a ton per mile for maize (and other grain), the continuance of which has been 
sanctioned till the 31st of Dec. 1909, when the matter is to be reconsidered.”461 However, 
Butler minuted that Sir Percy should provide evidence that there was the need for the 
reduction of the railway rates, and added that “a more expeditious procedure was 
necessary to make his case,” before the CO could be ready to transmit his request to the 
Treasury.462  
      At the same time, Butler concurred in Sir Percy’s proposal, when he stated that Sir 
Percy has experienced personnel of tried ability under him to help him achieve his 
desired economic policy. Butler pointed out that with H. A. F. Currie, Manager of the 
Railways, who Butler described as an experienced officer, with years of experience of the 
local conditions who could be relied upon for the success of the railway development. 463 
Also, Butler pointed out that there was Mr. MacDonald whose opinion in agricultural 
matters, according to Butler, could be relied upon.464 More importantly, as for the 
railway, Butler pointed out that Sir Percy was an expert on the question of the railway; 
therefore, no apprehension should be entertained on such a proposal.  
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      Butler suggested that since Sir Percy had proposed a policy that he believed would 
relieve the strain in both directions, and which Sir Percy guaranteed that it would not 
occasion any loss of revenue, Butler stated that, it would be unfair for the CO to reject his 
proposal and recommended further that Sir Percy’s proposal should be tried, when he 
stated that Sir Percy should, “I think, be given a free hand in dealing with coastward 
rates.”465 Therefore, Butler suggested that a copy of Sir Percy’s request be forwarded to 
the Treasury, with a note that “Lord Crewe trusts that they will agree to the proposal.”466  
     But there were hesitations by Read when he stated that this was not the first time the 
CO had attempted to get a freer hand with regard to the Uganda Railway, but they were 
unsuccessful.467 Read expressed his frustrations on how the affairs of the Uganda 
Railway were being managed, when he stated that “under the present system we are tied 
hand and foot and cannot make the smallest alteration in the rates without Treasury’s 
approval.”468 Read added that “this excessive centralization seems to be especially 
pernicious in the case of an enterprise like a railway and I hope that we shall succeed in 
securing greater freedom” for Sir Percy. 469  Fiddes concurred with Read, and 
recommended for a detailed proposal on the administration of the Uganda Railway.470 
Seely concurred in both Fiddes and Read’s minutes, and minuted to Crewe that, “I 
entirely agree with Fiddes, no doubt you can induce the Treasury to agree.”  Seely, in his 
comment, suggested that Crewe could induce the Treasury to reconsider its position on 
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the administration of the Uganda Railway.471 Crewe agreed, and stated that, “this 
question must be pressed on the Treasury, and I hope they will see that our attitude is 
reasonable.”472 Crewe also stated that “to govern a railway on the equator from here, is 
like conducting a war by an Aulic Council.”473  
     Therefore, Crewe instructed Fiddes to draft a dispatch to the Treasury, which Fiddes 
sent in a confidential dispatch of 6 December 1909, to the Secretary of the Treasury, with 
an enclosure of Sir Percy’s telegram of 12 November 1909, transmitted to the Secretary 
to be laid before the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury. Crewe also told the 
Commissioners that any periodic alterations of rate by Sir Percy would be reported from 
time to time and urged the Treasury to relax its tight hold over the affairs of the railway, 
as officials on the ground could be capable of supervising its affairs, should be given a 
free hand, and that the affairs of the railway should be allowed as flexible as possible.474 
But to the dismay of the CO and Sir Percy, the Treasury replied on 20 December 1909 
that, “in the absence of any detailed explanation and authority, the power to fix coastward 
rates should not extend below the minimum of ½d. per ton per mile.”475 Without 
flexibility on the control of the Uganda Railway rates, the situation could complicate the 
ability of the protectorate’s authorities to manage the railway and improve the economy. 
This was clearly seen when the Treasury refused to approve Sir Percy’s request for 
lowering the rates to 1/3d. but instead pointed out that it had already offered a generous 
minimum concession of ½d. on raw products for exports. Crewe intimated to Sir Percy 
the decision of the Treasury in a telegram of 28 December 1909 that the Treasury 
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approved the minimum railway coastward rates of ½d on raw products for export.476 
These measures pointed to future difficulties for Sir Percy’s policy. 
       Sir Percy replied to Crewe in a telegram of 10 January 1910, regretting that full 
terms of Crewe’s letter to the Treasury of 6 December 1909 could not have been adopted 
by the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury.477 Sir Percy also told Crewe that the ½d. 
minimum was not a substantial concession on raw products for export. Sir Percy added 
that the product he wished to base the prosperity of the colony was maize which was, as 
at 1909-1910, at a prohibitive rate of ½d.478 Sir Percy also reiterated in his telegram the 
desirability of being given a free hand in any alteration of the rate and was also willing to 
notify any proposed alteration below ½d.479 Sir Percy thus rejected the Treasury’s offer 
and asked Crewe to resubmit his request to the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury for a 
reconsideration of their decision on his low rates request.480  
     In the CO, Read minuted “speaking rightly the maize comes from a distance of 300-
400 miles.”481 Read added that the export of maize at 1/3d. per ton per mile which Sir 
Percy presented and requested to secure a low rate would be resent to the Treasury, with 
his telegram as an enclosure. Read added that the CO’s message to the Treasury should 
press that the governor should be given “full freedom for which we asked in our of 6 Dec. 
and saying we should be glad to have an answer with regard to the proposed rate for 
maize at the earliest opportunity as there may yet be time to bring the rate into force for 
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this years Crop and explain that so far as we can judge, the proposed rate is an average 
rate of about 1/3d. per ton per mile.”482  
     Fiddes in his minute expressed his concurrence with Read’s comment but stated that 
the reduction would have only applied to maize.483 Seely supported the latter as he stated, 
the Treasury should be reminded that the governor has “special experience of railway 
working.”484  Crewe agreed with Seely’s minute and instructed Fiddes to draft a letter to 
the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury.485 Therefore, a dispatch, dated 17 January 1910 
with an enclosure of Sir Percy’s request in his telegram of 10 January 1910, was 
addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, requesting the Lord Commissioners of the 
Treasury to reconsider their decision in respect of maize only.486 The Commissioners, 
who had the last word on the management of the finances of the Uganda Railway, refused 
to approve Sir Percy’s request for a reconsideration of the rate.487  
     Sir Percy’s proposal and the position of the Treasury on the reduction of the rate were 
one of the initial difficulties occasioned by Sir Percy’s proposed desire for a speedy 
acceleration of the economic development of the protectorate. The Treasury’s attitude 
right from the start suggested that it would not easy for Sir Percy to have his way despite 
the approval of the CO of his proposed economic development of the colony. But it was 
left for Sir Percy to devise other means to secure the consent of the Treasury. 
      In reaction to the Treasury’s rejection of his application and in an effort to press the 
Treasury to agree, be addressed a private letter of 14 June 1910 to Seely, intimating to 
him his disappointment with the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury for rejecting his 
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application. Sir Percy told Seely that all his requests were denied by the CO, and even the 
railway rates reduction that were approved by the CO were defeated by the Treasury.488 
Seely replied to Sir Percy, in a telegram of 9 July 1910, intimating to him that he would 
look into the question of the rates.489 Thereafter, Seely transmitted Sir Percy’s requests 
and grievances to Crewe, in a private letter of 1 August 1910 for further consideration.490     
       In the CO, Read minuted that “we must try to get Sir P. Girouard into a more 
cheerful frame of mind.”491 Read added, “I have remembered the point in his letter when 
he says that the lower rates have been defeated by the Treasury, I assumed that he is 
referring to the rates other than those on maize and beans.”492 Read commented further 
that he had the understanding that Sir Percy wanted to lower rates on such commodities 
which he wanted to start export trade with.493 In the case of the other articles, Read 
stated, “Sir Percy was anxious to be given permission to reduce rates, if necessary to ½d. 
per ton per mile, but the Treasury fenced the concessions by so many safeguards” that 
made it practically difficult to move them lower than Sir Percy had anticipated.494 Read 
added, “So long as the Treasury retain their antiquated ideas about these matters,” he 
could not think any progress could be made.495 Read added that they have sent “official 
letter to the Treasury” over the issue but no progress had been made, unless Crewe or 
Seely could approach the Treasury, privately.496 
     Upon such approach, and subsequent meeting between Fiddes, Read, and Cranworth 
of the Treasury, Sir Percy secured the approval of the Treasury on the lower rates for 
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coastward shipments on the Uganda Railway.497 Thereafter, in a further reply to Sir 
Percy, in a confidential letter of 31 July 1910, Seely stated that the issue of the rates had 
been revisited, and he should expect the Lord Commissioners approval soon.498 
      The success of Sir Percy’s economic development policy depended on low rates as an 
inducement for farmers to produce more and he recommended for the railway rate of 
1/3d. on a coastward bound shipment of products for export. But the Treasury refused 
and retained its 1/2d. per ton per mile which they considered as a generous concession on 
products for export. The Treasury had the final word on the Uganda Railway, having 
invested and enormous sum of money for its construction. Therefore, if Sir Percy would 
be given a free hand on the railway, such approval would have to be granted by the Lord 
Commissioners of the Treasury. The commissioners refused to grant such a free hand to 
Sir Percy, considering that the railway rate was reduced to the lowest barest minimum, 
recently. The reduction in railway rates had been Sir Percy’s policy of moving the 
economy forward.  
     It could be recalled that Sir Percy had insisted on a low rates, when he was the railway 
commissioner of the Transvaal colony. But the governor Milner refused, believing that 
the reduction would be inimical to the colony, pointing out that Sir Percy had already 
imposed low rates, which made it difficult for the colony to balance its annual budget. 
Therefore, he refused any reduction of the rates; pointing out that the railway had to pay 
and the profit from the railway would be invested elsewhere for the development of the 
colony. In fact it was the disagreement over the railway rates that led to the resignation of 
Sir Percy as commissioner of the Transvaal railways.  
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    Therefore, the question of low rates would not help move the colony forward, rather it 
would stagnate further investment, as it would take a long time before the railway could 
pay, and to invest the profit from the railway in other areas for the development of the 
colony. Therefore, even though the Treasury consented to the idea, it did not lead to the 
economic development of the colony, in view of the insignificant number of the 
European famers who were afforded low rates on the Uganda Railway. 
     In essence Sir Percy failed to learn a lesson from his attempted effort to lower the 
rates on the Transvaal railways, when he was the railway director in that colony. Even 
though, the reduction had been considered, that did not improve or encourage the 
European agricultural production for export. It turned out to be an ineffective policy 
instrument for the economic development of the country. In this regard, Sir Percy did not 
appraise the condition critically or his policy had not proved to be a gateway to the 
economic success which suggested that he had not been informed of the nature of the 
economy in that country to warrant his proposed economic policy.  
 Economic Activities 
      Sir Percy proposed the development of an export economy for the country for the 
eventual solvency of its economic predicament. He based his proposition on the export of 
European agricultural products, which he supported by concessions on import and export 
duties. On the other hand, he did not support African production, believing that it was the 
European production that could turn the tide of the economy. Sir Percy was confident that 
the introduction and cultivation of European agricultural commodities for export would 
produce what could support the country’s needs, and surplus products could be exported 
for the country to earn the desired duties. Therefore, Sir Percy was open to supporting the 
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settlers’ agricultural production for the eventual solvency of the country’s economic 
predicament. 
     One of the misapprehensions of policy that Sir Percy brought to bear on his 
agricultural development policy was separate agricultural development. In this regard, Sir 
Percy considered that it was the settlers’ production that could lead to the economic 
prosperity of the country. He had not considered any positive contribution from other 
races; the Indians and the Africans. All his support on agricultural development was 
geared toward supporting the settlers’ production to the detriment of the Indians and the 
Africans who were also active in agricultural cultivation. 
       In his drive to afford a priority for settler-cultivation, Sir Percy refused to listen to 
any contradictory advice. He did not believe that it would take years before settler 
production in the highlands could contribute to agricultural development. As to the 
preposition advocated by John Ainsworth that production in the Nyanza basin would 
have to support the white highlands, the area where the Europeans lived and had their 
farms, Sir Percy disagreed. Referring to this issue in his Main Report, completed in 1910, 
Sir Percy told Crewe, without mentioning Ainsworth by name, that as they had attracted 
the white population into the protectorate, they were morally bound to support them “in 
proving this beautiful and attractive region.”499  
     Sir Percy was wrong in his assessment, as it was the coast and the Nyanza basin that 
paved the way for the economic prosperity of the protectorate, especially in agricultural 
production, rather than his presumption that the white highlands would provide the 
economic development the colony needed. It was African Production in the Nyanza basin 
that provided the bulk of the produce exported that helped the protectorate to earn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Sir Percy to Crewe, Main Report, confidential, 26 May 1910, CO 533/74. 
152	  
	  
revenue and do away with the grants-in-aid from the British government, beginning from 
the 1912-13 fiscal year.500   
    The latter development suggested that Sir Percy had not appraised the condition of the 
country sufficiently to inform his proposed European agricultural development for export 
trade on the highlands only, disregarding other areas for development. It also suggested 
that Sir Percy was not abreast with the conditions to recommend a better alternative, or 
conducive areas, where the government could invest so as to afford the country the 
desired economic prosperity. His vision of transforming a peasant economic production 
to an agricultural production where, industry, wage labor and mechanized agriculture 
would have been the norm failed as he limited his policy to a few Europeans whose 
production could barely support subsistence let alone consider production for export.  
     He aimed for an economy oriented toward the production of desired metropolitan 
agricultural products for its industries. Such a policy would provide receipts for the 
Uganda railway by means of shipment of goods, and export duty receipts for the country. 
Therefore, Sir Percy considered the presence of European settlers would best help 
develop the colony through export trade. But the task was beyond the numerical strength 
of the Europeans whose production in 1912, amounted to 20,000 bags of maize being 
exported to the European market.501 
    The prosperity of the colony viz-viz other crown colonies, on the west coast of Africa 
and in the South Africa, might have informed his decision to develop export trade. By 
this measure, Sir Percy hoped that the colony could generate the desired revenue to fund 
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its administration and do away with the annual grants-in-aid from the British Treasury.502 
The question of development of agriculture for exports and the generation of the desired 
receipts for the colony’s economic prosperity, was not only a priority to Sir Percy, but 
also to the CO and the British Treasury which had to support the country with grants-in-
aid.503 It was the colony’s dependence on grants-in-aid, which prompted Sir Percy’s 
economic development policy so that the country could be self-supporting.504  
     But as Sir Percy was determined to raise the country to a new economic height, he 
introduced the reduction of railway rates as an incentive that could spur farmers to 
produce for export from which the government could levy duties on both exports and 
imports with a view to funding the government fiscal expenditure.505 But the extent to 
which his policy could achieve the latter goal remained a distant possibility; having failed 
to objectively appraise whether or not his proposed policy could provide the desired 
outcome. 
      It was very clear that in 1909, the agricultural exports of the colony were not enough 
to support its financial needs. The African production for export in 1909 stood at 75 
percent and in 1910, it decreased to 74 percent, while in 1911, 1912, and 1913, the 
percentages were 61, 66, and 68 percent of the total exports respectively. On the other 
hand, the European production for export in 1909 and 1910, were 1 and 3 percent of the 
total. While in 1911, 1912, and 1913, they were 7, 8, and 12 percent respectively.506  
Based on these economic statistics, it is clear that during Sir Percy’s term of office the 
protectorate’s exports came mostly from African production. But it was also on record 
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that the economic success of the country was not because of Sir Percy’s economic policy, 
but it owed its success to the African farmers, receipts from poll and hut taxes, and duties 
from export of goods originating from neighboring colonies, as well as the changing 
economic logic of the time that produced demands of commodities that were chiefly 
found or exported from the East Africa rather than the handiwork of Sir Percy.507 It could 
be seen from the colony’s agricultural output that the policy that turned the tide of the 
economy lacked support from Sir Percy. This could be seen from the economic activities 
of the colony that it was the African peasant production, especially from Nyanza, that 
accelerated the economic development of the country rather than Sir Percy’s economic 
development policy. Sir Percy’s economic development policy was designed for the 
European settlers, who were numerically too small to effect any change. The major 
export commodities that Sir Percy hoped to be the bulk of the colony’s exports, once the 
European settler-economy developed, would be wheat, coffee, and sisal, among other 
things. As he was determined to develop the settler economy, he afforded them all the 
support and encouragement they needed to produce.508  
     Sir Percy’s proposed economic development strategy would only be possible when 
farms were made accessible to prospective settlers who could invest in agriculture. But in 
view of the lack of a land policy that could provide access to farms with relative ease and 
also provide safeguards against land accumulation and dummying, the proposed 
economic development by means of European agricultural cultivation could not have a 
chance of success, as there was no adequate legislation on the land alienation and 
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allocation to afford prospective farmers easy access to farmland.509 In addition to the 
latter, there was the issue of competing land title claims on the coast, African land policy, 
and Arab land tenure system governed by Islamic law.510 All these conditions became a 
difficulty for Sir Percy’s government in coming up with a uniform land policy that could 
provide easy access to farmland for European settlers so that cultivation could commence 
with a view to accentuating exports production of the colony.511  This was in addition to 
the delay and uncertainty that occasioned the execution of his proposed estimates for the 
project.  
     However, the African production, which lacked the support from the government, 
eventually turned the economic tide of the protectorate, rather than the settler 
production.512 African exports of favored agricultural products to neighboring countries 
earned both the peasants and the colony incomes for further investment.513 Therefore, the 
increasing economic prosperity of the colony during Sir Percy’s tour of duty was, to a 
large extent, occasioned by the change in the global socio-economic and political logic of 
the time, rather than the performance of Sir Percy’s reduction of coastward rates and the 
subsequent agricultural products being exported. 514  In this regard, Sir Percy’s 
shortsighted vision of economic development, by limited production by a few, failed to 
afford the country the desired result. This suggested that Sir Percy had not made sound 
assessment of the colony’s economic problems so as to be in a position to provide 
remedies.      
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     The CO presumed that Sir Percy could fix the economic problems of the country, in 
view of his past record of performance, especially in the development of railways in the 
Sudan, Northern Nigeria and the Transvaal. But that did not happen, and, instead, he 
failed to effect the economic development he proposed on his assumption of the 
government.515 Therefore, to be judged as a fine administrator, Sir Percy’s performance 
should have been above board as for the development of agricultural production for 
export.516 He should have drawn from his experience of Northern Nigeria where the 
African peasants produced the bulk of groundnuts exported out of the country. Northern 
Nigeria, unlike the EAP, was not a settler colony, were color set the preference in the 
application of policy. But economic production for exports, designed to earn receipts 
from duties, should have been extended to whatever group that was judged to have the 
capability of production for exports rather than limiting state support to the very few. 
 Exports and Revenue  
     The detail on the progression of the economy, year by year, offers insight into the 
gradual but sustained economic growth in exports as well as in revenue. The expansion in 
value of exports and in the protectorate’s revenue marked the years of Sir Percy’s 
governorship. However, an examination of the export and revenue statistics shows that in 
certain areas the growth had little connection to, or was not impacted by, the introduction 
of Sir Percy’s economic development policy. Statistics for the financial years 1908-09 
through 1912-13 clearly illustrated this point. For 1908-09, the year before Sir Percy 
assumed leadership of the colonial state, revenue amounted to £485,668 with the imperial 
grant-in-aid at £138,000. Among the main heads under revenue were customs duties, the 





hut tax paid by African households, and revenue generated by the railway.517 For 1909-
10, revenue increased to £503,040 while for 1910-11 a further increase to £609,586 was 
recorded. Railway earnings, increased customs revenue, and expanded collection of hut 
and poll tax provided the bulk of the increase.518 For 1911-12, Sir Percy’s last year in 
charge, revenue reached £729,078. Of this, hut and poll tax reached its highest ever 
figure, £146,215, a clear indication of an ever greater African contribution to revenue and 
a reflection of growing production and sale of commodities for export. For 1912-13, 
revenue increased by 30 percent and reached an all time high of £952,525. For the first 
time since the establishment of the EAP no grant-in-aid was received from the British 
Government.519  
    The improved revenue situation owed much to increases in value of the protectorate’s 
exports during these years. This was reflected in increasing revenue from custom duties, 
hut and poll tax receipts, and railway income. For 1908-09 exports totaled £436,313 in 
value, during the following year these rose to £590,057. These figures included exports 
from Uganda, German East Africa and the Belgium Congo. The value of the 
protectorate’s exports alone was £190,668 for 1909-10. For 1910-11 exports value 
expanded dramatically to £276,489. For the year ending 31 March 1912, the value of 
exports rose to £333,670. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the bulk of this expanded 
export production came from African peasants, especially those in Nyanza Province. The 
accompanying table, which shows the origin of the protectorate’s exports from African 
and European producers, demonstrates the point. During 1911-12, for example, grains 
produced by Africans increased by 90 percent in value and reached a peak £108,568, 
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surpassing hides and skins as the protectorate’s leading exports by value.520 Exports of 
sim sim and maize, largely from Nyanza led to increases.521 For example, over 8,000 tons 
of maize was exported from Nyanza Province. The province was now the railway’s best 
customer, and it also contributed most to the protectorate’s hut and poll tax receipts. 
During 1911-12, for example, £57,676 was collected in Nyanza, almost 40 percent of the 
total collected for the year.522 The export from Nyanza African farmers owed the success 
to the efforts of Ainsworth who ensured Africans were allowed to work on their farms 
and that seeds were distributed to them, rather than being coerced to work for wages on 
the European farms and estates.523  
Table 4.1 Shows the Protectorates products produced by each of the race of the 
Protectorate, and its exports thereon. 
Category 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
African       
Hide and Skin 26 40 40 33 23 37 
Maize . 1 5 .. .. .. 
Beans and Peas 1 3 4 3 5 5 
Sim sim . 16 13 15 14 20 
Oil seeds linseed, 
cotton, castor, sim 
sim) 
. 1 . 2 1 . 
Other grains 
(millet, rice) 
. . . . 1 . 
Cotton 6 7 5 2 13 1 
Groundnut 1 . 1 1 2 2 





























European Settler       
Coffee . 1 1 3 2 5 
Sisal ---- ---- ---- ---- 1 2 
Other Fibre ---- ---- ---- ---- 1 2 
Plantation Rubber ---- ---- ---- 1 1 1 
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Wool 2 . 2 3 3 2 
Total Percentage 2 1 3 7 8 12 
Miscellaneous       
Coconuts/Copra 29 14 15 11 4 7 
Gum copal 1 1 1 1 . 1 
Bee wax 19 5 6 5 3 2 
Wild Animal 
Skins 
3 3 1 1 1 1 
Wild Rubber ---- ---- ---- 5 2 1 
Mangrove bark 1 1 . . . ---- 
Total Percentage 53 24 23 23 10 12 
Mix       
Maize    9 16 8 
Percentage total    9 16 8 
 
 
*This denotes export of product was under half of one percent 
** This denotes that export after 1910 came from African and European farmers as well, but no 
recorded export had been made. 
Source: Maxon, Struggle for Kenya, 32. 
  
     From the above table it could be understood that substantial increase in agricultural 
exports came from the African peasants. In 1908, the African Peasant production stood at 
45 Percent but by 1909 to 1913, African peasant generated more than half of the export 
of the commodities. The commodities that feature prominently in the exports were maize, 
cotton, beans, peas and sim sim.524  
             Conclusion 
      Sir Percy’s proposed policy had been approved when the CO accepted his request and 
the Treasury approved lowering the rate, but not without a lengthy correspondence and 
frustration on the part of Sir Percy, in view of the Treasury’s hold on the affairs of the 
Uganda railway. It also had to cause the intervention of Seely before the CO could press 
on the Treasury to consider the question of the rate in favor of Sir Percy’s 
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recommendations. But the lowering of the rates did not ameliorate the economic 
condition of the Europeans, as it had not encouraged production substantially.  
       Where it did, the output of the farmers was hampered by chronic droughts, especially 
in 1910-1911 harvests. The question of lowering rates as a policy of development had not 
to a large extent achieved the desired result. As for the agricultural production, there were 
considerable improvements in production, but it could not make any significant impact 
on the country, as the Europeans were too small to effect the economic development of 
the entire colony. In view of the limited numerical strength of the Europeans, and 
government assistance in providing seeds, land allotments were not easy to come by, 
making it difficult for the European farmers to achieve their desired production, their 
numerical strength notwithstanding.  
      It was true that during Sir Percy’s administration the country achieved its economic 
height, when it was able to do away with a grant-in-aid from the British government. But 
it was also clear that it was not the economic policies of Sir Percy that led to the 
economic development of the country to the extent that it was self-supporting; rather the 
development was achieved because of the change in socio-economic and political logic of 
the time. The latter came about by under-consumption in Kenya, the African agricultural 
production from the Nyanza basin which produced enough for consumption and export of 
goods desired in neighboring countries, led to the economic progress of the country rather 
than the European agriculture he had supported.  
       Revenue derived from exports of other colonies being transported on the Uganda 
Railway and shipped through Mombasa to neighboring countries was also the key to 
success. This suggested that Sir Percy had not fully appraised or grasped the colony’s 
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potentials for development before transmitting his proposed economic policy. His 
reliance on a small number of European settlers alone for the economic development of 
the colony was not well informed as exports of African goods needed in neighboring 
colonies plays a significant role in accentuating the economic success of the colony. 
Therefore the lack of success in his economic agenda was born out of his lack of a 
comprehension of the socio economic condition of both the EAP and the neighboring 
countries. The failure in this regard could not have been expected of Sir Percy, having 
been presumed to be an outstanding administrator. 
       It was very clear that his preferential treatment of the European over the remaining 
races, especially on the economic development of the colony, played a significant role in 
his failure to come up with an enduring economic policy for the development of the 
colony. It was also the same reason that saw to his failure to fix the economy up to the 
time he left the colony. But such economic policy, at the same time, required efficient 
infrastructure to operate successfully, and it was in view of such need that the question of 
construction of adjunct railway lines to facilitate shipments of goods that came forth. 
Therefore, Sir Percy recommended the construction of the abandoned Nairobi-Thika, 
Magadi, railways as adjunct of the Uganda Railway. The question of railway construction 
and development was associated with Sir Percy was known to have been an expert in 
both civilian and military railway construction and administration.  
 





                                                                 Chapter 8 
                                                       Railway Development  
 Introduction  
        By the time Sir Percy assumed the administration of the East Africa Protectorate, he 
was recognized as a leading expert in the British Empire on the subject of building and 
operation of railways. The EAP provided an opportunity for Sir Percy to utilize his 
experience and expertise for positive benefit. The building and development of railways 
began with the construction of the Uganda Railway which was started in 1896 and 
completed in 1901. The railway ran from the coast to Lake Victoria, and it had been an 
expensive enterprise for the British Treasury. While the single rail linked the interior with 
the coast, many parts of the protectorate with economic potential lay far away from the 
main line. There was thus need for construction of additional adjunct railways that might 
help to facilitate the transport of agricultural products from remote locations to the coast 
for onward shipment to European markets. Sir Percy quickly recognized this and sought 
to carry through the construction of adjunct railway lines so as to facilitate his proposed 
economic development policy. 
      This chapter will focus on two of the adjunct lines that marked the start of Sir Percy’s 
administration. The first was the rail link proposed between Nairobi and Fort Hall to the 
north of the capital that actually was initially constructed to Thika while the second was 
the Magadi railway extension that was proposed by the Magadi Soda Company to ease its 
transportation difficulties in the movement of soda ash from Lake Magadi to the Uganda 
Railway line. As an experienced railway engineer and manager, it could be anticipated 
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that the construction of adjunct railways would provide Sir Percy with an opportunity to 
demonstrate his talent by the successful initiation and completion of a branch railways.  
       An examination of these two lines suggests, however, that Sir Percy achieved only 
modest success rather than outstanding achievement as an administrator. Sir Percy moved 
quickly to recognize the need for additional rail lines as he pushed early in his 
governorship for approval for a rail line to be built to Fort Hall, asking for trust in his 
expertise and judgment so that he might be given a free hand to undertake the project. Sir 
Percy as the man on the spot with knowledge of the situation in Africa pressured the CO 
to approve the project. Such approval was not immediately forthcoming, however, and as 
time passed the CO became suspicious of Sir Percy’s motives and operating style as a 
result of a lengthy and frustrating correspondence surrounding this line. The issue of 
railway development thus provides an example to view some of the characteristics of Sir 
Percy’s style of administration, notably the unwillingness and inability to provide 
complete details to justify a course of action he strongly advocated, that later in his 
governorship would cause him great problems with his superior. 
  Nairobi-Fort Hall-Thika Railway  
    A railway linking Nairobi to Fort Hall, later altered to connect the capital of the 
protectorate only with Thika, the site of several European settler estates, was the first to 
be taken up by Sir Percy. It was to provide a feeder line that would join the main Uganda 
Railway at Nairobi. Such a line to connect Nairobi with Thika and Fort Hall had been 
proposed to the CO in 1906, and the then parliamentary undersecretary of State, Winston 
Churchill, enthusiastically endorsed it.525 Sir Percy soon came to the view that it was 
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necessary to revisit the question of building adjunct railways so as to provide the desired 
transportation to support his economic development policy.526 Such railways would 
provide the means for shipping commodities from productive agricultural centers of the 
colony as well as increasing the colony’s receipts from the working of the line.527 
Churchill’s visit to the protectorate in 1907 further reinforced the interest in railway 
development, both in the EAP and in London. Churchill was impressed with the 
cultivation in the Embu area to the northeast of Nairobi and indicated that application for 
railway extension to the productive areas could be considered by the CO.528  
     Later that year, a reconnaissance survey was sponsored by the East Africa and Uganda 
Corporation. Captain A. G. Stevenson carried out the survey for a railway from Nairobi 
through Thika and Fort Hall to Embu. Stevenson’s report suggested that the railway of 
around ninety-nine miles would be relatively easy to construct and would be 
economically viable.529 However, the corporation did not follow up the survey with 
action to undertake construction of a rail line. It was Sir Percy who revisited the idea of a 
railway from Nairobi to Thika and Fort Hall. Soon after his arrival, he visited various 
areas lying some distance from Nairobi where European settlers had started farming. He 
was impressed by the settlers around Thika who were developing sisal and coffee estates, 
but he was also struck by the fact that their farming was hindered by the absence of a 
reliable transport. As noted in the previous chapter, Sir Percy hoped to facilitate 
European export production as the mainstay of the protectorate’s economy and he 
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believed that if the European farmers could be induced to produce more export crops it 
would improve the economy of the EAP.530 
   Therefore, Sir Percy told Crewe, in telegram of 1 April 1910, that the desire to build the 
railway was not primarily motivated by the need for economic development. Rather he 
emphasized that the need for the railway was dictated by the unfolding ecological and 
environmental problems of the area under consideration for the rail link.531  
    The road between Nairobi and Thika had been closed due to the outbreak of the cattle 
disease, East Coast Fever, and the government had quarantined the Nairobi and Fort Hall 
areas for a period of two or three years. It was out of such circumstances that Sir Percy 
sought a means to ease these transportation difficulties by revisiting the question of the 
construction of a Nairobi to Thika railway.532 At this point, Sir Percy had provided little 
more than a justification for the line. He gave no detailed information as to the possible 
costs of construction, nor did he provide detailed estimates as to the type and amount of 
traffic that might be anticipated if the railway was built. The CO and the Treasury would 
not be likely to approve such a scheme without information such as estimated costs of 
construction and possible traffic on the proposed route. But when Sir Percy followed up 
in a telegram of 9 April 1910, he stated that he could not provide an exact estimate of 
imaginary traffic; however, he was confident there would be more production in the 
region that would be served by the rail line in the following year as European farmers 
were bringing more land under cultivation in view of the anticipated reduction of railway 
rates. Production during the current year had been hampered by drought, he added, but 
there was no doubt in the governor’s mind that the proposed line would cover the cost of 
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its construction.533 Sir Percy added that the area under discussion could produce two 
harvests a year, especially maize and beans, but not much had been produced by African 
farmers because of the high cost of shipping. With modern transport available in the form 
of a railway or tramway, large quantities of produce would be raised, according to Sir 
Percy, as the large numbers of Kikuyu living near the line would raise large quantities of 
maize and beans.534 
    However, the CO was not impressed with this explanation. Officials there wanted more 
precise details as to the cost of construction and assurance that the imperial investment in 
the line would be realized. This meant that some specific information as to costs of 
construction and the expected traffic were necessary before the CO could take any action 
in recommending this scheme to the Treasury. Crewe made these points in a telegram to 
Sir Percy on 27 April 1910. The telegram emphasized also that the CO wanted specific 
details so as not to be faced, when the current emergency situation was over, by a demand 
that the proposed line could only be made to pay by a further extension.535      
     More than a month after Sir Percy first raised the issue of the rail line, he finally 
responded with more detail. Yet he still hesitated in giving precise estimates as to the cost 
of construction and the prospect for traffic in the post emergency period. His estimates of 
the latter were general, but he noted that both European and African producers in the 
region would likely harvest between 200 and 400 tons of produce. Sir Percy also told 
Crewe that there was an increased number of settlers taking up farms around Thika and 
that there was potential for increased production among Kikuyu peasants. However, he 
could not give details to “annual expenditure and receipts….” He stated that the cost of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Sir Percy to Crewe, telegram, 9 April 1910, CO 53373. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Crewe to Sir Percy, telegram, 27 April 1910, CO 533/73. 
167	  
	  
construction would nevertheless be recovered. 536  As to the estimate of cost of 
construction of what he now termed a tramway, Sir Percy gave a rough figure of £2,000 
per mile. Further, Sir Percy told Crewe that he was prepared to raise capital charges from 
specific savings. The construction would thus serve as an object lesson in the 
construction and development lines in the EAP so that its success would prove that the 
construction of such a line was the proper way to promote economic development.537 Sir 
Percy also reminded Crewe that Churchill had travelled through the region and would 
surely support the railway scheme. Thus the governor urged for swift action in favor of 
the proposed line as he also promised to obtain £20,000 locally if the Treasury could 
provide £40,000.538  
     The CO now had more details of Sir Percy’s railway/ tramway scheme, but officials 
were not filled with enthusiasm for the governor’s plan. It had taken some time to obtain 
more details of the scheme, but uncertainty remained. Butler undertook a detailed 
examination of the issue, and his minute indicated a lack of confidence in Sir Percy as 
well as uncertainty that the CO could trust him as the man on the spot.539 These were 
significant issues as this would not be the last time that the CO would suspect that Sir 
Percy was not telling the whole story, or providing sufficient details, in support of a 
course of action he enthusiastically proposed. 
    To start with, Butler was not convinced by Sir Percy’s estimates of the costs of 
construction. Butler noted the lack of convincing data that the capital for the construction 
could be met from savings made on expenditure approved for the 1910-1911 financial 
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year.540 Butler was also doubtful that the £20,000 Sir Percy promised to raise would be 
forthcoming. He stated: “this is a clear case of £20,000 in the bush.”541 He also worried 
about the lack of detail as to how the money raised for construction would actually be 
spent when he minuted that “the whole question is surrounded by considerable doubt.”542 
Despite these doubts, Butler was still willing, in May of 1910, to trust the judgment of the 
man on the spot. The governor’s strong assurance “that it will be all right in the end” 
seemed to Butler to mean that the CO should forward the scheme to the Treasury for their 
approval despite his concern that it was “taking a big step in the dark” in their reliance on 
“the judgment of the personality of the Governor.”543 Since Sir Percy indicated that the 
proposal was a vital one, Butler ruled out rejecting his proposed railway/tramway line 
even though he minuted: ‘I cannot say that I personally feel very uncomfortable in being 
forced to that conclusion.”544 He recognized the possibility that Sir Percy might be 
misleading the CO and that the Treasury might in any case reject his plan, but he 
proposed to go ahead and submit the scheme to the Treasury with a request of approval of 
the funds requested.545 
     Seely also advocated despite doubts that the Treasury would approve. It was the “man 
on the spot” argument that proved influential in Seely’s decision. He noted that he did not 
subscribe to that belief in every situation in the colonies, but in the case of Sir Percy’s 
presumed knowledge of local conditions and expert knowledge in the field of transport 
caused Seely to trust the man on spot who knew more about “ such matters than most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








men.”546 Crewe also subscribed to this ideal when he minuted that Sir Percy had “special 
capabilities” for judging the position with regard to transport. However, he added an 
interesting observation that will be important to remember in assessing this issue as well 
as Sir Percy’s administration more generally. Crewe noted that a man in such a 
responsible position as governor “ought to be given a chance.” He added, Sir Percy might 
make it or make mistakes.547 On the strength of these opinions, the CO addressed a 
dispatch to the Treasury seeking approval for Sir Percy’s proposed railway/tramway. The 
CO included all correspondence on the subject with the dispatch and justified the request 
by the need to rely on the judgment of the governor.548 The latter statement suggests that 
the CO was not comfortable with certain aspects of the scheme, such as the fact that the 
scheme would immediately pay for itself, but Crewe felt he had no option than to accept 
Sir Percy’s proposal. In the dispatch to the Treasury, the CO requested a loan of £40,000 
be advanced to Sir Percy for the construction of twenty miles of tramway. The 
construction of the remaining ten miles would depend on Sir Percy realizing the savings 
of £20,000 he had promised.549  
     However, the Treasury refused to approve the request. The Treasury replied on 6 June 
that they could not sanction the construction of the proposed line, and instead they 
recommended either an improved system of motor transport or a monorail.550 Both these 
alternatives were presumed to be less expensive than the proposal from Sir Percy. Crewe 
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transmitted the Treasury’s decision to Sir Percy in a telegram of 10 June 1910 together 
with a request for his comments.551  
 Sir Percy’s Tramway  
     With the rejection of his proposal, Sir Percy now had not only to comment on the 
Treasury suggestion of motor traffic or monorail, but he needed to come up with some 
means of overcoming the skepticism of the CO and the Treasury. He now took up 
advocacy for a tramway as an easier undertaking than a railway he had proposed; he just 
changed the name but not the proposed project. It was merely a means to try to get 
around the refusal of the Treasury.  
       Sir Percy replied to Crewe’s transmission of the Treasury decision in a telegram of 
16 June 1910. He first made clear the impossibility of using road transport instead of a 
rail line by claiming that “efficient system of motor traffic” would require larger 
expenditure than could be justified for that class of transport.552 As to the idea of a 
monorail, Sir Percy stated that an experiment in Kampala was successful, and it could be 
suitable for the EAP. Thus Sir Percy recommended the construction of a monorail. 
Considering the topography of the country, this was the type of rail line that would work 
better in the EAP.553 But just two days later, Sir Percy had a change of mind. He sent 
another telegram to Crewe on 18 June 1910 in which he sought to clarify his position. It 
was a substantial clarification as he now told Crewe that he was not recommending a 
monorail for the EAP; rather he was suggesting that reference might be made to 
consulting engineers. But he went further in stating a preference for the construction of a 
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tramway that could use the old rolling stock of the Uganda Railway, as the best solution 
to the transport problem.554 
     In addition, Sir Percy indicated a preference for a tramway because of the topography 
of the country could not afford either motor or monorail traffic with relative ease. He 
further justified his support for a tramway by stating again that if the tramway was 
approved, he could find £20,000 from local sources to support the construction.555 From 
the contents of the two telegrams, it was clear that Sir Percy’s telegram of 18 June 1910 
was a retraction of one of his recommendations that the CO should consider a monorail 
for the EAP. He now advocated the building of a tramway to relieve the serious transport 
situation. He once again claimed that such a line would assist in the development of the 
large agricultural district inhabited by Kikuyu, where a million Africans, as well as some 
European settlers, were working to develop agricultural commodities for sale.556 
      The ball was now in the CO’s court. In an attempt to clarify the situation and reach 
consensus on the revised proposal of Sir Percy, a conference took place between Read 
and Butler of the CO and Mr. Cawston of the Treasury. As a result of the conference the 
CO and the Treasury ruled out the monorail idea, but they decided before considering the 
tramway scheme that further information should be sought from Sir Percy. Thus a 
telegram of 28 June 1910 was addressed to the governor, demanding to know the actual 
cost of “Fort Hall motor transport, if the road were made suitable.”557 The telegram also 
asked for the cost to the government if the colonial state had to provide vehicles to haul 
the goods and passengers by road.558      
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      Sir Percy replied in a telegram of 3 July 1910 that it would cost £54,000 to make the 
Fort Hall road suitable for motor traffic. This was clearly not a cheap alternative. Sir 
Percy added that available motor vehicles could carry very little, and it would be 
necessary for such carriers to charge high rates.559 On the strength of Sir Percy’s 
telegram, the CO sent a letter to the Treasury, pointing out it was useless to seek a 
remedy to the transport issue by any other scheme than a tramway. Crewe also reiterated 
that Sir Percy was confident that a tramway represented a cheaper alternative.560 These 
arguments did little as the Treasury refused to accept Sir Percy’s proposal. The Treasury 
replied to Sir Percy on 5 September 1910, pointing out that the information furnished 
with regard to the proposal was insufficient for the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury 
to approve the construction of the line. The treasury agreed to approve the scheme only if 
they could be availed with a full explanation, including details of the estimates of costs of 
construction and equipment together with a report on the nature of the traffic likely to be 
forthcoming.561 
     This continued lack of approval for a scheme that Sir Percy’s expertise should have 
facilitated raises interesting and important issues with regard to his administration. Even 
after prolonged correspondence, the CO and the Treasury were unwilling to give way to 
the wishes of the man on the spot. Crewe might hope that Sir Percy be allowed to make it 
or make mistakes, but the Treasury was not willing to do so without precise and detailed 
information. Sir Percy’s changes of mind as to monorail, tramway or railway were 
another factor that did not count very heavily in his favor. In fact this episode points to 
future problems for Sir Percy. His seeming unwillingness or inability to provide all the 
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details desired in London were troubling. He wanted to be given a free hand, as the man 
on the spot, to solve a transportation problem regarding which he was an expert. But he 
had not acted in ways that gained the confidence of the CO. He had yet to achieve 
success some five months after he initiated his proposal for the railway/tramway. The 
suspicion his actions aroused among his superiors and with the Treasury were indeed 
characteristics of a less than stellar administrator. 
       Nevertheless, Sir Percy kept plugging away in support of the line from Nairobi to 
Thika and Fort Hall. For example, he sent a confidential dispatch to the CO on 1 
November 1910 in which he provided estimates for a railway line thirty-one miles long 
which would cost £60,000.562 Sir Percy now estimated that the actual traffic would 
amount to 70,000 or 80,000 tons annually; mainly maize and beans, and that passengers 
and casual goods traffic should also be expected on this route.563 These new estimates did 
not end the correspondence of the adjunct railway. The CO made a further request for 
more precise information as to potential receipts as well as estimates for the annual cost 
of working and maintenance.564 While in London in December, Sir Percy provided 
revised estimates on all these matters.565  
   Even upon the receipt of new estimates of the cost of construction and profit on the 
traffic that would be carried, there remained doubts in the CO, and approval for the 
project dragged on. Butler, for example, was concerned that Sir Percy had not appraised 
the question of costs and prospects of a tramway adequately.566 Despite misgivings, the 
CO continued to back Sir Percy’s proposal. In a dispatch of 10 February 1911 Crewe 
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included the tramway proposal as one of three schemes to be funded by a loan of 250,000 
from the Treasury.567 Thus the tramway was approved during 1911 with this funding. 
When constructed to Thika, it was a railway built by the protectorate’s public works 
department.568 
    From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the information on the scheme provided 
by Sir Percy was not useful in consideration of its merits by the CO and the Treasury, in 
spite of the fact that it was presumed there that Sir Percy, having considerable knowledge 
and experience of railways, would develop the infrastructure of the colony. His 
performance with regard to projecting the cost of construction and effectively advocating 
for the approval of his scheme raised question as to Sir Percy’s competence in coming up 
with vital information. This caused a long delay in approval and suggests that he was not 
a great developer and administrator who could collect relevant information as well as 
gauge conditions to provide useful information that would enhance the development of 
the railway and the colony as a whole.  
      It was very clear that the CO and the Treasury did not approve the project initially 
because they were not satisfied with Sir Percy’s explanation as to the scheme. Rather 
they approved the scheme after a prolonged hesitation, doubt and caution that Sir Percy 
might not be providing the right information. In this instance, they eventually took risk to 
approve it, believing that he might be right in his proposition rather than that he would be 
mistaken. Later in 1911 however, another secretary of state found out to his dismay that 
Sir Percy’s poorly developed recommendations and concealed motives could lead to 
great embarrassment and threaten the reputation of Britain as a colonial power.  
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    The CO took the risk in approving the project not because they were satisfied with Sir 
Percy’s explanation, but because he was the man on the spot, as Seely had pointed out 
earlier. The CO caved in to Sir Percy in the end despite the uncomfortable feelings 
because they wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. Yet this formed an unhappy 
precedent for future troubles that spelled the end for Sir Percy as a colonial administrator. 
Magadi Railway  
      Sir Percy’s part in the building of the railway to Lake Magadi, on the other hand, 
presents a different example of his role as a railway expert, developer of infrastructure, 
and facilitator of colonial economic development. The Magadi Soda Company proposed 
the construction of the railway. It intended to ship soda ash from Lake Magadi to the 
coast via the Uganda Railway. The line also became known as the Magadi-Konza railway 
that joined the Uganda Railway at mile 267.  
    The working of the soda deposits was expected to produce wealth for the colony, and a 
railway was required to move the soda ash to the world market. Sir Percy came into the 
affair of the railway on the ground that the company’s activities would benefit the 
economic development of the colony. Sir Percy thus did not initiate the idea of the 
railway line. However, he wasted little time in supporting the company’s endeavor and 
facilitated the granting of concessions to the company. He advocated for government 
support for the railway’s construction and purchase of rolling stock. He facilitated this 
funding in his approaches to the CO, and he was also instrumental in obtaining land for 
the company at Kilindini in Mombasa. 
     Finally, he was prepared to overlook the terms of the 1904 agreement between the 
Maasai and the British government so as to enable the company to obtain land for 
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housing staff near Lake Magadi as well for the water supply for the soda plant and its 
workers.  
     Sir Percy was keen to promote economic development through European enterprise, 
as noted earlier in this dissertation. In 1909, for example, he advocated that the British 
government should sponsor an order for new rolling stock for the Magadi railway before 
construction had started or the company now holding the concession, Messrs. Samuel & 
Co., had even exercised their option for the lease and the right to construct a railway.569 
At the CO, Butler was hesitant to support Sir Percy’s recommendation as he felt it was 
difficult to ask the Treasury to provide the rolling stock before “we know whether the 
soda is going to be worked.”570 He felt sure the Treasury would feel the company was 
trying to rush to them.571 Early in his governorship, just as late, Sir Percy had no 
hesitation in rushing to demand action from the CO without contemplating the 
consequences of hasty action.  
     The question of constructing a pier at Kilindini for the company also saw Sir Percy 
move quickly to use state resources for the benefit of the company. Samuel & Co. 
approached the CO prior to Sir Percy’s assumption of government to demand that larger 
facilities were needed at Mombasa if their export of soda ash was to be successful. The 
company was especially concerned that their operations would be seriously hampered if 
they could not have adequate storage space for soda ash cargoes since it might within the 
same fortnight be compelled to ship full cargoes to Britain, Europe, “ ports in the East,” 
and to America. Thus Samuel & Co. took the view that they should have a storage facility 
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for 50,000 tons of soda at Kilindini. The company pressured the CO to state its position 
on what it viewed as a critical matter.572   
      Soon after Sir Percy took charge in Nairobi, the issue came before him for action. The 
CO asked him if there was available land at Kilindini for purchase by the colonial state. 
Crewe observed that the land at around Kilindini harbor will probably become extremely 
valuable, and it would be unwise not to wait for any better opportunity to present itself 
for buying land which might eventually be required for important harbor works at 
Kilindini.573 Sir Percy took the request seriously and in a telegram of 19 November 1909, 
he reported that there were “70 acres of land in the possession of an Indian which blocked 
the development of Kilindini.”574 Sir Percy told Crewe that he planned to purchase the 
said land at a cost of £4,000 and to debit the railway capital account.575 Sir Percy claimed 
that the purchase should be carried out now as he expected that the land would reach a 
very high price soon. The CO staff agreed with Sir Percy’s recommended course of 
action and moved quickly to obtain funds from the Treasury so that plans for construction 
of a deep-water pier could begin as soon as possible.576 As noted earlier in the chapter, 
funding for the completion wharfs and storage buildings for the company’s use was 
provided by the protectorate. 
     Here again, Sir Percy’s action was more those of facilitation rather than an initiator of 
infrastructure that was to benefit the colony as well as the company. In doing so, his 
action has come in for criticism as using state resources too freely to promote the 
economic interest of one company and single industry rather than the entire colony and 
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other users of the railway. The port facilities constructed by the government proved to be 
very lucrative and, some might argue, an unfair concession for the company, and Sir 
Percy started the process.577 
    Sir Percy also initiated another controversial and, strictly speaking, illegal action on 
behalf of the company developing the soda ash resource at Lake Magadi. The company 
felt that the climate at Lake Magadi was too hot for Europeans to reside there and 
requested to be allowed to lease land at Ngong to build houses for European staff. The 
land lay within that reserved for the Maasai under the terms of the 1904 treaty. Sir Percy 
was prepared to ignore the treaty and its clear guarantee that it was to remain in Maasai 
possession and could not be allowed to Europeans as he agreed to a lease for the Magadi 
Soda Company.578 This, of course, would not be the last time that Sir Percy was to ignore 
the terms of the 1904 treaty with the Maasai, and, as was the case with his action in 1911, 
Sir Percy’s participation left a lot to be desired and created problems for the CO and the 
British government for years to come. 
  Conclusion  
      In the area of railway construction, as in some others during his time in the EAP, Sir 
Percy’s performance was mixed. He was successful in obtaining approval for the Nairobi 
to Thika railway, but the approval was delayed due to his failure to provide the desired 
information and data that could be presented to the Treasury. Moreover, his method of 
dealing with the issue, which included imprecise and incomplete replies to requests for 
costs and potential traffic, and concealing his true intentions from his superiors, were not 
characteristic of an outstanding colonial administrator This was not the only time he was 
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able to achieve his desired policy goal after a long and frustrating correspondence with 
the CO.  
       For the Magadi line, Sir Percy could take even less credit. It was highly likely, for 
example, that the railway would have been built without his direct involvement. He did 
act to facilitate the soda company’s interest and potential profit at the expense of the well 
being of the colony as a whole. He acted decisively to obtain the land for piers and 
storage facilities at Kilindini and to provide land on which the company could build 
houses for European staff, but his actions caused later difficulties and has been criticized 
as unfair to the Maasai of Ngong and other port users. This was therefore a mixed legacy 
marked more by promise than performance. A similar situation could be seen on the coast 
where the abolition of the legal status of slavery had created difficulties for the 
administration to resolve competing and title claims and had accentuated difficulties in 
grants of land to prospective European cultivators. 
 
                                                     




                                        
                 





                                                                 Chapter 9 
                                                 The Administration of the Coast       
     Introduction  
       Sir Percy had upon assumption of government, proposed a number of far reaching 
reforms that would transform the coast administrative structure, ensure the resolution of 
coast land titles, deal with the labor question arising from the abolition of the legal status 
of slavery, and, develop a European agricultural economy. Sir Percy considered the coast 
as having potential for a European plantation economy. But at the same time, Sir Percy 
regretted that the unresolved question of the coastland titles hindered efforts aimed at the 
development of the coast agricultural potential. In pursuit of his desired development 
agenda, Sir Percy proposed the administrative merger of the three coast provinces of 
Seyyedie, Tanaland, and Jubaland under one provincial administration headquartered at 
Seyyedie. 
       Another important issue that would facilitate the implementation of Sir Percy’s 
proposed coast development policy was the resolution of the problem occasioned by the 
abolition of the legal status of slavery in the protectorate, especially the title claims, 
caused by the Sharia land tenure, the African land holding laws, and the abolition of 
slavery. As for the question of labor, Sir Percy was deeply concerned that labor shortages 
posed a difficulty in the development of agriculture.  
      In spite of difficulties, he was determined to grant concessions to individuals and 
companies to develop plantations on the coast. Already, there was in existence on the 
coast concessionaire companies engaged in the preliminary development of their estates 
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that was beclouded in controversy over their excess grants, which the government failed 
to curtail.  
 Coast Administration and Taxation 
      The administration of policy on the coast presented a series of challenges to Sir 
Percy’s governorship. The coast, though a part of the protectorate, appeared to have been 
distinct from the remaining parts of the protectorate’s social formations and economic 
activities, in view of its mixed Arab and African populations, and its plantation estates 
being cultivated by slaves.579 One of the major recommendations of Sir Percy, in his 
Interim Report, was that the three coast provinces of Seyyedie, Jubaland, and Tanaland 
should be merged into one provincial administration. Sir Percy’s proposed policy was 
informed by the need to create a strong provincial administration on the coast and if his 
proposal was accepted, Sir Percy recommended Seyyedie Province as headquarters of the 
newly reconstituted province. 
      With regard to the administration of the reconstituted province, Sir Percy 
recommended the appointment of Frederick Jackson, Lieutenant Governor of the 
protectorate, as provincial commissioner of the newly reconstituted province, if not 
transferred to Uganda as governor. But if Jackson was transferred, Sir Percy 
recommended C. W. Hobley be appointed.580 In the CO, Sir Percy’s recommendations of 
strengthening the administration were welcomed. But F. G. A. Butler suggested that they 
should tread cautiously with such recommendations, in view of the fact that Sir Percy had 
no knowledge of the protectorate to inform his recommendation within a period of two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Sir Percy to Crewe, Interim Report, confidential, 13 November 1909, CO 533/63. Fred Morton, Children of Ham: 
Freed Slaves on the Kenya Coast, 1873 to 1907 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 1-2. 




months from his assumption of the government of the protectorate.581 Therefore, the CO 
refused to sanction the proposed merger of the coast provinces as discussed in chapter 
four. 
       Another issue that Sir Percy considered important for coast administration was tax 
collection. The protectorate administration lacked a well-defined method of tax 
collection. Poll and hut taxes were collected through different methods throughout the 
protectorate. The coast provinces were no exception as they also lacked a clearly defined 
method of tax collection, which made it difficult for the government to maintain records 
of collections and defaults as well as enforcement of proper penalties on defaulters. The 
latter situation was deplorable especially in Vanga, situated to the south of Mombasa, 
where some of the chiefs and headmen were involved in the tax collection.582 Chiefs 
could collect taxes but never issued any evidence and spent the money collected from the 
payees. Therefore the collection of taxes by chiefs and headmen was deplorable, and in 
addition, collectors were illiterate and could neither read nor write. Tax collection 
involved the knowledge of reading and writing, and as they were illiterate, such a task 
was beyond their competence, if proper tax collections were to be enforced.583 
   However, in 1909, Malindi District came up with a different method of tax collection 
that made provision for the payment of chiefs and headmen a commission of up to 3 
percent of their total collections of taxes from their respective areas. Under this method, 
the chiefs and headmen exercised supervisory roles in the collection as well as 
accompanying the tribesmen to the district office to ensure that funds collected were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Minute by Butler to Read, 14 December 1909, on Sir Percy to Crewe, Interim Report, confidential, 13 November 
1909, CO 533/63. 
582 Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 243. 
583 Ibid.  
183	  
	  
remitted to the government.584 In fact, on the coast, the tax collection was carried out by 
the Arab mudirs, other than in the districts of Taita and Malindi, where the Africans 
collected to the government their tax.585 
     Prior to 1909, the chiefs and headmen were never assigned with any specified 
responsibility, but thereafter they were involved in certain responsibilities, especially tax 
collection to which they were entrusted. But as the reforms deprived them of equal 
pension benefits and reflecting on their role in the abolition of slavery, as well as their 
increasing influence in native administration, they felt disheartened and betrayed by the 
government.586 This situation demoralized the Arabs in the service of the government, 
and, when Sir Percy assumed the administration of government, he had not attempted to 
revise the conditions of service in order to revert the Arabs to their former position of 
equal retirement benefits with European colleagues. The latter situation was the cause of 
their bitterness and disappointment with the government, their increasing role and 
influence in administration notwithstanding.587 The latter situation demoralized the Arab 
civil servants and had a negative impact on their performance in the administration, 
especially on tax collection. 
    As for the Giriama, one of the communities making up the Mijikenda, the tax 
collection based on 3 percent commission payment worked out well. The method eased 
tax collection in the Giriama area where more taxes were collected than they had been in 
previous years, and within a short period of time.588 The difficulty associated with tax 
collection could be due to lack of institutions to carry out the task in an efficient manner. 
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The government had also been slow in the extension of administrative control over the 
coast tribes in spite of the fact that colonial administration had been imposed in the 
protectorate since 1895. The local colonial authorities made no significant contact with 
the Mijikenda other than passing through their settlements, on their caravans to the inland 
country.589  
       The latter position was informed by the “relative importance of the Mijikenda to the 
coast economy and their subsidiary political position to the Swahili.”590 The role of the 
Swahili in the coast economy informed the colonial authorities decision to engage the 
Swahili and ignore the Mijikinda, whom they considered had a subsidiary role in the 
coast economic activities. 591  In fact, there was no effective presence of colonial 
administration officials in the Mijikenda country until 1898, when the colonial authorities 
made their presence in Rabai, and in Mwangea in 1912. The relative reluctance of the 
protectorate government to enforce administrative control over the Mijikenda in view of 
their subsidiary role to the Swahili in the coast economic activities afforded the 
Mijikenda to pursue their lives without much government interference.592  
      However, in the interim period (1898-1912) local colonial authorities introduced 
minimal administrative control over the Mijikenda, but as from 1912, the colonial 
authorities began to exert pressure on the Mijikenda.593 The first of such administrative 
measures imposed upon the Mijikenda was the imposition of taxes to generate revenue as 
well as force the Mijikenda to go out to work on European plantations so that they could 
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provide the desired labor, as well as raise the needed cash to pay government taxes.594 As 
far as the Mijikenda were concerned, such imposition of taxes, and a request to provide 
labor, was tantamount to conquest. Also, in August 1914, the government demanded that 
the Giriama should vacate the northern Galana area for prospective European farming; in 
addition, they were told to provide 1,000 porters for the Carrier Corps.595  
       These demands resulted in the outbreak of Giriama resistance but the authorities did 
not move to stamp out the revolt at once, instead, they avoided it. The government 
refused to be drawn to a full-scale conflict with local populations, in view of the outbreak 
of the First World War, in which Britain was already in a war with Germany in Tanzania 
and wished to avoid further confrontation with the Giriama.596 Therefore during the war 
period, the government imposed a skeletal administration over the Mijikenda, and by the 
end of the war, the government directed its attention to the European settlement in the 
highlands, and failed to continue with its attempt to establish effective administration 
over the Mijikenda.597  
     The significance of the Giriama issue as far as Sir Percy’s coast development policy 
was concerned was that his policy of extending government control over the Mijikenda 
tribes, especially the Giriama, not only failed, but also produced a bitter consequence two 
years after Sir Percy left the protectorate. In fact it was the outcome of Sir Percy’s policy 
towards the Mijikenda that created a deep-seated grievance against the government that 
resulted in a revolt. The proposed policy was not successfully implemented, but the 
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consequence of the attempted implementation of such policies continued to be felt well 
beyond the period of Sir Percy’s administration.   
     Another similar situation to the Giriama, which Sir Percy would have succeeded in 
extending administrative control and development but failed, as he failed in the Giriama 
country, was in the Taita District. Taita was some 100 miles distance to the north of 
Mombasa, and the colonial authorities had established their base in Taita since the early 
days of the administration of the protectorate. But in spite of the long established 
presence of a semblance of authority, the condition of the administration of the district 
was in a sorry state by 1909. The presence of authority in the Taita District did not 
amount to the extension of government control over the district. In fact, the local 
authorities could not impose any of the government policies, least of all, the tax 
collection.598 The latter division and the newly introduced role of the village headman, 
afforded the government or the district officials of the Taita and Malindi districts to 
improve the efficiency of their administration especially in the area of tax collections. 
The division provided clearly defined limits of each headman in his administrative 
functions, especially tax collections. 
     In view of the latter state of affairs, and with Sir Percy’s desire to extend 
administrative control over the latter, the 1902 Village Headman Ordinance, which 
empowered the headmen to collect taxes, was called into effect in 1910.599 The ordinance 
empowered Sir Percy to create five administrative divisions, each under the control of a 
headman.600 Such divisions not only served to justify Sir Percy’s attempted effort at 
developing the local political institutions of the Africans, but also went far in mitigating 
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the difficulty of tax collections in such areas that came under the division. The 
administrative division afforded relief in the administration of the district, especially tax 
collection.  
         In the same year, 1910, no complaints had been made against the headmen; instead, 
they were commended for their loyalty and honesty in the discharge of their duties.601  
Under the latter administrative organization, headmen were held responsible for tax 
collection, reporting crimes, safeguarding the forest from destruction, reporting outbreaks 
of disease, and any problem affecting the welfare of their people.602  In the latter two 
areas (Mijikenda and the Taita District), however, Sir Percy neither administered these 
territories as he proposed nor did he introduce Ainsworth’s method of tax collection. The 
condition of tax collection throughout the coast remained as it had been without any 
reform. Sir Percy did not press the CO for his proposed implementation of the Ainsworth 
method of tax collection. Even the relative success of these districts in tax collection 
owed the initiative to their respective district officers, the creation of the five divisions 
notwithstanding. 
      Therefore neither effective administrative control nor taxation or any form of 
development was initiated over these coast communities during the administration of Sir 
Percy. The merger of the coast provinces proposal was rejected on the strength of the fact 
that it was not practically expedient for such to ensue within Sir Percy’s proposed 
development agenda. The CO was skeptical of Sir Percy’s proposed scheme in view of 
the protectorate’s peculiar condition and Sir Percy’s lack of knowledge of it.  
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     With regard to Sir Percy’s much popularized Ainsworth method of tax collection, 
which he considered effective and worthy of application not only on the coast but 
throughout the protectorate, it had in the end not been efficiently applied at the coast, as 
Sir Percy never followed up with the CO in respect of the application of the tax method. 
The main basis of Sir Percy’s tax proposal was his belief of the need to adopt a uniform 
method of tax collection throughout the protectorate, which he suggested would settle 
such inchoate methods of tax collection. Sir Percy believed that the method of tax 
collection in the protectorate presented a very sorry state of affairs, and therefore, 
proposed to apply Ainsworth’s method of tax collections in the Nyanza Province, which 
he believed was the best method of collection. But his proposal failed, as he never 
pressed the CO to approve of the method, and the situation remained as it had been at the 
coast.  
       In addition to taxation, Sir Percy turned his attention to the question of developing 
the African institutions when he told Crewe in his Interim Report Upon the Protectorate 
of 13 November 1909 that there was no defined policy in respect of the African areas. Sir 
Percy pointed out that as for the African, no general policy had been laid down except 
that nebulously outlined in the new land act, with regard to tenure of land. The law 
however produced or created “two very patent and extraordinary positions for the native 
population.”603 Sir Percy also added that such conditions were further compounded by a 
“too early and unconsidered transition from the conditions inseparable from the abolition 
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of the legal status of slavery.”604 This had “more or less broken the power and usefulness 
of our highly civilized Arab rulers of the Coast Strip.”605  
    The abolition of slavery had produced bitter consequences for the Arab plantation 
economy and the whole once prosperous coast plantation estates were in ruin. The 
abolition not only produced labor shortages but also created competing title claims that 
complicated the introduction of coastland policy. Sir Percy’s proposed economic 
development policy would have most probably worked better in the Transvaal colony, 
and in Northern Nigeria where there were in existence, in addition to a well-sorted-out 
administration system, sound administrators with track record in the British colonial 
service. In addition, Northern Nigeria was not a settler colony, even though the Transvaal 
and the Orange River were settler colonies, but their system of administration through the 
intercolonial council, chaired by Lord Milner, made it different in every respect with the 
EAP.  
       Therefore, with Lord Milner as Governor in the crown colonies of the Transvaal and 
Orange River and his council system of administering the colonies, and with Lugard as 
Governor of Northern Nigeria, with his indirect rule system of administration, certainly 
Sir Percy’s proposed economic policy might have had a good chance of winning the 
support of the CO, as well as of implementation with relative ease. The sharp difference 
in the administration of the two (EAP as opposed to the South and West African 
colonies), Sir Percy’s failure to take into consideration the remarkable differences, 
especially differences in the social formation within these crown colonies, all combined 
to inform the CO’s cautious moves with Sir Percy’s proposal, and it was these 
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considerations that informed the CO’s decision not to approve his policy 
recommendations. 
       By the time Sir Percy left the protectorate in 1912, most, if not all, of his proposed 
policies were rejected, while those given some thought, especially on the suitable method 
of tax collection in which he proposed to adopt the Ainsworth method of tax collection in 
the Nyanza Province, had not been followed up with the CO to see to its approval. It was 
true that order had been achieved in some areas of the coast in respect of tax collection 
and administrative reforms in the form of the created administrative divisions and their 
control under the headmen. There was also the involvement of the headmen and the chief 
in tax collection.606 Even those semblances of sanity in administration and taxation, 
especially in the Mijikenda country and the Taita District, owed its initiative and success 
to respective district officers. The latter policy of administrative control and collection 
was intended not for the coast alone, but for the entire protectorate, but it was only in the 
Taita and Malindi districts that such policy recorded a minimal success.607    
    However, Sir Percy’s coast policy fell far below expectations of the reforms he 
proposed in both his Interim and the Main Reports upon the protectorate, especially in the 
sections dealing with the coast administration and taxation. It failed to provide the desired 
satisfaction, as the proposed policy recommendations were never implemented for 
effective and efficient coast administration and taxation. 
 The Administration of Coast Land Policy 
       The area of the coast of the protectorate had three provincial headquarters of 
Tanaland, Seyyedie and the Jubaland. The Seyyedie province consisted of the coast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




districts of Malindi, Mombasa and Vanga, and the inland district of Taita. The first three 
contained the territories of the defunct administration of the Sultan of Zanzibar to a 
distance of 10 miles from the coast.608 These areas were occupied by representatives of 
many mixed tribes, from the Arabs and Swahilis to the several sections of the 
Mijikenda.609 In addition to the Sultan’s area of jurisdiction that was governed by the 
Sharia land holding system, there were other areas governed by the Sharia land tenure, 
especially Tanaland, which lay to the south of Jubaland, and the islands of the Lamu 
Archipelago.610 
      The coast had potential for the development of agricultural cultivation and a 
plantation economy. This was clearly demonstrated by the earlier Arab plantation 
economy, and cultivation for food production by the coast communities since the early 
days of the coast slave trade.611 The coast areas were most fertile and once produced 
quantities of grain for export during the period of the slave trade, when Arabs held large 
properties and made considerable profits. The abolition of the slavery resulted in most 
properties being abandoned, reverting the estates to waste land. On the other hand, the 
Africans had been growing rice around swamps, even though the area of cultivation 
around it was limited. 612 But with a proper water control through canals and 
embankments, a large area of the swamps might be turned into a prosperous cultivation 
ground.613  
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       The coast was a prosperous cultivation ground, and, this had been clearly stated by 
the Commissioner of Lands who was leaving the protectorate on the termination of his 
four years appointment. The Commissioner, Colonel J. A. L. Montgomery, pointed out in 
his Handing-Over Report of 9 May 1910 that in addition to the latter, there were also 
other areas of the coast that had the potential of agricultural cultivation and a plantation 
economy, especially on the area of the coastline and the creeks and the islands of the 
Lamu Archipelago, which produced quantities of mangroves.614 In submitting his Further 
Report of 19 February 1912, Sir Percy reiterated Montgomery’s observation that the 
coast, in addition to producing above-mentioned products, could produce other products, 
especially rubber, coconuts, sisal, and rice, among other crops.615  In fact, Montgomery 
was optimistic that the coast areas were capable of supporting rubber plantations and 
other tropical products.616  The prospect of the coast as presented by Montgomery in 
glowing terms, found support in Sir Percy.  
       But at the same time, Sir Percy had already expressed his concern over the prospect 
of the coast cultivation in his Interim Report to Crewe, of 13 November 1909, that the 
difficulty of the position of the coast, other than survey, was “accentuated by too early an 
abolition of slavery.” The whole coast was held in freehold and the slaves knew the 
boundaries of their masters’ properties. The slaves had now been dispersed, “the masters 
are largely ruined and their land titles in a state of chaos.”617 Sir Percy added, “if the 
position is not remedied early, there may be trouble with the population of the coast 
strip.”618 Also, Sir Percy observed in a telegram to Crewe of 4 March 1910 that the latter 
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situation was further compounded by faction fights within the population, Somali raids, 
title claims, and the abolition of the legal status of slavery that caused much of the lands 
to revert to waste.619 Sir Percy praised the liwalis, cadis and mudirs for their faithful 
service in administration.620 But he pointed out that, as a class, they had become very 
disappointed and discouraged, owing to the gradual decline of their status.621 In spite of 
the latter condition of the Arabs, Sir Percy did not affect any reform that would put the 
Arabs in an equal status with their Europeans colleagues in the service of the 
government, their contribution to the abolition of the slavery notwithstanding. 
     As far as the coast agricultural potential was concerned, before the arrival of Sir 
Percy, a few agricultural experiments had been carried out on the coast, but there was no 
apparent success. Maize was cultivated in Malindi, which was believed to be one of the 
rich food producing areas of the coast, but maize production in Malindi seemed to have 
been produced in abundance to the extent that the agricultural officer was not certain 
whether or not better quality maize could be cultivated.622 Although Sir Percy reported in 
his Annual Report of 1910-1911 that “the general condition of the tribes was improving,” 
he admitted that there were shortages of staff, which made it difficult to visit tribes in the 
remote locations of the districts regularly.623 Nevertheless, the government initiated the 
distribution large amounts of seed on both sides of the Sabaki River in May 1910, but 
such an initiative was started late, and, as such, it was too late for the government to 
secure the desired result.624  
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      In addition to the latter, the government distributed large amounts of seed at Malindi 
and Mumbrui in April and May, but the output of such products in that year was 
relatively very small. The shortage in the output was occasioned by a shortage of rainfall 
and inadequate supervision, better output could have been expected during the harvest 
season.625 However, despite this lack of success, Sir Percy viewed the coastal region as 
having great economic potential. In early 1910, he expressed to the secretary of state his 
determination to develop European plantation agriculture at the coast, despite the 
shortages of labor caused by the abolition of slavery that ended Arab cultivation, and 
their once prospering estates had reverted to waste.626   
       The Arabs, by the use of slave labor had engaged, since 1820s, in the cultivation of 
clove plantations that formed the very base of the coast economy.627 But with the 
abolition of the legal status of slavery, the Arabs were no longer in a position to continue 
with the cultivation of their plantation estates. In fact their estates lay waste, and their 
lifestyle was ruined by the abolition, compensation paid to them for the loss of their 
slaves notwithstanding.628 Sir Percy pointed out to Crewe, in his Interim Report of 13 
November 1909, that the abolition produced dire consequences for the Arabs economy, 
and reiterated to Crewe the same position in his telegram of 4 March 1910 of the 
difficulties and uncertainties created by the early, unpremeditated abolition of slavery that 
had produced bitter consequences for the coast Arabs.629 With regard to the latter, the 
government paid compensation to the Arabs for the loss of their slaves, but that had not 
alleviated the deteriorating economic position of the Arabs and there was little hope for 
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successful Arab cultivation in the future. 630  However Sir Percy believed that the 
development of the coast agricultural potential was possible but it would require clearing 
of the bush and survey. The cost of the survey would be expensive, but he was optimistic 
that the area when put in use would repay the cost of its survey.631 Sir Percy observed in 
May 1910 that if the money allotted to the forestry department had been applied to 
surveying, the coast would have been surveyed, and, the government would not have 
been in such a difficulty.632  
      Therefore it was under these varied land-holding systems, complicated claims to land 
titles, and the existence of waste lands that Sir Percy proposed to develop the coast 
economic potential that he believed would best be tapped through the development of 
European colonists’ plantation economy. Sir Percy added that the coast held great 
prospects for investments and that the only militating difficulty to such a promising 
future was the question of the titles.633  But Sir Percy was optimistic that as soon as such 
difficulty was removed, especially with the coming into effect of the Lands Titles 
Ordinance, 1908, the question of titles would be resolved.634 
     With the latter, Montgomery stated, “great attraction will be held out to a profitable 
and secure investment of European capital.”635 One of the flashpoints of potential 
difficulty in the settlement of the titles question, Montgomery stated, was inside the “10 
miles zone,” hitherto administered by the Sultan.636 In the latter, Montgomery told Sir 
Percy in 1910, “land tenure presents extra-ordinary difficulties due to the conflict of the 
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coast land titles.637 In view of the latter situation, Sir Percy noted in a dispatch covering 
Montgomery’s report that the resolution of claims to land titles would help in the 
resolution of the coastland holding system, and pave the way for the evolution of a 
European plantation economy, but the title claims had to be addressed. The coast, though 
being the first to have contact with the British administration, was almost the last to have 
a defined land policy, as it never had a land policy defined under the British law.638  
      But as Sir Percy attempted to establish land policy that would govern the conduct of 
land dealing on the coast it became a difficult issue, indeed. The main causes of these 
difficulties were overlapping land policy between the Sharia and the Mijikenda laws that 
produced competing title claims, complicated by the abolition of slavery and the dispersal 
of the slaves. However, Montgomery pointed out that land was going up in value since 
the price of rubber had appreciated considerably, and people were buying and selling 
lands to which they had no rights.639 An effort to stop the latter transactions was made by 
the government when a Recorder of Titles was appointed in 1907, but despite such 
appointments, Sir Percy observed in his confidential dispatch of 4 June 1910 that nothing 
had been done until 1909 when survey work commenced.640       
      Sir Percy added that there was the need to survey the coastland for proper delineation 
as the land had reverted to waste since the abolition of the slavery. Sir Percy added that a 
cadastral survey was now ahead of requirements in the highlands and stated that the 
situation of the coast titles was “deplorable” and should be resolved immediately.641 In 
addition to the existing recorder of titles appointed since 1907, and in order to speed up 
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the survey of the coast, Sir Percy told Crewe in his confidential dispatch of 11 June 1910 
that he approved the employment of one of the surveyors of the cadastral branch.642 But 
in spite of the latter effort, Sir Percy pointed out that nothing could be achieved without 
the resolution of the titles question. This, Sir Percy had already made it to clear to Crewe, 
in his Interim Report, and he reiterated the same position in his confidential dispatch of 4 
June 1910.643 
      In view of Sir Percy’s requests of funds to affect the coast survey and recruit 
surveyors, as contained in his confidential dispatch of 4 June 1910, the CO forwarded his 
request to the Treasury for consideration. Responding to the CO’s submissions in respect 
of Sir Percy’s requests, G. H. Murray of the Treasury, in a confidential dispatch of 19 
April 1910, told Crewe of the need to provide rules and a scale of fees for the coast 
survey, and for the registration of titles at the coast.644  Crewe, in a confidential dispatch 
of 2 May 1910, with enclosure of Murray’s dispatch, conveyed the Treasury’s 
requirement to Sir Percy, and asked Sir Percy to comply.645  The Lord Commissioners of 
the Treasury required that rules and fees must be framed before approval could be 
given.646     
        Also, Crewe told Sir Percy, in a telegram of 7 May 1910, of his willingness to 
support Sir Percy’s requests for the survey of the coastland.647 Therefore Sir Percy 
reiterated to Crewe in a confidential dispatch of 19 May 1910 the urgent need to affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Sir Percy to Crewe, confidential, 11 June 1910, CO 533/74. 
643Sir Percy to Crewe, Interim Report, confidential, 13 November 1909, CO 533/63; Sir Percy to Crewe, confidential, 4 
June 1910, CO 533/74. 
644 G. H. Murray to Crewe, private, 19 April 1910, CO 533/74.  
645 Crewe to Sir Percy, private, 2 May 1910, CO 533/74. 
646 Murray to Crewe, private, 19 April 1910, CO 533/74. 
647 Crewe to Sir Percy, telegram, 7 May 1910, CO 533/74. 
198	  
	  
the coast survey; provide funds for the survey, and the need for hiring of Survey staff.648 
In a follow up to the latter, Sir Percy, in a confidential dispatch of 4 June 1910, told 
Crewe that he was forwarding copies of registration of titles at the coast, copies of Rules 
and Scale of Fees under the Land Titles Amendment Ordinance, 1910, with a 
memorandum by R. M. Combe, Crown Advocate, in concurrence with the Treasury’s 
requirements of 19 April 1910.649 Also, in his dispatch of 4 June 1910, Sir Percy 
reminded Crewe if he could see his way in appointing additional survey staff as he 
(Crewe) expressed his concurrence with his request in his telegram of 7 May 1910.650   
      In a related development, Sir Percy also observed and reported to Crewe, in his 
confidential dispatch of 11 June 1910, of his view in respect of the works of the survey 
department and his proposed future requirements in this respect. In the latter, Sir Percy 
told Crewe that “triangulation similar in accuracy to that which had already been done 
should cover such areas of the country as are likely to be settled by white settlers or to be 
developed by planters on the coast.”651 However, Sir Percy estimated that ten months 
would be required to effect survey work on the coast, south ward from Mombasa.” 652  
    In spite of the latter effort of Sir Percy, the CO had been reluctant to support his 
proposed policy agendas. The CO attitude had been worrisome to Sir Percy who had 
expressed his frustrations to Colonel John Seely, Parliamentary Undersecretary and 
successor to Winston Churchill. Sir Percy, in a private and confidential letter of 14 June 
1910, reminded Seely, “You told me before I left that it would be your endeavor to give 
every support possible in smoothing out the somewhat tangled state of affairs. I must say 
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quite frankly that Iam not very happy in the support so far. All my extraordinary requests 
except one - that of lower railway rates- have been either refused or put off.”653  
     Sir Percy also expressed his disappointment on the issue of land concessions and his 
difficulty in the CO accepting his clearly laid out policy in respect of concessions and 
expressed his reservations against the CO when he said, “I have appealed several times to 
ask that large agreements for concession in land &c. should only be settled both in 
principle and detail by the government of the protectorate- of course always with 
Secretary of State’s knowledge. If this is not done Government here is looked upon as a 
nonentity, which need not to be consulted seriously.”654 In view of the latter state of 
affairs and especially with regard to concessions to companies and the question of native 
rights, Sir Percy made reference to the Waleran concession and condemned it as 
suggesting that any pretension that the CO was concerned in safeguarding native rights, 
when he said, “The concession to Waleran is, I think, a most unfortunate one. Our 
experience in the past of these large concessions has been deplorable. We have many 
small people with considerable means ready to develop to a much greater extent than that 
which is now promised by Waleran. Moreover, native rights upon which every one is so 
insistant seem to have been very little considered indeed.”655  Sir Percy also questioned 
the rationale of the CO’s telegram that sought developing rubber plantations on the coast, 
when he said, “I presumed from the telegram indigenous rubber is one of the items, 
which it is sought to develop. This rubber belonged to the people, and has been worked 
by them and small contractors for some years. Are we to deprive them of these rights?”656  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Seely replied to Sir Percy with a telegram and a dispatch on two different occasions, but 
he reserved his replies until the CO staff, to whom he forwarded Sir Percy’s letter could 
respond to the issues raised in the letter. In the CO, Sir Percy’s private letter was received 
with sympathy. Read, in a minute to Fiddes, stated, “we must try to put Sir Percy into a 
more cheerful frame of mind.”657 All the senior staff of the CO concurred with Read’s 
comment and a review of their decision on Sir Percy’s railway rates recommendations 
was recalled for reconsideration.658  
        In fact the CO’s cautious stand in dealing with Sir Percy’s proposed development 
policies contributed in putting off any proposal that he presented. His lack of 
performance in some instances could be attributed to the CO’s unfavorable disposition to 
his policy recommendations. But with Sir Percy’s letter to Seely, the CO softened its 
position and reconsidered some of his recommendations, especially the downward 
railway rates and request for funds to affect the coast survey. Thereafter, Seely 
acknowledged Sir Percy’s letter with thanks, in a telegram of 30 July 1910, and promised 
to furnish full explanations in a dispatch at a later time, on all the issues Sir Percy raised 
in his letter.659  
     In response to Sir Percy’s letter, Seely, in a confidential dispatch of 9 August 1910, 
gave a detailed explanation of every issue Sir Percy raised in the June letter. As for land 
concessions, Seely defended the CO’s interference in grants of concessions in the 
protectorate, when he said that “we have no wish to settle these matters over your head, 
on the contrary we try to throw them as far as possible in to the hands of the local 
administration. But the secretary of state cannot prevent persons approaching him on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 Minute by Read to Fiddes, 21 July 1910, on Sir Percy to Seely, private, 14 June 1910, CO 533/74. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Seely to Sir Percy, telegram, 30 July 1910, CO 533/ 74. 
201	  
	  
these matters and he would not refuse to consider their representations when they do so, 
in any case, there are certain questions such as the investigation of the financial status of 
would–be concessionaires and which must be dealt with through the crown agent 
here.”660 Seely added, “the Waleran concession is a ‘damnosa hereditas’ from the FO 
days. The concession was originally granted by the then commissioner of the protectorate 
without any reference to the home authorities and we are now suffering for his action.”661 
As for the question of African rights, Seely told Sir Percy that they did their best to 
preserve African rights which Seely referred to when he insisted in the draft agreement 
for a lease clauses that could bind the leases; “not to interfere with land occupied by 
natives, not to sell arms or ammunition to natives, not to sell spirits to natives, to respect 
customary rights of natives.”662 Seely added that “in view of uncertainty as to what are 
the native rights, we have told Waleran that he must go out and settle the matter locally 
with you, and I really do not see what more we could do.”663 Seely concluded this aspect 
of the coast in the letter by sympathizing with Sir Percy on his irritation for the delay in 
settling the coast title claims, However, Seely added, “the treasury’s feelings are also 
ruffled, as they think that we have not acted up to our original professions. We have 
however pressed your views on them to the utmost and I think that, before this reaches 
you, you will have received a telegram giving you practically what you want.”664 
    Thereafter, the government released, within the 1910-1911 estimates, the sum of 
£4,812 for the works of coastland settlement. The amount was increased to £6,262 for 
1911-1912, and £10,804 for 1912-1913. The provision of these sums provided a great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







drain on the protectorate’s finances and delayed other important work. The necessity for 
it, Sir Percy stated, was “beyond all doubt, and, had it been incurred at an earlier period, 
much quicker and more satisfactory work would have been carried out. Progress had been 
retarded by sickness among the staff, more particularly among the surveyors, and by the 
great difficulty encountered in securing the services of competent men, the salaries 
offered by Government for surveyors having proved far too small to attract men to work 
in these unhealthy districts.”665 The approval of the funds notwithstanding, the title 
claims had to be resolved before proper survey could be affected.  Sir Percy succeeded in 
putting forward the problems before the CO and suggesting how these problems could be 
resolved. He has also succeeded in securing the approval of the Treasury for the funds 
needed to survey the coastlands, but these efforts were complicated by a lack of the 
resolution of the title question, which Sir Percy had to resolve.  
     The resolution of the title claims was not an easy undertaking, Montgomery, in his 
Handing-Over Report, told Sir Percy that one of the most important matters before the 
administration “was the question of the indefiniteness of land tenure at the coast.”666 
Montgomery added that to resolve the question, the government promulgated the Land 
Title Ordinance, 1908, which was intended to resolve the insecurity of title to land, and, 
which was “materially retarding the economic development of the country.”667 
  Montgomery recommended, “as soon as the difficulties are removed, great attraction 
will be held out to a profitable and secure investment of European capital.”668 However, 
Montgomery summarized the problem of the title claims that “inside the ‘ten mile zone’ 
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land tenure present extra ordinary difficulties owing to the conflict of Mijikinda and 
Sharia law and local customs.”669  
     Therefore, in concurrence with Montgomery’s recommendations, and in an attempt to 
resolve the title claims, Sir Percy proposed to apply the Coast Lands Title Ordinance, 
1908, which provided a court for the resolution of the title claims. But the court was not 
constituted to hear and resolve these claims as Montgomery pointed out that in spite of 
the fact that the ordinance had been applied to the district of Malindi, judicial inquiry 
could not begin, as there was no official establishment to carry out a judicial enquiry.670 
Sir Percy also reiterated Montgomery’s concern, in his Further Report of 19 February 
1912, that in December 1909, the ordinance framed to settle title claims came into effect 
and had been applied to the districts of Malindi and Takaungu at once, but due to lack of 
establishment that could undertake the task, no judicial inquiry could begin.671 However, 
Montgomery had earlier on observed that the provision of the court made in the 
ordinance for the resolution of the boundaries would have to be settled by another means, 
which was well known to the people, such as settlement out of court, by a reconciliation 
board, consisting of a civil officer and two or three Arab officials, to endeavor to come to 
some agreement with the various claimants over their land titles.672 One of the main 
problems of the coastland, Montgomery added, “was the indefiniteness of titles, which 
had been considerably speculated by Africans and Indians.”673  
     Therefore, Sir Percy sought to apply the Coast Lands Titles Ordinance, 1908, which 
was charged with the responsibility of settling Arab claims to land. An amendment to the 
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ordinance empowered Sir Percy to constitute an arbitration board to hear and recommend 
on the best possible way of resolving the title question. Sir Percy appointed an arbitration 
board chaired by Kenneth MacDougall, the retired protectorate’s Registrar of Slaves. He 
was well known to the people and had intimate knowledge of the coast, and could speak 
their language, together with Assistant Liwali for Mombasa, Ali bin Salim as Vice 
Chairman. The two assistant Liwalis were constituted as an arbitration board.674  But it 
was not until 10 August 1910 that definite authority was granted to the arbitration board 
to carry on with proceedings, with the expenditure provided for in the 1910-1911 
estimates.675  
     The board made considerable progress in settling the claims of the Mazrui people 
north of Mombasa, in the Takaungu district. The work of the arbitration board was 
valuable and reflected the highest credit upon all concerned. The effectiveness of the 
arbitration board drew satisfaction from the people of the coast; the Chief of the Mazrui, 
Rashid bin Salim, in a letter of 25 February 1912 to Sir Percy, expressed his thanks and 
gratitude and that of his people with the work of the arbitration board.  Salim stated “I 
have the honour on their behalf to express the great satisfaction it gives me to thank your 
arbitration board for the manner, ability and courtesy they have shown in the carrying of 
their extremely difficult and onerous duties in the district of Takaungu.”676 Salim thanked 
Sir Percy for appointing such a committee, which, according to him, “settled claims 
without prejudice to any person or persons.”677 Salim also added that the formation of the 
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committee had “very materially benefitted the people of the coast lands.”678 Salim added 
that matters of great importance have been “definitely settled without waste of time in 
litigation and with the minimum amount of expenditure.”679 Salim concluded that, now, 
the problem of land titles in respect of the district of Takaungu had been finally settled 
and that all credit should be due to the useful ideas of his excellency, Sir Percy.  
      However, Salim’s commendations of the board must have probably been induced in 
view of the fact that the board had not satisfactorily resolved the title claims up to the 
time Sir Percy left the protectorate in 1912.680 It could be clearly noted that there was 
controversy over the concession of Mwele and the East Africa Estates that had not been 
resolved, among other concessions. Even Sir Percy concluded in May 1910 that it was 
difficult for any one unacquainted with the condition of the coast to realize the 
preexisting state of affairs, or the work involved in settling claims, which often entailed 
the possession of a few acres or of a few coconuts trees.681 The latter state of affairs made 
it difficult for a proper delineation of each estate into farmland.  In spite of the work of 
the arbitration board, the remaining cases of land titles and grants, especially those of the 
Mazrui land, were not successfully alienated up to May 1914.682 There was also the 
unresolved question of the East Africa Estates and Mwele concession that were not 
resolved well beyond 1912.683  
     Another problem of concern to Sir Percy was the question of out sourcing labor, 
which became a potential threat to the evolution of agricultural cultivation on the coast. 
Already, planters in Malindi and Mombasa complained of the unwillingness of the local 
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people to go out and work. In such circumstances, planters were forced to rely upon up-
country workers, chiefly Kikuyu and Luo, to secure a reliable supply of labor.684  The 
Giriama, who Sir Percy attempted to incorporate into wage earning so as to secure 
additional source of labor for the planters, protested against such measures, forcing the 
government to back track, leaving the Giriama alone.685 Since then, Sir Percy had not 
proposed any policy to provide labor for the planters, and shortages of labor continued to 
pester the planters and the government as well. 
    The problem of labor shortages and out sourcing of labor had been pestering the 
protectorate before Sir Percy’s assumption of government. It could be recalled that the 
settlers had in 1908 urged Sir James Hayes Sadler, Sir Percy’s predecessor; to assist in 
obtaining from India indentured labor.686 Sadler submitted their request to the Sanderson 
committee, but the committee turned down the planters’ plea for the indentured labor and 
the planters were left to their own devices.687  The significance of this aspect is that Sir 
Percy was not alone in being unable to solve the curious question of labor shortage which 
had negative impact on the European settlers ability to produce more. Sir Percy should 
have sought other means to assist the farmers especially increasing the import of tractors 
and harvestors to aid the farmers but he could not do so. 
Land Concession Administration 
       The administration of land concessions to individuals and corporations was 
undertaken in the areas of the coast, bearing in mind the difficulty of the land title claims 
and labor shortages, which had not been fully resolved. In the Tanaland Province, not 
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much progress had been made in the development of agriculture in spite of its minimal 
land title claims. But in spite of the limited success, Sir Percy told Harcourt, in his 
Further Report to the Main Report of 19 February 1912, that it has materially improved 
as considerable progress had been made on European plantations in and around Malindi. 
In addition, more attention was being “devoted to tropical culture, the development of the 
Tana River valley was progressing, and would be developed at an early stage.”688 The 
Tana valley was “sparsely populated, but contained much land of special value in tropical 
cultivation, land which, moreover, was outside the coast dominion of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar and had few, if any, native claims upon it.”689  
     Sir Percy’s dispatch was welcomed in the CO, Read told Fiddes that “we ought 
certainly to have a first rate men to administer the coast, which is some of the best of the 
country. If and when Zanzibar is transferred to the CO, we might perhaps have one man 
to administer the whole of the Sultan’s dominion, who would spend his time partly at 
Zanzibar and partly at Mombasa.”690 Fiddes minuted “an interesting and useful report, as 
proposed.”691 Anderson concurred with the latter view.692 Harcourt stated, “I have had a 
talk with Sir Percy on many of the things in this report. Several noted here are not in my 
list of subjects. Let me have a new list prepared from this.”693  The impression of the CO 
on the Tanaland was positive, and officials contemplated supporting the administration of 
Tanaland with suitable administrators, and developing the province as well. But neither 
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Sir Percy nor the CO revisited this issue, as land title claims, which were a major priority 
of the government, would have to be resolved in the first instance.694  
     In spite of the government priority of settling the title claims, Sir Percy pointed out to 
the CO an area lying to the south of Jubaland, and the islands of Lamu Archipelago, as 
areas he considered suitable for European plantations.  But the recommendation of these 
areas as potential European plantation estates was an oversight on the part of Sir Percy, as 
he was aware that they were under the habitation of the Arabs of various tribes.695 
Admittedly, the area was capable of rubber plantations and other tropical products but 
due to faction fights within the population, Somali raids, and the abolition of the legal 
status of slavery, much of the lands had reverted to waste.696  However, Sir Percy argued 
in 1912 that the coast, though swampy and unhealthy, was a place where European 
colonists could still have made a living in some part of it.697  
    Sir Percy believed that such unhealthy lands could have been converted in use if 
colonists, especially from South Africa or India, had been allowed to take up lands. Sir 
Percy claimed in 1912 that despite the poor health conditions of the coast, applications 
had been received from time to time for large areas on the Tana.698 However, and in spite 
of the applications received, the government could affect only one grant of 10,000 acres 
to the East Africa Cotton Syndicate.699 In addition, another 10,000 acres in Tanaland had 
been earmarked for the British East Africa Corporation.  
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    Tanaland, according to Sir Percy was “undoubtedly of extra ordinary fertility, with its 
enriched silt from river flood.”700 However, Sir Percy suggested that for successful 
cultivation on such land, floods must be controlled. Sir Percy also reported in his Further 
Report Upon the Protectorate of 19 February 1912 that if the old riverbed could be open, 
as proposed in one of the projects in the area, this might allow the flow of more 
waterways during the period of the flood. However, Sir Percy argued that if a large 
amount of capital could be made available for the erection of embankments and canals, 
the district might become “a second Egypt.” Nevertheless, Sir Percy told Harcourt that 
under the existing circumstance, the country was usually flooded and the swamp filled 
up, providing places for breeding mosquitoes.701  
      Sir Percy also stated in his Further Report that the Africans had been growing rice 
around those swamps, even though the area of cultivation around it was limited. But with 
proper water control of the area, Sir Percy opined that large area of swamp might be 
turned into a “smiling garden.”702 On the part of the coastline and the creek near the 
islands of Lamu Archipelago, Sir Percy stated that quantities of mangroves were 
produced. In a similar development, Smith Mackenzie and Company had already been 
granted concessions for bark and timber. The area of the latter’s concession ran from 
Mkonumbi Creek on the South to Kiunga on the North, including the Lamu Archipelago. 
In these areas, there were some good forests known for fertility in rubber production.703 
Moreover, Sir Percy pointed out that the local people had worked rubber, but there was 
no rubber plantation toward the Somali country for fear of raiding parties.704 Sir Percy 








was hopeful that if these forests could produce good timber, they would prove to be a 
valuable asset as they were situated within close proximity to the sea, from which there 
were creeks that run inland.  
     In view of the potential economic prosperity that the coast held as presented by Sir 
Percy in glowing terms, and his desire to develop European agricultural plantations, not 
much had been done toward the attainment of the latter during his term of office. Such 
proposed developments were hindered by uncertainty on the land titles, which retarded 
the proposed agricultural development to a considerable extent. Sir Percy’s attempt to 
resolve the title claims did not produce the desired result. 
      There was a similar area of some 10,000-acre properties in the Malindi District, and it 
was on that land that a grant of two concessions for the collection of rubber had been 
made. Each of the two concessions was of 100 square miles, given to Messrs Macalister 
and Diespecker. There were also pending negotiations on the transfer of other properties 
on the revised condition of the land holding system. However, Sir Percy raised the 
question of the largest concession ever granted or allowed in the protectorate; the East 
Africa Estates Limited.705 The area of this concession stretched from Mombasa to the 
boundary of German territory. The latter covered an area of 350,000 acres (546 square 
miles).706  
       With the latter two huge concessions and the desire of Sir Percy to resolve the title 
claims, Sir Percy reported in 1912 that land grants on the coast had been limited pending 
the resolution of the title question. But he proposed that in delimiting the area of 
concession, all blocks of forest over half a square mile in extent would be reserved for the 
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government. While on the part of the Taita, the tribe that mainly occupied the inland 
Taita district, there were some grants of their land, which produced wild fiber.707  But Sir 
Percy regretted that the company that was granted such a concession never had much 
success. Again, Sir Percy had in his Further Report reiterated that the coast land question 
had been “worrisome to the Government.”708      
     Also, Sir Percy observed that it had been somewhat difficult all through to understand 
the policy of granting large concessions in land upon the coast subject to African rights, 
and not providing in any way for the funds to define such rights. But despite government 
regulations on the resolution of titles, and the commendation passed on the committee by 
Salim, the government erred on the coastland dealings. The latter came in the form of 
concessions granted to two companies.  
      The two largest of these concessions, granted originally by the Foreign Office, but 
finally approved of by the CO, were situated to the south of Mombasa. The first of such 
grants of 350,000 acres, more or less, was made to the East Africa Estates Limited, and 
the other concession of 100,000, acres, more or less, was made to Diespecter Macalister, 
subsequently transferred to Lord Waleran, and known as Mwele concessions.709 The said 
concessions became a problem to the government, as it could not successfully apply the 
titles regulatory ordinance to this district, in view of unregulated concessions to such 
companies.  
       Again, Sir Percy pointed out to Harcourt in 1912 that one great inconvenience arising 
from the concession to Mwele was the provision in the concession which would make it 
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impossible to establish an efficient municipality in Mombasa.710 Sir Percy told Harcourt 
in February 1912 that “if the treaty is renewed in its present form, or a fresh one entered 
into, containing the same provisions, the disabilities, which we have suffered in the past 
on the coast, more particularly in municipal administration, must continue a matter for 
deep regret.” 711  But in order to regulate the extra ordinary concessions of these 
companies, the government moved to engage the companies on the best possible way to 
resolve the large sizes of their concessions.  
     The government engaged the companies in negotiation with the hope of regulating 
their grants, and disposing their excess, with a view of imposing upon the companies the 
cost of survey. But the position of each concession was granted under different 
circumstances; the concession of East Africa Estates Limited was originally granted to 
Messrs Thomas and Goldman, afterwards transferred to the Uplands of East Africa 
Limited, in 1912, and it retained the East Africa Estates Limited, as its name. The 
concession consisted of the 350,000 acres at the coast and of 3,000 acres at the coast and 
in the highlands, near Limuru. The larger grant was made with the intension of 
developing tropical products, if one considered the grant of such land in other colonies, 
notably the Straits Settlement was limited to 2,000 or 3,000 acres.712   
     In the case of the Federated Malaya States, the maximum grant for a proprietor to hold 
was 640 acres, which would require the approval of the Resident General.713 The 
unworkable size of the present concession can be readily realized, more particularly if it 
is noted between 5 and 7 sterling pounds per acre was necessary for development of these 
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coastlands up to the third year of planting.714 However, the government denied having 
made such grants, stating that these were impossible for the government to have made. 
Sir Percy pointed out that in view of lack of funds to determine their concessions, the 
government would not have considered affecting such large concessions.715 Sir Percy 
stated in 1912 that such companies acquired large areas from African owners in certain 
areas, and the East African Syndicate had already floated a subsidiary company, known 
as the Gazi Rubber Estates.716  
     There was also the Mwele concession, 100,000 acres, more or less, but the 
government proposed that an area of 2,000 acres might be found for the concessionaire in 
order that they should begin operations.717 Such a suggestion was forwarded to the 
colonial government, but it was held that the selection and survey of the area should fall 
upon the company, but by February 1912, nothing was heard of the matter.718 The 
government and the companies erred in the administration of concession, a matter of deep 
regret, which Sir Percy could hardly resolve, his proposed economic development 
notwithstanding.  
    The very nature of the extraordinary grant to these companies, which was in excess of 
what they were supposed to have been granted, was made prior to Sir Percy’s assumption 
of government and they became difficult for him to resolve. On his subsequent attempts 
to resolve the excess grants and regulate the conduct of the companies, especially the 
East Africa Estates, they objected to the proposed resolution of their excess grants. 
Therefore their objection was referred to Read for arbitration provided in the concession 
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terms in the event of disagreements. There was no resolution on the curtailment of the 
excess of the companies up to the time of Sir Percy left the protectorate.  
       In conclusion, the issue of concession, especially to influential syndicates, was 
beyond Sir Percy’s reach. Ideally, Sir Percy would have been the right person to handle 
the issue of concessions in the protectorate. But as these influential companies were 
connected to senior government and parliamentary officials, their concessions were 
executed over the head of Sir Percy, in the CO. Therefore, Sir Percy could hardly be 
successful in effecting concessions or curtailing the larger sizes of concession as such 
concessions were supported by senior government officials in London. It could be 
recalled that Sir Percy expressed his disappointment with the way concessions were 
granted in a private and confidential letter of 4 June 1910, when he told Seely about the 
concession of Waleran, which Sir Percy believed it should not have been granted in the 
first instance, as the proprietors were incompetent. 719  Sir Percy’s criticism of the 
concession, especially that of Waleran was not welcomed in the CO. In fact, the CO 
defended the concessionaires in spite of the fact that the concession in question violated 
the regulations governing grants and its working conditions. 
  Conclusion 
        By the time of Sir Percy’s departure from the protectorate, not much had been 
achieved in respect of solving the coast’s numerous problems that he identified early in 
his governorship. Another area of shortcoming was his failed attempt to unite the three 
coast provinces under one administration, with Jackson as Provincial Commissioner.     
     However, the former was no more than wishful thinking as the CO refused to support 
his proposed merger of the three provinces of Seyyedie, Tanaland, and Jubaland. 
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Moreover, his attempt to extend administrative control and regularize the method of tax 
collection into a uniform method especially after that of Ainsworth of Nyanza Province 
was unsuccessful. Thus for the administrative control and taxation, there was minimal 
success that owed its initiative to the district officers of Taita and Malindi districts.  
       With regard to the land title claims, Sir Percy had attempted to resolve the question 
of titles through the application of the Coast Lands Titles Ordinance, 1908, which 
provided for a court. But the court was unsuitable for the task and a solution was sought 
in an arbitration board. The arbitration board made considerable progress toward settling 
the thorny question of the title as evidenced in Salim’s letter of appreciation to Sir Percy. 
But despite such appreciations, there were still questions as to title claims that had not 
been fully settled up to the time of Sir Percy’s departure from the protectorate. The title 
claims delayed plantation development to the north of Mombasa, while to the south of 
Mombasa, there were few concessionaire companies operating, as the area had fewer land 
title clams than the northern part of Mombasa.   
       With regard to labor question, the Giriama enjoyed a little quiescence from the 
British interference until a time when the government sought to impose wage labor over 
them, using administrative control as means of incorporating them into wage labor. Even 
then, they resisted such measures, and the colonial control had remained nominal over 
them up to the First World War. In 1912 the government decided to remove them from 
the north bank of the Sabaki to free 100,000 acres of land for European plantations, and 
to introduce a rigid collection of hut tax to force the Giriama into the labor market, but 
the government was unsuccessful.  
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       On the other hand, the Giriama revolt of 1914, two years after Sir Percy left the 
protectorate, was caused by the Sir Percy’s policy towards the Giriama. It was Sir Percy’s 
proposed incorporation of the Giriama into wage labor and his attempt to remove them 
from their abode known for its soil fertility, and, to grant the land to European colonists 
for plantation cultivation that sowed the seed of discord between the local authorities and 
the Giriama, which culminated in the 1914 revolt. 



















                                                            Chapter 10 
                                                           Land Policy 
   Introduction     
        At the time Sir Percy assumed the governorship of the protectorate, one of the most 
critical issues that faced him was the land question. The CO was particularly concerned 
with the amendment of existing legislation governing the grants of land to European 
settlers, the conditions governing such grants, the development of a system that would 
open land to potential European cultivators, and the protection of African land rights 
among many land issues. The CO had been disappointed in the lack of success in dealing 
with these matters that characterized the governorship of Sir Percy’s predecessor, Sir 
James Hayes Sadler.  
      The amendment of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, engaged Sadler in a 
correspondence with Crewe over Elgin’s recommendations, which Sadler declined to 
include in the amendment of April 1909. Crewe deferred assent on the ordinance as it did 
not reflect Elgin’s recommendations, and upon Sir Percy’s assumption of government, 
Crewe asked him to consider Elgin’s recommendations with a view to including them in 
the amendment of the ordinance. The CO hoped that Sir Percy would be able to deal 
effectively with the land question, including the passage of a new ordinance with specific 
clauses that the CO believed would effectively check land speculation, which was seen as 
a major problem and a threat to the protectorate’s future development.  
      Sir Percy proved unequal to the task set for him when he took over the governorship 
of the EAP. Not only did he fail to implement the type of legislation desired by the CO, 
but under his governorship land speculation continued as Sir Percy was unwilling and 
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unable to enforce existing regulations relating to grants of land and conditions of tenure. 
This failure was primarily caused by Sir Percy’s favoritism and support for the 
protectorate’s European settlers. Here as in other important issues, such as the Maasai 
move, he followed policies aimed at winning favor of the settlers, rather than those that 
would have enhanced the general well being of the protectorate and its entire population.  
      As the land question has long been viewed by historians of the EAP as being one of 
the most fundamental in determining the course of its development, Sir Percy’s actions 
not only can be viewed as a failure in the short term. In the longer term, his actions, and 
lack of action, helped to entrench European privilege economically and politically, to the 
detriment of Kenya’s future. In the sphere of administration of grants of land, based on 
the existing condition, Sir Percy had not performed to the satisfaction of the CO. He had 
proposed to develop the economy, and in doing so, the land question became a significant 
asset in achieving his policy recommendations.  
      Successive governments had done little in opening the land for the settlers to 
cultivate, and Sir Percy proposed that as he wanted to develop the economic potential of 
the protectorate, which he viewed in the development of large scale farming and industry, 
land must be open to prospective farmers, so that the protectorate would earn the desired 
funds to be self supporting. The CO believed that there must be regulations to safeguard 
grants of land. Measures should be designed not only to regulate land dealings, but also 
for the government to share increased land value to improve the future welfare of the 
colony.  
      But Sir Percy refused to budge and applied only a few policy measures; these were 
freehold and fixed rents, believing that it would provide government with the desired 
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safeguards, but in the end his policy produced bitter consequences for the government 
and the settlers, as immigrants could not secure grants, in view of speculation. In view of 
the latter, Sir Percy could not be considered to have introduced an effective policy of 
dispensing lands. In view of the outcome of his policy, neither could Sir Percy be 
considered as the best administration of land policy, as there were extraordinary land 
dealings that produced speculation and dummying. Against the background of 
irregularity in the administration of regulation in grants of lands, the administration of 
land policy designed to provide land to settlers had not been as successful as Sir Percy 
proposed. He had proposed to develop the economy, and in doing so, the land question 
became central.  
      But the grants of land in the protectorate compounded his proposed economic 
development as it had been characterized by lack of a uniform legislation, which failed to 
satisfy farmers, and had been a factor in accentuating the difficulty of accessing grants of 
land to prospective farmers. The latter condition was accentuated further when Sir Percy 
refused to allow enabling legislation that could have mitigated the difficult position in 
land grants in the protectorate. Against the background of irregularity in the 
administration of legislation in grants of lands, the administration of land policy designed 
to provide land to settlers had not been successful as Sir Percy proposed. 
     Land grants had been marred by irregularity, especially in speculation and dummies, 
as Sir Percy refused to enforce revision of rents, and insisted that land tax must be 
dropped. Harcourt agreed not because it was the right course of action for him to follow 
but he wanted to move on. The latter position of Sir Percy must have been informed by 
his belief that land should be opened up to big business to develop the country. 
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Therefore, the dispensation of land was characterized by irregularities that could be 
noticed in grants of land, which showed flagrant violations that he failed to stop.  
    This formed the basis of his weakness, not only in coming up with effective policy, but 
also of enforcement of policy that would have sanitized land dealings. The latter 
produced speculations and dummying, which Sir Percy failed to combat. The Colonial 
Office thus lost control of affairs, especially in land dealings, and had to defer to Sir 
Percy’s successor all questions on land policy. 
 Land Legislation 
      Since 1905, when the CO took over the administration of the EAP from the Foreign 
Office, it had been preoccupied with framing legislation that could make land accessible 
to settlers. The colony relied on the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1902, in dispensing Crown 
lands to settlers entering the country. The ordinance could not effectively provide the 
desired safeguards in land dealings. Therefore, the CO sought to amend the ordinance by 
means of legislation. The search for an enduring land policy, by which land could be 
administered, remained the main objective of the CO in the EAP.720  
      Therefore, the CO sought to make land accessible for European settlement as well as 
establish certain safeguards against excessive accumulation and speculation.721  The CO 
sought by means of legislation to establish some government control over land dealings 
and ensure that farmers developed their land holding in accordance with the working 
regulations of land administration. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, 
put forward these objectives in a confidential dispatch of 19 March 1908 to the Governor 
of the EAP, Sadler, for consideration. Elgin proposed land be granted on 99-year leases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




with a revision of rentals after 33 years, at 5 percent of the unimproved value of the 
landholding, the introduction of land tax, and anti-dummying measures.722   
    Elgin’s proposed regulations could not be introduced as settlers objected to these 
regulations, particularly the reevaluation of rentals and introduction of land tax on the 
introduction of the land bill in the Legislative Council, in 1909. Settlers demanded an 
extended term of leases, as the terms of the bill would limit their profit from agriculture 
and land speculation.723 When the bill was passed, the reevaluation was altered to fixed 
rentals, the land tax was dropped, and the provision of development conditions that 
should be met, before a landholder could transfer the property as an anti-dummying 
measure, was also dropped.724  The CO rejected the bill as it desired these provisions so 
as to secure a share in the increased value of the land, as well as to safeguard land against 
excessive accumulation and speculation. The settlers’ objection jeopardized the original 
bill, and the CO retained these regulations pending a time, when the ordinance would be 
amended. 
     Sir Percy, upon his assumption of government, found the protectorate engaged in 
correspondence with the CO about how best they could amend the Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1902, which had been amended in April 1909, a few months before his 
arrival.725 But Crewe deferred assent on the ordinance, as relevant regulations laid down 
by his predecessor, Lord Elgin, were not included in the amendment of the ordinance.726 
Crewe was categorical that the government adhere to the view that “means must be 
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sought of securing to the government a share in the increased value of the land.”727  In 
order to meet this task, the CO was committed to legislation that would regulate the 
conduct of land dealings, as well as provide the government through laid down 
regulations as proposed by Elgin; a share in the increased land value.728 Sadler was asked, 
in a confidential dispatch of 7 January 1909, to include in the amendment of the 
ordinance and in all future grants of land, a revision of rents after the 33rd and 66th years 
on a 99 year-lease, surtax, and 3-5 years development conditions which must be met, 
before land could be transferred to another person.729  Elgin’s regulations sought to curb 
larger accumulation of land in the hands of individuals by the enforcement of these 
regulations “so far as it is possible to do so.’’730 The CO maintained that the provision of 
the bill stood as recommended by Elgin, until there was the need of amendments of any 
particular provision arising from the debate in the Legislative Council of the protectorate. 
Even then, it was the details of the provision that may be altered not the particular 
measures enunciated by Elgin. 
     The CO believed that the alterations made in 1909 were not considered in detail, and 
therefore, Crewe, upon Sir Percy’s assumption of government, asked him, in a 
confidential dispatch of the 16 September 1909, to consider Elgin’s regulations in a 
further amendment of the April 1909 ordinance.731 Sir Percy replied to Crewe, in a 
confidential dispatch of 30 September 1909, requesting more time to meet the inhabitants 
of the country and also to acquaint himself with the local conditions of the protectorate, 
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before he could report his observation on the April 1909 ordinance.732 Also, Sir Percy 
told Crewe, “If government is to strictly adhere to the policy of sharing in incremental 
values in keeping down the accumulations of land - the latter a very difficult matter.”733  
    Therefore consideration of the amendment of the April 1909 ordinance was deferred 
until a time when Sir Percy would have the opportunity of meeting the inhabitants of the 
colony, and also of acquainting himself with the local situation, so that he would have an 
opportunity of considering the “matter on the spot.”734 On receipt of Sir Percy’s dispatch, 
the CO was optimistic that Sir Percy would include Elgin’s regulations in the amendment 
of the ordinance. Butler, in his minute on Sir Percy’s confidential dispatch of 30 
September 1909, stated “the views expressed in a section of the dispatch were in 
accordance with the views expressed by Sir P. Girouard in his dealing with the land 
question in Northern Nigeria. It is probable, therefore, that he is not in any way 
suggesting that we should depart from those principles, but is seeking a firm declaration 
of policy which will support him in dealing with local opinion.”735 But Parliamentary 
Undersecretary of State Seely stated that a dispatch should be transmitted immediately, 
stating that they should not ignore the revision of rent clauses in the amendment of the 
ordinance.736 Seely’s minute was in reference to Elgin’s revision of rents provision that 
he strongly believed should not be ignored.  
     However, in another round of minutes on Sir Percy’s dispatch, Butler stated that even 
Sir Percy’s dispatch of 30 September 1909 left the door opened for further consideration 
and amendment of the ordinance, as he expressed his desire to study the Ordinance and to 
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make his recommendations.737 Also, in a further comment, Seely argued that the issue as 
stated in their dispatch of 7 January 1909 should be brought up.738 Seely was making 
reference to Elgin’s regulation transmitted to Sadler for inclusion, which the governor 
refused to include, and should therefore be brought up for Sir Percy’s consideration.  
    The CO was hopeful that Sir Percy would consider these regulations in the amendment 
of April 1909, and apprehension as to whether or not these regulations would form part of 
a further amendment of April 1909 ordinance was laid to rest in the short run. Crewe, 
while waiting on Sir Percy’s comment, reverted to conditions of grants of land as 
contained in Elgin’s regulations of 19 March 1908, and also as provided in the CO’s 
notice of introduction of the regulations of 7 May 1908. 
     The CO expressed their strict adherence to the principles enunciated in Elgin’s 
dispatch of 19 March 1908, believing that it would provide the desired safeguards, and 
stood firm in support of such regulations. Again, while Sir Percy was working on his 
Interim Report Upon the EAP, he referred to the land question, when he reiterated his 
earlier question to Crewe, “If government is to strictly adhere to the policy of sharing in 
incremental values in keeping down the accumulations of land- the latter a very difficult 
matter.”739 From the latter reiterated statement, it would be difficult to suggest that Sir 
Percy would be willing to consider a legislation that would allow the government to have 
a share in the increased value of land.  
     However, Sir Percy put the amendment of the land ordinance on hold for six months. 
Thereafter, he reported to Crewe, in a confidential dispatch of 17 February 1910, that he 
had come to the conclusion that the best possible course of action to be taken was the 
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adoption of the ordinance passed by the protectorate Legislative Council in April 1909.740  
Sir Percy also told Crewe that the colonists were reasoning on false premises in their 
opposition and that the proposals would undoubtedly prove of lasting benefit to the 
community.741 However, Sir Percy suggested to Crewe that he would nevertheless prefer 
to sacrifice the measure, as there were strong feelings against such measures in the 
protectorate.742 Sir Percy also told Crewe that he was in total support of the omission of 
the graduated land tax provision from the ordinance and defended his position by 
corroborating the view of the land committee that moderate grants of farms would 
prevent speculation and dummying, as long as development conditions were met.743 
Again, Sir Percy supported the amendment further when he told Crewe, “I can see no 
great objections to reasonable accumulations in the hands of reputable capitalists.”744 Sir 
Percy argued further that there was a “very strong feeling … in the country entirely 
adverse to any revision of rentals within the period of a 99 years lease.”745 Sir Percy 
contended that the protectorate was likely to be self-governing before 33 years, when the 
first revision of rents was expected; therefore, “it should be left to the good sense of the 
future population to deal with these incremental values and that we are today sufficiently 
protecting the rights of future generation by retaining practically the whole of the land as 
leasehold.”746  
      As to excessive accumulation of large areas of land, Sir Percy also told Crewe in 
February that it did not matter how much land a farmer held as long as he could effect 
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development on his land. He therefore pointed out that it was within the interest of a 
capitalist to take possession of a large area of land, and it was also unnecessary to 
introduce a land tax and anti-dummying regulations.747 Sir Percy accepted the 1909 
ordinance in its entirety as it supported the interest of the settlers, which would afford 
them the opportunity of grabbing land without any measures that would limit them in 
doing so. He wanted to allow the settlers do as they wished, especially as exemplified by 
Delamere’s land grab by means of dummying, when he was subdividing his Njoro estates 
presumably for dummying purposes.748   
    The CO’s officials were unhappy with Sir Percy’s position on the amendment, as he 
supported the position of his predecessor against Elgin’s regulations that the CO wished 
to form part of any future amendment. The CO viewed Elgin’s regulations as the best 
measures that would provide the needed safeguards against land speculation and 
dummying. The CO not only refused to budge, but were also exasperated with his reply. 
Butler, in his minute, stated that Sir Percy was “prepared to throw over, in deference to 
the wishes of the White Settlers, the conditions imposed by the Secretary of State.” 749   
     As Sir Percy supported the April 1909 ordinance, he clearly departed from the land 
policy enunciated by Elgin, and his own view of safeguarding land and opening up land 
to immigrants and cultivators who could invest and develop the country. The latter, Sir 
Percy had clearly enunciated in his Interim Report Upon the EAP of 13 November 
1909.750  Therefore, Sir Percy adopted the settler’s desire on land policy by relegating his 
own proposed policy and the government’s regulations of safeguarding the land to the 
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interest of the settlers by supporting his predecessor’s view. His support of Sadler’s view 
was informed by his desire to shield the settlers from legislation that would not only 
regulate their land dealings, but would also require the settler to pay land taxes and a 
revision of rents for the future welfare of the country. Sir Percy supported the settlers 
against the British government, but the CO refused to accept his recommendations.  
      The divergence of opinion between Crewe and Sir Percy on the position of the 
amendment of April 1909 ordinance became the first source of discord between Sir Percy 
and the CO. The officials of the CO wanted to include the revision of rentals after every 
33 years on a 99 years lease, surtax, and transfer of land after development conditions 
were met, as contained in Lord Elgin’s confidential dispatch of 19 March 1908, in all 
future grants.751  Sir Percy’s rejection of the regulations might have heightened Crewe’s 
reservation, arising not only from Sir Percy’s rejection of the regulations, but also from 
his perusal of both bi-annual returns of grants of land for 1 January to 31 June, and I July 
to 31 December 1909, respectively. In the latter two, Crewe learnt that Sir Percy had not 
been applying Elgin’s regulations on all new grants of land. Elgin’s regulations, it was 
believed, would, in the end, form the working regulations for all grants of land in the 
protectorate, and therefore must be included in all grants, pending the time when they 
will form part of a new land ordinance.752 In view of Crewe’s observation, he addressed a 
confidential dispatch of 10 May 1910 to Sir Percy, enquiring whether revisions of rents 
were being included in all new grants of land.753 Crewe’s enquiry might have been in 
connection with grants of land concessions in which he noticed from the returns of grants 
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of land that it was unlikely that revision of rents was applied to certain grants, especially 
a grant to Heatley of an additional 5,000-acre concession.  
    The question of irregularity in Heatley’s grant came up when the acting Governor, 
Jackson, addressed a confidential dispatch of 15 August 1909, to Crewe, with enclosed 
returns of grants of land for 1 January to 31 June 1909, for Crewe’s consideration. 
Following Crewe’s perusal of the returns of grants of land, Crewe, in a confidential 
dispatch of 30 October 1909, asked Jackson, in the absence of Sir Percy, to furnish 
further information in respect of returns of grants of land ending 31 June 1909.  
      In the returns, Crewe observed that Hartley’s grant was reflected in section 2. 1 and 
repeated in section 2.2 as provided in the returns of grants of land ending 31 June 
1909.754 Crewe asked Jackson of areas granted to both Gale’s and Heatley’s concessions, 
and conditions applied in the grant of an additional 5,000-acre concession to Heatley.755 
Jackson replied to Crewe, in a confidential dispatch of 15 January 1910, that the area 
granted to Heatley was in section 2.1 of the returns, and, it was not the one in section 2.2 
of the returns of grants of land. However, Jackson told Crewe that the two areas granted 
to both Gale and Heatley were identical.756 As for conditions on which these grants were 
made, Jackson also told Crewe that a freehold rate of two Rupees per acre was inserted in 
error and that the actual rate charged was Rs. 1 per acre for freehold and half anna per 
acre per annum for leasehold.757 Also, Jackson stated that the deeds of Gale’s grant were 
only registered on 20 May 1909 and appeared therefore in the returns of grants ending 31 
June 1909.758 Jackson also told Crewe that, in concurrence with his dispatch of 30 
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October 1909 instructing the governor to grant an additional 5,000 acres to Heatley, he 
has instructed to affect the grant accordingly.759   
     But the fact of the matter in this additional grant to Heatley was that the revision of 
rentals as laid down in Elgin’s regulation was not included in Heatley’s grant.  Heatley’s 
concession of an additional 5,000 acres appeared in the returns January to June 1910. 
Heatley’s concession was given on a freehold; no revision of rental after 33rd and 66th 
years on 99 years lease was applied. In view of Crewe’s perusal of bi-annual returns of 
grants of land for 1 January to 31 June, and 1 July to 31 December 1910, Crewe doubted 
whether laid down regulations as provided by Elgin were being complied with. His 
doubts were confirmed that Heatley’s grant was made on a freehold condition, which 
brought to the open that revision of rents had not been applied on Heatley’s grant.760  
     Sir Percy’s refusal to enforce the revision of rents provision of the regulation was not 
on Heatley’s grant alone, as Harcourt discovered similar violation in grants that 
contravened the regulations. The latter grant was not made in compliance with the 
regulations and the CO had no means of compelling an unwilling Sir Percy to enforce the 
revision of rents provision in all grants, a provision desired most by the CO. Even though 
Sir Percy was quick in defending his action that it was not too late to include revision, its 
inclusion could spark a protest from the European settlers.761 He also believed that the 
colonists would have self-government before the first revision of 33 years. Therefore, 
future decision as to the revision should be left for the colonists to decide, once they were 
independent.762  
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      As Sir Percy succeeded in dropping these land regulatory measures, the revision of 
rents and land tax provisions in grants of land, he had deprived the government a share in 
the increased value of land after the 33rd and 66th years on 99 year leases. The provision 
dealing with the revision of rents was held with utmost importance in the CO, as it was 
believed that the provision would not only safeguard against dummying, but would also 
afford the government, through the revision of rents after every 33 years, a share in the 
increased value of the land.  
      But Sir Percy refused, and the CO had to fold their hands to see Sir Percy doing what 
he wished. The administration of grants of land without the application of land tax and 
the refusal to apply revision of rents meant that grants were vulnerable to fraudulent 
practices. This was further accentuated by lack of supervision and enforcement of 
penalties, in a case where defaulters were caught. Under the conditions that Sir Percy 
retained, grants of land were characterized by irregularities that caused the CO to enquire 
from time to time of the conditions on which grants of land were made. In the latter, there 
was an absence of a clear intimation in the returns of land as to the application of revision 
of rents regulation in the grants, as well as the price of first and subsequent revisions to 
be applied.763 The provision was part of the regulations stipulated in the notice of 
introduction of Elgin’s regulations of 19 March 1908.764 It was also in compliance with 
the notice of introduction of the regulations, which Crewe transmitted to Sadler in his 
confidential dispatch of 7 May 1908, with an enclosure of Elgin’s regulation of 19 March 
1908.765  
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    Thereafter, the protectorate’s Commissioner of Lands, Colonel J. A. L. Montgomery, 
had issued a circular notice of introduction of the regulations in the protectorate, on 1 
June 1908.766 But Sir Percy refrained to apply the regulations and had never replied to 
Crewe as to why he refrained from introducing the said regulations, leaving Crewe in the 
dark as to whether or not revision of rents was being applied in all new grants of land. 
Crewe availed himself of information that a revision of rents provision of the regulations 
was not being applied in all new grants as he directed. But Crewe would have to hear 
from Sir Percy, as the man on spot, whether or not the regulation was being applied. But 
as Sir Percy declined to reply, Crewe continued to approve grants based on Sir Percy’s 
recommendations. Certainly not without caution and doubts that Sir Percy might not have 
been applying revision of rents in all new grants of land. 
     Crewe was able to get to the bottom of the issue from the report of the sitting of the 
East Africa Department’s Land Committee, CO, on 21 June 1910. The Committee, in 
reporting one of their sitting, in a confidential dispatch of 21 June 1910, told Crewe that 
during the meeting of the committee, it noted from a statement made by the EAP’s late 
Commissioner of Lands, Montgomery, that Sir Percy refrained from including the 
revision of rents after 33rd and 66th years on 99 year leases, in all new grants, since the 
issuance of the regulation of 7 May 1908.767  
     The CO was unhappy with Sir Percy’s non-compliance with the regulations, and his 
action provoked anger in the CO when Butler, in his minute on the report, stated, “it was 
very thoughtless of the people in the Protectorate to refrain from enforcing this rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




without any formal notification and without telling us that they had done so.”768 Butler 
added, “we have imagined all along that new grants since the regulations were issued 
included this very important condition.”769 Butler recalled, “this belief has not been 
without its influence in considering applications for additional grants of land (e.g. Mr. 
Heatley’s concessions), and has also made us perhaps underrate the consequences of 
delay in dealing with the new Lands Ordinance.”770 Butler added that “Naturally the 
urgency of arriving at a decision on that Ordinance was not felt so keenly when it was 
believed that requirements laid down by Lord Elgin, which are embodied in the 
regulation referred to were being complied with.” 771  Therefore, Butler transmitted 
another draft copy of the regulations, which Montgomery issued in the protectorate and 
transmitted a copy to the CO as notification of introduction of the regulations in the 
protectorate.772  
      Therefore, Crewe, relying on the committee’s report and a minute by Butler, 
addressed a confidential dispatch of 6 July 1910 to Sir Percy, deploring his action for 
non-compliance with the revision of rentals provision of the regulations. Crewe, in a 
hearty expression of anger, told Sir Percy; “I understand from Colonel Montgomery, late 
Commissioner of Lands, that No. 2 of the regulations for the grant of lands, dated the 7th 
of May 1908, has not been applied in the case of new grants made since that date.” 773  
Crewe also stated that the regulations provided for the revision of rent at the end of the 
33rd and 66th years of a 99 years lease, which was, he stated, “of course, a condition of the 
greatest importance.” He added: I should be glad to know whether it is the fact that this 
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condition has not been included in new licenses or leases granted since the 7th May of 
1908, and, if not, why, for what reason the operation of the regulation has been 
suspended.”774 Also, Crewe told Sir Percy “this is the first intimation which has reached 
me that this regulation was not being applied. Enquiries as to conditions on which land is 
granted have been applied with the regulations of the 7th of May 1908 in the belief that all 
these regulations were operative.”775 Crewe added, “I may also observe that the belief 
that the revision of rent formed one of the conditions on which new grants of land were 
being made has not been without its influence on myself in considering applications for 
the grant of additional areas, and in the consideration of the Land Ordinance.”776  
    Exasperated, Crewe believed that Sir Percy disguised the fact of the matter to him, 
when refraining from inclusion of the said provision in all grants. Crewe felt that Sir 
Percy deceived him, when he refused to disclose the true position of grants. Crewe 
believed that all provisions of the land regulations were being enforced which made him 
not push for the immediate amendment of the ordinance, believing that, at last, it would 
be Elgin’s regulations that would prevail in any further amendment of the April 1909 
ordinance.  
      After some delay, Sir Percy replied to Crewe, in a confidential dispatch of 15 August 
1910, defending his action that it wasn’t too late to include the rental re-evaluation 
provision into the new leases, in addition to other conditions.777 But Sir Percy warned that 
the inclusion of such a provision could spark dissatisfaction and opposition in the 
protectorate and undo the good the government had done.778 Sir Percy argued that the 
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inclusion of the revision of rentals would discourage prospective immigrants into the 
country. Sir Percy also argued that the provisions of the revision of rents held no 
significance, as the country would be independent before the first 33 years revision. 779 
Therefore, the question of future land dealings should be reserved for the future 
populations of the country to decide upon. Sir Percy also pointed out that in June 1906 
even Sadler did not apply the provision of the revision of rents in granting a 547 square 
miles lease on the coast to Upland Syndicate of East Africa, on a fixed rental.780  
      But Crewe was not satisfied with Sir Percy’s explanation, as well as his handling of 
the land dealings in the protectorate. He received the reply for what it was worth, and he 
continued to raise more observations and questions arising from his perusal of returns of 
grants of land, and in his consideration of applications for grants of land.   
      A sound administrator of government policy would not respond to Crewe in the way 
Sir Percy did. More importantly, as a custodian of government policy, Sir Percy failed to 
nurture and sustain the implementation of government regulations for opening up land for 
prospective immigrants and for the development of the protectorate economy, which he 
strongly advocated in his telegram of 12 November 1909 to Crewe and reiterated the 
same position, in his confidential dispatch of 13 November 1909 to Crewe.781 Sir Percy’s 
action in this regard could hardly be considered of an administrator who could defend 
government policy of greatest importance, in view of the CO’s determination not only in 
safeguarding lands against speculation and dummying, but also for the government to 
have a share in the increased value of land. In the latter requirements of the government, 
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Sir Percy had not effectively carried out any of them, having refrained to do so, and had 
never informed the CO of his refusal to enforce the said regulations.  
      The implications of his action on the administration of government policy were below 
the expectations of the CO for the discharge of his responsibilities. In fact, his action was 
detrimental to the government policy of land administration, a gross failing on his 
competence in the execution of government policy, which clearly exposed his bias and 
advocacy of settlers’ interest at the expense of government. This was a failing of Sir 
Percy, as the CO was confident that he could effectively carry out the task entrusted to 
him, but they were disappointed with his performance, as he had failed to do so. His 
action was informed by his desire to defend the cause of the settlers against legislation 
that would demand them to contribute to the welfare of the protectorate. His action in 
considering that the country would be independent before the 33 year first revision was 
uncalled for, as it did not form part of His Majesty’s Government policy in that 
protectorate. Therefore, Sir Percy’s view that the country would be independent before 
the 33 years, when the first revision of rents would be due, was subversion not only from 
His Majesty’s Government policy, but also of the policy of administration he had 
enunciated for the protectorate in his Interim Report, as to the land question.782 Therefore, 
Sir Percy’s departure from a laid down policy of administration in respect of the land 
question, which he also considered a cardinal issue in the economic development of the 
protectorate, did not amount to a sound administration of policy from a person considered 
as an outstanding British colonial administrator and proconsul.783   
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    In another blow to Sir Percy’s administration, Crewe, determined to address the 
festering land question, refused to concede to Sir Percy’s wishes of retaining the 
provision of the land ordinance without the inclusion of Elgin’s regulations. Therefore, 
Crewe referred the land bill to a committee for further recommendation with a view of 
including Elgin’s regulations in a further amendment of the Land Ordinance of April 29 
1910. This was necessary as Crewe disagreed with all Sir Percy’s explanations as to the 
suitability or otherwise of applying Elgin’s recommendations.  
     The body at the CO that was given the task of deliberating on the desirability of 
including Elgin’s recommendations, in the amendment of the land ordinance, was a Sub-
Committee of the Land Concessions Committee, chaired by Colonel John Barton 
Seely.784 Other members of the committee were drawn from the CO, such as W. D. Ellis, 
H. F. Batterbee, Sir H. J. Read, Bertram Cox, legal assistant, and the late Commissioner 
of Lands, East Africa Protectorate, Colonel J. A. L. Montgomery who testified on the 
settlers’ view.785   
     The committee, in the course of its proceedings, heard and collected evidence 
especially in the form of a memorandum from Mr. Pemba Reeves, an expert on New 
Zealand’s land question and development. Reeves, in a memorandum of 4 May 1910, 
recommended that the government should control transfer of lands and be strict in grants 
of the remaining 4,000 square miles of land.786 Reeves recommended further that land 
grants must be regulated to ensure that big businesses were not allowed to take over 
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control of the remaining land and that free transfer of land should be allowed for the 
future, after development conditions were met.787 
    But such transfer must be subject to adequate white occupation of the land, which must 
be insisted upon as a condition of transfer in the case of the remaining land.788 Reeve’s 
testimony was important to the Seely-led committee in its resolution of the land question 
as it formed part of the recommendations they transmitted to Crewe. Seely, in his 
recommendations in a confidential dispatch of 13 July 1910, told Crewe to adhere to his 
decision as to the provision in the law of penalties against dummying, in which 
individuals and syndicates caught with multiple grants of land in their possession, for the 
purpose of holding what was reasonably unacceptable by the regulations, such grants be 
revoked and farms forfeited to the government.789  
   Seely drew Crewe’s attention to a possible development of a strong feeling of 
resentment amongst settlers in the protectorate once his recommendations were 
implemented. But he also recommended to Crewe, that such resentment could be 
addressed, if they could request the Treasury to set aside a certain definite sum of money 
each year for the improvement of communications.790 Also, Seely suggested that such a 
project would mitigate the feeling of resentment amongst the white settlers, and would 
also stimulate further immigration into the protectorate.791 Seely added that the proposed 
improvement policy, if adhered to, would “justify government’s claims for share of the 
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land’s increased value, which it could hardly help to create by its own action.”792 In 
concluding his recommendations, Seely wrote that such improvements would be to the 
advantage of all the races of the protectorate. 793  Seely pointed out that whilst 
recommending the desirability of doing something to improve communications in the 
protectorate, he also recommended that a letter should be addressed to Sir Percy, 
intimating to him the resolutions and inviting him to London so as to produce a joint 
report.   
    After the submission of the report to Crewe, it was passed through the normal CO’s 
administrative channel for consideration. Thereafter, Crewe, in a confidential dispatch of 
19 July 1910, told Sir Percy that the committee had reported, and he should travel home, 
with a view to producing a joint report with the committee.794 However, the resolution of 
the committee did not resonate with Sir Percy, when he replied in a confidential dispatch 
of 10 September 1910, objecting to the recommendations of the committee.795 Sir Percy 
left for London, on 14 November 1910 for discussion of the land regulations with 
Harcourt, and returned to Mombasa, on 21 February 1911. 
    G. H. Mungeam’s British Rule in Kenya noted that Sir Percy met Lewis Harcourt, on 
the committee’s resolution, in December 1910. 796  Crewe had been transferred as 
Secretary of State for the India, while Harcourt was appointed Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, in November.797 Sir Percy argued before Harcourt in favor of the settlers, but 
Harcourt refused to budge, and maintained the CO’s position on the amendment of the 
ordinance. 
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      Also, Harcourt rejected the ordinance of April 1909.798  Harcourt followed up the 
discussion with Sir Percy, in a confidential dispatch of 3 February 1911, that he had 
represented the settlers view with much force and ability.799 However, Harcourt reiterated 
the CO’s position on the revision of rents when he told Sir Percy that the government 
must have a share of the increased value of land after every 33 years.800 Also, Harcourt 
told Sir Percy that he “wished to retain the provision against land accumulation lest the 
ideal of a large white population in the white highlands should be seriously prejudiced,” 
Harcourt added, his responsibility was for the future welfare of the protectorate.801 
     Harcourt, whilst being clearly categorical of his position on the land question, had at 
the same time considered Sir Percy’s objection on the committee’s resolution. He told Sir 
Percy, in that same dispatch of 3 February 1911, to redraft the bill, including all the 
deleted provisions, and to submit it for his consideration.802  Sir Percy left London for the 
East Africa Protectorate, on 26 February 1911, but he could not report on the revision of 
the ordinance to Harcourt until four months later. 
    In the interim, he maintained his stand against enforcements of revision of rents and 
his insistence that land tax be dropped on new and prior grants not registered as of 28 
February 1911. With Harcourt consenting to the request, a land grant was made under 
fixed rents and freehold conditions. Fixed rents and freehold conditions of grants caused 
irregularities in land grants, and prompted the CO to enquire from time to time, of 
conditions under which, land was being allotted. These conditions, and the consequence 
of dropping the land tax on all grants, brought grants under fixed rentals and freeholds 
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conditions, which voided all safeguards desired in land dealings.803 With such a method 
of grants, there was now a distant possibility of coming up with a land bill any time 
sooner as Sir Percy reported to Harcourt, on 3 May 1911, that he had not been able to 
redraft a good land bill.804 Sir Percy asked Harcourt if the legal adviser of the CO could 
be asked to redraft the bill in consultations with the protectorate’s Crown Advocate, R. 
M. Combe, and the Treasurer who were on leave in England.805  
   The CO was irked with his letter. Butler, in his minute, suggested that if the law was 
drafted in the CO, it will be assumed that “this law which is apparently obnoxious to the 
majority of the white population … has been dictated from home not only in general 
policy but also in detail.”806 Harcourt was angered by the dispatch and minuted “Oh yes! 
We shall reply effectively to these tactics. If his legal advisers are so inefficient they had 
better look out for private practice at home…. I may have to tell him that if I suspect him 
of such action … he wd. be at once recalled.”807 The CO were clearly not happy with Sir 
Percy’s action as he disappointed Harcourt who gave him the opportunity of coming up 
with a new land bill, but he failed to do so. Sir Percy could not allow amendment of the 
ordinance of April 1909, and did not come up with a revised bill as Harcourt expected 
him to do so. As there was no progress made on the revision of the bill and with the 
application of fixed rental and freehold conditions of grants, it was impossible to believe 
that Sir Percy had administered land in a manner that would provide the desired 
safeguards. It also suggested that he had not proffered any solution to the problems of 
land dealings, and instead, compounded it. Despite Sir Percy’s refusal to revise the bill, 
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Harcourt was hopeful that the land bill, if revised, would provide the desired safeguards, 
and therefore, he asked two officials of the protectorate, Combe and the Treasurer who 
were on leave in London, to revise the bill and in case of any difficulty to consult the 
CO’s legal adviser.808  
    Combe was also told to use the New Zealand Income Tax Assessment Act of 1908, to 
settle the knotty question of land taxation, which had been unsettled, and had been part of 
the problems hindering the passage of the bill.809 Combe concluded his revision of the 
bill in September 1911, and the bill was referred to the standing Land Committee, East 
Africa Department, CO, for further deliberations and resolution. Even then, the section 
dealing with the land tax had not been properly settled.810 The Land Committee reported 
in November 1911 on the assumption that it was desired to adhere to the principles laid 
down in Elgin’s dispatch of 19 March 1908.811 Elgin’s regulations had always been a 
reference point for any review of the land bill as the CO was not comfortable with the 
fixed rentals and freehold conditions of grants that Sir Percy had been applying on all 
grants. 
 Administration of Grants of Lands  
      Irregularities in grants of land had been taking place before Sir Percy assumed the 
government of the protectorate, but they were minimal. A simple clarification could 
sometimes resolve the misunderstanding or expose the level of irregular grants being 
made. But upon Sir Percy’s assumption of government, grants of land were characterized 
by irregularities that produced speculation and dummying. Harcourt discovered irregular 
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land dealings in Sir Percy’s returns of 1 January to 31 June 1911, which caused him to 
address a confidential dispatch of 28 October 1911, demanding further clarification on 
such returns. Harcourt asked Sir Percy to furnish further information as to conditions of 
grants of land and the number of persons holding grants who were complying with the 
terms of their grants.812 Sir Percy replied to Harcourt, in a confidential dispatch of 14 
February 1912, with enclosures by the Land Officer R. B. Wright. In Sir Percy’s 
dispatch, he told Harcourt that, as to conditions of grants of land, he was made to believe 
that they were in concurrence with the general policy laid down in respect of land 
administration, which was the policy of His Majesty’s Government that “one of the 
principles to be maintained in the land laws was the prevention of ‘undue accumulation 
of properties’ in the hands of individuals.”813  Therefore, Sir Percy told Harcourt that in 
furtherance of the said policy, he was instructed not to grant an area exceeding 150,000 
acres, and all land transfers that would increase someone’s area beyond that must be 
referred to him (Harcourt) for approval.814   
    In spite of Sir Percy’s knowledge of the limits on the acres allowed for him to grant, he 
refused to comply with such limits and went out of his way to allow the Sintu Avenue 
Syndicate to acquire 320,000 acres of land. In that case, he defended his action in making 
larger grants to syndicates when he told Harcourt of his belief that companies with 
genuine interest of developing their land, especially on the coastal areas of the 
protectorate, should be allotted sufficient land for their development. He specifically 
pointed to a case where he granted larger areas of land to a group of individuals who 
were running an estate as partners. Such action was in contravention of the regulations as 
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he was expected to seek approval from Harcourt before he could approve of the grants of 
such acreage to the syndicate, which were beyond what was allowed for him to 
approve.815 
    However, Sir Percy told Harcourt, in his dispatch, that upon his assumption of 
government, he discovered that a large area of crown land in the highlands had been 
surveyed into farmlands, and on a particular day, applications for grants and occupation 
of such land were entertained. As to conditions of grants, applicants must show proof of 
means of a certain amount, occupation of a grant within 6 months from the date of grant 
by the leasee or a European agent, and fulfillment of certain development conditions. 
Also, the leasee must prove, in this case, evidence that he has effected some development 
on his land, and the lease being procurable after 3-5 years, when development conditions 
were met.816 But Sir Percy had not been supervising grants of land to ensure landholders 
complied with these conditions of grants. Some settlers took advantage of government 
failing in that direction to speculate or dummy their grants.817  Sir Percy defended his 
action by criticizing the varied requirements set out in the regulations described above. 
He stated that one of the problems with this method of making grants was the danger of a 
real hardship being imposed upon bonafide farmers who arrived in the protectorate to 
take up land. They might find it difficult to obtain a grant though there was uninhabited 
land available that could be thrown open for allotments.818 These allotments could not be 
possible until the land was surveyed. In this situation, new arrivals in the country found it 
difficult to secure farms from government grants and had to resort to purchasing from 
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speculators, or from government auction of lands in the settled areas, which was a very 
rare occurrence.819  
   Sir Percy could have fixed the latter problem associated with the method of grant, but 
despite available land and an increased number of surveyors that had entered into the 
country in 1911, Sir Percy could not open up land for surveying and allotment to meet the 
demands of applicants for farmland.820 The land in the settled areas was disposed by 
auction as Sir Percy had pointed out, but even then, Sir Percy’s auction was not directed 
to meet the needs of immigrant settlers who were committed to making EAP their home. 
His auction of township land, for example, was to meet the very best interest of 
syndicates. This was clearly demonstrated in 1911 when he auctioned ten township plots 
in an ambiguous circumstance to a syndicate, in contravention of the rule.821  The action 
caused the CO to warn him against future occurrence of similar grants.822 Therefore, the 
latter problems that Sir Percy raised had not been without its influence in mitigating the 
prospect of immigration into the country, and of making farms available to settlers for 
agricultural development.823 But Sir Percy never opened up land for allotment to meet the 
needs of immigrants entering the colony, and such action was a drawback on the prospect 
of immigration which, it was hoped, would accentuate the development of the colony. 
      As for the number of persons holding land and complying with their obligations of 
developing their land, Sir Percy added that there were over 3 million acres of land which 
had been alienated in 460 names, placing the average holding at 7000 acres; but Sir Percy 
opined that it was near impossible to calculate accurately, in view of the nature of grants 
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of land he had described in the preceding paragraphs.824 But he was optimistic that 7000 
acres were more than enough for a grant, when he stated, “Originally speaking, a farm of 
3,000 to 5,000 acres is sufficient for any single individuals who are running an estate as 
partners.”825 Therefore, Sir Percy urged Harcourt; in his February dispatch, that in his 
own opinion that should be stopped.826 He specifically pointed a case where he granted 
larger areas of land to a group of individuals who were running an estate as partners. 
However, Sir Percy suggested, “in the district 2,000 to 4,000 acres would suffice for a 
plantation destined for the production of tropical products, and a similar grant of 3,000 to 
5,000 acres would appear to be sufficient for a crown grant in the highlands.”827  
   Certainly, Sir Percy’s proposition about the acreage suitable for individual and /or 
syndicate were quite sufficient, but Sir Percy failed to ensure that such acreage was 
accepted by the CO and committed in legislation. It was only in February 1912 that he 
recommended such acreages as suitable holdings for different categories of farmers, but 
then it was too late for him to secure the CO consent on his recommendations, since he 
soon resigned. Again, despite his recommendations on size of acreage, he allowed the 
Sintu Avenue Syndicate to acquire ten township plots, which were supposed to have 
been, presumably, disposed of by means of auction.828 These reform recommendations 
should have been made to the CO in 1909, when Sir Percy assumed government, but he 
had not presented the problem of land regulations to the CO for consideration. His 
decision to drop the regulations were also against the advise of Wright who insisted that 
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the regulations should be retained so as to sanitize the condition of grants, but Sir Percy 
refused to budge. 
           
  Returns of Grants of Lands  
      A summary of grants being made and the number of applications for grants were 
necessary for Harcourt’s understanding of Sir Percy’s administration of land. Return of 
grants, as provided by Wright, detailed applications and grants being made and pending 
applications for grants. This came about following Harcourt’s confidential dispatch of 28 
October 1911, demanding clarification, on the general conditions of grants, and sanction 
to stop dispensing land under certain conditions.829 But before he could stop Sir Percy, 
Harcourt was in receipt of additional information about his request for the number of 
people holding land in the protectorate, through returns of grants. Sir Percy replied to 
Harcourt on the question of the number of persons holding grants, in his dispatch of 14 
February 1912 with enclosure of returns of land grants by Wright, dated 14 February 
1912.830 The latter dispatch, disclosed how deplorable the protectorate’s land grant and 
that not much had been made by Sir Percy’s administration to rectify the prevailing land 
speculation. Other than his failure to solve the pressing problem of speculation and 
dummying, he failed to open up land for prospective European settlers, thus inhibiting the 
immigration of new famers interested in taking up land. Harcourt specifically requested 
clarification on the general conditions of grants, including the number of applications for 
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grants and a summary of grants made, in October 1911, and he was prepared to order the 
governor to stop dispensing land under certain conditions.831   
    In Wright’s returns, he advised Sir Percy against dropping the land tax and applying 
fixed rental conditions, as they would worsen the condition of land grants in the colony. 
Wright, in his returns of grants of land for 1 July to 31 December 1911, indicated in both 
his covering dispatch, and the returns of grants of land that at the time of dropping the 
land tax, there were 202 standing applications for 381 farms, which would have to be 
granted under fixed rentals, in view of dropping the land tax regulation, as a condition of 
grants of land.832 However, Wright told him, in his covering dispatch, that the dropping 
of the land tax provision would cause the 202 farms to revert to fixed rents, and advised 
Sir Percy against dropping the regulations. Sir Percy refused to heed the advice and 
insisted to Harcourt that the regulations should be dropped. The effect of his action in 
dropping land tax brought 300 farms in Uasin Gishu, West Kenya, Sotik, Kinangop, 
Gilgil, and the first part of Londiani grants under fixed rents.833   
     In the latter areas, farms had been granted but were not registered by the time of Sir 
Percy’s arrival in the country. At best, if the land tax and revision of rents had been 
allowed as conditions of grants, what Sir Percy should have done under the land 
regulations of penalties for violators, was to register those farms, and enforce land tax 
and revision of rents on those grants. In the alternative, he could revoke the licenses and 
forfeit to the government those farms. But neither of the two penalties was enforced, and, 
instead, he reported to Harcourt his observation as to such extraordinary grants being 
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made before his assumption of government, in his confidential dispatch of 14 February 
1912 and further additional information in another confidential dispatch of 21 February 
1912, all detailing applications for land and grants administration.834  
      In Wright’s enclosed covering dispatch for the return of grants of land of 1 July to 31 
December 1911, was a table showing three-year grants of land; 1909, 1910, and 1911.835 
Wright reported that as at 31 June 1911, there were 387 applications pending for grants in 
a July-December 1911 grants period. Also, Wright reported that there were 184 new 
applications registered as at 31 June 1911, making a total of 571 applications for grants in 
the July-December 1911 grants.836 Wright also stated that in the July-December 1911 
grants, there were 214 registered completed deeds compared with 158 registered deeds in 
the January-June 1911 period. However, out of these applications, there were 24 
applications cancelled or withdrawn. With such cancellations, the remaining total number 
of applications stood at 328, against the earlier applications of 387 that were supposed to 
have been allotted, in the January-June 1911 grants.837 Therefore, Wright categorized all 
the applications that were at various stages of allotment under different headings, with the 
applicable number of applications pending action in that category. For example, there 
were “pending return or draft deeds”(9), “pending engrossment”(10), pending return of 
counter part deeds or money”(32), “pending registration”(89) or a total of 140 out of the 
328, which were at a final stages of completion, thus leaving 138 applications for further 
consideration, and leaving 20, considered normal and satisfactory under other head.838  
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       However, a majority of applications pending return had been included in the January-
June 1911 returns, when Campbell was acting for Wright, and a large number of the 
applications, especially those on the coast, where “complications in respect of native 
claims and titles defeat immediate settlement, are likely to keep this item high for some 
time.”839 However, Wright pointed out that the cause of the large number of pending 
applications, as stated by Mr. Campbell, was the question of the removal of the Maasai. 
Wright pointed out that the cause of the large number of pending applications was 
beyond the control of the land office, as it had to do with the removal of the Maasai, and 
the allocation of their land to applicants.  Also, Wright stated that it was necessary to give 
a detailed account of the grants which, without “this explanation, might reasonably be the 
subject, if not of criticism, of question with regard to “pending survey.”840 Despite the 
detail provided by Wright, the performance of the colony in opening up land to 
prospective immigrant was not commensurate with demands.  
     In fact, Wright appeared to have been surprised that the number of grants under the 
latter head was not larger than expected, as conditions of survey had improved, as 
licensed surveyors had moved into the country, and assisted the Department of Lands.  
Thus improvement in the survey of land would continue to ease the problem of pending 
applications under this head. But in spite of the improved condition of survey, Sir Percy 
had not been able to open up land for survey with a view to allot farms to prospective 
immigrants. Lack of opening up farms had hampered immigration and agricultural 
development as farmers were waiting to get farms but no land was open for the surveyors 
despite their presence in the country.    





    Sir Percy’s reluctance to open up land for prospective immigration had not been 
without its influence in mitigating the flow of immigration into the colony. It frustrated 
European settlers desire to move into the country as farms were not easy to secure. This 
development could not have been said to be in the best interest of development or 
administration, if the desired development program were to be judged successful or if Sir 
Percy was to be judged as a successful administrator who could be said to have 
accentuated the successful administration and development of the country.  
 Irregularity in Grants of Lands 
       From the preceding returns of grants, moreover, Harcourt also discovered some 
irregular land dealings that caused him to address a confidential dispatch to Sir Percy, 
demanding further clarification. Harcourt addressed the confidential dispatch on 8 April 
1912 to Sir Percy stating that he discovered that the Sintu Avenue Syndicate was granted 
leases of 10 township plots at rupees 15 per annum for each plot. Harcourt also told Sir 
Percy: “I presumed that the plots were sold in auction in the usual manner, and, if so, I 
shall be glad to be informed of the sum paid in each case for the right to lease.”841 
Harcourt added, “in the case of township plots the auction price at which the right to 
lease was sold should have been included in the returns as well as the rental payable in 
respect of the plot.”842 Harcourt added that this was necessary in order that “Returns may 
furnish a complete record of the consideration received by government for all crown 
lands alienated.”843    
      Harcourt also advised Sir Percy to impose a limit on large blocks in townships, 
presumably for speculation purposes. Harcourt also asked Sir Percy to send him his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





observations as to the best means of addressing the concerns he raised. Harcourt also 
observed that in the Naivasha Province, Messrs. Newland and McCall had been granted 
1000 acres of agricultural land freehold. In this instance, however, Harcourt reminded Sir 
Percy that the right to purchase freeholds was one of the conditions stated in the original 
leases, and, in such a situation, it should have been stated in the returns of land that the 
“freehold was granted under the terms of the original lease.”844 In spite of efforts to affect 
safeguards in land dealings, this was an example of Sir Percy’s failure to furnish full 
information of dispensing land to the CO.     
      In this regard, Harcourt was concerned that land dealings in the protectorate were 
being carried out in an unusual manner. Harcourt observed that there were irregularities 
in documenting land dealings, which was a cause of concern, as Sir Percy failed to fully 
furnish the CO with details of the procedure being followed in dispensing lands. More 
importantly, Harcourt learnt from the returns of grants that laid down regulations were 
being compromised in dispensing crown lands. The latter case was not the only case 
where evidence of irregular grants arising from his administration of grants of land could 
be established.  
     There were many of them, and one of such grants not only exposed irregular land 
dealings, but also exposed Sir Percy’s disposition toward allowing the settlers to grab 
land at the expense of the government. This could be seen from W. G. Sewell’s land 
transaction, which Sir Percy reported to Harcourt in a confidential dispatch of 22 
February 1912, with an enclosure of Sewall’s land transactions. He stated he needed 
Harcourt’s guidance as to the best way to handle Sewall’s land transactions.845  
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     In Sir Percy’s submission on Sewall’s application, he told Harcourt that Sewall was 
allowed to acquire 1,7773 acres. Sewall had also asked to be allowed to acquire by 
transfer a farm of 640 acres at Mazeras, and Sir Percy concluded “I should be glad to 
know whether the fact that his other holdings are all in the highlands would be considered 
to justify a small additional grant at the coast.”846 Therefore, Sir Percy told Harcourt that 
he needed the CO’s advice on how to document Sewall’s land transactions.847  
   The CO wondered as to why Sir Percy should send such a transaction for their advice. 
However, Batterbee minuted that Sir Percy should be referred to the laid down 
regulations for his compliance on the said subject rather than refer to Harcourt for 
guidance.848  Read, Butler, and Fiddes concurred with Batterbee’s comments. But nothing 
was heard until the protectorate’s acting governor, C. C. Bowring’s, confidential dispatch 
of 4 March 1912 raised the case once more. In his dispatch was an enclosure of Sewall’s 
letter, addressed to Sir Percy and dated 27 February 1912. Bowring told Harcourt that 
Sewall requested that his proposal should be favorably considered. Bowring reiterated 
that what Sewall stated in the letter appeared to be correct, except if he parted with his 
Kinangop farm, and with the acquisition which Sewall wished to make, he would still 
have an area of 17,134 acres, even if he parted with the Kinangop farm, and his 
possessions would not violate government regulations. 849  In support of Sewall’s 
application, Bowring praised Sewall as having the largest wheat farm.850 However, 
Bowring added that of great importance was the undisputable fact that Sewall had 
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effected considerable development of his land.851  Sewall stated in his letter to Sir Percy 
of 27 February 1912, enclosed in Bowring’s dispatch to Harcourt of 4 March 1912, that 
he was granted a single grant of 4,466 acres from crown lands and that he bought the 
remainder of his land.852 As to his 4,466-acre farm, Sewall stated that he had fulfilled all 
conditions on the above farm at Kinangop and had concluded arrangements to sell his 
farm to a sheep farming syndicate, when permitted by law, on 2 August 1912. Sewall also 
told Bowring that he had a larger area of 1,500 acres under cultivation on his farm at 
Njoro than anyone’s farm in the protectorate. As to his Kinangop farm, Sewall stated that 
it was of utmost value to him as the grass on his Njoro farm had little or no nourishment 
in it, and he must have a place to rest his 600 head of oxen; which number he required to 
work his farm. The farm, he added, was near his Njoro farm. However, Sewell told Sir 
Percy that if he could not be permitted to buy the farm he would have no option other 
than renting grazing which would be an unnecessary hardship on him. As to the 
homestead at Mazeras that he wished to transfer to his name, he had done all the 
development on the farm of one and two years rubber trees and having 500 acres ready to 
plant which he would plant that year. Sewell allayed apprehension of the authorities when 
he told Bowring that, if the transfer were allowed he would have 15,000 acres, which was 
still less than the limit allowed, as the farm at Kinangop was 4,468 acres.853 Therefore, 
Sewell added that he had done a lot more work than anyone on his wheat farm, and that 
his purchase of additional acres would not exceed the limits allowed by the 
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government. 854  Batterbee, in his minute, expressed his reservations as to these 
transactions, when he said that he would allow Sewall to acquire the 3,281 acres.  
    But it was understandable from this case that Sewall wanted more land not because he 
never had enough for his needs, but because he desired to make a profit out of these land 
purchases. One of his farms was disposed of to a sheep faming syndicate, but he stated 
that he would certainly not want to encourage speculation. 855  However, Batterbee 
recommended that while he would not have objection to Sewall acquiring the 640 acres at 
Mazeras as recommended by Sir Percy, but he objected to the other in view of the fact 
that the rest were in the highlands.856 Read stated in his minute, “I think that we might let 
him have the 640 acres on the coast… but I would not do more than this.”857 Anderson 
doubted the entire transactions, when he minuted, “Is there any truth in his statement as 
to the grazing on his Njoro farm? and is he stock farming?”858 In response, the East 
Africa Department of the CO minuted, “East Africa dept. has no infn. on these points. 
Mr. Stordy, Chief Vet. Officer is on leave and might know.”859  
      Therefore a decision on Sewall’s land transactions was deferred and a request for 
more information on Sewall’s transaction was sought from the protectorate’s Chief 
Veterinary Officer, R. J. Stordy. In a reply to the enquiry, Stordy’s letter, dated 9 April 
1912 addressed to Batterbee, was received in the CO. Stordy told Batterbee, “Yes, I know 
Sewall quite well. He is a wheat farmer; at least he is an active member of the Wheat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
854 Ibid.  
855 Minute by Batterbee to Read, 28 March 1912, on Ibid. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Minute by Read to Fiddes, 29 March 1912, on Ibid. 
858 Minute by Anderson, 30 March 1912, on Ibid. 
859 Minute by East Africa Department to Anderson, 1 April 1912, in Bowring to Harcourt, confidential, 4 March 1912, 
enclosure, Sewall to Sir Percy, private, 27 February 1912, all in CO 533/103. 
255	  
	  
Growers Association.”860  As for Sewall’s pending application, Stordy added, “His 
request seems to me unreasonable. If Sewall is prepared to sell such portion of his present 
holding as makes it worth the while of a sheep farming Syndicate to purchase, then surely 
he is parting with more of his farm than would prove sufficient for the resting of his work 
oxen, for no Syndicate would propose to purchase a paltry 3,000 acres on which to run 
sheep.”861 In addition, Stordy wrote that Sewell did not need 600 oxen to work his 
holding. Stordy disagreed with Sewell’s application despite Sir Percy and Bowring’s 
recommendations that the application be granted. Stordy supported his objections to 
Sewell’s application when he observed that: 
There must be many hundreds of oxen working the extensive farms in the Njoro 
district; but I cannot remember having heard the grazing completely condemned, 
nor can I believe that on a 13,000 acre Njoro holding no nourishing grazing can be 
found. It is astounding the number of far-fetched arguments that are raised over and 
over again by the East Africa land grabbers. Personally, I have always been 
opposed to extensive holdings, and as the area suitable for white colonization is, 
comparatively speaking, a small one, and as we are always being told by experts 
and the settlers themselves of the marvelous fertility of the soil and the carrying 
power of the pasture–lands, then I say extensive holdings, while very desirable from 
the capitalist’s point of view, are not essential for the furtherance of the 
Protectorate, but are detrimental to its best interests.862     
    
     Thereafter, Batterbee recalled the previous correspondence on Sewell’s land 
transaction. He stated, “in view of what Mr. Stordy says, I do not think that he had 
attached much importance to Sewall’s statement as to grazing.863 Anderson, Butler, Read, 
Fiddes expressed their concurrence with Batterbee’s minute.864 Harcourt, in his minute, 
made a reference to a minute by Read, and stated, “as proposed as Mr. Read’s minute of 
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March 29 at once.”865 Harcourt’s minute was an instruction that Read’s minute of 29 
March 1912 in respect of this subject should form the reply to both Sir Percy and 
Bowring’s confidential dispatches, with an enclosure of Sewall’s letter to Bowring. Read, 
in his minute of 29 March 1910, as shown above, refused the application for a grant of 
3,281 acres as it was in the highlands, but recommended that Sewall should be allowed to 
acquire the 640 acres he applied for at Mazeras, on the coast. 
     Thereafter, Harcourt replied to Sir Percy, in a confidential dispatch of 17 April 1912, 
“in view of the extent of Mr. W. G. Sewall’s present holdings of land, l am unable to 
approve of his being permitted to purchase two additional areas of 328 acres.”866  
Harcourt also pointed out that “having regard, however to the fact that his Sewall’s [sic] 
other holdings are in the highlands, I will raise no objection to his being allowed to 
acquire a farm of 640 acres at Mazeras.”867  The CO was able to get to the bottom of such 
an extraordinary transaction and confirmed not only their doubts as to transparency, 
worthiness or otherwise of the transaction, but also their cautious reservations and doubts 
as to Sir Percy’s knowledge of the protectorate to inform the proposed policy reforms he 
had wanted to carry through. 
     The question of transparency in Sir Percy’s dealing with the CO had been disclosed, 
but such action of the CO of passing behind Sir Percy to seek information from his 
subordinates had been the dynamics of the CO when, on his assumption of the 
administration of the protectorate, Sir Percy warned the CO that, if they sought 
information from his subordinates on any issue under consideration, he would resign. He 
made reference to his predecessor’s predicament in a similar situation when the CO by 
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passed him to seek information from his subordinates. In fact Sir Percy was right in his 
criticism of the CO as it not only embarrassed Sadler and subsequently led to his transfer 
to the Windward Islands. Also, there was a similar case involving the former 
commissioner of the protectorate, Sir Charles Eliot, over the grant of land to a syndicate, 
which the then Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, Lord Lansdowne, claimed that 
the grant interfered with the Maasai nominal grazing reserve, an issue which led to his 
premature resignation, in 1904. His apprehension was allayed by Fiddes who asked him 
to treat the staff with respect taking into consideration their pioneering administrative role 
in the early days of the protectorate, and if he did as Fiddes advised such action would 
never have happened.  
     Fiddes’s counsel notwithstanding, the CO, with the knowledge of Fiddes, went out of 
the way to seek information from his subordinate staff, Stordy. The CO’s suspicion of Sir 
Percy’s sinister action in dispensing land had been brought to the open when they got to 
the bottom of such extraordinary practice. They sought and obtained information behind 
his back that Sewall’s grant did not comply with the regulations and therefore denied the 
application. The CO found that the allocation to Sewall, which Sir Percy supported, 
would be used for speculation. Therefore, the application and their enquiry disclosed how 
Sir Percy disregarded the land regulations in dispensing crown land which does not in 
any way suggest that he had dispensed the land in a manner consistent with the 
regulations. His failing in this aspect was very clear and it could not be considered to 
have been an excellent job to be expected from an outstanding administration, as the 
grant would have compromised the land regulations.  
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    This correspondence indicated that Sir Percy, instead of treating the Sewell case as laid 
down in the land regulations under the 1902 ordinance, or the 1909 proposed land bill 
amendment, or at least to enforce upon Sewell the auction regulations, declined to do so. 
Sir Percy was fully aware that Sewall’s land transactions became complicated for him to 
resolve in view of Sewall’s purchase of large acreage, which might be used for 
speculation.868 Sir Percy referred the transaction to Harcourt so as to exonerate himself 
from blame, having known that the transaction was extra-ordinary in spite of the fact that 
it did not violate government regulations but it suggested that the grant might be used for 
speculations.  
     Instead of Sir Percy refusing Sewell’s applications, he supported it and forwarded to 
Harcourt for consideration. From Sewell’s holdings, it was clear that Sir Percy was 
unwilling to stop settlers from land speculation, a violation that   made it difficult for 
prospective farmers to secure farms. If Sir Percy could support an application with a 
potential for speculation, it would be difficult for any suitable land regulation to be 
applied in the colony, and that would not in any way be considered to have been in the 
very best interest of the colony and neither does it constitute an effective and successful 
administration of crown land. Such irregularity does not portray Sir Percy in the very best 
category of administrators, if considered from his initial recommendations on the 
evolution of a land policy for the colony. At the time of presenting this recommendation 
in February 1912, Sir Percy had less than three months to resign. Therefore, his 
recommendations were too late and of no effect.  Even if his proposal was approved, he 
could not have effectively implemented the regulations, as they were not of significant 
difference from the existing regulations that he refrained to apply. Again, the 
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ineffectiveness of lack of enforcement of the existing legislation was partly responsible 
for the prevalence of speculation and dummies, and still Sir Percy would have been 
indifferent to the administration of the legislation. Therefore, the condition of land 
administration would have been the same, his recommendations notwithstanding. In the 
highlands, Sir Percy suggested that it would be good for individual farming rather than 
farming by a big syndicate. Therefore, he recommended personal occupation, a land 
board to screen applicants for grants of land, no second grant from the crown land to a 
person already holding a crown grant, discontinuing grants by means of power of 
attorney and for persons who have never visited the country.869 However, Sir Percy 
pointed out in his dispatch that the whole system was thoroughly bad and it should be 
discontinued, and that it was the conditions of grants that produced land speculation and 
dummying.  
     On receipt of Sir Percy’s dispatch in the CO, Batterbee, in his minute, expressed his 
concurrence with Sir Percy’s proposal when he noted that Sir Percy had made a strong 
case that all applications should be made by personal presence and personal occupation 
upon grants of land, and by insisting on such conditions, only bona fide farmers could 
access to farm land. Batterbee pointed out that the governor, by the applications of these 
measures, if approved, would prevent land accumulation.870  
     However, Batterbee observed that the governor was concerned with the deplorable 
state of affairs in land dealings, and wanted to put a stop to it, by affecting regulatory 
measure to prevent dummying and grants of land by means of power of attorney, which 
could only be “prevented by stringent measures if a farmer of the governors proposal” 
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was to have access to land.871 Batterbee stated that he saw no reason why it should not be 
true that such measures should be applied for the benefit of the farmer.872 However, 
Batterbee also stated that the “Secretary of State certainly has no desire to stand in the 
way of anything, which would prevent the accumulation of land in the hands of 
individuals.”873 
    With regard to Sir Percy’s proposal that no second grants of crown land should be 
made to the same person, Batterbee observed that there was an objection on the question 
of the number of acres to be allotted as crown grants were 2,500 acres and extended to 
5,000 acres. But Sir Percy should be asked how he proposed to do that in view of the 
differences between his recommendations and the existing limits on grants of crown land.  
In this case both latter two options were viewed as complicating with each other, 
therefore, a means must be sought for a proper land dispensation. 
    On the question of regulating land allotment by an advisory board, Batterbee 
recommended that the responsibility should be given to the Land Board. But Batterbee 
observed that the Land Board might be not be effective as it would only recommend, but 
not decide. 874  However, Batterbee was in full concurrence with Sir Percy’s 
recommendations when, in concluding his minute, he pointed out flaws in the existing 
method of dispensing crown land that “the present method of allotment has nothing to 
recommend it, and the sooner it is abolished the better.”875  It suggests the need for a 
procedure to recommend prospective applicants for a grant of land, as there was no such 
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procedure in place. The procedure would minimize the fraudulent application from grant 
of land. 
     As to Read, he expressed his general agreement with Sir Percy’s recommendations 
and Batterbee’s minute when he recalled his visit to the protectorate and commented that 
the protectorate’s Director of Agriculture who had an “extensive knowledge of the 
country and the settlers and who had several years previous experience of colonial 
service in S. Africa, urged upon me when I was in the protectorate the necessity for an 
advisory board, which could bring candidate before it and see whether they were likely to 
make good settlers, could examine into their financial position (at present money is 
sometimes lent for a day or two to enable an applicant to show that he has the means of 
developing his property and as soon as he has got his grant, is lent to someone else for a 
similar purpose).”876  This suggested that the land board if adopted as a means of land 
grant would not solve the problem of land speculation and dummying in the colony.  
      However, as to the proposed regulations, Read expressed his full concurrence as to 
the 99 years leases and the reservation of the right to impose a land tax, whether 
progressive on all land leased by the crown or only on undeveloped lands, would regulate 
land dealings in the protectorate. Read was optimistic that they could find a solution to 
the land question that would not only be acceptable to the settlers, but would also 
safeguard the government interest.877   
     But Anderson disagreed with Sir Percy’s recommendation, and the minutes of 
Batterbee and Read on the desirability of the land board as a means of screening 
applicants for grants of land. He minuted, “I must say that the idea of a land board to pass 
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settlers does not commend itself to me. They would of course only allot to their friends, 
and after all what is the advantage of controlling the original allotment unless we insist 
also on complete control of transfers, and so render land unmarketable unless the transfer 
or transferee are in the good graces of the board.”878  
     Anderson also challenged the local authorities for failing to observe conditions on 
land grants as well as to effect inspection to ensure compliance with the laid down 
conditions. Anderson opined that there was the need to affect a systematic procedure for 
inspecting farms; so as to ensure that laid down conditions in the land regulations were 
being carried out. Also, Anderson added that the land board would be a tool for grabbing 
the crown land by a few individuals when he stated, “these patent advices of Ld. 
Delamere & Co. for keeping East Africa select, and the management of the Crown 
Estates in their own hands, will only lead to further & worse trouble. I do not see why the 
merchant or the small shopkeeper should not be allowed to add farming to his business, if 
he is so disposed.”879 In fact Anderson was concerned that Lord Delamere would have 
access to more than what was reasonably acceptable by the government, if there was no 
effective legislation to regulate the conduct of land dealing. But from all indications, Sir 
Percy was an unwilling partner in coming up with the required safeguards, as he has been 
reluctant in allowing effective legislation to be applied in land dealings.  
      Therefore, his attitude would have paved the way for Lord Delamere and others to 
acquire what was reasonably unacceptable acreage to the detriment of government 
policy.880 This action could in no way be attributed to a good administrator under 
whatever circumstance. Anderson pointed out that the cause of the whole trouble was that 
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they were giving something for nothing and stated, “the individual who gets it, very often 
only wants it to sell & reap the advantage of his luck in getting an allotment.”881 
    In his analysis, Anderson was very critical of Sir Percy when he pointed out that if Sir 
Percy could auction some farms, why couldn’t he use the auction method universally, 
and, “couple it with stringent conditions of personal occupation, and more stringent 
development conditions, which should be enforced strictly by forfeiture for non-
compliance, without compensation.”882 Anderson also stated that as government would 
have all farms surveyed before allotment was made, there would be no difficulties in 
carrying out “periodical auctions as surveys are completed, and the terms of occupation 
should be made clearly known and strictly enforced.”883  
      In concluding his minute, Anderson condemned the proposed idea of a land board 
whose “proceedings would be a target for Members of the Parliament, especially Mr. 
Ramsay MacDonald or Mr. MacCallum Scott,” and contended that, if his 
recommendations were accepted, “there will be less of this evil.”884 Lord Emmott885 
disagreed with Anderson, and expressed his general concurrence with Sir Percy’s 
recommendations, when he said, “Sir J. Anderson’s minute presupposed that the Land 
Board is an unsuitable body for making recommendations as to applicants for farms. The 
composition of this board was (and so far as I know is) four officials and three unofficial 
representing different districts. I see no reason on the face of it why such a Board should 
indulge in log-rolling.”886 Therefore, Emmott expressed his willingness to defer to Sir 
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Percy’s proposal, when he stated, “On the whole I shd. be inclined to adopt the Govrs 
proposal & give them a fair trial.”887   
       However, Emmott added that he favoured the Land Board, as “even if we run the risk 
of occasional unsuitable man being selected by a Land Board we shall also (provided the 
board is properly manned and does its duty) obtain a far better choice on the whole. On 
the other hand, I agree that we ought to keep a tight hand on transfers. This is more easily 
done under a more elastic system than under a plan of universal auction.”888 After 
discussion between Anderson and Harcourt the latter asked Anderson to arrange the 
modalities of how Harcourt’s decision could be implemented.  Anderson, in his minute to 
Fiddes, stated that as for the East African lands, S of S has decided for the present to drop 
the idea of taxing land already alienated and to confine further discussion to the question 
of the terms and conditions upon which lands still in hand should be leased. “Will you 
say who will be selected to go into this matter with Sir P. Girouard?”889 Fiddes stated, 
“we can’t do better than leave it to those who have discussed it hitherto i. e. Mr. Read, 
Mr. Risley, with the assistance of Mr. Butler and Mr. Batterbee.”890  
     Therefore, Harcourt, while agreeing to defer to the Governor’s proposal, also 
expressed his willingness to allow the committee members to revisit the question, taking 
into consideration Sir Percy’s recommendations. Initially, the committee decided to settle 
the land tax question before they engaged in further deliberation of the recommendations, 
when they sought and obtained recommendations from the protectorate’s Land Ranger, 
Arthur C. Tannahill, who was on leave in London at the time. However, there was hope 
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that a land bill for the administration of land policy could have been realized as the bill 
had been revised.  
     But before action could be taken on the report, Sir Percy arrived London, in March 
1912, for his leave, and had the opportunity of discussing with Harcourt the question of 
dropping the land tax provision from the revised bill.891 Sir Percy told Harcourt, in a 
confidential dispatch of 4 March 1912, to drop the land tax provision from the bill.892  
Harcourt consented to the request and asked the committee to reconsider the matter with 
some modification of the principles of land tax.893 With the dropping of the land tax 
regulation and the addition to Sir Percy’s refusal to enforce the revision of rents 
regulation on all grants, grants of land was marred with irregularities, which 
characterized Sir Percy’s administration of land policy. It was true that before his arrival 
to the protectorate, there were irregularities in grants of land, but during his tour of duty, 
it reached a new level never seen before.    
        It was this situation that the CO were avoiding by insisting on applying Elgin’s 
regulations, but as Sir Percy refrained from doing so, they had no option other than to 
watch the man on the spot do as he wished. As the revision of rental provision was 
abandoned, all grants of land would be made on freehold or fixed rents, by implication 
Sir Percy forced his way in granting land under fixed rental. Also, he had not been 
applying the revision of rents, which the CO insisted upon, but he refrained to do so. But 
the dispensing of land was attended with irregularity, as the dropping of the land tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891 Sir Percy to Harcourt, confidential, 4 March 1912, CO 533/102; Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in 
Kenya, 127; Bennett, Kenya, 33. 
892 Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, 122. 
893 Harcourt to Belfield, confidential, 8 November 1912, CO 533/102; Minutes by Read to Fiddes, 30 August 1912, 
Fiddes, 3 September 1912, Belfield to Harcourt, confidential, 30 August 1912, CO 533/ 102. 
266	  
	  
opened up land to increased speculation and dummying never seen before, which caused 
Sir Percy to recommend remedial measures to combat the practice. 
        Therefore, Sir Percy recommended certain remedial measures for Harcourt’s 
approval, in his confidential dispatch of 14 February 1912, believing that if they were 
enforced, speculation and dummying would have been minimized. 894  Sir Percy’s 
proposed measures were the establishment of an advisory board to screen applicants for 
grants of land, discontinuation of grants by means of power of attorney, disallowing 
grants to persons who had never visited the country, and requesting authority from 
Harcourt to veto land transfer, as he found expedient.895  But his recommendations came 
late and were overshadowed by the Maasai removal. Sir Percy removed them from their 
Laikipia land without the approval of Harcourt to do so. His action on the Maasai was 
motivated by his desire to grant the land to the settlers, which was further accentuated by 
pressure for more fertile land from the settlers. In view of his role in the latter case, 
Harcourt forced him to resign after a prolonged meeting in the CO, on 8 May 1912. The 
meeting disclosed how Sir Percy disguised information from Harcourt, on the Maasai 
case, and in view of the magnitude of the case before the Commons, Harcourt forced him 
to resign, believing that Sir Percy lied and had made him lie before the Commons. 
Thence, Sir Percy must go.896 The Maasai move was also a land policy question that 
portrayed how Sir Percy removed the Maasai from the reserves and granted their fertile 
land to European farmers without the consent of the CO.897  
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     These actions regarding land could hardly be attributed to a successful administrator 
who must keep the CO informed of all developments in the protectorate and desist from 
any action that would embarrass His Majesty’s Government. The promise of farms to 
farmers and the removal of the Maasai was no less an embarrassment to His Majesty’s 
Government, an action that caused the CO to ease Sir Percy out of office. The incident, 
clearly demonstrated that Sir Percy shirked his responsibility, failed to live up to his 
proposed African policy and to respect the authority of his Majesty’s Government. There 
was no less a failure than this, and nor was there a greater disservice than this, and in no 
way could his performance in this regard be considered outstanding. 
 Conclusion 
       The CO’s main policy objective in the EAP was to make land accessible to the 
European settlers. The CO’s sustained effort at the amendment of the 1902 land 
ordinance was confronted with objections from the settlers and reluctance from the 
governor to enforce Elgin’s proposed land regulations. The settlers viewed the 
regulations as obstacles to their profit in agriculture and land as the regulations could 
limit the profit they could earn by speculation. The governors, especially Sir Percy, 
favored the settlers, and therefore, he shielded them against any land regulation that 
would be detrimental to their economic interest, even if the regulation was for the best 
interest of the government. 
     The administration of land regulations in dispensing crown lands had tasked both the 
CO and the protectorate in an uneasy way. Sir Percy was expected to not only amend the 
April 1909 ordinance, but also to administer Elgin’s regulations in dispensing crown 
lands. Sadler refused to apply Elgin’s regulations in the amendments of the Crown Land 
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Ordinance, 1902, which caused Crewe to defer his accent on the new ordinance of April 
1909. The CO believed that Sir Percy would be the right person to affect the amendments 
of the ordinance, but he not only failed to amend the April 1909 ordinance, but he 
rejected important provisions; revision of rents and surtax, as condition of grants, which 
formed important parts of Elgin’s regulations.  
   Sir Percy’s action in that direction, caused grants of land to be based on fixed rents and 
freehold grants, thereby opening up land to speculators and dummies. Supervision to 
ensure compliance with the few left over conditions of grants had not been affected, and 
that allowed leasees do as they wished with their farms. The dropping of the land tax and 
the refusal to enforce revision of rents had destroyed the CO’s efforts in search of 
safeguards in land dealings finally and had opened up land to increased speculation and 
dummying never seen before. The latter condition of land dealings finally or belatedly 
caused Sir Percy to recommend remedial measures to combat the practice, in 1912.     
       These violations were accentuated by lack of supervision to ensure whether or not 
leasees complied with the terms of their grants, and where violations were discovered, 
penalties were never enforced on violators as provided in the law of penalties on land 
dealings, and that allowed leasees to do as they wished. The cause of his reluctance to 
enforce regulations, which would have regulated the settlers’ conduct in land dealings, 
was mainly informed by his desire to support the settlers in their quest for a better land 
dealings, even if, it were at the expense of the government. But his support of the settlers’ 
interest to the detriment of government interest had cost the government both in policy 
and in earnings. This was characteristic of Sir Percy’s administration that has been 
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illustrated in other chapters of the dissertation. With land, as with the Maasai move, this 
proved a major weakness of Sir Percy’s governorship. 
 
 






















                                                             Chapter 11 
                                   Maasai Move and Land Compensation Issue 
   Introduction 
      The move of those Maasai who had gone there following the 1904 treaty from the 
Laikipia plateau became a huge issue for Sir Percy’s administration in 1910 and 1911. 
The matter of compensation for European farmers who would be impacted by the move 
of the Maasai groups from Laikipia also marked that period. In confronting the 
challenges set by these related matters, Sir Percy failed conspicuously, just as in the 
examples provided in the previous chapter, to deal efficiently and fairly with issues 
involving land. The Maasai move from Laikipia and associated land compensation 
brought out quite clearly Sir Percy’s failure to provide justice and fair play for the people 
he administered. As in other areas of administration, Sir Percy favored the claims and 
interests of European settlers over those of Africans in dealing with those issues. Beyond 
that, however, Sir Percy resorted to cover-ups in an attempt to disguise the true nature of 
his actions and their motivation. Furthermore, in forcing the Maasai on Laikipia to agree 
to leave that region, he broke his word to his superiors at CO and a treaty that had been 
agreed with the Maasai in 1904. These actions were hardly to be expected of a sound 
administrator, and indeed Sir Percy’s handling of the Maasai move and associated land 
compensation proved major reasons for his removal from the governorship of the EAP. 
 First Maasai Move 
     Upon the declaration of the protectorate, in 1895, Hardinge became the first 
administrator, taking instruction from the FO. In Hardinge’s consolidation of British 
authority, he came into contact with the Maasai, whom he and his successors found very 
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useful in their war of occupation. Since the local colonial authorities contact with the 
Maasai, in 1895, relationship between the two had been friendly. The Maasai had at 
certain critical period took refuge at the British fort when they were confronted with 
internecine conflict that threatened to exterminate them.898 On the part of the local 
colonial authorities, they considered the Maasai as interpreters and competent guides. 
The British local colonial authorities opined that among all the peoples on the railway 
line to Uganda, it was only the Maasai who could leave “material and supplies 
untouched.”899 When the Maasai were told that they would be removed for Laikipia, they 
did not resist moving, probably because they were friendly with the colonial authorities. 
In fact there were occasions when the British local authorities used the Maasai as 
mercenaries in suppressing opposition to their authority. The Maasai elder, Ole Gilisho, 
led some of these warriors and suppressed rebellion against the colonial authority. 
Despite friendly relationship between the two, the colonial authorities were unaware that 
the Maasai had no one leader. The colonial authorities appointed a leader by elevating the 
Maasai prophet, Olonana, as the Maasai exalted ruler. In addition, he and Ole Gilisho 
were made officials of government and paid salaries.900 On the transfer of Hadinge, 
another career diplomat, Sir Charles Eliot, replaced him.901  
     Eliot assumed government of the protectorate with a title of Commissioner of the 
protectorate. Following his arrival to the protectorate, he contemplated the removal of the 
Maasai from their original settlement in the Rift Valley to a different place. On Eliot’s 
resignation, his successor, Stewart declared that the Maasai must be removed to Laikipia. 
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This was the first of two moves associated with the Maasai in the history of the EAP. The 
first move was from the Rift Valley to Laikipia, in 1904. This was the first Maasai move, 
in which, Sir Donald Stewart entered into agreement with the Maasai elders, that some of 
the Maasai would vacate their original settlement in the Rift Valley for Laikipia. On the 
other hand, the settlers would inhabit the Rift Valley along the railway line. The Maasai 
moved to Laikipia in 1905 but some of the Maasai settled to the south of Laikipia or in 
the southern Maasai reserve. 
        Stewart was succeeded by Sir James Hayes Sadler who did not engage himself with 
the Maasai question, and upon his transfer and before Sir Percy could assume 
government, the public works department of the protectorate, contemplated removing the 
Maasai from Laikipia to the extended southern Maasai reserve. The head of public works 
department, McGregor Ross, instructed two of its staffers to report on the desirability or 
otherwise of the Maasai habitation of the extended southern Maasai reserve.902 The two-
man committee reported that the southern Maasai reserve was suitable to pastoral 
nomadic community rather than an agricultural community.903 The report formed the 
basis on which the local authorities sought to remove the Maasai for the second time. The 
latter effort by the public works department was a hint not to be disregarded on the 
proposed second Maasai move, prior to Sir Percy’s assumption of government. In 
September 1909, Sir Percy assumed the government of the protectorate, and in his 
Interim Report, further reinforced the desirability of preserving African reserves, as noted 
earlier.904 
 The Land Compensation 
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      The proposed Maasai move and grant of Laikipia to the European farmers on the of 
the Maasai move, did not work out as the protectorate’s authorities had envisaged. The 
government proposed exchange was a futile enterprise. In the proposed land 
compensations in Laikipia for the European farmers leaving the Guaso Nyiro region, the 
European farmers would be removed from Guaso Nyiro to a fertile Laikipia. While the 
Maasai who had been leaving in Laikipia would be removed to the extended southern 
Maasai reserve. There was compensation for the removal of the farmers but there was no 
compensation for the removal of the Maasai. Even then, the compensation for the 
removal of the farmers caused discontentment among the farmers and presented the 
administration in a very unenviable position among the settlers. It also caused some of 
the settlers to leave the protectorate out of frustration, compensation being paid to them 
for the depreciation of their stock notwithstanding.  
       The farmers contended that the proposed compensation was not enough for them to 
relinquish their farms, and additional compensation of fifty percent of the size of each 
farmer’s farm was added to them. The farmers agreed with compensations for their 
farms, but they demanded monetary, in addition to land, compensation being made over 
to them. The government acquiesced, but on the commencement of the move, the move 
collapsed. When the move collapsed, the farmers sought shelter in a nearby European 
settlers farms, pending government decision.  
      The government decision was not forthcoming. Some of the farmers returned to 
Guaso Nyiro, some of them refused to take the offer of compensation made to them, 
while a few of the settlers moved back to South Africa out of frustration. The failed 
removal of the Guaso Nyiro settlers discouraged prospective immigrants into the 
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protectorate and presented the unfair dealings of Sir Percy’s administration in granting 
compensations to the white farmers while refusing to consider the Maasai for the same 
compensation. The fail moves of the farmers were no less important in undermining the 
administration desire to encouraged immigration into the protectorate and could not be 
considered an effective administration, having jeopardized lives of the races of the 
protectorates by removing them at the time of a poor season, and also discouraging 
prospective immigration into the protectorate, at the time, when immigrants into the 
colony were being sought. 
      As described earlier, there was an attempt to move the Maasai out of Laikipia prior to 
Sir Percy’s assumption of government. The Land Officer of the protectorate, R. B. 
Wright’s, circular of 3 June 1909 told the European farmers in the Guaso Nyiro region 
and those living on the edge of Sotik country that the government wanted their farms for 
the Laikipia Maasai.905 Wright asked the farmers whether they would be willing to 
relinquish their farms for the Maasai, and to receive compensation equal to their Guaso 
Nyiro farms on Laikipia, and half as much in another area open for allotment, especially 
Uasin Gishu and Sotik.906  
    Wright asked the farmers that if government was successful in the removal of the 
Maasai, whether they would agree to relinquish their farms on the said terms of 
compensation.907 Wright asked further that if they would not accept the said terms, on 
what terms of compensation would they be willing to relinquish their Guaso Nyiro farms 
to take up other farms on Laikipia.908 Even though the said letter was non-committal, but 
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it was a hint, not to be disregarded, on the intent of the government to remove the Maasai 
from Laikipia.  
      The first hint suggesting that Sir Percy could not stand up to his proposed safeguards 
of African reserves was allowing Wright to continue with his process of compensation, 
which he initiated at least four months before Sir Percy assumed the government of the 
protectorate. Upon Sir Percy’s assumption of government, he allowed Wright to issue 
other letters in 1910, which clearly suggested that Sir Percy was not only aware of the 
planned removal of the Maasai prior to his arrival into the country, but he supported it 
and subsequently took over the initiatives to remove the Maasai. Prior to Sir Percy 
consenting to Wright to continue the issuance of letters to the Guaso Nyiro European 
farmers, one of the late claimants of Laikipia, Delamere, having accepted compensation 
for his Laikipia farm in another district of his choice, also turned to Wright and pressured 
him to reconsider his Laikipia claims.909  
     Thereafter, Wright intimated to Montgomery of Delamere’s renewed Laikipia claims. 
The basis of Delamere’s Laikipia claims was that, prior to the 1904 Maasai agreement, 
there were farms allotted to 26 European farmers in Laikipia, and when it was agreed that 
the Maasai would be relocated to Laikipia from their original settlement in the Rift 
Valley, those farmers were compensated in another district.910 Among those farmers were 
Delamere and Galbraith Cole who declined to take the offers of compensation being 
made to them by the government. Instead, they selected farms in a different district, and 
asked the government to approve of their choice as their compensations for their Laikipia 
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farms.911 The government approved of their choices; therefore, Laikipia became opened 
for the Maasai to move in. But despite compensations made to Delamere and Cole, the 
duo never acquiesced to the settlements of their Laikipia claims, when they applied to 
Wright, to reconsider their Laikipia claims in late 1908.912 Delamere demanded that his 
Laikipia claims stand and should be reconsidered.913 Wright, in a memorandum of 15 
April 1910, told the Commissioner of Lands, Colonel J. A. L. Montgomery, of 
Delamere’s renewed Laikipia claims. 914  Montgomery, in a minute on Wright’s 
memorandum, recognized Delamere and Cole’s claims over Laikipia.915 
      In order to reply to Wright, Montgomery consulted with Sir Percy, and thereafter 
addressed a memorandum of 7 April 1910 to Sir Percy, proposing a land allocation 
procedure to the 26 late Laikipia claimants. Delamere and Cole topped the list of the 
claimants. Again, in the proposed grants of farms to the late claimants in Laikipia, 
Delamere and Cole were given the opportunity of first choice of farms, before any of the 
claimants could choose, plus half as much land, as their compensations.916 Wright 
supported additional grants of half as much of their compensations, when he stated that 
Delamere was given the extra land because he “perhaps did certain developments on his 
farm.”917 Also, Wright stated that Delamere was said to have helped the government by 
inducing the farmers to accept the Laikipia offer. As to Cole’s additional grants, Wright 
stated that Cole was in occupation of his farm and had affected some developments, 
when he agreed to accept the Laikipia offer in 1904 and therefore deserved additional 
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compensation. Contrary to Wright’s position, the Assistant Land Officer, L. M. Dundas, 
objected, stating in a minute that Delamere and Cole were offered half as much because, 
at the request of the government in 1904, they agreed to relinquish their Laikipia farms 
for the first Maasai move.918  
    As to developments said to have been affected by Delamere and Cole, Dundas stated 
that he could not ascertain any developments said to have been made by them, on their 
farms, that would afford them additional compensation of half as much being made over 
their Laikipia compensations.919 As to the remaining farmers, they were never afforded 
half as much as their compensations. However, Dundas stated there was nothing in their 
records to show that they were promised half as much of their compensations.920  
     The remaining late Laikipia claimants, also at the request of the government, 
relinquished their Laikipia farms for the Maasai move, Wright and Dundas’s claims 
notwithstanding.  But they were denied an additional half as much as their 
compensations, which were afforded to Delamere and Cole.921 The preferential treatment 
accorded to Delamere and Cole over the remaining late Laikipia claimants did not 
suggest that the compensation was carried out in a manner consistent with the type of 
compensation Wright had proposed to the farmers, in his letters of 3 June 1909 and 18 
April 1910. 
      There was an inconsistency in the proposed compensations, in which a preferential 
offer was made to the two influential settlers by grants of half as much compensation.  Sir 
Percy, in his intimation to Crewe on the question of Laikipia Maasai, disguised the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






inconsistency and told Crewe, in his telegram of 30 April 1910, that Delamere, who was 
partial to the Maasai, gave up his Laikipia farm in 1904 for the Maasai and encouraged 
other settlers to give up their land for the Maasai.922  Prior to such intimation, Sir Percy 
had already instructed Wright to intimate to the settlers further developments on the 
proposed move, in which Wright, in a letter of 18 April 1910 to the settlers, conveyed a 
definite offer of compensation to farmers of, an equal proportion of their farms, on 
Laikipia and its vicinity, plus half as much, in another district; Uasin Gishu or Sotik.923      
      The letter was not only suggestive but compelling evidence of the promise of farms 
being made to the farmers. It also suggested that there was an impending government 
decision for the removal of the Maasai from Laikipia to the extended southern Maasai 
reserve. It also suggested that Sir Percy was drifting away from his policy of preserving 
the African reserves against interest groups who might grab African land within the 
African reserves for their own interest.924 Therefore, Sir Percy’s actions were contrary to 
the established administrative procedure, as the CO would expect an intimation of his 
proposed removal of Maasai, which Crewe would have to approve, before he could 
entertain the removal of the Maasai. But Sir Percy refused to tell Crewe of developments 
described in this section in respect of the proposed move. 
       The European farmers who were promised farms whenever the Maasai were 
removed, also had their own ordeal, as the Maasai move failed. They could not move, 
despite government’s vacating order. These European farmers had their own share of the 
ordeal of the Maasai move, as they were offered Laikipia, and were told to move, as the 
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Maasai leave. But their move also collapsed, as the Maasai could not move. The farmers 
demanded an addition of monetary compensation for the loss, delay and inconvenience 
occasioned to them by government’s action. The later action was necessitated by Lord 
Delamere’s insistence on his claims over a farmland in Laikipia. But whatever claims 
Delamere might have had, it should not have reversed a policy Sir Percy proposed to 
safeguard, especially the safeguard of African reserves, he had enunciated in his Interim 
Report.  
     Sir Percy’s action on land compensation caused suffering for both the farmers and the 
Maasai, and undermined immigration of prospective settlers. Unfairness in compensation 
between the farmers and the Maasai showed his favoritism to the settlers over the Maasai. 
The European demands about their compensations were met by the local authorities, but 
as for the Maasai, no offer of compensation was made to them, despite, suffering, 
depreciation of stock, death of stock and loss of human lives among the aged Maasai on 
the commencement of the failed move.  
      In the long run, Sir Percy upheld the interest of the white community, over the 
preservation of the Maasai native reserve, when he removed the Maasai from Laikipia to 
the southern reserve against their wishes. Sir Percy not only failed to preserve the African 
reserve, a policy he advocated for, but also interfered with the reserve. The manner in 
which the compensation was carried out caused doubt if an administrator of outstanding 
capability could compromise government-approved policy, so as to safeguard the interest 
of a settler-community. With these clearly stated shortcomings, Sir Percy’s 
administration of compensation did not amount to an effective administration of land 
compensation. It was a display of favoritism to the European settlers without due regard 
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to the Maasai who should have been compensated. His policy of compensation was a 
failure and it brought his presumed competence as a fair and effective administrator into 
disrepute.             
  Sir Percy and the Planned Maasai Move 
      Despite this declared support for safeguarding African reserves, Sir Percy soon 
discovered that there was an effort to remove the Maasai from Laikipia to the extended 
southern Maasai reserve.  Despite his recommendation for the preservation of African 
reserves against syndicates and interested individuals and groups, he failed to stop the 
proposed removal of the Maasai. Sir Percy allowed the Land Officer, Wright, and the 
Commissioner of Lands, Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery, to continue with the process 
of removing the Maasai. Even when the land office was issuing letters to the European 
farmers with hints that they would be removed to Laikipia while the Maasai would move 
to the extended southern Maasai reserve. Prior to Sir Percy’s assumption of government, 
there was a correspondence with the European farmers, living in the Guaso Nyiro region 
hinting at the intention to remove the Maasai from Laikipia to southern Maasai reserve so 
that they could inhabit the same southern reserve with the other Maasai.925 
     Other than the removal of the Maasai to the southern reserve, there was also a move 
by the Maasai to attend their traditional annual ceremony in the same southern reserve. 
This move was not the removal of the Maasai from Laikipia; rather it was their move to 
the south to attend their annual circumcision ceremonies. It was reported in the Blue 
Book that the ceremonies were said to have commenced without the official sanction of 
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the Maasai chief religious figure who the British recognized as chief, Olonana.926  
     According to the Maasai tradition, his sanction was needed to declare the ceremony 
opened. But Olonana withheld sanction on the ground that the Loita Maasai were not 
permitted to attend the occasion with their cattle. The restriction on the Loita cattle was a 
cause for concern for Olonana who, as the Blue Book notes, appealed to Sir Percy to 
permit them to hold the ceremony in Ngong, in view of restrictions imposed on the Loita 
Maasai.927 It was also reported in the Blue Book that Sir Percy consented to this request 
so that the Loita Maasai could participate with their cattle in the ceremony.928 Thereafter, 
Olonana instructed, in January 1910, that the Loita Maasai and Kinangop warriors should 
move to Ngong for the ceremony.929 The Blue Book also notes that, in view of the 
restrictions imposed on the Loita Maasai, Lenana also appealed to Sir Percy that unless 
his authority was recognized and his instruction obeyed, he feared a disruption between 
the two sections of the Maasai tribes.930   
     Thereafter, the Blue Book notes that Sir Percy acknowledged Olonana’s concern, and 
on 2 February 1910 Sir Percy convened a meeting in Nairobi, with all the Maasai 
leadership present. During the meeting, the Blue Book notes that Olonana made a 
passionate appeal to Sir Percy over the circumstances leading to the change in the Maasai 
affairs, since the last ceremony, when Olonana pointed out to Sir Percy that the 
restrictions, whereby free intercommunications between the two sections of the tribe was 
leading to disunity and could compromise his authority.931   
     Therefore, the Blue Book notes that Olonana appealed to Sir Percy that, “it was his 
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most earnest wish that the northern Masai should move from Laikipia to inhabit the 
southern reserve.”932 However, the Blue Book notes that Sir Percy told Olonana that the 
removal of the Maasai out of Laikipia could not be approved without consulting other 
Maasai leaders; Ole Masikonde and Ole Gilisho.933 Contrary to the views expressed in 
the Blue Book, Olonana never appealed to Sir Percy that the Maasai wished move out of 
Laikipia, and neither did Sir Percy tell Olonana that other Maasai leaders had to be 
consulted before a decision could be made.934  
     It should be noted that from an account of a physician serving in the protectorate, Dr. 
Norman Leys, Olonana did not ask Sir Percy that the Maasai wanted to move out of 
Laikipia.935 However, Leys noted that the restriction of free intercommunication that the 
government imposed between the northern and the southern Maasai was making 
movements to and from difficult for such nomadic pastoralists.936 Leys also noted that the 
restrictions were sufficient for the Maasai to move out of Laikipia, even before they 
could be asked to move out, but even then, the Maasai had not sought permission to move 
out of Laikipia.937 The restrictions, Leys added, were due to government’s failure to 
beacon the cattle route, which it promised to do, and had made it difficult for the Maasai 
to wander with the livestock.938 
    Leys’s opinion was in concurrence with the views that Sir Percy told Crewe, in his 
telegram of 6 May 1910, that it was the failure of the government to beacon the cattle 
route it had promised to beacon that caused restrictions on intercommunication between 
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the northern and the southern Maasai.939  But at the same time, Sir Percy disguised the 
fact to Hopwood, in a private letter, when he told him, that Olonana begged him to allow 
the Laikipia Maasai move to the south to unite with this kinsmen.940 Sir Percy also told 
Hopwood that Olonana complained to him that his authority over his people was 
becoming tenuous, as movement between the northern and the southern Maasai was 
restricted, which made it difficult for Olonana to exercise effective control over the 
southern Maasai. Uniting the tribes in one place would strengthen Olonana’s authority.941  
     However, Sir Percy suggested that their move, if affected, would be in the best interest 
of the tribe, and that everybody in the country believed that as long as the Maasai remain 
in Laikipia, the country could hardly be developed.942 But restrictions imposed on the 
Maasai movements with their livestock due to the government’s failure to beacon the 
cattle route, so that the Maasai cattle could not stray into the European farms was making 
movements between the northern and the southern Maasai sub-tribes increasingly 
difficult, and Olonana’s authority over the southern Maasai was becoming increasingly 
tenuous. With such difficulty, the Maasai did not need to be told to move, they would 
choose to do so, if they were given the option. But even then, they did not choose to 
move out of Laikipia to the extended southern Maasai reserve.943  
       But Sir Percy, out of pressure for Laikipia land from the white farmers, and his desire 
to allot Laikipia land to those farmers, disguised the fact to the CO, when he told Crewe, 
in a telegram of 7 March 1910, that the Maasai wished to move out of Laikipia to Ngong, 
in the south, stating that the Maasai wished to move out of Laikipia to join their kinsmen, 
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in the southern reserve, and that they were the first to suggest that they wished to 
move.944 On receipt of Sir Percy’s telegram, in the CO, another letter with its last page 
missing, dated 3 February 1910, and addressed to Professor Gilbert Murray, written by 
Dr. Norman Leys, was also received.945  
    In the letter, Leys dismissed Sir Percy’s claims that the Maasai wished to move when 
he stated, “great wrong would be done to the Masai.”946 Leys added that settler pressure 
for fertile farmland was the chief cause of the government desire to move the Maasai, and 
not the Maasai wish.947 Therefore, Leys asked Murray, “if the government was going to 
break its promise to the Masai?”948 The promise that Leys referred to, was that the 
government, in the 1904 treaty it entered into with the Maasai, promised that the Maasai 
would inhabit Laikipia as long as they exist as a race.949 
     In the CO, Fiddes, in his comments on the two documents, stated “either the letter was 
false, in which case the writer should be dismissed, or it was true, which made the 
governor’s position impossible.”950 But Fiddes supported Sir Percy’s position, stating that 
they were “bound to believe him."951 Fiddes added that the matter should be investigated, 
and warned that, “great circumspection is necessary in dealing with this matter, which 
might easily give rise to a tornado in the House of Commons.”952 Moreover, Fiddes made 
reference to the 1904 treaty between Stewart and the Maasai, and observed that, “nothing 
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could be more solemn and binding in form,” than a treaty of 1904.953  Also, Fiddes 
suggested further that, “If the Masai wished to move, a treaty equally solemn and binding 
as that of the 1904 must be procured.”954 Therefore, Fiddes recommended that Sir Percy 
should be told to suspend the proposed move, and to await further directives by 
dispatch.955 Seely and Crewe expressed their concurrence with Fiddes, as they never 
commented further, other than endorsing their initials on the documents. Therefore, 
Crewe instructed for a telegraphic reply to Sir Percy that he should suspend the move, 
pending further directives by dispatch.956   
     As the CO was drafting a full reply, Sir Percy refused to wait for Crewe’s dispatch, 
and informed Crewe that the move had already commenced.957  In fact, Crewe and other 
officials in the CO were stunned, and no one could believe that Sir Percy could direct the 
removal of the Maasai without Crewe’s approval.958 The CO officials were exasperated 
with Sir Percy’s action, when Butler, in his minute stated, that it was amazing that Sir 
Percy should have “forgotten his duty so as to lend himself to an irrevocable step without 
first obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State.959 Fiddes’s frustration could be 
clearly inferred from his minute, when he stated that the whole issue had a very ugly 
look.960 Crewe became concerned that Sir Percy’s action might cause the Commons to 
demand an explanation on the move, when he sated, “this might easily become a very 
awkward question.”961 Therefore, Crewe addressed a telegram of 21 April 1910, directing 
Sir Percy to suspend the move, allow the Maasai to return to Laikipia, and to await 
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further instructions by dispatch.962 Sir Percy told Crewe, in a telegram of 22 April May 
1910, that the move has been suspended, and the Maasai were told to return to 
Laikipia.963 
     The action was the worst-case scenario of an administrator carrying out 
responsibilities that were not sanctioned by the home government had he preferred to 
await instructions from the CO on whether they would consent to the move or not. Such 
action did not portray Sir Percy as a successful administrator as he had not been 
consistent and open to the CO as to the true position of his action other than disguising 
the facts of the matter.  
      The preliminary arrangements of the Maasai move, especially Wright’s letters to the 
farmers with intimations of modes of compensation the government would offer to the 
farmers, should the government be successful in removing the Maasai, and the eventual 
removal of the Maasai, were shrouded in secrecy. The CO was never informed of any 
proposed movements and no approval was sought for such movements or for the promise 
of farms being made to the late Laikipia claimants. Sir Percy’s action amounted to 
disregard for the established working norms, where he was expected to inform the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies of all government activities in the protectorate.  
        In addition, for a successful administration of a protectorate, and for a governor to 
be successful, he must ensure harmonious working relations with the CO and keep them 
informed of all activities of government, and refer issues that required Crewe’s attention 
to him, for his consideration and approval, before Sir Percy could execute any action.964  
But Sir Percy refused to do so, and transmitted intimations of his action, when the Maasai 
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move collapsed.965 This was not how a governor could be a successful administrator, 
when he failed to provide a clear intimation of his actions and failed to seek approval 
before taking action, which provoked anger and hostility against him in the CO. For a 
successful administrator, he must cultivate good relations with his superiors in the CO 
and keep them informed of all developments in the country, which Sir Percy failed to do. 
But Sir Percy refused, and there was no way, a successful administrator would go to such 
length in initiating the removal of a community to a different location without seeking the 
approval of the CO.    
       This should have been the case, more especially, in a country where the British 
Government was concerned with the preservation of African land rights. It could be 
recalled that Winston Churchill had to defend the position of the government, in July 
1907, before the Parliament, on the preservation of African land rights and the removal of 
the Maasai from the Rift Valley to Laikipia.966 Therefore, any action that would involve 
the removal of Africans to a different location must be referred to the CO for approval. 
But Sir Percy refused to seek approval before directing the Maasai to move. As Sir Percy 
received directives to suspend the move, he complied with the directives, but complained 
to Hopwood, in a private and confidential letter of 21 April 1910, disguising the fact to 
Hopwood that the move was in the best interest of the Maasai.967 But it was clear from 
the circumstances that culminated in the removal of the Maasai that, as I stated in the 
preceding paragraphs, the move was not in the best interest of the Maasai, as Sir Percy 
claimed. 
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     The removal of the Maasai from Laikipia to the ecologically unfriendly extended 
southern Maasai reserve would not have been otherwise than detrimental to the very best 
interest of the Maasai. His statement in the letter to Hopwood that he had the Maasai at 
heart, does not appear to be without doubt as the move was mainly to afford the European 
farmers access to better farms, while the Maasai would be relocated to an arid area, 
where shortage of water supply was mentioned as a potential problem that they had to 
deal with.968   
    But with the intervention of the CO, there seemed to have been a respite for the 
Maasai, when Crewe, in his confidential dispatch of 22 April 1910, told Sir Percy that the 
agreement of 1904, signed between the Maasai and the government was “solemn and 
binding,” and implored Sir Percy that in view of the “enduring nature of the 1904 
agreement, it could not be revoked without another treaty of equal stature with that of 
1904.”969  
       Also, Crewe admonished Sir Percy against rumors in London that the Maasai might 
have been coerced to accept the move, and concluded his dispatch by raising concern that 
“due to the severe form which the cattle disease had taken, it is probable that the move 
could not have been undertaken in any case, for fear of infecting the stock on European 
farms, and in the Loita plains.”970  
      Sir Percy complied with Crewe’s directives, and also addressed a letter to the farmers 
waiting for the Maasai move so that they could move into Laikipia, intimating to them 
that the move was suspended due to cattle disease that Crewe referred to in his dispatch 
rather than the move was suspended because he did not seek the CO’s approval before 
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the commencement of the move. However, Sir Percy defended his action, when he 
pointed out that the Maasai herds were becoming increasingly large and that the Laikipia 
reserve was insufficient for their herds to graze.971 He pointed out that the reserve was 
extended twice and still, most frequently, the livestock strayed into European farms for 
more pasture, and the owners of the livestock were in the process “sometimes fined.”972 
Also, in his reply to Crewe by a telegram of 6 May 1910, he stated that he had wanted to 
reunite the Maasai tribes in one area so as to preserve the reserves as well as the authority 
of the paramount chief Olonana. Sir Percy also added that, “gravest reason for the move 
was is that paramount chief is losing his power by our having treaty some years ago 
(which was) absolutely necessary (for) quarantine reasons and owing to impossibility to 
allow Masai to wander over half a miles through sixty mile of European farms.”973   
    The local authorities had earlier assured the Maasai in Laikipia that a cattle route 
would be beaconed so that they could move their stock without cattle straying into 
European farms. In addition, the beaconed cattle route would connect the Laikipia Maasai 
with their kin in the southern reserve. Without the beacon the Maasai could not wander 
with their cattle nor could they maintain contact with the Maasai in the southern reserve. 
In view of the significance of the route, the local authorizes assured the Maasai that the 
route would be beaconed. But since early 1910 when the promise to beacon had been 
made, the local authorities never beaconed the cattle route and intercommunication 
between the two section of the Maasai was becoming a distant possibility and that 
Olonana’s power to exercise control over both the Laikipia and the southern reserve was 
becoming increasingly tenuous.  Therefore, the absence of the beacons had made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
971 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 34-35. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Sir Percy to Crewe, telegram, 6 May 1910, CO 533/73.  
290	  
	  
movement of the Laikipia Maasai almost impossible and that was good enough for the 
Laikipia Maasai to leave Laikipia even if the government had not proposed to remove 
them. 
     As to the desirability of procuring an agreement for the Maasai move as recommended 
by Fiddes, Sir Percy stated that he was already in possession of the agreement, made in 
presence of witnesses who were the same signatories of the 1904 agreement, and once the 
agreement was signed, the move might proceed. But Sir Percy told Crewe, in his 
telegram of 6 May 1910, that he would prefer to place the Maasai in the hands of a board 
of trustees. The board of trustees, would be composed of the Chief Judge of the High 
Court, and two Judges, a Bishop, and Secretary of Native Affairs, as members.974 Sir 
Percy attempted to deflect blame on his action in the removal of the Maasai, stating 
different stories that deflected from the main issue that for him. It was not only the 
question of procuring agreement, but also of the CO consenting to the move. But neither 
was an agreement procured nor was the CO being informed of the proposed move, which 
was shrouded in secrecy, and it only came to the knowledge of the CO, when the move 
collapsed. Sir Percy’s action, in this regard caused considerable embarrassment to the 
CO, and directed their hostility against him, which eventually caused his resignation.975  
    With such subversive administrative action, it would in no way be considered an 
outstanding performance, and neither would Sir Percy be considered a successful 
administrator, as the CO should not only to be informed of government activities in the 
country, but they had to approve of policies that the governor proposed for 
implementation in the colony. However, Sir Percy was also concerned with his action in 
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the removal of the Maasai, which did not portray him, as an administrator who was 
following clearly the laid down procedure of administration. He had not been intimating 
the CO of development in the country, which was an important requirement for effective, 
efficient and a successful administration.976 Haunted by his subversive action, Sir Percy 
also told Hopwood, in a private letter of 6 May 1910, “I would not desire to embarrass 
government and lam deeply sensible of support accorded but would earnestly point out 
that if your support is now withdrawn my Government would be completely discredited 
and, though leaving myself completely in your hands would prefer to be relieved in my 
government and return presently and explain my reports which I have now almost 
completed.”977 He suggested further that the present arrangement was that the European 
farmers would be moving north. With the northern Maasai ready to move south, this must 
be carried on during May and June, and such arrangement was a reaffirmation of his 
proposed reserves to be governed by a board of trustees.978   
      In spite of Sir Percy’s explanation in self-defense, Crewe refused to budge, when he 
replied to Sir Percy’s telegram of 6 May 1910, and Sir Percy’s private letter to Hopwood, 
of 21 April 1910, in a telegram of 12 May 1910. He stated, “I fear it is not feasible to 
place the Masai reserve in the hands of trustees for reason which will be explained to you 
by dispatch.”979 Therefore, Crewe reiterated his commitment to safeguarding African 
reserves by the British government rather than individuals, when he explained his 
position to Sir Percy, in a confidential dispatch of 31 May 1910, that the British 
government would be the trustee and that the involvement of private persons would be 
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            Maasai Treaty of 1911 
       Nevertheless, Sir Percy took the CO instruction seriously and convened a meeting at 
Ngong and concluded a provisional agreement between the Maasai and the government. 
The terms of the agreement stated that the tribesmen, being satisfied that it was to their 
best interest that the Maasai people should inhabit one area, agreed to move from 
Laikipia to Loita plains.  
      A conference was convened to sign the agreement between the Maasai leadership and 
the authorities of the colony. The representatives of the Maasai were Olonana, Ole 
Masikonde and Ole Gilisho, and Saburi (whose position in the southern reserve was 
similar to Ole Masikonde in the northern reserve). There were also heads of clans i.e. the 
principal elders of the northern reserve and the spokesmen of the senior and junior of the 
coming age group of the warriors. Sir Percy, Hobley and Lane, provincial commissioners, 
Combe, the Crown Advocate, Hollis, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and Collyer, 
District Commissioner of the Northern Reserve, represented the government. Also, in 
attendance was Reverend Dr. Scott who served as an independent witness. The contents 
of the agreement were read to the Maasai delegates that the agreement entered into 
between the government and the Maasai “of their own free will was translated and finally 
explained to them.”981 Upon listening to the contents of the agreement, Ole Gilisho 
dissented, and told the conference that the said area was not large enough for their needs. 
But Sir Percy asked Ole Gilisho and Ole Masikonde to depute representatives to report on 
the country with Collyer. Sir Percy also promised that if the area was found to be too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




small, the country across the Amala River would be made over to them.982  
    The two men nominated by Ole Gilisho later reported that the said area was too small 
for their habitation and that the Sotik would steal their cattle. Also Collyer, who was 
recommended to Ole Gilisho by Sir Percy as part of the deputation, reported that the 
“Masai of Laikipia were ready to go if the government ordered them to do so, but that 
they do not wish to leave Laikipia.” 983 
       In August 1910, the Maasai convened a meeting with a view to consider the report, 
and to take a common position. After the meeting, they approached Collyer and told him 
that they were ready to move out of Laikipia if the government ordered them to do so, 
“but they did not wish to leave Laikipia.”984 If all these reports were placed before 
Crewe, he could hardly have been impressed, let alone be convinced sufficiently to 
approve of the removal of the Maasai to such an ecologically unfriendly southern 
reserve.985  
    As negotiations were on going between Sir Percy and the Maasai, Sir Percy received a 
strongly worded letter from Leys, dated 25 May 1910. Leys was very critical of Sir Percy 
over the removal of the Maasai, deploring the nature of land dealing in the protectorate, 
and how “European influence threatened native lands.”986  Leys told Sir Percy that the 
Maasai move would confirm the belief that “all specially desirable native reserves would 
similarly come to be exchanged for more distant, less well watered or less fertile land.”987 
Leys was critical of Sir Percy’s land dealings which, he pointed out, caused the removal 
of the Maasai. However, in view of the damaging remark that Leys made against Sir 
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Percy and his administration, he had, upon a second thought, addressed another letter of 
27 May 1910 that he wished to withdraw a certain portion of his letter of 25 May 1910; 
the portion that criticized government for exchanging African lands with far distant and 
less watered areas.988  In a reply to Leys, Sir Percy, in a letter of 2 June 1910, assured 
Leys that he would take the “earliest opportunity afforded by a public occasion to make it 
unmistakably clear that government policy in resistance of such encroachment was so 
fixed and strong as to make the hopes of it utterly vain.”989  He assured Leys that as long 
as he was governor “any proposal from any quarter to move a single native village would 
have his uncompromising resistance.”990  Sir Percy told Leys that the “breach in those 
principles shown in his Maasai policy was due to circumstances so exceptional.”991  
    Sir Percy added that the disunion of the tribe and the circumstances arising out of stock 
disease meant that he made up his mind that they would have to move whenever he 
investigated the subject. Sir Percy added that the fulfillment of these assurances would 
have gone far to neutralize the effect of the move on the minds of the Europeans.  Leys’ 
confrontation with Sir Percy was investigated after Sir Percy resigned, in July 1912. The 
CO received all the details of what transpired between Leys and Sir Percy, when, in 
September, Harcourt requested the Acting Governor, C. C. Bowring, to submit to him all 
correspondence between Sir Percy and Leys. Bowring transmitted what transpired 
between Sir Percy and Leys to the CO. The transcript of discussion between Leys and Sir 
Percy, exposed altercations over the Maasai move and Sir Percy’s defense of his action 
that clearly was not only a cover up but also a contravention of his proposed policy for 
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the administration of the Africans. 
        Upon perusal of the correspondences, Read commented, “whether or not Sir Percy 
gave the assurance in question and whether or not, he made the public statement referred 
to, “I do not think that Dr. Leys has made his case any better or it affected by the renewed 
letter of his.”992  Anderson made a pointed accusation that Leys had masterminded the 
Maasai court case against the government. Anderson became very critical of the Maasai 
attorney, Alexander Morrison, whom Anderson described as a “Hungry lawyer.”993 
Anderson added that Leys had “placed himself between the lawyer and the delegation 
and engaged in communication between the two, it will be difficult to agree with 
Leys.”994  He further added that Leys attitude was reprehensible and that this issue might 
lead to the end of his service.995 Anderson concluded, “such a man cannot be retained in 
the service.”996 Harcourt agreed with Anderson’s comments, but not without some 
reservations; Harcourt’s doubt had arisen in connection with the telegram from Sir 
Percy’s successor, Belfield, of 23 May 1912 which threw a “sinister light on Sir Percy 
Girouard’s ‘frankness’, if not on his motives for action.”997 Harcourt added, “Granting 
this however, I do not think it affects the disloyal action of Dr. Leys.”998 
     Harcourt’s statement was without doubt that Sir Percy’s motives in this regard must 
have been informed by certain considerations to remove the Maasai. It could be recalled 
that Sir Percy, despite his proposed safeguard of African areas, did not live up to his 
word, when he attempted to compromise African areas. This suggested that he did not 
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have Africans at heart, as he had stated earlier on. His sinister motives of safeguarding 
African reserves did not go unchallenged, when Leys challenged him and pointed out that 
there was no sincerity as to African reserves and government would in the long run 
remove Africans from fertile areas to a less fertile areas to give way for European farms, 
a policy that Leys considered as a betrayal of the Africans and Sir Percy’s cynical 
motives in defending African right which he had enunciated in his interim report. Despite 
the bold step taken by Leys in exposing Sir Percy’s unfair deals, the CO failed to support 
his position simply because the CO was bound to support the governor rather than his 
subordinate. Precedence showed that listening to subordinates behind the governors could 
cause resignation, and thus the CO, probably for that reason, refused to support Leys, and 
the issue was allowed to slide down in an easy way. 
      However, Sir Percy’s attempted Maasai move had to be delayed, as he could not 
conclude a treaty in 1910. The move was deferred to 1911. But even then, consultations 
with the Maasai on the proposed move were on going, when, on 7 March 1911, Olonana 
died.  The Blue Book notes that Olonana was suffering from dysentery, though he was 
getting on well, when he suddenly collapsed.999 The Blue Book notes, that the Assistant 
District Commissioner for the southern Maasai reserve, Mr. Crewe-Read, had visited 
Olonana and discussed various minor questions with him, a few hours before his 
death.1000 It was reported that Olonana, while in his deathbed, uttered before Crewe-Read, 
“tell the government to look after my children and to give them the money that I should 
have earned if I had been alive. Tell my people to obey the government as they have done 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




during my life. Tell the Laikipia Masai to move with their cattle to the Loita plains.”1001   
     Olonana’s 13 years old son Seggi succeeded his father in a succession selection made 
in the presence of Provincial Commissioner, C. R. W. Lane. There were also two regents 
(Nagoya, a cousin of Olonana was selected as regent for the south and Ole Gilisho for the 
north). This arrangement was necessitated due to the young age of Seggi. The Blue Book 
reported that during the investiture ceremony, Ole Gilisho stated on behalf of the northern 
Maasai that he wished to ask that they be permitted to move to the extended southern 
reserve. Ole Gilisho was said to have stated that the change of opinion was due to the 
death of Olonana and the dying wish he had left behind.  Again, Ole Gilisho stated they 
also feared of a possible disruption between the two sections of the tribe.1002 Lane, who 
was present at the meeting, was reported to have told them to consult the government in 
Nairobi over the issue.1003 As a sequel to their request, Sir Percy convened a meeting of 
the Maasai representatives in Nairobi on 3 April 1911. The Blue Book notes that Ole 
Gilisho, speaking on behalf of the Northern Masai, stated that it was their wish to move 
to the extended southern reserve.1004  
     On 4 April 1911, a formal treaty was drafted, and another meeting was convened with 
the Maasai leadership. The Blue Book notes that members of the executive council and 
the provincial commissioners were summoned, and, in the presence of all, the Blue Book 
notes, Sir Percy asked the Maasai leaders “whether or not they wish to move to the 
extended southern reserve.”1005  It further notes that the Maasai were said to have replied 
that they wanted to move in honor of Olonana’s death wish. But a possible water shortage 
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in the southern reserve was raised. The Blue Book account states that Ole Gilisho, acting 
as spokesperson for the Maasai, stated “if the government would help improve the water 
supply, they would contribute toward the work by the payment of bullocks.” 1006  The 
Blue Book notes that Ole Gilisho requested that all the Europeans living in the area of the 
southern reserve should be removed, and that the area applied for by Mr. Powy’s Cobb, 
known as “The Promised Land,” should be made over to them. The Maasai also asked for 
protection against possible Sotik raids, and approval for protection was granted. 
Therefore the Maasai finally asked that they would like to move as soon as possible, and 
at a time when there was grass along the route to the southern reserve. The Blue Book 
also states that the Maasai asked that they should be allowed to move slowly, but they 
were told, “the move was contingent upon the approval of His Majesty, the King…”1007 
They were told that if they were permitted to move, they would be allowed to proceed 
slowly. After all the issues raised had been considered, the treaty was translated and fully 
explained to them, and the Maasai affixed their marks in the presence of European 
officials. Thereafter the treaty was sent to Ole Masikonde in Rumuruti and other old men 
in order to secure his consent and to inform them of the meeting at Ngong.    
     Thereafter Sir Percy, in a telegram of 5 April 1911, told Harcourt that the Maasai held 
a meeting in Olonana’s old home and have expressed their desire to move to the southern 
reserve in honor of Olonana’s dying wish; that they should move after his death to the 
southern reserve. 1008  Sir Percy also told Harcourt that he had concluded a treaty 
agreement with the Maasai, on the proposed move, and urged Harcourt to approve the 
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move.1009  Harcourt replied in a telegram of 7 April 1911, and asked Sir Percy to submit 
full details in a dispatch.1010   
    Sir Percy’s action caused officials in the CO to tread with circumspection in dealing 
with any issue he might transmit to them, rather than considering him as a successful and 
an outstanding administrator. Harcourt demonstrated this when he became suspicious of 
Sir Percy’s correspondence over the case, and because of the deep-seated distrust and 
hostility the CO officials had against him. Harcourt minuted that Sir Percy might have 
telepathically inspired Olonana’s dying speech and awaited unfolding development.1011 
Harcourt’s minute raised a very important question on the performance of Sir Percy as an 
administrator, as there was no way, with such comment from the most senior of Sir 
Percy’s superiors in the CO, that would suggest that Sir Percy was considered not only a 
successful but also an outstanding administrator. 
    Another failure of Sir Percy’s administration came at a time Harcourt was considering 
approving the Maasai move, believing that Sir Percy had complied with the CO 
confidential dispatch of 22 April 1910 which required of him to conclude a treaty 
between the government and the Maasai. He was also told in the dispatch that the 
agreement should be in a similar manner to that which Stewart and the Maasai leadership 
had concluded in 1904.1012 Stewart and the Maasai entered into an enduring treaty 
agreement that the Maasai would move from the Rift Valley to inhabit Laikipia as long as 
they existed as an ethnic group. The agreement between Stewart and the Maasai was 
considered an enduring agreement, and the CO hoped that Sir Percy would enter into a 
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similar agreement, before he could remove the Maasai from Laikipia to the extended 
southern reserve.  
     But rumors that Sir Percy promised farms on Laikipia to European farmers before 
1911 began to filter to the Commons. A Member of Parliament and leader of the Labor 
Party, Ramsey MacDonald, addressed a private letter to Harcourt of 18 May 1911 with an 
enclosure of an anonymous petition addressed to MacDonald.1013  MacDonald told 
Harcourt that promises of farms in Laikipia had been made to farmers, and challenged 
Harcourt to inquire from the District Commissioner, Northern Maasai Reserve, Collyer, 
who was in London on leave.1014 The anonymous petition, allegedly written by Leys, 
criticized Sir Percy’s administration of bowing to settlers. The governor was described as 
a supporter and advocate of Europeans settlers. Leys wrote,  “our governor is not playing 
fair; his mind and ambition lead him into intrigues and bluffing. It is freely said that he 
does not mean to listen to the COs admonitions. He thinks himself safe in the favours of 
wealthy planters and investors.” 1015  
      The disappointment of the CO was clearly demonstrated in a minute by Fiddes, 
stating, “this, if true, meant that Girouard and his principal officers were in a conspiracy 
to deceive.”1016  The latter minute on Sir Percy did not portray him as an honest 
administrator, if it proved that MacDonald’s allegations were true. But the confirmation 
of such allegations was just a matter of time, as some of his dealings, shrouded in 
secrecy, had been exposed to Parliament and the CO.1017 
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      In spite of the magnitude of the allegations, the CO would most likely be reluctant to 
investigate Sir Percy on anonymous allegations, and instead, they would rather allow 
MacDonald to challenge them, by raising the issue on the floor of the Commons. The CO 
had enough of similar instances in Kenya’s past, where subordinate staff reported issues 
behind the back of the governor, and, upon investigation, it usually provoked anger, 
unhappy feelings and resignations. 1018  The memories of Jackson and Bagge, who 
informed the Foreign Office of alleged attempts by the protectorate’s Commissioner, Sir 
Charles Eliot, to grant land to a syndicate, in the Maasai nominal grazing reserve, were 
still afresh in their memories. Eliot’s travail began, when the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, listened to similar gossips behind Eliot’s back, 
presumably from Jackson and Bagge. The outcome of such gossips over the grants, 
soured relations between Eliot and Lansdowne, and resulted in the resignation of Eliot, in 
1904. These were examples of how listening to gossip from the governor’s subordinate 
staff could lead to unhappy relations between the governor and the CO, which the latter 
wished to avoid. 
      There was also the case of Jackson, which the CO could not overlook, when Jackson 
reported, though to a lesser extent, against Sir Percy’s immediate predecessor, Sir James 
Hayes Sadler. This discredited Sadler and resulted in his transfer to the British colony of 
the Windward Islands.1019 The CO, however, might also have recalled Sir Percy’s Main 
Report, in which Sir Percy was very critical of nearly all the officials of the protectorate, 
stating that he would not condone acts of staff reporting to the CO, behind his back.1020 
Sir Percy had, without doubt, clearly told the CO that he would not condone staff talking 
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behind his back to his superiors in the CO. Therefore, with previous experience of by 
passing the governor to listen to the governor’s subordinate staff of rumors or anonymous 
allegations, Harcourt refused to budge on MacDonald’s allegations and advise. But at the 
same time, however, Harcourt did not dismiss MacDonald’s allegations outright, as he 
had heard the same allegations from C. R. W. Lane, whom Sir Percy had, earlier on, 
described as liable to utter disloyal statements. Lane had already told Harcourt that Sir 
Percy promised farms on Laikipia to European farmers.1021  
     In view of such allegations, Harcourt delayed approving the move to allow 
MacDonald to prove his allegations, and stated that if MacDonald could not substantiate 
his allegations, he would have no alternative course of action open to him, than to 
approve the move.1022  However, Harcourt stated that the allegations against Sir Percy 
should be published, and should anyone desire to confront Sir Percy, he would have 
something to rely upon.1023 He added that to investigate Sir Percy on anonymous charges 
would provoke him, to tender his resignation.1024 Fiddes agreed, and stated that there was 
no need to consult Collyer as MacDonald suggested.1025 However, Fiddes suggested 
further that, even if, the allegations were true, MacDonald might be “pulverized to raise 
the issue on the floor of the Commons.”1026  
      Despite the fact that Harcourt was determined to approve the move, however, he did 
not reject MacDonald’s allegations outright. As he was awaiting MacDonald to 
substantiate his allegations, he enquired from Sir Percy, when he cabled a telegram of 5 
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October 1911, warning against “the grant of, or promise of, land” and enquiring whether 
any grants or promises to such land had already been made.1027  
    Sir Percy replied to Harcourt, in a telegram of 7 October 1911, that “no such right had 
been given or promised, but that Europeans who had given up 130,000 acres for the 
extended southern Masai Reserve had to be accommodated elsewhere.”1028 Harcourt 
knew this statement was false because Lane, Sir Percy’s Provincial Commissioner, had 
already told Harcourt that promises of farms had been made.1029 Harcourt commented on 
Sir Percy’s reply, “we can accept this information for what it is worth, but Lane the 
District Commr [sic] whom I saw the other day thought that farms in the Northern 
Reserve had been promised.”1030   
    Despite doubts arising from allegations that Sir Percy promised farmers Laikipia, 
Harcourt, in his reply to a question from the Commons, on 12 April 1912, stated, “no 
allocation of land occupied by the northern Masai had yet been made to Europeans.”1031  
Therefore, the CO shelved the advice of MacDonald, and resigned to their fate, as 
MacDonald was not forthcoming in substantiating his allegations, On 29 May 1911, 
Harcourt conveyed his approval to Sir Percy, and the move commenced.1032  The 
approval of the move reads: “This agreement appears to have fulfilled all the conditions 
laid down in paragraph 6 of my predecessor’s dispatch of 22 April 1910, viz. that the new 
agreement of 1904, signed by a similar body of chiefs, and similarly attested by the 
interpreters and leading local officials. I have therefore felt justified in giving my 
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approval to the agreement, and I have informed you accordingly in my telegram of 29th 
May.”1033 
     Following the approval of the move, a tour of the southern Maasai Reserve was made, 
and a final decision was also made to remove the Laikipia Maasai. But the report on the 
area was not encouraging, and noted, in addition to previous doubts about the reserve, 
that the area was too small. An additional area across the Amala River was made over to 
the Maasai so that they could be fully accommodated. With approval granted, and the 
move was resumed. Soon after it commenced it collapsed in June and was suspended. Sir 
Percy reported, in a telegram of 10 August 1910, that the move had been suspended due 
to cold and rains on the Mau plateau.1034   
    Additional information was received in a dispatch with a report from the Director of 
Agriculture of the protectorate, MacDonald, stating that all the Maasai livestock had been 
sent back to Laikipia. But he denied that there were livestock losses and suffering, and 
regretted that the move failed.1035 But in reporting the collapse of the move, Sir Percy 
disguised the true position as to why the move was suspended, when he told Harcourt that 
the move was suspended to allow the Maasai cattle to graze before it could be resume. He 
added that the move had been hurried up.1036  In the CO, Harcourt disagreed with Sir 
Percy upon reading his reason for the suspension of the move. Harcourt stated, “this was 
a piece of monstrous impertinence” coming from Sir Percy.1037  
     The proposed Maasai move from Laikipia to the southern reserve had been widely 
known in the protectorate, and at the commencement of the move, the mission had been 
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accomplished, with opening up of a fine grazing land for European farmers. It was widely 
presumed that the Maasai were removed from Laikipia to the extended southern Maasai 
Reserve to give way to the European farmers, but the circumstances in which, the move 
was conceived in secrecy, and attempted execution of the move failed, and the disguising 
of information on the move to the CO, was later disclosed to the shock and consternation 
of Harcourt and officials in the CO. These dealings disclosed vague correspondences on 
important issues, which Sir Percy wrought in telegrams; providing little information, and, 
in some instances, he had to be told to write in a dispatch. If the latter were the problems, 
still Sir Percy could be considered a successful administrator. But in a situation where 
nearly all his dealings on this issue were disguised, it disclosed not only the dishonesty of 
the administration, but also the sinister motives relating to the purpose and intent of the 
removal of the Maasai.  
    All these dealings were not disclosed to the CO that had the power and authority to 
decide on these matters, as Sir Percy refrained from transmitting information and seeking 
approval on the proposed Maasai move and the promise of farms. With these actions, Sir 
Percy not only failed to prove the presumed notion of him being an outstanding and a 
successful administrator, but he demonstrated that he was an administrator whose 
superiors in the CO would not repose their confidence in him. Instead of his performance 
earning him respect and good working relations with the CO, qualities that were 
indispensable for a successful administrator, his action earned him the hostility of his 
superiors.1038  
     Sir Percy’s failure in this aspect of his administration caused considerable 
disappointments and embarrassments to the CO, and it was he chief cause for his 
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resignation. Sir Percy was forced to resign not because he was a successful administrator, 
but because he failed to administer in a manner consistent with the expectations of the 
CO, which was vested with powers and authority to decide policies for His Majesty’s 
dominions.1039 Irked by his performance, Harcourt nursed considerable reservations 
against him, and had been waiting for an opportunity to ventilate his grievances against 
Sir Percy’s promise of farms to farmers and the handling of the Maasai move without his 
consent.1040  
     Thereafter, the opportunity came in the aftermath of the failed Maasai move, which 
disclosed to Harcourt, in the ensuing correspondence between Sir Percy and the CO, how 
Sir Percy concealed information on the proposed removal of the Maasai from 
Harcourt.1041 An angered Harcourt was aware that Sir Percy made the promise, as Lane 
had already told him the same.1042 Harcourt also learned that MacDonald’s allegation was 
the truth, but as the fact had been disguised from him, he acted based on false 
information, as he had no option other than to believe Sir Percy.1043  
     Harcourt found himself in a very difficult situation over the affairs of the protectorate; 
he was pained that Sir Percy misled him, in the administration of the affairs of the 
country.1044 But he had no option other than to live with it, and to wait for an opportune 
time to confront Sir Percy.1045 The most important thing was that he had a hint that his 
governor was disguising the facts of the matter from him, which forced him to deal with 
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whatever Sir Percy might report to him, with great circumspection.1046 
     In spite of the fact that his mishandling of the Maasai had been disclosed, Sir Percy 
sought to cover up, when he told Harcourt, in November 1911, that, in the past, there had 
been no well-defined policy over the Maasai, and that had been responsible for the delay 
in the Maasai move. He therefore told Harcourt of the need to come up with a well-
defined policy on the Maasai. Unbeknown to Sir Percy, Harcourt had already been 
angered over his deceitful correspondence over the Maasai move. Harcourt was 
dissatisfied with the whole arrangement and had been waiting for an opportunity to 
ventilate his grievance, and his disappointments to Sir Percy, and this might had been part 
of the opportunity occasioned to Harcourt to address Sir Percy, on the question of the 
Maasai move. Harcourt told Sir Percy, the extent of his disappointment, when he stated: 
“It is clear that on the most favourable construction the whole arrangements for moving 
the tribe have been grossly mismanaged. There had been no adequate preparation before 
the move any proper supervision to control it during its progress you will understand that 
my confidence in the future handling of the matter has been greatly shaken.”1047  
     Harcourt’s statement suggested that he had lost confidence in Sir Percy’s handling of 
the Maasai move. However, as Sir Percy had directed that the Maasai should return to 
Laikipia following the failed move, Sir Percy reported to Harcourt that, the Maasai had 
been told to return to Laikipia, and they had returned since August. Sir Percy also 
reported in November that the Maasai were sent back to Laikipia, but some of them, were 
left on European farms.1048  Such conflicting reports raised doubts in the CO; Fiddes 
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doubted if the information they had been getting from Sir Percy was the truth.1049 Fiddes 
also asked of the whereabouts of the Maasai?  He added, “this most interesting part of the 
story wd. be the part that we are not allowed to know.”1050 Frustrated, Harcourt stated, 
“this is always so with Sir Percy Girouard…. I give it up; I can’t waste the remnants on 
my brain on his riddles.”1051 Harcourt’s anger could be seen not only from his comments 
but also from his writing. He used, “on my brain,” rather than “of my brain.”1052  
    In May 1912, when Sir Percy was home on leave, Harcourt seized the opportunity and 
confronted him, over the issue. In the ensuing discussion between Sir Percy and Harcourt, 
in Harcourt’s office at the CO, Sir Percy admitted that promises had been made to the 
European farmers who gave up their farms for the Maasai move.1053 Harcourt was 
astonished hearing Sir Percy admitting that promises had been made to the farmers. Still, 
Harcourt asked him, if he could comment on his telegram of 7 October 1911, in which Sir 
Percy told Harcourt that no promises had been made to the farmers, which was a reply to 
Harcourt’s telegram of 5 October 1911, in which, Harcourt warned against the grant of or 
promise of, land, asked if promises of farms had been made to the farmers.1054  
  But Sir Percy couldn’t comment; he became speechless at last. He said nothing other 
than he saw no inconsistency in what he said in the telegram of 7 October 1911, and his 
admission of the promise in Harcourt’s office. Harcourt was stunned and embarrassed 
that Sir Percy had intentionally misled him. In fact, the interview between Harcourt and 
Sir Percy was, in the main, the last altercation that ended Sir Percy’s Kenya 
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governorship, in an uncelebrated and most disappointing performance, on the Maasai 
question.1055  
     It was reported that, at that very moment Sir Percy tendered his resignation to 
Harcourt, which he accepted, some sources hinted that Harcourt forced him to resign.1056 
Harcourt clearly lost confidence in Sir Percy. Harcourt’s frustrations over the move 
stemmed from how secretly Sir Percy arranged the removal of the Maasai without 
informing the CO, which caused Harcourt to demand a resignation from Sir Percy.1057 
Harcourt, dissatisfied with his performance, was no longer willing to continue with him, 
as he could not vouch of his confidence. The following was the draft of the discussion 
that ensued between Harcourt and Sir Percy:  
Mr. Harcourt’s discussion with Sir Percy today brought to light a curious 
misunderstanding. He said in reply to a question that the (South African) farmers who 
gave up their land in the south in order to make room for the Masai were promised that if 
the Laikipia lands were thrown open they wd. be considered (apparently they have been 
hanging about, on other peoples farms, ever since, waiting the fulfillment of this 
promise.) He was reminded of the telegraphic enquiry made by the Secretary of State on 
this point and of his reply, and said that he had stated nothing inconsistent with the above. 
It is difficult to reconcile this with our telegram of 5/10/11(31623) and his reply 
32728(cf. the Secretary of State minute on the later).1058 
 
     A copy was telegraphed to Bowring together with copies of the former two to refresh 
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his memory.1059 Therefore, Fiddes drafted another letter addressed to Bowring, Officer 
Administering the Government, reiterating the warning given to Sir Percy that no dealing 
must be undertaken or promises made, concerning the Laikipia lands until they had been 
submitted to Harcourt and approved by him.1060 For the benefit of the doubts, the CO 
enclosed Harcourt’s telegram of 5 October 1911 warning against promises of land and 
enquiring whether promise had been made, and Sir Percy’s reply, in a telegram, dated 7 
October 1911 that no promise of land had been made.1061 His resignation was a further 
confirmation that his performance had not been successful, it was a failed administration 
and neither could he consider an outstanding administrator as claimed by Kirk-
Greene.1062  
     The fact that Maasai were forcibly removed out of Laikipia was confirmed in the 
Maasai case against the government. In a sworn affidavit of Stephano Ole Hongop before 
a High Court of Justice sitting in Mombasa, in 1912, Hongop told the High Court that the 
Maasai were being forced to move out of Laikipia by the government.1063 Stephano told 
the Court that the Maasai agreed to move out of Laikipia, not because they wanted to 
move, but they had to move because of fear of government.1064  Huxley in Whiteman’s 
Country pointed out that Sir Percy was not dismissed but resigned to take a better offer in 
an ammunition factory. 1065  But Huxley’s position was indefensible from archival 
manuscripts that detailed correspondence between Sir Percy and Harcourt on the Maasai 
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question to the last, when he encountered Harcourt in the CO. The correspondence 
between Sir Percy and Harcourt and Sir Percy’s interview with Harcourt, showed that Sir 
Percy lied, and he had lost the support and confidence of Harcourt and officials in the 
CO.  
       It was out of these circumstances that Harcourt viewed that Sir Percy could not be 
retained. Therefore, he asked him to resign.1066 With this failing in his administration and 
in dealings with his superiors in London, his performance was unsatisfactory. In dealing 
with the CO, Sir Percy was expected to keep it informed of his activities in the colony 
and to seek approvals through dispatches of actions he might execute in the colony. He 
should ensure that he complied with the directives of the CO as instructed in their 
approvals as well as other directives to carry through certain tasks in the colony. This 
failing in the Maasai case was not the only case where his performance was criticized. 
There was also the case of a European farmer, Galbraith Cole, whom the CO directed Sir 
Percy to deport, having shot and killed a suspect, and admitted, before a jury, of doing so 
to kill. The CO feared his presence could pose a threat to peace and order and directed for 
his deportation but Sir Percy created administrative and legal difficulties to block the 
deportation. 
       In the second Maasai move, despite their friendly relations with the local authorities, 
the Maasai resisted their removal from Laikipia to the southern reserve. The Maasai 
complained that the proposed second move for the extended southern reserve was not in 
their own best interest. The pointed out that in the southern reserve, there was no 
adequate water for their cattle and that Sotik would steal their cattle. But Sir Percy did 
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not present the concern of the Maasai to the CO, when he intimated to Harcourt that they 
agreed to move. Even then, the CO told Sir Percy that the Maasai would have to agree to 
move and that he should enter into a treaty with them, similar to the treaty Stewart 
entered with the Maasai in 1904. But that never happened, as in the first failed Maasai 
move, he did not enter into agreement. It was following the failed first move that the CO 
told him that he must enter into agreement. Sir Percy initiated agreement with the Maasai 
but before he could conclude it, he was transferred out. It was his successor, Sir Conway 
Henry Belfield who concluded the agreement with the Maasai, and directed their removal 
to the southern reserve. The Maasai leaders tried to reverse their removal to the southern 
reserve, by resorting to a court proceeding to block their removal from Laikipia. Their 
application failed and they had to stay the southern reserve. 
 Conclusion   
       The removal of a portion of the Maasai from the Rift Valley to Laikipia in 1904 was 
successful and it was done in agreement with the Maasai leadership. Stewart’s agreement 
with the Maasai brought the Maasai groups to inhabit Laikipia as long as they existed. 
But the agreement could not be sustained as the local authorities in concert with 
influential settlers were working to reclaim Laikipia by removing the Maasai to the 
extended southern Maasai reserve. Upon Sir Percy’s assumption of the government of the 
protectorate, he should have stopped the proposed move, as it conflicted with his 
proposed safeguard of African reserves, but he failed to do so. Instead, Sir Percy 
acquiesced in the proposed removal of the Maasai, coming under pressure of the settlers 
who wanted fertile Laikipia land for their farming. Sir Percy failed to make agreement 
with the Maasai as Stewart did, and failed to seek the CO’s approval, and directed the 
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Laikipia Maasai should move to the extended southern Maasai reserve in 1910. On the 
commencement of the move it collapsed, and the CO intervened to suspend the move and 
asked Sir Percy to make agreement with the Maasai before he could remove them.  
       He could not make agreement with the Maasai within a short period of time, when he 
happened to be in the CO, in early 1912, when Harcourt asked him of the removal of the 
Maasai without the approval of the CO. Harcourt’s interview with Sir Percy on the 
removal of the Maasai, in the CO, resulted in the resignation of Sir Percy. Harcourt 
believed that Sir Percy was not forthcoming in his discharge of duty, especially the 
circumstance that surrounded the Maasai move had cause him to place Sir Percy in a very 
unenviable position. The CO believed that Sir Percy was not forthcoming in telling the 
truth surrounding the secret proposed removal of the Maasai from Laikipia.  
     Therefore Maasai were not comfortable with the removal, but they were compelled to 
move. This caused Maasai to seek redress in a court of law against the government 
eviction without their consent. Their application failed, and they were compelled to move 
to the southern reserve. Sir Percy’s action in the removal of the Maasai caused the 
government court action, disappointed the CO, and embarrassed himself before his 
superiors. He left the service of the EAP as a failed administrator, who work out his own 








                                                                Chapter 12    
                                                      The Galbraith Cole Case 
    Introduction  
       The Cole case was a test on Sir Percy’s sense of justice and fairness, but at the same 
time, it showed how his support of settlers had an impact on his sense of justice in the 
discharge of his official functions. When Cole was docked before the jury for shooting to 
kill a suspected thief who stole a sheep from his farm, he admitted of shooting to kill. 
Despite his testimony, which was viewed a threat to peace and good governance; the jury 
acquitted him against the advice of justice Hamilton to return a guilty verdict against 
Cole.  
     The CO, concerned about a reprisal from the Africans in view of his testimony, 
directed Sir Percy to deport Cole. Sir Percy refused to adhere to Harcourt’s deportation 
order and sought to block the order by creating administrative and judicial difficulties. 
Earlier on, he refused to appeal against the verdict of the jury, causing anger in the CO. 
Thereafter, the CO directed deportation. Even then, Sir Percy continued to cause 
difficulties to block deportation.  
       It caused anger in the CO before Sir Percy could issue deportation against Cole, and 
even then, he issued the deportation order in the name of Harcourt, which suggested that, 
it was Harcourt who directed the deportation not him. Sir Percy wanted to shield Cole of 
deportation, knowing fully that Cole was an influential person in London, a relative of the 
Earl of Enniskilin. Sir Percy’s failure to issue the order caused embarrassments to the 
CO, and further placed Sir Percy in a very unenviable position with the CO.  
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    The Cole case was a contributing factor in Sir Percy’s resignation. Sir Percy’s action in 
this case suggested that he was not willing to obey the instruction of his superiors in 
London, and such an act of insubordination would not be condoned as the CO expected 
its governor to comply with the directives emanating from the CO, and also to inform the 
CO of any development in the protectorate. In this case, Sir Percy failed to do so, and it 
became a factor that contributed in the CO’s view about him. 
 The Incidence and the Case 
         The history of Cole and the government was mainly on a case of an African 
suspected to have stolen a sheep from Cole’s farm.  Cole, a prominent settler in Kenya, 
shot a suspected African he alleged to have stolen a sheep from his farm, abandoned the 
dead body, and never reported the case to the police. The nearby Africans who witnessed 
the shooting reported the case to the government after 12 days. On receipt of the report, 
an autopsy was performed by a physician, Dr. Boedeker, which confirmed that the 
deceased died as a result of his bullet wound.1067  
      In a five minutes trial, the jury acquitted Cole of a murder charge, despite his 
admission of shooting to kill. The jury returned a not guilty verdict on the case, despite 
objection from Justice Hamilton.1068 Alarmed by the degree of miscarriage of justice, and 
the fact Cole’s testimony established that he could be a threat to peace and order, the CO 
directed Sir Percy to take all the necessary steps to deport Cole back to England.1069 
     But the deportation took a dramatic turn, when Sir Percy refused to comply with the 
deportation directives, and raised administrative and judicial difficulties to block the 
deportation of Cole. Sir Percy’s action provoked indignation in the CO, for his refusal to 
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comply with the deportation directives. It caused frustration of Harcourt and all the senior 
officials of the CO, before Sir Percy could issue the deportation warrant. On issuing the 
warrant, Sir Percy was greeted with protest against the deportation order, especially from 
Cole’s counsel, and Lord Delamere, as well as in London. The protest was the cause of 
prolonged altercations between Sir Percy and the CO, which provoked anger, 
disappointment, and placed Sir Percy in a very unenviable position. 
      Cole’s action in 1911 followed from an attempt to trace the whereabouts of some 
Africans he believed to have stolen a sheep from his farm. When he came across a 
number of Africans skinning a sheep not far away from his house, Cole assumed that it 
was his stolen sheep, which was being skinned, and he opened fire on them, as they ran 
away.  
     The bullet hit the back of one of the suspects and penetrated through his stomach, 
pulling out his intestine, which lay waste on the ground.1070 The other two suspected 
thieves ran for their lives and escaped unhurt.1071 Thereafter, neither Cole nor the escaped 
Africans reported the incident, until 12 days later, when some Africans reported the 
incident to the local authorities.1072 Cole was arrested following discovery of the body 
and police investigations showed that the man had died from Cole’s actions. Following a 
preliminary inquiry, Cole was committed to the high court at Nakuru, in the heart of the 
white highlands, to stand trial for murder. The trial began on 31 May 1911 as the 
protectorate presented testimony from both European and African witnesses that clearly 
pointed to Cole as having caused the death of another human being. It was left to a jury 
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of nine European men to decide the guilt of the defendant. As noted earlier, the all white 
jury quickly acquitted Cole.  
    Therefore, Sir Percy reported to Harcourt, in a telegram of 7 June 1911, the verdict of 
the jury, and stated that he had contemplated appealing against the verdict but his 
attorney advised him that appeal was not possible in a case were the defendant was 
acquitted of the charges against him.1073 Sir Percy also told Harcourt that the case was 
“due to the prevalence of stock theft.”1074  
      The CO had actually learnt of the case in a press report of 26 April 1911, and officials 
were alarmed with the degree at which the jury miscarried justice.1075 Read had already 
read the press report and upon perusal of Sir Percy’s report, disagreed with Sir Percy’s 
argument that appeal cannot be made in a case where a defendant was acquitted.1076  
Read stated, “In spite of Sir P. Girouard’s apologetics, it seems to me murder is murder 
and that it is out of the question to allow the matter to slide in the easy manner he appears 
to contemplate.”1077 Fiddes and Harcourt agreed, and a telegram of 12 June 1911, was 
addressed to Sir Percy, directing him to appeal against the verdict. In the telegram, 
Harcourt stated, “a callous and unjustifiable murder had been committed and that there 
had been a gross miscarriage of justice.”1078   
      Therefore the CO disagreed with the jury and the advice of Sir Percy that appeal was 
not possible in a case where the defendant was acquitted. Harcourt directed Sir Percy to 
appeal against the acquittal verdict, if he was advised that was possible, but Sir Percy had 
earlier on, told Harcourt that he was advised that appeal was not possible, in an acquittal 
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case, decided by a jury.1079  Sir Percy replied to Harcourt’s telegram, in a confidential 
dispatch of 24 June 1911, with an enclosure of a copy of the court’s proceedings, and a 
private letter, addressed to Harcourt.1080 In the dispatch, Sir Percy refused to comply with 
Harcourt’s instructions, when he reiterated that the “crime was due to prevalence of 
unchecked stock thefts.”1081 However, Sir Percy disguised the true position of the 
Naivasha district, when he told Harcourt that the crime was due to the prevalence of stock 
theft. In fact, there was no prevalence of stock theft in the Naivasha district. Therefore, 
his allegations of stock theft was a cover up against Cole’s acquittal verdict, as he was 
determined to shield Cole from further litigation or any attempt at deportation. Sir Percy 
also stated that it was undesirable to appeal, but he preferred, however, to consider any 
proposal which might be submitted to him.1082  
     However, Sir Percy’s allegations could not be taken seriously, as available statistics of 
stock theft in Naivasha, showed it was comparatively insignificant. In fact, from the 
available statistics of stock theft, which Bowring transmitted to Harcourt, in a 
confidential dispatch of 25 May 1912, with an enclosure of a Returns of Stock Thefts 
Reported to the Police, Naivasha, for Fifteen Months Ended 31 March 1912, indicated 
that, for a 15-month stock theft, ending on 31 March 1912, comparatively insignificant 
number of cases of stock theft in the Naivasha district, which could not be described as 
prevalent.1083  In fact, the total numbers of cattle stolen during the 15-month period were 
only 6 cases. Out of the latter, one was recovered, one person was convicted, one person 
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was arrested, one case had been established, and only a few cattle stolen.1084 As for sheep 
and goats, there were 30 cases, out of which 25 convictions had been obtained, 67 
persons had been arrested, 44 persons had been convicted, 82 head of sheep and goats 
were stolen, and 42 head of sheep and goats recovered.1085 Bowring pointed out that stock 
theft appeared to have been over blown by the white farmers to block Cole’s proposed 
deportation.1086  Bowring also told Harcourt that as for agitation against the stock thefts, 
“It has become increasingly evident during the last few month that this matter is by no 
means of such importance as was contended in certain quarters in 1911. In fact, there is 
reason to believe that the public agitations engineered in the interest of the accused in the 
Cole case.”1087 In the CO, Fiddes was disappointed with the figures relative to Sir Percy’s 
references of prevalence of stock theft during Cole’s case. Fiddes stated that despite all 
the talk about stock theft during Cole’s case, the number presented in Bowring’s dispatch 
was insignificant to warrant references being made to stock theft.1088  
     As to Sir Percy’s private letter addressed to Harcourt in 1911, he proposed two options 
which, if adopted, could ease the strain caused over the verdict. The first option was the 
suspension of trial by jury and the second, was the deportation of Cole.1089 Sir Percy’s 
recommendations were informed by the court proceedings, in which he noted that the 
defense attorney had not done his job of defending his client.1090   
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     Shocked by the action of the defense attorney, and the miscarriage of justice, 
Batterbee was stunned to learn that the defense counsel refused to defend his client.1091  
Batterbee stated that the defense counsel made no attempt to “set up any defense and 
evidently relied upon the Jury to acquit simply because he was a white man.”1092 Out of 
the two possible options Sir Percy proposed to Harcourt, Anderson, in his minute, 
recommended the second option; deportation of Cole.1093 Anderson believed that section 
25.1 of the 1902, East Africa order-in-council applied to Cole. The court proceedings, 
and particularly the action of the defense attorney in not even bothering to put up a 
defense for his client, shocked many in the CO. The outcome of the case outraged civil 
servants in the colony and such outrage was not inconsequential in the way the CO 
decided to deal with the case. The outrage over the verdict certainly impacted the way in 
which the CO decided to deal with the Cole case. Anderson took the lead in suggesting 
the CO response after they had seen the transcript of the trial. Of the two possible options 
Sir Percy proposed to Harcourt, Anderson, in his minute, recommended the second, the 
deportation of Cole.1094  
      Deportation  
 Therefore, Anderson stated that the protectorate could order deportation, once a sworn 
affidavit attesting to Cole’s testimony had been made.1095 Again, Anderson’s choice of a 
deportation option on Cole’s case was informed by his concern that the court proceedings 
of the case was public knowledge, and Harcourt might be asked in the parliament as to 
why Cole had not been deported, a question to which, according to Anderson, “it would 
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be difficult to frame a satisfactory reply.”1096  Harcourt agreed, and stated, “it was a very 
horrible case…. Cole must be deported.”1097   
       Thereafter, Harcourt, in a telegram of 28 July 1911, told Sir Percy, “I have come to 
the conclusion that he must be deported under section 25.1 of the order-in-council. If you 
have any observation to make telegraph them at once as I wish to direct deportation 
immediately.”1098 The Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Lord 
Lucas, expressed his satisfaction with Harcourt’s decision to deport Cole. Lucas minuted, 
“Iam glad you decided for Cole’s deportation.”1099 Lucas added, “this will show the 
settlers that we mean business….”1100 The wisdom behind the CO decision to deport Cole 
lay in the protectorate’s racial formations. A protectorate where black and white live in 
separate settlements, and the Cole case being a case between the white farmer and a black 
African suspect killed, it was feared that Cole’s presence in the colony might ignite racial 
tension and provoke reprisals from the Africans.  
      To avoid the latter course of action, Harcourt’s telegram of 28 July was categorical, 
and an expression of urgency to effect deportation was also very clear. But since the said 
telegram had been sent to Sir Percy, nothing was forthcoming from him. The long lull 
caused Harcourt to dispatch two telegrams of 3 and 7 August 1911, reminding Sir Percy 
to respond to his telegram of 28 July 1911.1101 However, silence greeted such telegrams, 
as there were no replies received in the CO. Harcourt and the CO’s officials were not 
only embarrassed, but they were disappointed with Sir Percy’s disregard to such 
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telegrams. In fact, Harcourt was outraged, and at once, directed that a telegram must be 
dispatched to Sir Percy to respond at once. A strongly worded telegram of 9 August 1911 
was dispatched to Sir Percy, demanding of him to respond to Harcourt’s telegram of 28 
July 1911 at once on receipt of this telegram, and provide an explanation as to why he 
omitted to do so, earlier on.1102  
      On the receipt of the said telegram, Sir Percy reluctantly replied to Harcourt, in a 
telegram of 10 August 1911, objecting to Harcourt’s deportation directives and raising 
possible difficulties to be encountered, if a deportation order was to be executed. Sir 
Percy stated that, upon consultations with the High Court Judges and his Executive 
Council, he came to the conclusion that a person acquitted in a criminal case could not be 
deported.1103 Sir Percy observed that, if Cole applied for a writ of habeas corpus, and it 
was granted, no deportation could ensue.1104  The CO were astonished that Sir Percy went 
out of his way to consult judges on a matter that might go before them, in due course.1105  
Harcourt strongly disagreed with his arguments, and in a telegram of 10 August 1911 told 
Sir Percy that the Order-in-Council empowered the governor to order a deportation of 
any individual “conducting himself so as to be dangerous to the peace and good order in 
East Africa….”1106     
     Believing that Sir Percy did not understand his argument, Harcourt explained the 
relevant section of the case as contained in the 1902 Ordinance.1107 Harcourt also told Sir 
Percy, in the telegram, that he seemed to have entirely misapprehended as to why Cole 
must be deported. Harcourt stated that the need to deport Cole stemmed from the fact that 
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the testimony he made in court established that he was “conducting himself so as to be 
dangerous to peace and good order whose continued presence in the protectorate may 
provide reprisal by natives,” and not because his court case had any connection with the 
deportation.1108   
      Harcourt also dismissed Sir Percy’s argument when he told him that, the CO legal 
adviser held that no appeal could be made against a deportation order under section 25.1 
of the 1902 Order-in-Council.1109 Therefore, Harcourt instructed Sir Percy to affect all the 
necessary process to institute the deportation of Cole.1110  Harcourt’s explanations 
notwithstanding, Sir Percy refused to budge. He told Harcourt, in a telegram of 22 
August 1911, that he doubted that section 25 and 26 of the Order applied in the Cole 
case.1111  However, to prove his objection and also to exonerate himself of blame Sir 
Percy enclosed a sworn affidavit by an Acting Crown Advocate, and stated that, if the 
lawyers in the CO considered the evidence in the affidavit adequate, he would issue the 
deportation order.1112 But the CO refused to refer the case to their legal adviser, and 
instead, told Sir Percy, in a telegram of 29 August 1911, to affect the deportation order. 
With the latter, the Colonial Office believed that Sir Percy would affect the deportation 
order as he had promised to do so, in his telegram of 22 August 1911.1113  The telegram 
instructed Sir Percy to comply with the instruction of the deportation order Harcourt 
transmitted to him, in the previous telegram.1114   
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     Sir Percy replied to Harcourt, in a telegram of 5 September 1911, that after 
consultations with his Executive Council, he is issuing the deportation order under 
protest, and only on orders from London.1115 Sir Percy added that as “the order-in-council 
of October 1906 directs me to carry out your instructions, Iam issuing a deportation 
warrant ordered in your telegram of July 28.”1116  In the CO, Read stated that Sir Percy 
was trying to divest himself of any responsibility in connection with this matter.1117  The 
CO officials were stunned by Sir Percy’s reply, and Harcourt consulted with the CO legal 
adviser before instructing for a strongly worded telegraphic reply of 9 September 1911, 
asking Sir Percy to comply with the section 25.1 of the order-in-council. In the telegram, 
Harcourt also asked Sir Percy if he had complied or ordered the deportation in his 
[Harcourt] name, as he had stated, in his telegraphic reply of 5 September 1911.1118  
    In a sequel to Harcourt’s telegram of 9 September 1911, Sir Percy reported, in a 
telegram of 15 September 1911, that Cole had been served with the deportation order.1119 
But the CO was not impressed since before Sir Percy could reply to Harcourt, already the 
CO learnt from the Times of 9 September 1911 that Sir Percy publicly suggested that 
Harcourt issued the deportation order.1120 In a minute by Read, he stated, “this is not very 
convincing.” 1121  Thereafter, Lord Lucas, said “Sir Percy’s dispatch furnished no 
justification or explanation.”1122  Harcourt replied to Sir Percy, with a telegram that was 
critical of his conduct in the Cole case. Harcourt reflected Read’s minute and accused Sir 
Percy of refusing to cooperate, and attempting to divest himself of the responsibility in 
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the deportation of Cole. 1123  Harcourt concluded his telegram by reflecting on the 
difficulties occasioned to him by Sir Percy’s refusal to cooperate in effecting the 
deportation order. He told Sir Percy, in a private letter, “I regret that throughout this case 
I have failed to receive from you the co-operation to which I consider myself 
entitled.”1124 Harcourt added, in a private letter of 24 October 1911, “So far from lending 
me ready assistance, you continued to raise difficulties which appeared to me to be 
adequately covered by the instructions and opinions already sent to you.”1125 
    Thereafter, there were objections to the deportation by the settlers in the protectorate. 
Cole’s British counsel, Sir Edward Carson, advised him to disregard the deportation 
warrant and to continue with his life in Kenya.1126 Also, Lord Delamere cabled the Daily 
Mirror to protest the deportation.1127  
      The case earned wide publicity, and opposition against the local authorities mounted 
both in the protectorate and in London. In the protectorate, there was opposition against 
the local authorities on how they handled the case. The latter came from Dr. Norman 
Leys, who might have got insight into the case through Dr. Boedeker, a friend and a co-
worker, who performed an autopsy on the deceased’s body.1128 Leys, known for his 
controversy in the Maasai move, communicated the information to a friend, Harvey, and 
asked him if they are getting the official report published.1129 Leys was more hopeful of 
the usefulness of the Cole case against the local authorities than the hopeless case of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1123 Harcourt to Sir Percy, telegram, 9 September 1911, CO 533/90. 
1124 Ibid. 
1125 Harcourt to Sir Percy, private, 24 October 1911, CO 533/90. 
1126 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 68. 
1127 Ibid. 




Maasai.1130 It was believed that Harvey told Ramsey MacDonald, leader of the Labor 
Party, and Member of the Commons, who raised the issue with the CO, and subsequently, 
on the floor of the Commons, and embarrassed the CO.1131    
      The Cole case was also of interest to the Pastoralists Association, EAP, who 
petitioned Harcourt for the rescission of the deportation warrant. But the petition raised 
other concerns than addressing the problem, which it was intended to address. The 
petition was defective, as the CO expected every person mentioned in the petition to 
append his signature against his name, and the absence of such, raised doubts on the 
originality of the petition.1132 In the said petition, there were some names of the 
petitioners whose signatures were not appended against their names. On receipt of the 
petition, Sir Percy did not initiate to address the petitioners on the circumstances 
surrounding the deportation of Cole, other than acknowledgement of receipt of the 
petition, stating that he would forward their petition to Harcourt. Thereafter, he 
transmitted the petition to Harcourt to address the problem, a problem, which he should 
have addressed. His action was to demonstrate to Harcourt the consequence of the 
deportation that he was not willing to attend to, and instead, Harcourt should attend to it, 
as he has ordered for the deportation. Therefore, Sir Percy, in a confidential dispatch of 
15 September 1911, told Harcourt, he was forwarding a petition from the Pastoralists 
Association as an enclosure to his dispatch.1133  
     In the CO, Butler minuted that Sir Percy was forwarding the petition to Harcourt to 
decide over a case that should have been disposed of by Sir Percy. Sir Percy must have 
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been trying to divest himself of responsibility in the deportation of such an influential 
settler, as he felt more safe and comfortable in the midst of planters than in executing his 
job accordingly. Read stated that Sir Percy, instead of responding to a petition, decided to 
send it to Harcourt to respond on the petition.1134 Also, enclosed in Sir Percy’s dispatch, 
was a copy of an acknowledged receipt of the petition, addressed to the petitioners that 
the petition will be forwarded to the Secretary of State1135 In reacting to Sir Percy’s 
action, Butler, in his minute, suggested as a response; “Harcourt sees no reason in 
modifying the action which has been taken in the case of Cole.”1136 Butler also doubted 
any need to reply to the petitioners, and pointed out that “the petitioners would have long 
ceased to expect any reply.”1137  However, Butler suggested a less obvious reason to 
reply; that all those whose names were appended to it did not sign the petition. Butler 
also doubted what Sir Percy’s private secretary had described as petition, which 
according to Butler, a petition; “I understand will be signed by all members of the 
Pastoralists Association.”1138 Anderson was sarcastic when he stated, “he can tell the 
petitioners that their petition has been sent to the Secretary of State.”1139 Fiddes stated, 
that the petition should be sent back for petitioners to append their signatures. Fiddes 
added that in the future, Sir Percy should be told to wait, until all petitioners appended 
their signatures against their names before dealing with a similar petition.1140 In a minute 
by Harcourt, he expressed his concurrence with Butler, and stated, “Sir Percy should be 
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told to wait until petitions are signed before dealing with or making promises about 
them.”1141 However, Harcourt added that “such a communication as that of Sir Percy 
might be used to induce signatures to the petitioners.”1142 Harcourt observed that, the 
“whole thing is dead now, the row has been less, and the effect better, than some of us 
dared to hope.”1143  
      Therefore, in a reply to Sir Percy’s dispatch, a confidential dispatch of 4 December 
1912 was addressed to Sir Percy, stating the need to append all signatures to a petition 
before he could forward it to the CO.1144 Harcourt informed Sir Percy to communicate to 
the members of the Pastoralists Association that “I have received their petition dated 1 
October 1911, but that I see no reason for modifying the action which has been taken in 
the case of Cole.”1145 Harcourt added when he referred to a letter from Sir Percy’s 
secretary, and stated that, it appears from W. J. E. Lawson - Walton’s letter of the 12 
October 1911, when the petition was submitted to you, “it had not actually been signed 
by all those whose names were appended to it.”1146 Harcourt commented further, when he 
stated that,  “I consider it desirable to wait until all the signatures to a petition have been 
actually appended to, before dealing with it, or undertaking to forward it for 
consideration.”1147 Harcourt implored Sir Percy to adhere to the latter, when he stated 
that, “I have to request that this practice may be followed in the future.”1148  
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     Conclusion 
      In the Cole case, the CO finally compelled Sir Percy to budge to their terms. His 
action in the Cole case was a good example of insubordination to his superior officers in 
the CO. It also suggested unwillingness or reluctance in the execution of appropriate 
action as ordained in the relevant ordinance to deport Cole. His action of engaging in 
subversive correspondence over the deportation of Cole was a clear testimony to his 
partiality toward the settler community, which caused exasperation in the CO. The end of 
Cole’s case disappointed the CO. With this performance, it would be nearly impossible to 
commend Sir Percy, as he has engaged in subversive action to frustrate the CO, in their 
attempted efforts to deport Cole. His action soured relations between him and the CO, 
which had already lost confidence in him, believing that he had failed them, and there 
would be no better description of Sir Percy as far as Cole case was concerned other than, 
he failed to carry out the duty assigned to him, which discredited him, before the CO. 
      The compensation issue, the Maasai move and Galbraith Cole’s case tested Sir 
Percy’s sense of fairness in the administration of the colony. Sir Percy’s administration of 
the colony was judged to be a successful administration, especially by Kirk-Greene, 
suggesting that Sir Percy administration brought order and economic prosperity in the 
colony. Mungeam’s British Rule in Kenya considered that Sir Percy brought order in the 
chaotic administration of the colony, and considered Sir Percy as a successful 
administrator.  However, Sir Percy’s administration could not be in any way be 
considered an outstanding performance in view of the way he handled the compensation 
question, the Maasai move and the Galbraith Cole case. 
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                                                            Chapter 13 
                                                            Conclusion  
          In the end, Sir Percy’s action or failure to follow the dictates of the CO did not save 
Galbraith Cole as he was deported from the EAP in September 1911. Partly as a result of 
London’s loss of confidence in Sir Percy occasioned by the Maasai move and the Cole 
affair, he followed suit the following year.  Sir Percy held office as governor less than 
three years that were critical in Kenya’s history. No doubt Sir Percy had performed 
considerably well prior to his Kenya service in the Sudan, Egypt, Transvaal and Northern 
Nigeria and with relative success. But in Kenya, it was an entirely different story. There, 
his performance was not only embarrassing to the CO but it was also disappointing. In 
view of the latter, he failed to deliver successfully as claimed in many of the sources 
mentioned in this work. The criteria I have used in assessing his performance and 
determining his success or failure are generally the yardstick that the CO wanted officials 
in the British colonies to adhere to, for the success in the administration of those colonies. 
        In reflecting on the CO’s expectations for Sir Percy’s performance and on the 
assessment of his policy of government administration in the protectorate, it becomes, 
clear that he failed to deliver as the CO proposed and as expected of him. Sir Percy 
proposed to institute government standing orders, restructure government administration 
and departments, improve and strengthen the machinery of government and amalgamate 
Uganda to the EAP. Not much was achieved in the latter aspect; he improved the 
condition of administration by providing government circulars and schedule of duty of 
administrative staff. But the success was below his proposed recommendations for 
improvement of the condition of the administration.  
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     As to the strengthening of the machinery of government, Sir Percy had not been able 
to trim the size of staff members of the protectorate. In the latter case, the CO refused to 
give way, stating that the staff past service during the pioneer years of the protectorate 
had to be recognized. They should not be cut adrift, therefore, with the exception of the 
retirement of heads of public works, agriculture and the conservator, the CO refused to 
pension off or superannuate some of the staff Sir Percy recommended to be relieved from 
the service of the protectorate.  
      Sir Percy also proposed the merger of the coast provinces of Seyyedie, Jubaland and 
Tanaland into one provincial administration. It did not only fail to resonate with the CO, 
but was refused approval as the separate existence of the provinces outweighed their 
amalgamation for economic consideration and strengthening of the machinery of 
government of the provincial administration. The existence of the coast provinces was 
considered as administration expediency. The merger of the provinces could have been 
detrimental to the very best interest of the minority ethnic groups and could have led to 
nationalist feelings. Therefore, the CO forbade Sir Percy’s proposed merger for economy 
and strengthening in the interest of enduring in the political and administrative 
expedience for safety and acquiescence in the political atmosphere to prevail.  
    This was one of the failings in his policy reviews that suggested that Sir Percy failed to 
appraise the position of the coast provinces and the rationale for their separate existence.  
If he had done so, he would not have recommended for their merger. 
     The institution of official government circulars to govern the conduct of day-to-day 
government action in the administration of the colony was also proposed for reform. Sir 
Percy sought to provide order and direction for political officers in carrying out 
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government functions, including the administration of taxation which, other than in the 
Nyanza Province, he considered chaotic throughout the colony and recommended for its 
reform.  
     Sir Percy succeeded considerably in affecting certain administrative reforms, 
especially in official government official circulars, giving order, direction and similarity 
of action in carrying out government functions and he improved the method of tax 
collection in the coastal provinces, especially among the Mijikenda. The relative 
successes, however, were much less insignificant in proportion to his proposed 
administrative reform, and they were limited to the coast. For a colony with a swath of 
land stretching from the southern tip of the head waters of the white Nile to over 1000 
miles to its southern extremity bordering the shores of the Indian Ocean, with a 
population of over two million subjects of the crown in 1909.  
       In reviewing the condition of the machinery of government, Sir Percy proposed to 
pension off or superannuate some of the senior, as well as junior, officials of the colony 
and to merge or scrap some of the departments he considered redundant, incompetent, 
lazy and supine or duplicating functions of other departments of government 
administration. The latter reforms, Sir Percy told Crewe, would strengthen the machinery 
of government administration and the economy of the colony. The CO requested details 
of how Sir Percy intended to effect the latter, taking into consideration adjustment of 
officials to occupy offices of the retired officials, adjustment of claims and pension 
benefits in a time when the annual budget of the colony had not made provision for these 
retirements and when the British Treasury did not provide any assistance to a retiring 
colonial official in the colony.  
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      For Sir Percy to effectively address the latter question was an uphill climb and after a 
prolonged hesitation, he asked the CO for the proposed reform to be approved. But the 
CO told him that it would not act on pieces of information in a telegram. The officials 
reiterated their earlier position that they needed more details on how the retirees could be 
paid and vacancies and claims of adjustment settled. There was a deadlock and Sir Percy, 
instead chose to press for the transfer of Jackson to Uganda and the appointment of 
Bowring to the newly created post of a colonial secretary. The CO agreed and promoted 
Jackson to the post of governor of the Uganda Protectorate. The CO also considered his 
proposed reform on the executive, legislative and the judiciary powers of the protectorate. 
His recommendations were not approved.  However, the CO approved the appointment of 
six unofficial members on the Legislative Council.  
      Other than the latter, the CO refused to give way for staff and administrative reforms. 
The status quo was maintained, as the CO believed that the existing staffs were 
appropriate for the colony at the time and nothing was discussed further. In addition to 
the latter, the CO was skeptical to implement the recommendation, believing that Sir 
Percy had not mastered the political, administrative and racial landscape of the colony to 
warrant his hefty recommendation, so they treaded cautiously on these reforms. Sir 
Percy’s failing to secure the approval of his policy reforms were not only a measure of 
the doubts expressed by the CO, but his recommendations were not in tandem with the 
required policy of His Majesty’s Government in the administration of the Crown’s 
dominions.  
     His Majesty’s Government expected policy such as this to provide a good working 
relationship with the CO, and the executive, legislature and the judiciary branches so as 
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to achieve the full results desired by the CO and the subjects in the colony. But the CO 
viewed that Sir Percy’s uncomplimentary comments on nearly all the officials of the 
colony and his proposed restructuring would not only fail to provide the desired results of 
a quiescent, effective and efficient administration, but it could lead to complications 
between him and the staff members of the colony and derail the administrative drive for 
better service to the colony. At the time the CO refused his proposed reforms, the 
officials in the CO admonished Sir Percy to be patient and accommodate all the staff 
members of the colony as the CO could not weed them out without benefits and 
considering that these staff had served the colony meritoriously in its pioneer years.  
     The weeding of some staff members of the protectorate and the strengthening of the 
machinery of government, as well as the extension of the restructuring government 
departments became his proposed restructuring of staff of the protectorate. In the 
restructuring of government departments and their functions, Sir Percy considered 
amalgamating Uganda Protectorate to the EAP when he was asked by the CO to report on 
its administration. Sir Percy considered the amalgamation of the EAP and the Uganda 
Protectorate for the development of the region’s economy and the strengthening of the 
machinery of government of British possessions in East Africa. He held that the 
amalgamation of the two protectorates under the administration of the EAP would 
strengthen the machinery of government, provide economy in expenditure, and facilitate 
the development of the Uganda. But the CO upon perusal of his reports on the EAP and 
Uganda came to a clear opinion that amalgamation would not be in the best interest of 
Uganda Protectorate, and the CO opined that Sir Percy must have been under 
misapprehension to suggest that EAP was more developed and could assist in the 
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development of Uganda. The CO also concluded that Uganda was more prosperous and 
should be left alone to develop independent of the EAP. Sir Percy’s recommendation for 
the amalgamation was not informed by knowledge of the two colonies but by his desire 
for relevance and for having a large expanse of land under his command. 
      The failure to provide genuine assessment that could be used to improve the condition 
of the colony was no less a short coming in an administration that was seeking a way for 
effective administration for the conduct of its multi-racial society, especially the 
European settlers and the Indians residents. In considering the application of government 
policy on the inhabitants of the country, Sir Percy observed that the European settlers 
were confronted with the problem of access to land. He considered that the existing 
legislation did not afford the settlers opportunity of easy access to land. To this, he 
proposed to relieve the situation by coming up with a land policy that could afford them 
access to land for agricultural cultivation. In addition to access to land, they should be 
included in other government bodies as advisory persons, especially in the government 
agricultural department so that their advice should be part of the government policy as the 
decision of the executive could not necessarily reflect the views and wishes of the settlers 
as to their agricultural pursuit. Sir Percy also considered that the Europeans, who 
intended to make the colony home, should be allowed to participate in the government of 
the country especially at country and local government level.    
        The highlands settlement should be exclusive to them and be carved out as an 
independent settlement exclusive to other races with its own administration. He 
advocated the increased participation of the settlers on the legislative council. The settlers 
also had the leverage to put forward certain demands especially when they formed a 
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political association, under which they sought to have elective representation. But the 
government was able to keep a tight control over their activities with a view to curtail 
their excessive political demand. Despite the favorable disposition and proposed policy 
toward the Europeans settlers, the condition of the settlers was not better off than it had 
been. This was because some of his proposed policies were not approved, and in some 
instances, Sir Percy never followed up with the Colonial Office, on his requests.  
       As to the Indians, the administration had not adopted a favorable disposition towards 
their demands, and policy by which they could be governed was proposed. Therefore, the 
government, instead of mitigating the difficult position of the Indians, chose to accentuate 
their difficulty by recommending the suspension and later on, removal of the 
representative on the Legislative Council. The Indians demands for immigration of more 
Indians into the colony, seeking equality of rights and treatment as British subjects, 
ending racial discrimination in land distribution, and judicial procedures. These demands 
were refused by the colony and the Indians continued to suffer such disabilities, which 
provoked an interview by Jeevanjee in London on the Indian condition, causing the 
intervention of the Secretary of State for India and the All-Muslim League on behalf of 
the Indians. Despite the interventions, nothing changed for the better and their struggle 
continued. 
     The effective administration of these races required a policy to guide officials in the 
administration of not only the Indian subjects of the crown but also of the European 
settlers. In this Sir Percy noted, there was no defined policy of administration of the 
settlers, and he desired to create a policy to govern the conduct of the settlers. He 
therefore, proposed for their greater involvement in the legislative council, county and 
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local government administration, and establishment of a separate area for their 
settlement, distinct from other races.  
      He recommended for their participation in the government agricultural department 
and in other analogous bodies to better their cause, especially for those who wished to 
make the colony their home. He recommended that the settlers should be taken into 
confidence and should be afforded all rights and privileges that the government could 
afford.  
     The CO approved these recommendations when it reappointed Lord Delamere as 
settler representative on the Legislative Council. The CO also increased the unofficial 
representation on the Legislative Council to six. The CO also accepted that the settlers 
should be held in confidence and should be allowed participation in counties and local 
governments as well as in other government bodies, such as the agriculture department. 
The question of the participation of settlers in the government of the colony, especially 
county and local government was not achieved by the administration despite the CO’s 
approval. Sir Percy, transmitting details of the process and pressing on the CO to act on 
the proposal, caused the latter policy to fail. By the time he left the colony, the question 
of settlers involvement in the administration for their own affairs had not been achieved.  
      As to the Indian policy of administration, Sir Percy inherited a large body of Indians 
in the colony without a define policy on their status and rights within the administration. 
The Indians had been living with disabilities since the entry of the white settlers into the 
protectorate, as successive local authorities adopted a different approach to the welfare 
and prospects between the settlers and the Indians, favoring the settlers and accentuating 
the difficult position of the Indians in the colony. This had been in existence prior to Sir 
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Percy’s arrival into the colony, and he had not devised any means to alleviate their 
suffering. Instead, he accentuated their difficult position.     
      Sir Percy had not proposed any measure to alleviate the difficult position of the 
Indians despite their numerous disabilities, and instead recommended for the dropping of 
their representative on the Legislative Council. He also opposed Indian access to land in 
the highlands, refused to reconsider the question of Indian immigration into the colony 
and towed the line of his predecessor when he refused to accept Indian demands for equal 
government opportunities with settlers and for fair treatment through trial by jury as 
applied to the settlers, attending the same markets, owning land in strategic market areas, 
and using the same streamers with the settlers on the Uganda Railways.  
    Sir Percy as with his predecessors, refused to give way to any of the Indian demands. 
The favoritism he had shown to the settlers and his anti-Indian position accentuated the 
racial divide and created a structure similar to that of the apartheid South Africa to bear 
on the colony. The latter development had in no way created peace, harmony and 
acquiescence, and had, instead, led to the feeling of racial animosity and the rise of 
nationalism on the part of the Indians to reassert their rights in a colony they claimed that 
without them it would not had been the way it was. They also claimed that because of the 
numerical and cultural influence they had established that the colony should be 
amalgamated to the Indian viceroy. The question of race and administration was an 
important policy question in the colony as there were Africans, in addition to the settlers 
and the Indians.  
      As to the Africans, Sir Percy considered the introduction of a separate policy of 
administration, in which African chiefs and elders government their people to be 
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supervised by European officials. This was similar to a system of administration Lord 
Lugard introduced in Northern Nigeria Protectorate where African chiefs were allowed to 
decide on their own affairs but subject to moderation by British colonial officials in the 
persons of residents and district officers. Sir Percy’s proposed policy was accepted by the 
Colonial Office with a request to furnish further details as to the process of the policy.  In 
detailing the process, Sir Percy introduced a different element from his earlier proposal 
when he stated that he would place the Africans under a board of trustees. But the 
Colonial Office viewed that the involvement of private persons in the administration of 
the subjects of the Crown would be unnecessary complication, and therefore, refused to 
approve the policy. Thereafter, Sir Percy revised his proposal, which conferred 
administrative responsibilities on African chiefs and elders to govern the people with 
supervision by European officials.  
        The administrative reform provided official circulars to provincial and district 
commissioners on the conduct in the discharge of their functions with a view to achieving 
similarity in the discharge of government function as opposed to individual idiosyncrasy 
that characterized the administration. This administrative reform was achieved by Sir 
Percy, but it had not gone far to alleviate the disabilities which Sir Percy had proposed to 
alleviate, especially as to safeguards of African land against interest and business groups.  
In spite of the fact that it was an administrative measure which had not gone far and was 
faced with a challenge of the High Court involvement in the administration of African 
areas, African youth were not favorably disposed to his African policy administration as 
they preferred the European model of administration they considered better than their 
own traditional method of administration.  
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      Therefore, Sir Percy’s African policy of administration, despite the CO’s acceptance 
of the policy, he failed to provide acceptable process of the policy to the CO, causing the 
rejection of the proposed policy outright. Not much had ben achieved and the proposed 
safeguards and efficient African policy became a distant possibility. The inhabitants of 
the colony, Sir Percy viewed, were not better off, and proposed to introduce an economic 
policy to alleviate the condition so that the colony could obtained sufficient receipts to 
balance its budgets, and the settlers should have economic prosperity by means of 
developing agricultural production for exports. The remaining races of the protectorate 
were left to their own devices, as government had no economic development policy for 
their prosperity. 
    The Africans also lacked a policy of administration and Sir Percy sought to put one in 
place. His African policy recommendation of the safeguarding of African land and the 
introduction of an indirect rule system which was accepted in the first instance. The CO 
agreed upon the question of African land safeguards, but subsequent developments 
originating from the settler quest for more fertile land compelled Sir Percy to 
compromise his policy when he offered to remove the Maasai from Laikipia, in violation 
of an enduring agreement between the Maasai and the government, and to grant the same 
land to European farmers.   
        As to the introduction of indirect rule, the CO subsequently rejected it as Sir Percy 
sought to involve private persons in the administration of crown subjects of the empire. 
The CO objected to the recommendation as it would have amounted to His Majesty’ 
Government abandoning responsibility to a private board of trustees which would have 
been an embarrassment to the imperial government. Sir Percy failed to provide the 
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desired safeguards on land out of pressure from the European settlers, who demanded 
more land for cultivation, and thereby compelled him to break his promise of 
safeguarding African land within their own reserves. His Majesty’s Government desired 
effective administration for subjects of the empire, especially maintenance of law and 
order, so that the economy of the colony could prosper for the betterment of the colony 
and its inhabitants.  
       The economic policy, which Sir Percy also believed would provide prosperity of the 
colony, was to induce famers to produce for export so that revenue receipts from the 
export of the colony could ease the colony’s dependence on an annual grant-in-aid from 
the British Treasury. The detail of the process involved was that the Treasury would 
lower rates on the Uganda Railway for export goods. The Treasury agreed and lowered 
the rates, but by the end of Sir Percy’s administration of the colony, his policy failed to 
provide the economic solvency he proposed it would afford the protectorate. Certainly it 
was during Sir Percy’s tenure that the colony attained economic solvency, but it was not 
his policy that produced the economic prosperity that the colony witnessed from 1913 
onwards.  
     The economic success of the colony lay in African peasant farmers from the Nyanza 
basin who had produced more for consumption and exported the surplus. This earned the 
government part of the revenue receipts. In addition to the latter, receipts on goods from 
other colonies exported through the EAP’s port of Mombasa and shipped on the Uganda 
Railway, and receipts from poll and hut taxes being paid by African peasants also 
contributed to the salvation of the EAP economy. The latter receipts were instrumental in 
the colony’s attainment of economic independence. Sir Percy’s policy failed to provide 
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the desired relief, as the settlers were not numerically strong enough to produce sufficient 
exports that could earn the desired revenue to support its administration.  
    This failing is viewed as a shortsighted proposed economic policy, limiting production 
for export to a few individuals that could not provide the relief sought. Had Sir Percy 
assessed the economic position of the colony more fully, he would have broadened his 
policy to include other races of the colony for more production and more revenue. But the 
limitation he placed on his policy was the main factor that caused the policy to fail. 
Therefore, the administration of economic policy, as in other aspects of his administration 
noted in the preceding paragraphs, suggests that Sir Percy lacked knowledge of the 
economic potential of the colony for more production so as to afford relief for an 
administration that needed more receipts to cater for the development of a poor colony, 
such as the EAP.  
      In addition, Sir Percy must had been under racial influence of affording his kith and 
kin the most favored treatment in economic development which placed him under a 
misapprehension, that the same policy would also afford relief to the colony, irrespective 
of the inclusion of other races of the colony. In addition, Sir Percy viewed that the 
economic development of the colony would be a success story, if railway development 
could be undertaken with a view to ease the difficulty in the shipment of export products. 
The construction of Nairobi-Thika railway was reconsidered and the Magadi railway was 
welcomed.  
     The Nairobi-Thika railway became an important line in the shipment of products for 
export, even though the initial purpose for the line was to provide relief to the area in the 
emergency period when the area had no means of communication to other parts of the 
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colony. The Magadi railway was initiated by a soda company for the shipment of their 
products, but as a colony seeking investment from private enterprise for the development 
of the colony, the government paid the cost of the construction of the railway.  
     Both the Nairobi-Thika and the Magadi railway were brought under the administration 
of the Uganda Railway and were used by peasants to ship their products to the port for 
exports. The provision of adjunct railways had eased the movement of goods to the port 
for export and had afforded the government receipts that went a long way in alleviating 
its difficult financial position. In addition to these receipts, there were receipts from the 
land grants, especially in the form of land tax, which also formed part of the colony’s 
receipts. Though it did not form a significant share of the receipts, but the land question 
in general formed an important aspect of the administration, as it was in land 
administration that Sir Percy’s inefficiency in policy administration became clearly 
visible. 
     The administration of land policy was held off as there was no adequate land 
ordinance to guide the conduct of land dealings, but there were land regulations that 
governed the conduct of land grants and administration in the form of the Elgin 
regulations, which had to be included in any amendment of the land ordinance. In the 
process of the inclusion, Sir Percy refused to support these regulations that had formed 
the working regulations in dispensing crown land in the colony since 1907. Doing this 
was interpreted as shielding the settlers from legislation that would require them to pay 
taxes on land they held as Sir Percy had asked that the land tax should be dropped.  
    The land tax, revision of rents after 33 years on a 99 years lease and transfer of land 
after development conditions, as enunciated by Elgin, were the working regulations on 
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land administration in the colony. Sir Percy refused to apply these regulations in his 
administration of land and refused their inclusion in the revision of the land ordinance to 
the consternation of the CO. This condition accentuated land speculation and dummying, 
producing difficulty in accessing land to prospective immigrants who had to resort to 
buying exorbitantly from speculators, thereby undermining the prospects of government 
receipts from the increased land value of the colony. Prospective immigrants suffered as 
land became accessible only a few influential farmers.  
     These influential farmers became a problem in the administration of lands in the 
protectorate. They sought large acres of fertile land to develop estates, and in doing so, 
they revisited the question of Laikipia land, which they were being compensated for, and 
reclaimed the land. The local authorities approved the Laikipia land for them without the 
knowledge of the CO and when Sir Percy sought to remove the Maasai so that these 
farmers could take over, the Maasai move failed. This disclosed the secrecy and sinister 
motive behind his action. The move displaced the Maasai and the farmers who had left 
Guaso Nyiro, presumably to occupy Laikipia, failed to secure Laikipia as the Maasai had 
to return to Laikipia following their failed move.  
    This brought in the question of land compensation for the two; Maasai and the farmers. 
The Maasai were never offered any compensation, but the farmers were offered 
compensation for relinquishing their Guaso Nyiro farms to take up farms in Laikipia. The 
manner of the administration of compensation to the settlers by Sir Percy’s government 
left some of the farmers, who felt they were not fairly compensated, with no option other 
than to go back to South Africa. These actions also discouraged some prospective 
immigrants to the colony.  
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    While the question of the Maasai move was unfolding, the case of Cole came forth. 
Cole shot a suspected thief and killed him and refused to report it to the authorities. Cole 
was tried and even though he was exonerated by a jury, testimony suggested the he was a 
threat to peace and security. The CO directed Sir Percy to deport him. Sir Percy refused 
and continued to create administrative and judicial difficulties to block his deportation to 
the dismay of the CO officials. The question of compensation, the Maasai move and the 
deportation of Cole portrayed Sir Percy’s administration in a bad light and were the main 
factors that led to his dismissal from his enviable post of governor.   
     By the time Sir Percy left the colony most of the policies he had enunciated had not 
been implemented, even if they were approved by the CO. Sir Percy’s Kenya tour of duty 
could best be remembered by a legacy of unfulfilled promises. He failed to resolve the 
knotty land question, accentuated the racial divide between the settlers and the Indians, 
and he interfered with the African reserves. This was caused by his favoritism for the 
settlers and his dislike for the Indians. He afforded the settlers all opportunities in 
government and businesses but denied the Indians, following a similar policy of his 
predecessor on the Indians of the protectorate. The Indians never had what they wished, 
especially allowing further immigration of Indians into the protectorate, trial by jury, land 
in the highlands, equal opportunities in the government with the European settlers and 
grants of land in a suitable business district in Nairobi, among other things.  
        Despite Sir Percy’s successful tour of duty in the Sudan, Transvaal and Northern 
Nigeria, his failings in the administration of the EAP were clearly visible in affecting 
policy of government administration, dealing with the races of the protectorate, economic 
development and, the worst of all, in his performance in dispensing crown lands. These 
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failings occasioned to Sir Percy because of the historical antecedent of the protectorate. 
The EAP had had a succession of ineffective governors and staff members further 
compounded by the entry of European settlers, some of them very influential in London, 
casting their eyes on every fertile land for agricultural cultivation, making a fair and 
equitable dispensing of crown land a difficult matter not only for Sir Percy but also for 
his predecessors. Personal interest of those settlers was an important factor in 
accentuating the difficulty in the administration of the protectorate and causing governors 
to leave behind complicated administration and in some case, governors had resigned, 
especially Sir Percy, having resigned over the Maasai land dealings. In view of the 
difficult circumstance of the protectorate, Sir Percy had by the time he was forced to 
resign, not done much to impress the CO and instead the CO was disappointed. The CO 
could not hide their disappointment and frustration with Sir Percy. A senior official in the 
CO, W. C. Bottomley, summarized Sir Percy’s tour of duty in the protectorate, when he 
stated, “the mark he left on the protectorate at the end of his administratration in 1912 
was rather one of promise than of performance. His promises in fact were the chief 
difficulty in the way of his successor and Sir Henry Belfield was continually in a position 
of having to refuse to recognize alleged promises made to settlers by Sir Percy 
Girouard…. There is nothing in his [Girouard’s] record in East Africa to shew [sic] his 
efforts would be directed to the permanent welfare of the country rather than to the 
expediency of the moment and his own popularity.”1149 This was a befitting assessment 
of Sir Percy’s rush to failure; having failed to deliver his proposed reform and left behind 
promises rather than performance. 
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